Thursday, October 8, 2015

More LCS Analaysis Will Repeat Past Results

PCU Jackson (LCS 6)
     In the most recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress calls for another round of analysis into the frigate variant of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) that is slated to begin with LCS 33. In NDAA Section 130, Congress calls on the Navy to conduct, “A capabilities based assessment, or equivalent report, to assess capability gaps and associated capability requirements and risks for the upgraded Littoral Combat Ship, which is proposed to commence with LCS 33. Such assessment shall conform with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01.”
     It is late in the game for second-guessing the Navy on a program where 24 ships have already been built or funded. Another round of joint assessments will only reproduce the body of information the Navy has been building since 2001 on what place the littoral combat ship will occupy in the fleet. There have always been only 3 potential solutions to the problem of the block obsolescence of the now retired Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (FFG’s), the Avenger class mine countermeasures ships (MCM’s), and the Cyclone class patrol coastals (PC’s). These include the New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) concept of many single mission small frigates as proposed by some members of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty and the Office of Net Assessment; the mid-sized modular warship concept embodied by the LCS and its frigate variant; and a larger, multi mission frigate like the now retired Perry’s. Any new analysis will likely find that the mid-sized, modular warship concept as represented by LCS and its frigate variant still represents the best choice for the low-end component of the Navy’s new High/Low mix. Individual pieces of equipment on specific modules may change, but that was always assumed in the modular component warship concept. These new calls for analysis represent a lack of understanding into the Navy’s surface combatant needs in the 2nd decade of the 21st century and into the future.
     The origins of a ship to replace multiple combatants, including the FFG’s, began with studies conducted in the 1980’s’s to minimize cost through standardization and reduction in the number of warship classes. Some of these predicted a reduction of ship classes to just two; a larger carrier (of other platforms) and a scout fighter as an  expendable escort.[1] Interest was minimal, as Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work suggested in his 2004 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) paper on LCS and transformation. Work said, “With no immediate naval challenger on the horizon, and with the ships in service quite capable of meeting any potential near- to mid-term threat, the urgency for designing an entirely new generation of combat ships was quite low.”[2]
Independence variant LCS under construction at Austal Yard

            While the larger modular “large objects carrier” concept moved toward more specialized duties in the form of today’s afloat forward staging base (AFSB), the scout fighter continued to develop into a heavily armed attack craft. This concept was picked up by forward thinkers such as Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and Captain Wayne Hughes and became the famous “streetfighter”; a warship that combined Cebrowski’s concept of an expendable warship with Hughes’ vision of numerous small missile combatants as an offensive force in littoral waters. Both Cebrowski and Hughes were concerned that so much of the Navy’s ship-based combat power was being concentrated into a smaller number of ships. A more-numerous fleet of smaller and expendable vessels such as streetfighter would reverse this concentration trend and allow for a larger and more robust naval network; where Cebrowski considered true naval power and capability was now resident.[3] Hughes wanted a larger number of ships that would allow for sustained, messy fights in littoral waters where reaction time would be short and the potential for damage and loss of U.S. warships significant.[4] The streetfighter was then adopted by so-called “transformationalists” at the dawn of the 21st century seeking low cost, minimum-manned, technologically advanced warships as the next step in a revolution in military affairs (RMA) at sea. The Office of the Secretary of Defense explicitly told the Navy that it must accept a small combatant of some kind in order to secure support for its DD 21 class.[5]
            The Navy, however, was not enamored with small, expendable warships and sent the streetfighter concept back for further modification. This involved growing the overall size of the streetfighter to make it self-deployable and more survivable. Work says Cebrowski and Hughes needlessly created animosity from the surface warfare officer corps by suggesting, “They build small ships destined to lose” rather than focusing on the proper mix of large and small ships.[6] The initial design size grew in response to survivability concerns as well as a new operating concept. Rather than charge into the littorals looking for enemies, the new littoral combatant, as approved in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), would protect existing sea base units from attacks emanating from within littoral waters.[7] This concept of LCS was vetted and approved by Congress in 2003. The legislative branch complained about the lack of a full analysis of alternatives; the so-called “virgin birth” of the LCS, but by allowing the program to proceed, “It implicitly endorsed then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Vern Clark’s intention to pursue a small littoral combat ship in a way distinctly different from normal programs.”[8]
     Analysis of the type demanded by Congress in the latest NDAA has in fact already been done by the Navy several times over the course of the period 2000-2015 for a low end, surface combatant component of the networked battle fleet. Each option was carefully considered with meaningful analysis. The first option considered was an updated version of the now retired Perry class multi mission frigate. Such a replacement was estimated to have cost $617 million in 2005 dollars ($752 million in 2015 dollars adjusted for inflation) based on its light load displacement, corrected for additional costs associated with its electronic systems and military equipment.[9] This cost was considered too high for a smaller combatant and it was believed that network connectivity could allow a smaller ship to be substituted with similar capability results.[10]
LCS 5 (Milwaukee) and LCS 7 (Detroit)

