Somali, Piracy, and the UN

I suggest again my colleague Charli Carpenter on Somalia and the United Nations:

The diavlog also includes clips on Western support for the Somali government and the economics of Somali piracy.

Spitfire

I never saw this, but it seems like an intriguing project:

The dilemma that faces historians and other chroniclers of World War II is, obviously, that the World War II generation is passing very quickly. First person narratives and eyewitness experience aren't the only ways to approach either history or political science, but they can be quite important. At the same time, the massive volume of writings on World War II can sometimes serve to obscure rather than illuminate the possibility for further contribution. This is to say that it takes some work to figure just how and why a particular narrative is relevant.

Piracy How To

My colleague Charli Carpenter has an excellent post bringing together a couple reports on the business model of Somali piracy. Check it out...

Operation Sweeping Broom

Off the coast of Somalia HNLMS Tromp is busy with operation Sweeping Broom. Well, of the coast of the Seychelles would be more accurate.

According to legend the namegiver of the ship, admiral Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp, raised a broom in the mast at one time, to indicate he had swept the English from the sea. Since then every naval ship with the name Tromp has a broom on board. And at special occasions it is raised, to indicate the vessel is busy sweeping the ocean clean of everyone standing in the way of peace.

At the moment operation Sweeping Broom is going well.
March 14th a mothership was caught with two pirates.
March 15th the two skiffs that were with the mothership from the previous day were caught with 7 pirates aboard. 2 skiffs were destroyed with the Goalkeeper.
March 17th 2 small skiffs and a mothership together with 17 pirates were aprehended, after the pirates had decided to hijack HNLMS Tromp. They soon discovered that was a bad plan. The 2 skiffs have been destroyed.
March 17th 1 mothership and 2 skiffs were seen. The pirates tried to flee in one of the skiffs when they saw the Tromp coming. The helicopter of the Tromp tried to stop them with shots across the bow and when that didn't help the Tromp used her 127mm canon. The skiff wasn't stopped because the night fell and it was too dangerous, due to the shipping in the region, to proceed. However 4 pirates were caught together with the mothership and a skiff. Both vessels have been destroyed.

During all this several AK-47's, RPG's, sattelite telephones and other pirate attributes have been found and confiscated.

There is however a 'but' and that is that, in compliance with EU guidelines, the pirates have been let go or will be let go, although in at least one case the Seychelles Coast Guard have been informed of the impeding arrival of a couple of pirates.

So when will HNLMS Tromp see those same pirates again?

UPDATE
March 18th the pirates that got away in the dark yesterday have been caught this morning.

"Got Sea Control" in USNI Proceedings

My concern has been growing lately about the importance of Sea Control, and my perception that as every day goes by--the gap between our ability to "do" it and others ability to "contest it" shrinks.

In this month's Proceedings, Captain Vic Addison of OPNAV and CDR David Dominy (RN) team up to offer an interesting discussion of Sea Control, offering a useful framework for evaluating "littoral" sea control and then applying it to two scenarios--the Falklands war and the 2006 Israeli/Hezbollah conflict.

I had to read the article twice in order to fully appreciate it. One hopes that both the Brits and the Israelis had staffs who could have performed a deeper dive along these lines. I get the feeling the Israelis just got caught sleeping, thinking that there wasn't a threat to their Sea Control (Addison and Dominy bring up a truth that one doesn't often think about--that control of littoral seas does not mean possession of a Navy or Coast Guard). But the Brits could have done quite a bit more to take the Argentine air arm out earlier--the primary method by which the Argentinians contested British attempts to control seaspace.

Bryan McGrath

The German Navy's Lack of Power Projection

This past weekend Solomon asked why, of all the European Powers, Germany has the weakest navy in terms of power projection.

It's not that the German navy hasn't been thinking about it.

