Discussion and Debate on Strategy in Asia

Here is the video from today's Center for National Policy discussion between T.X. Hammes and me on strategy in Asia.  



Bryan McGrath

Cartwright Unleashed

It starts slow, but about 5 minutes in you'll realize why you want to watch this until the end. And I'm serious, this ends in a way you want to see.

Perception problem in the South China Sea Dispute

The dispute between China and Philippines has gotten quite ugly in the past couple of months. It's quite a bad development for China when one considers how good the relationship was just 3 years ago. Internationally, China has been seen as the bully in this case pushing a smaller nation. I read this article on Times that put some good perspectives on this. If you want to know how Chinese leaders think, reading the quotes by Yang Yi is probably the most helpful.

“Eighty percent of the population wants us to use the military,” says Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Beijing. “They’re asking, ‘Why are we so weak? Why are we wasting money on our Navy if we are not going to use it?’ Outsiders really do not appreciate what is going on inside China.” Yang says there is a risk of miscalculation as China builds its military and asserts territorial claims in the region. Abroad, he says, China is seen as too assertive; but at home, it’s just the opposite.

Based on my time on Chinese forums, I can say that what Yang says here is 100% true. The question is then why do Chinese people think that Chinese leadership is weak. You have to consider 3 things here:

1. Chinese kids are taught from a very young age that the majority of South China Sea are part of China. If you have ever taken a look at maps of China issued in China, you would see what I mean.
2. A renewed self-confidence and nationalism in China in the recent years (especially since 2009)
3. In the past 150 years, Chinese leaders have been generally speaking very weak in dealing with foreign intrusions. So regardless of how legitimate Chinese claims over South China Sea is, Chinese public will connect it to weakness of past Chinese leadership.

So, the Chinese government has basically created a monster that it has trouble containing. When the Chinese public looks at this dispute in such contrasting light to other publics around China, it's hard to see how Chinese government can navigate through this without looking weak to its own population.

Cartwright Gets Candid at Joint Warfighter 2012

I sat stunned today as Hoss Cartwright, former vice-chairman of the Joint Staff, gave a remarkable speech at the Joint Warfighter Conference in Virginia Beach, Virginia. I've probably seen a dozen or so speeches from General Cartwright, and I've never seen him put on a performance anything like this.

Without a single note card, without skipping a beat or step in his comments, the General "savaged sacred cows from the Joint Strike Fighter to cybersecurity to the AirSea Battle concept" in the words of Sydney Freedman of AOL Defense. You bet - that's one way to put it.

First he hit on the topic of sequestration, then followed with recapitalization. From AOL Defense:

That means "we've got at least another increment of a couple hundred [billion]," Cartwright went on. "If you take another two hundred billion out of this budget, we're going to start to run into a problem if you don't start thinking about the strategy," he said. "You really need strategy before you spend money, and what you spend it on needs to be something you can actually afford."

On the ground, the current strategy is one shaped by a decade of optimization for operations from static bases in Afghanistan and Iraq. "We are now an occupation force," Cartwright said. "When you go to battle by getting up in the morning in your compound, getting into your armored vehicles, go out and patrol, and return to your compound at night, that is an occupation force." With all its armored vehicles, its body armor, and -- equally important -- its massive logistical tail, "it is a very heavy force, too heavy to move by air," he said. So if the Marine Corps and Army recapitalize their ground vehicle fleets without reconceptualizing them, they will lack the agility that future operations require.

And that doesn't even include what he said about the Joint Strike Fighter. Read the article.

Congress has got to find a way to get these kind of incredibly candid comments from military leaders while they are still on active duty. It is way past time for someone who is on active duty to testify ""We built the F-35 with absolutely no protection for it from a cyber standpoint," which is exactly what he said today. We are talking about a fighter aircraft that will serve as the backbone of the United States aviation for decades, and is already hampered by millions lines of software code that isn't quite right yet, and a retired VCJCS reveals the aircraft wasn't developed with cyberwarfare in mind? The Lockheed Martin guy two tables over looked very uncomfortable, and since Cartwright is a former marine aviator, his credibility on the subject is not in question.