            Another round of analysis might suggest that an even higher cost multi mission Perry class replacement would be prohibitive in comparison with the limited combat capability such ships deliver. The cost of the Australian Hobart class destroyer program and recently released figures for the production of the Royal Navy’s Type 26 global combat ship (both European-style large frigate designs) support the supposition that a US-constructed medium capability combatant would cost at least $1 billion dollars a copy while providing about ½ the combat capability of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer.[11] Some European states such as Denmark have built relatively inexpensive frigate-like ships, but made use of recycled, legacy equipment, outsourced key elements of construction to low cost, Eastern European builders, and sent the ships to sea without all of the equipment and armament in place; conditions the United States Navy would not duplicate.[12]
            The second course of action is the small, numerous fleet of 1000 ton, single mission frigates as proposed by members of the NPS faculty and the OSD Office of Net Assessment. This “New Navy Fighting Machine” (NNFM) concept is well detailed in force structure and operational concept, but significantly less in how it will be logistically supported when forward deployed. Its authors accept that there are limited numbers of combat logistics ships available to refuel and support a large force of single mission combatants, and only suggest that resources and support for them will inevitably be found if and when required.[13] The NNFM concept is at its heart operational and tactical, but does not address wider strategic concerns. It suggests that heavy lift ships, such as those they hauled the damaged frigates Stark and Samuel B. Roberts back to the U.S. from the Persian Gulf might be used to transport a substantial element of NNFM platforms to overseas locations.[14] The NNFM does not, however, suggest how this could be done in wartime against opposition. These small combatants would be, for all intents and purposes, strategically imprisoned within their regional environments and dependent on a large, and as of yet unbuilt logistics network. Those logistics ships would in turn require escort and protection, as would the regional bases and smaller logistics ships the NNFM would depend on for support during active combat operations. The NNFM also specifically says that small combatants should be “prepared to accept losses while achieving littoral water superiority”, a repetition of the same language that caused many in the Surface Warfare community to reject the larger LCS in the mid 2000’s.[15] This combination of logistics problems, lack of connection to wider U.S. Naval strategy, and accepted lack of survivability was rejected early in the LCS development process. It would do little good to revisit this concept in further analysis.

USS Fort Worth (LCS 3)

            The last concept worth analytical consideration is that of the current LCS and its frigate variant. The Navy has, however, answered all of the chief criticisms of the program at different times over the last 12 years. Secretary Work states that the Navy (and presumably Congress at the time) accepted that the LCS would not have the same unrefueled range as the retiring FFG.[16] The high sprint speed was considered useful in moving the LCS rapidly within theater and to enable rapid concentration of multiple ships of the class from remote patrol locations.[17] LCS was expected to conduct antisubmarine operations and substantial rotary wing aviation facilities were considered absolutely necessary for that mission’s accomplishment. The smaller crew size was also well considered. The current Cyclone class patrol coastal ships operate for extended period with a mere 28 person crew. There have certainly been many problems with elements of the LCS program. The initial cost of $220 million dollars platform was not realistic. Some of the equipment in both the sea frames and the modules was immature when programmed. The first two units (LCS 1 and 2) have very limited weight growth ability. PEO LCS is still "cleaning up" from significant program issues of the last decade. That said, there has been little outside analysis (beyond the examples presented here) supporting better ways the Navy could have solved the problem of multiple low level platforms reaching block obsolescence. While often decried in multiple venues, the analytical “virgin birth” of LCS was approved by senior Department of Defense officials with authority and responsibility over programmatic issues. Congress has endorsed the LCS program’s continuation on multiple occasions. It could be that LCS critics keep repeating the “virgin birth” accusation because they don’t like the result of those studies that were conducted.
            LCS was built to a lower survivability standard than that of the Perry’s from the perspective that unlike the frigate, it was not intended to sustain a hit and continue to fight due to its smaller physical size, and smaller crew available to conduct damage control. Network connectivity was also assumed to support survivability through advanced warning and the provision of an operational picture beyond that available from the LCS’ organic sensors.[18] Secretary Work points out that the current families of large naval ordnance (missiles and torpedoes) can just as easily sink a 10,000 ton Ticonderoga class cruiser as it can an LCS. Survivability, as currently defined by the Navy in OPNAV Instruction 9070.1A, allocates only 1/3 of that concept to recovery from damage, and bases 2/3 on avoidance of attack and defeat of weapons that acquire a target vessel.[19]The Perry class being replaced by the LCS is not the ship it was 15 years ago. It leaves service as globally deployable offshore patrol vessel with a heavy antisubmarine warfare capability. It is no longer a medium capable, multimillion warship as it was when first commissioned in the 1970's. There is no need to replace the 1979 Perry.
            The recent Russian use of the Gepard class frigates as launch platforms for a cruise missile strike on Syria will likely cause more criticism of the LCS concept and demands for more analysis.[20] The Gepard’s are smaller than LCS, but have a much heavier armament than either LCS sea frame. Despite this difference, there is no need to demand that LCS or its frigate variant be immediately up-armed to perform the same capability as demonstrated by the Gepard’s.  The modular warship concept separates much of the ship’s potential armament in the form of modules in order to enable more upgrades and reduce both initial and long term costs of the LCS system. An LCS surface warfare or land attack module may eventually boast the same capabilities as the Gepard. Modularity, hower, ensures that the LCS can continue to support new weapon systems throughout its lifespan, while frigates with dedicated weapon systems like the Gepard langusih in growing obsolescence. Every Navy must designate missions for its warships incumbent with national requirements. Vessels of similar size and general appearance do not necessarily have the same missions. To assume that LCS must be able to perform every mission that like-sized warships built by other nations perform demonstrates a very immature understanding of seapower.
            In short, the same questions now being asked by Congress regarding the LCS Program have been answered multiple times over the last dozen years. Another analysis of alternatives is not going to yield a different set of results, but will instead merely cost the taxpayers more money for the duplication of effort. LCS and its frigate variant still represent the best way forward for increasing the size of the U.S. surface fleet, and preserving multiple mission capabilities in a period of continuing financial constraints. There is no need to copy other small frigates like the Gepard’s as the globally deployed and operational U.S. Navy has a fundamentally different set of tasks than regional fleets like that of Russia. The Navy needs to finalize the configuration and specifics of the LCS frigate variant, and Congress is well within its rights to demand those be submitted to the nation’s legislative body in an expeditious manner. The Navy needs to do a better job in educating members of the legislative branch in how the LCS concept will be implemented. Congress, however, needs to fund the frigate variant of the LCS to its full build in order to replace the now retired Perry class frigates. It remains a variant of the LCS, not an entirely new class, and should not be subject to a complete repetition of the analysis of the last dozen years.