In 1994 Germany had trouble with the withdrawal of its troops from UNISOM II in Somalia. The navy thought a new type of ship could prevent future problems. The ship had such a priority that the navy said it should be fully operational before the year 2000.
The idea from MTG Marinetechnik GmbH -the company that has been established by the German government as an independent centre of excellence in 1966 to design German surface warships- was the Taktische Konzept Mehrzweckschiff (TKM), a 20,000t ship.
The ship would have had a range of 7,500 NM, room for 700 personnel from the army, ro-ro capability and room for 271 vehicles, 8 helicopters, 2 landing craft and a 70 bed hospital with 2 operating rooms. The cost for this all would be between 500 and 620 million Deutschmark.
For comparison it's interesting to know that HNLMS Rotterdam (12,750t) was 265 million Guilders (about 237 DMark).
In 1995 the plug was pulled by the politicians, mainly because of the huge cost of the ship.
The navy, however, hadn't given up on the idea.

In 1998 the Weizsäcker-commission was formed, with the intruction to give the goverment advice about the future of the German armed forces. This commission adviced to get a 'transport and deployment support ship'.
This became the ETrUS (Einsatz Truppenunterstützungsschiff) project. In 2003 it was removed from the Navy's plans, mainly because of costs. Most likely it would have been a further development of the Rotterdam/Galicia class.

The navy, however, was still not giving up and in 2007 news came that Joint Support Ships were to be included in the 2009 plan for the navy.
This resulted in inclusion of these Joint Support Ships -most likely a LPD/LHD- in the Zielvorstellung Marine 2025+ (Navy Plan 2025+).
However, a final decision is not expected before 2016.

So why is it taking Germany so long to get an amphibious capability?
Because Germany doesn't have a real naval tradition. Historically their focus has always been on the army and they therefore lack the marines that are usually associated with these type of ships.
This army-centric thinking also dominated during the Cold War and still exists today. Besides that, the army and air force are seeing these amphibious ships as a threat to their dominance in the 'lift' role.

The Holland-class OPVs Will Need A Change

Background
On December the 20th in 2007 the Dutch MoD and Schelde Marinebouw (now: Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding) signed a contract for the construction of 4 patrol vessels. These vessels were the result of the Marinestudie 2005 which proposed to sell 4 M-class (Karel Doorman class) frigates. With that money 4 patrol vessels should be bought, the Marine Corps should be strengthened, getting more capabilities for the successor of AOR HNLMS Zuiderkruis (the contract for this Joint Support Ship was signed this December) and re-introducing a minesweeping capability (in 2009 5 companies have send their proposals after a RFI).

However, even prior to signing the contract then Deputy Minister Cees van der Knaap criticised the Dutch defence industry.

A few years ago during economic hardship the Ministry, according to Van der Knaap, 'stuck out its neck to help the business ". As main example the Deputy Minister mentioned the acquisition of four patrol vessels. These had no priority for the MoD, but to prevent the industry from having empty shipyards, it was decided to buy the ships.

Characteristics
For an OPV - called Ocean Going Patrol Vessel by the MOD - it's huge at 3750t. Even if the MoD calls them 'small flexible patrol vessels'. It's bigger than the 3320t M-class it replaces.
There are a couple of reasons for this. First, mild steel is used to build the vessels. This is heavier than the high tensile steel used for frigates. Mild steel is cheaper and since the ships will only do 22 knots, high tensile steel is not necessary. A plus is that this cheaper steel is actually more blast resistant. The second reason is the use of a lot of armour on the ships and the last reason is the need to operate the NH-90 helicopter up to Sea State 5.

Length: 354ft.
Propulsion: Diesel-electric
Max Sustained Speed: 22kts
Range: 5000nm (@15kts)
Endurance: 21 days
Crew: 50 (max. 90 + 100 evacuees)
Armament: 1x 76mm Oto Melara, 1x30mm Marlin WS, 2x 12.7mm Hitrole (all remotely operated)
Stern Launch: 1
RHIB Davit: 1 RHIB
Aviation Facilities: One NH-90 + hangar
Cost: €120 million a piece of which about €30 million is for the Integrated Mast from Thales.