What a stunning speech. I'll be posting a copy as soon as it is up. It will lull you to sleep in the first two minutes before he bitch-slaps you with repeated brilliance, then ends on a topic of medical innovation developed as a result of DARPA work that is an entire topic unto itself - and makes the entire concept introduced in the Matrix movies of uploading martial arts software into your brain not simply science fiction - but very possibly the very, very near future.


Cartwright also had some very interesting things to say regarding cyber. Indeed, as far as cyber goes, Cartwright is slowly becoming the most articulate person in the room on the subject. For a sample check out this video from OpenGov yesterday. In his speech today he talked about how the US is 90% defensive and 10% offensive with cyber, which he correctly IMO described as 'bass ackward.' Said another way, Cartwright takes a very Clausewitz view on cyberspace, and that attack is the first, best option. As he was discussing it I kept thinking to myself "why have the Chinese figured this out and we seem lost on the concept?"

Lots of good stuff today. More to come.

----

As a side note from Day 1 at #JWC12 - there were a lot of foreign officers in uniform at the conference today, indeed the conference had a lot of people in uniform. It's a different vibe when you are at a conference with so many people in uniform, and today it seemed like the Army showed up in battalion strength. I bet the venders were happy, and I imagine the Army was pleased to overrun a Navy conference like they did today.

EU Strikes Somali Pirate Depot

Apparently the Europeans were serious when they voted to start striking targets on land. Release from EUNAVFOR.

15th May – Earlier today, following the decision taken on 23 March 2012 by the Council of the European Union to allow the EU Naval Force to take disruption action against known pirate supplies on the shore, EU forces conducted an operation to destroy pirate equipment on the Somali coastline.

The operation was conducted in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 and has the full support of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. The focused, precise and proportionate action was conducted from the air and all forces returned safely to EU warships on completion. Whilst assessment is on-going, surveillance of the area during the action indicates that no Somalis were injured ashore as a result of EU action.

Speaking about the operation, the Operation Commander of the EU Naval Force, Rear Admiral Duncan Potts said “We believe this action by the EU Naval Force will further increase the pressure on, and disrupt pirates’ efforts to get out to sea to attack merchant shipping and dhows. The local Somali people and fishermen – many of whom have suffered so much because of piracy in the region, can be reassured that our focus was on known pirate supplies and will remain so in the future.”

At no point did EU Naval Force ‘boots’ go ashore. Rear Admiral Potts went on to say “The EU Naval Force action against pirate supplies on the shoreline is merely an extension of the disruption actions carried out against pirate ships at sea, and Operation Atalanta remains committed to fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa and the humanitarian mission of protecting World Food Programme ships that bring vital aid to the Somali people.”

Operation Atalanta is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to tackling symptoms and root causes of piracy in the Horn of Africa and the EU strategic framework for that region adopted in November 2011. Currently there are 9 warships in the EU Naval Force and 5 Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

The reach of Somali pirates is vast; they have attacked merchant ships up to 1,750 miles off the Somali coast. Preventing them getting out to sea is a crucial step in removing their impunity ashore and to further the success of counter-piracy operations.

First, this is the French and the Danes, both of whom have had enough of piracy. The Danes have been particularly effective in their anti-piracy tactics for a long time. The attack was likely launched from the French Mistral class vessel in the area. I am hearing the shooters were British, and concentrated on taking out the outboard motors of pirate boats. We have discussed this in the past on the blog - indeed taking out outboard motors on pirate boats has been something US Navy officers who have patrolled off Somalia have mentioned several times in several venues as being one way to quickly hurt pirate operations. Why hasn't the US Navy done this before? Someone should ask the State Department...

A target in Somalia with no people was probably low hanging fruit. Its hard to believe an airstrike against a depot so important no one was there is going to be an effective deterrent against piracy.

I don't mean to sound cold, but I do think the EU is going to have to actually kill pirates if their little land attack strategy is going to be an effective deterrent. Based on the way this press release is worded, I'm not sure that's the plan.

Updated: Turns out it was a Spanish SH-60B from the frigate Reina Sofía (F-84) with other EU forces supporting. What a good sign to see the Spanish engaged like this, and with success it is more likely we will see more of this kind of activity.