[1] (The National Shipbuilding Research Program, 1989 Ship Production Symposium proceedings)
[3] Ibid, p. 51.
[4] Ibid, p. 53.
[8] Ibid, p. 5.
[9] Ibib, p. 7.
[10] Ibid, p. 8.
[11] and
[12] and
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid, pp. 19, 20.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid, pp. 20, 21.

Tuesday, October 6, 2015

DOT&E's Incomplete LCS Survivability Logic

LCS Independence and frigate Gary

     The most recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) language on the Littoral Combat Ship program makes requests more akin to a program in development, rather than one with 24 ships built or under production contract. One of the most pernicious of these is a demand for more analysis on the surviviability of the proposed frigate variant of the LCS.  The constant reporting of this supposed LCS deficiency by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is likely one of the key underpinnings for this dictate. The most recent edition of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the LCS program by Ron O’Rourke has a number of statements from the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) on the survivability (or apparent lack of such capacity) of the modified LCS, now designated as a frigate (FF). DOT&E reports state that proposed capabilities of the modified LCS are still inadequate “compared to the Navy’s legacy frigates.”[1] DOT&E also said that the minor modification of LCS as frigate variant would have somewhat less susceptibility to attack, but “will not yield a ship significantly more survivable than the (current) LCS.”[2]
     It would be helpful if DOT&E published a detailed report of how the agency came to these conclusions. The test and evaluation agency seems to place great faith in the “legacy” Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate, whose last member just exited the active fleet this month, as the ideal modern multimission frigate. The Perry’s were once the recipients of the same sort of criticism currently leveled at the LCS in terms of armament and survivability. The Perry’s are departing from the Navy, however, in a considerably less capable and survivable condition than when they began entering the fleet in the late 1970’s. A direct comparison of the departing Perry’s and both current LCS variants suggests that that their survivability is roughly similar.
      DOT&E seems to believe that the Perry class represents the ideal multimission frigate, but the class was once equally labeled as under-armed, unsurvivable, and crewed too lightly for high endurance operations. A February 1975 GAO report on the Perry (then called a patrol frigate), suggested the ship was too small to accept upgrades over a 30 year lifespan and questioned if the ship could remain viable over that period.[3] A January 1979 GAO analysis of the FFG-7 class criticized the selection of the SQS-56 sonar for the ship, suggested its lifespan would be too short for significant upgrades, said the crew was too small, and was especially critical of the ship’s survivability, suggesting the FFG was, “vulnerable to low level threats” and would be “a cheap kill” in comparison with other ships.[4] The Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral Sam Cox, USN (ret), suggested recently that the LCS was being subjected to the same sort of criticism now leveled at the LCS.[5]
USS Stark (FFG 31) after missile hits, May 1987
     The Perry’s have now departed from the fleet, but in a much denuded condition in terms of armament and sensors, making direct comparisons of their former selves with the current LCS and/or FF disingenuous at best. The Perry once boasted an armament of 40 missiles, a 76mm gun, a close in weapon system (CIWS), and antisubmarine torpedo tubes; all supported by the Mark 92 fire control system. By the late 1990’s, however, the FFG’s was assessed as having, “low capability against near and midterm missile threats.”[6] The Navy removed the FFGs’ MK13 missile launcher in the early 2000’s and with it the ship’s surface to air (SM-1MR) and surface to surface missile (SSM) capabilities. The ship retained its antisubmarine warfare sensors and weapons. The Perry’s retained their CIWS; a weapon generally assumed to be capable of no more than three engagements against air, missile and surface platforms before requiring a reload.