On paper it actually has a lot in common with the notional characteristics of the future Offshore Patrol Cutter from the USCG.

Missions
The missions the OPV's are intended to do are at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. And compared to the M-class the OPV's are supposed to be a lot cheaper to use. The OPV's will do Coast Guard type duties -patrolling the Exclusice Economic Zones of the Kingdom of the Netherlands- and Maritime Security Operations around the globe. A lot of these MSO's tend te be relatively close to shore and not in the 'blue water'. Examples of these MSO's would be the current operations of the coast of Somalia against pirates (although that one is moving more and more towards the open ocean) and the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force that tries to prevent smuggling, especially of arms to Libanon.

What stands out
Looking at its intended missions, there are 4 things about the OPV's that really stand out. The first is the lack of a CIWS, the second is the Integrated Mast and all its capabilities, the third one is the lack of 'provisions for' and the last is its lean manning.

A CIWS is wat the Holland class is really missing. And having no "provisions for" means that the through-deck Goalkeeper is a no-go. Both the Phalanx and the Rolling Airframe Missile are options though. The SeaRAM that's currently being developed would be easier than the RAM, since the RAM must be integrated with the ship's combat system and the SeaRAM would have it's own independent sensors.

The capabilities of the Integrated Mast are really good (at least on paper). They are actually way beyond what an OPV would need. The reason that they did buy those masts is the Defence Industry Strategy from the MoD. This Strategy has highlighted 6 technology areas in which the Dutch Defence Industry has chances of developing products that could attract international customers. Sensor systems is one of these areas and so to help industry the Dutch MoD acts as launching customer.

The absence of 'provisions for' means that upgrade possibilities in armament are very limited.
The lack of a X-band Fire Control Radar means that the Seasparrow Missiles the M-class did have can't be used. For terminal guidance these and its successor the Evolved Seasparrow, require a X-band FCR.
And though the SM-6 would be a possibility, because it has active homing, adding a VLS means a rework of the internal layouts to the point that building a new ship would be easier. The same goes for the active homing MBDA Mica, which has another drawback: it would be a new addition to the Dutch inventory. And I do think these missile systems are too much for the Holland class and its intended missions.
There are however two other options. One is the possibilty to add point deffence missile launchers to the Marlin. There is a module to add MBDA's Mistral to the Marlin WS. The other one is to add the STRALES system to the 76mm. The first fully operational 76/62 STRALES should be installed on board an Italian Navy ship at the end of this year.

The lean manning is one of the reasons the costs of operation for the OPV are much lower than for those of an M-class frigate, since the OPV's have about 1/3 of the manning of the M-class.

The lean manning might make the ship relatively inexpensive to operate, but it has a couple of drawbacks. The small crew has been accomplished by a lot of automation, but that comes at certain risks. The biggest reduction to the crew has been achieved by the automation of damage control, which means that the crew size for damage control has been reduced a lot. But it does mean that there are few people to repair the ship in the event of an emergency, so it has to get into port for repairs much earlier than a frigate. And lets hope there's never a malfunction in this control system, because there are not enough people on board to take over.

The Marlin and Hitroles are both remotely operated. An operator has to point them to a target, but after that the Combat Management System takes over.

The main problem I see with the lean manning however are not in the above points, but with operating the sensor systems. I think that the Dutch Navy should assign someone to implement the proposal of Lt. dr. ir. Wilbert van Norden on a new decision support system by on the OPVs - in its wisdom the Navy has decided to assign Van Norden to HNLMS Evertsen for 3 years, instead of letting him implement his proposal on the OPVs. In his disertation Sensing What Matters he writes:

Decision support functionalities are needed to support the human operators on board Royal Netherlands Navy ships since the missions are increasingly complex and they take place in increasingly complex environments. Furthermore, growing complexity in sensor systems requires more knowledge to utilise these sensor systems to their fullest potential. The available human knowledge on board rnln ships however is decreasing due to a strive to reduce ship's complements and to reduce their training and education time. Where previously each individual sensor was assigned to a specialised operator, now one generic sensor operator is expected to control all sensors together.