Insurance Company Funded Private Navy Preparing for Pirate Wars

Private Navy's to fight pirates are coming, and we are starting to see more details.

A private navy costing US$70 million (Dh257m) is being set up to escort merchant ships through the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden.

It will comprise a fleet of 18 ships, based in Djibouti, and will offer to convoy merchant vessels along the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC).

This is the world's most dangerous shipping lane, between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The fleet will be operated by the Convoy Escort Programme (CEP), a British company launched by the international shipping insurers Jardine Lloyd Thompson (JLT) and the Lloyds of London underwriters Ascot.

Full funding will be in place by the end of next month, and the CEP hopes the fleet will be operational by December.

"The shipping industry needs to stand up and be counted," said Angus Campbell, the CEP's chief executive and a former director of Overseas Shipholding Group, the world's second-biggest listed oil tanker company. "The time is now, not in four or five years' time."

Piracy in the region is costing the global economy an estimated US$7 billion a year. For the ship owners alone, every vessel sailing through the waters off Somalia is charged additional insurance premiums of between $50,000 and $80,000.

Ships opting to carry their own armed guards can be charged an additional $18,000 and $60,000 per voyage by security companies.

Although the European Union is spending more than €8m (Dh37.94m) a year to maintain a naval force in the waters - EU NavFor - its warships still cannot provide close support to all merchant vessels.

The CEP, however, offers substantial savings to owners as well as protection from pirate attack. The CEP will buy insurance and use that to cover the ships in its convoys, so owners will no longer need to pay premiums, or hire security.

Instead, they will just pay a flat $30,000 to $40,000 per ship in the convoy.

Read the rest here.

Note the ships of this private Navy will be conducting their mission Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC). The thing is, very few pirate attacks and maybe as few as 2 total hijackings have taken place in the corridor over the past few years, so in some ways this is smoke and mirrors from the insurance industry, and a way for them to sustain the money grab but protect product at the same time.

This sets an interesting precedent in the 21st century. It is past time to start thinking about what the role of private Navy's will be during the next war at sea - because as this demonstrates, the need for private Navy's will always exist and during war time it's a safe bet they absolutely will exist.

AQAP’s Fight From the Sea

This week’s most excellent news from the Arabian Peninsula was that long time fugitive COLE bombing planner Fahd al-Quso was exploded. But a little noticed related story was Al Qaeda’s retaliatory attack in the vicinity of Zinjibar, which killed 30+ Yemeni troops. What is most interesting about this attack is that a portion of AQAP’s fighters reportedly infiltrated via fishing boats, demonstrating a very nascent amphibious warfare capability. The importance of Zinjibar and Yemen’s Southern coast to AQ's strategy has been discussed by this author before.

In the terrorists’ own words: “Attention is drawn to the fact that for the first time the Mujahideen attacked the puppets both by land and sea. This fact testifies to the rapidly growing potential of the armed forces of AQAP.” Since the attack on COLE, Islamic militants in Yemen have occasionally promoted their “fleet” and threatened friendly shipping. So why haven’t we seen more evidence of their maritime capability? One, as special operations folks like to say, "don't confuse enthusiasm with capability."  Al Qaeda's appreciation and desire for naval power is real, but building a viable maritime capability much beyond smuggling networks and an occasional lucky attack is  challenging.  Second, since COLE, allied navies and commercial shipping have increased their awareness and hardened themselves against these sorts of attacks (we also have unchecked piracy to thank for that). Finally, these plots have likely been quietly disrupted by various counter-terrorism actions.  Nevertheless, much like AQAP’s ongoing laser-like focus on attacking Western aviation was inspired by successful 911 aviation attacks, aspirations for a useful maritime capability bolstered by the success against COLE are unlikely to wane, so ongoing attention is warranted.

And in a tangentially-connected story, four Somalis were arrested on Yemen’s Socotra Island learning how to scuba dive. Were they these guys just enjoying a sabbatical from buccaneering or do they represent another example of the al Shabaab fighters who have increasingly adjusted their sights toward jihad in Yemen as their own prospects falter in Somalia?  As AQAP still controls terrority in Southern Yemen, it has become the new magnet and safe haven for foreign fighters.  Until we get serious about destroying these safe havens faster than they can regenerate, the movement will persist and the war against al Qaeda will not be won.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Panetta Warns Legislators Against Pet Projects

Presumably, SECDEF's admonitions to Congress don't apply to the Secretary of the Navy and his questionable and expensive emphasis on biofuels.