     The Navy defines survivability in OPNAV 9070.1A as a combination of susceptibility to attack, vulnerability to weapons that actively target a ship and recoverability from damage sustained.[7] What does a head to head comparison of the retiring FFG to the baseline LCS sea frame using these criteria reveal about the survivability of both classes? Consider the threat of cruise missile attack; the preferred weapon against surface ships. Neither class is particularly stealthy in design. Emissions control of electromagnetic equipment (radars, sonars, communications, etc) may allow both ships to equally avoid missile attack. In its current condition, the Perry has only its CIWS with perhaps three potential engagements. The LCS has the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launcher (or SeaRAM) with 11-21 missiles per mount, superior range to the 20mm gun of the conventional CIWS, and a similar or better engagement capacity.[8]
Fires out aboard HMS Sheffield. She foundered later in heavy seas
     The Perry is a physically larger ship at 453 ft length, 4200 tons full load displacement, as compared to either LCS sea frame (Freedom at 378 ft length at 3900 tons and Independence at 418 ft length at 3100 tons.) Larger size and greater length represent an advantage in survivability from the perspective of a longer floodable length and greater reserve buoyancy. Such factors come into consideration after a ship is hit. Missile combat since World War 2, most notably in the 1982 Falkland Islands war and in the missile damage suffered by USS Stark (FFG 31) in the 1987 attack suggests that one medium-sized cruise missile or large bomb can immobilize a medium-sized surface combatant (3000-6000 tons displacement). The post-battle investigations of the Stark and the HMS Sheffield (lost in combat in the Falklands) revealed that both ships suffered significant damage to their ability to fight fires from cruise missile hits, residual cruise missile fuel caused significant fires, and that smoke spread rapidly and rendered damage control efforts difficult.[9] Stark at one point sustained a 16 degree list and could have sunk had she encountered similar weather conditions that caused the loss of Sheffield days after she incurred similar damage (also from an Exocet missile hit).[10] Examination of the loss reports of HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope, both of 384 ft. length and 3250 tons full load displacement, suggest that LCS (of similar size) is likely to be affected to an equal or greater extent by similar ordnance.[11] While both reports are heavily redacted, and recommend additional equipment and training, neither report suggests the Type 21 frigate was too small or “unsurvivable” given the level of damage they sustained.
    If all factors of “survivability” for the FFG and the LCS, as currently defined by the Navy, are compared, the results are roughly equal. Both ships are equally effective at avoiding attack through emission control and operational/tactical maneuvering. The hard kill systems of LCS will likely sustain more engagements at longer ranges against cruise missiles than could the FFG. Finally, the FFG, by virtue of its larger size, is more likely to recover from damage sustained than the LCS. The most important point of survivability, however, is to “avoid a hit, and not stand still and slug it out.”[12]
HMS Ardent after fatal bomb hits on her aft, port quarter
     DOT&E needs to publish more detailed reports as to why it continues to so strongly object to LCS survivability. As it stands, the Test and Evaluation agency seems to only compare LCS to its immediate predecessor and only in the most superficial terms.This decision seems contrary to previous DOT&E pronouncements on the importance of detailed testing, such as its suggestion that the Navy invest in a more capable self defense test ship that supports live fire missile testing.[13] Both LCS sea frames are scheduled to complete full shock trials next year.[14] In the absence of other data and in light of the historical evidence presented, perhaps DOT&E should restrict its comments on survivability until it has actionable data. LCS is no less survivable than the departing Perry’s and no ship under 4000 tons and 400 feet in length is terribly “survivable” against modern ordnance.         

[1] Ron O’Rourke, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program; Background and Issues for Congress”, Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service, 21 September 2015, p. 26.
[2] Ibid.
[6] James F. Wiggins, “Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defense “, Washington D.C., General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO/NSIAD-00-149, July, 2000, p. 43.
[11] and

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