The increasingly complex missions and environment he refers to are the missions in the littoral. There are a lot of vessels in the littoral, but not all are adverseries. Just look at the current operations of Somalia. There are a lot of skiffs out there, but not every skiff has pirates on board.
Operating sensor systems close to land is more difficult than on the open ocean. Near land the weather changes faster, making sensor performance harder to predict. There's also land clutter influencing sensor systems. The above makes it harder to find your targets, resulting in a small amount of time left in which to react. And having only a few operators makes it even more difficult than it already is.

Conclusion
With its Integrated Mast the operators on board will have a really clear picture of that anti-ship missile coming in. And while the greater range Mistral or STRALES system are nice to have, it's actually te CIWS that is really missing. This is after all an OPV, with a need for defence against an unforseen AShM or low slow flyer, and not a frigate. Everybody knows the story of what happened to INS Hanit and it shows that even these MSO's are not without danger. And who guarantees that Somali pirates can't get their hands on a Silkworm.
So for MSO operations, such as those mentioned already, a CIWS is absolutely necessary. Any suggestions that the OPV will be protected by coalition ships in these events is utter nonsence, since the ships aren't sailing in close tactical formation. They are widespread along the coastline and other ships will be too far away to offer any assistance. So the OPV has to be able to protect itself against an unforseen event. And while you may have a choice to not send the Holland-class on MSO's, that would effectively make it a Coast Guard ship without any need for either its current weaponry or sensor system.

A lot of times the OPV's will be operating in the littoral. A really complex environment with a lot of vessels, not all of whom are adverseries, and land nearby, which results in a lot of land clutter in the sensor systems. Both mean that you need more people to operate effectively in the littoral than on the open ocean. But the OPV's have a much smaller crew than the ships the Netherlands uses for these littoral tasks at the moment.
A new decision support system, such as the one proposed by Lt. dr. ir. Wilbert van Norden, could alleviate this problem.

So in its current form the Holland class are not the right ships for all of its intended missions. But this should be relatively easy to correct.

Dutch To Upgrade Goalkeeper CIWS

Deputy minister Jack de Vries has sent a letter to the Dutch Parliament informing them that the MoD is going to start a project aimed at upgrading the Goalkeeper CIWS.

The Goalkeeper has been designed by Signaal, then a subsidiary of Philips, between 1975 and 1979 and entered service with the Dutch Navy in 1980.

According to the letter the development of more sophisticated anti-ship missiles means the Goalkeeper has become less effective. Besides that a couple of parts are now technologically outdated, resulting in the system being more vulnerable to malfunctions.
The radar will be upgraded, to make the system better suitable against threats in the littorals.
The electronics, prime movers, control circuit apparatus and software will also be upgraded or replaced.
Thales Nederland and General Dynamics will be involved in the upgrade.
The actual upgrading will be done between 2012 and 2018 during the CIWS' regular maintenance.

At the moment it looks like the Dutch will have to pay for the development themselves, although the other countries that use the system have shown interest in the upgrade.

The Dutch intend to keep their Goalkeepers in service until 2025.

EU NAVFOR Have Been Busy This Weekend

It looks like the decision on the 24th of February to expand the objectives of Operation Atalanta to include control of Somali ports where pirates are based as well as going after mother ships is already paying off.

According to the EU NAVFOR website:

Over the weekend of 5 – 7 March, EU NAVFOR units have been involved in concerted operations to interdict and disrupt pirate action groups before they had the opportunity to pirate vessels in the Indian Ocean.

Six pirate action groups have been intercepted, mother ships and skiffs have been destroyed and over 40 pirates have been taken into custody.

The French captured 35 pirates and seized 4 motherships and 6 skiffs during these actions.

Now we'll have to wait and see what happens with the captured pirates.

Fired CO Accused of "Drag Racing"

I don't intend to write here about Captain Holly Graf's dismissal, only to say that drag racing one's ship should not be considered a black mark. All the great ones do it.

Bryan McGrath