Bryan McGrath

Questionable Assumptions

SAN DIEGO (May 2, 2012) The first of class littoral combat ships USS Freedom (LCS 1), rear, and USS Independence (LCS 2) maneuver together during an exercise off the coast of Southern California. The littoral combat ship is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant designed to operate in the near-shore environment, while capable of open-ocean tasking, and win against 21st-century coastal threats such as submarines, mines, and swarming small craft. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jan Shultis/Released)

Robert Haddick's contribution back on March 30, 2012 in the Foreign Policy/Small Wars Journal This Week at War series is an interesting and yet very familiar take on naval developments unfolding in the Pacific theater. Even as time has passed since Bob Work spoke at Surface Navy Association conference, a theme has emerged with staying power that continues to find itself as a part of nearly every Pacific discussion lately.

Robert Haddick eloquently discusses the issues like this.

Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work, in a January 2012 speech to the Surface Navy Association, dismissed concerns about the Navy's shrinking ship count. Work asserted that the Navy's robust plans for long-range air reconnaissance, conducted by new aircraft such as the P-8A Poseidon and a Navy version of the Global Hawk drone, will do much of the routine maritime patrolling previously done by ships. Bases in Australia, the Cocos Islands, and elsewhere in the southwest Pacific would support surveillance of the South China Sea. If ships were required to respond to problems, admirals could send them in as always. But under Work's assumption, fewer ships will be needed for routine patrolling. And with less routine steaming, the Navy will save money and keep its ships better maintained.

The question is whether more aerial maritime reconnaissance and fewer ships making fewer port visits around the South China Sea and elsewhere will provide the reassuring and stabilizing presence that the visible presence of Navy ships has heretofore provided. Work's air reconnaissance doctrine and the Navy's slumping fleet size combine to form a new theory for providing a stabilizing presence in global commons such as the South China Sea. We will know that this theory is not working if the leaders of U.S. allies increase their diplomatic hedging behavior. Regional arms races, another response to a perceived decline in U.S. military power, would be another indication of failure. China's ongoing annual double-digit increases in defense spending and a looming submarine arms race in the region are not good signs.

These two paragraphs by Robert Haddick sum up nicely the two biggest issues surrounding the US Navy today, and do so in the context of the South China Sea. The first issue is what Robert Haddick is calling Work's air reconnaissance doctrine, but the second issue is at least as important - the role the Littoral Combat Ship is expected to perform for the nation in the future.

Bob Work's air reconnaissance doctrine is probably one of the most interesting evolutions of sea power theory since WWI, and easily one of the least discussed major changes taking place in the Navy right now. At Surface Navy Association - ironically - Bob Work made clear the Navy will replace the presence of ships with ISR aircraft, and he stated that ship numbers do carry the same importance as in previous eras primarily because advanced ISR will give fewer ships more information than they have ever had, thus allow fewer ships to perform the same mission just as effectively as more ships without the ISR could. The argument that technology enables a smaller fleet to be as effective as larger fleets in previous eras is not new, indeed it is an argument Bob Work has made in several ways in the past - including at SNA when he stated the 300 ship Navy will be far more capable than the 600 ship Navy of the 1980s.

The key questions to ask as this theory is executed include whether aircraft can legitimately replace the presence of a ship, what is lost in the context of political influence as ships are substituted with aircraft, and whether replacing ships with aircraft is a legitimate approach towards maritime battlespaces in peacetime when that same effort has been largely ineffective dealing with other low intensity maritime problems like narcotics and piracy.

An aircraft, submarine, and unmanned system all suffer from a very specific problem in the maritime domain - they cannot influence any ship at sea unless they do so through fear or threat, and ultimately aircraft, submarines, and unmanned systems can either observe a target or destroy a target - with virtually no middle ground along the scales of escalation. One of the primary political values of surface warfare is the range of scalable options that naval forces have in dealing with ships of other nations; whether observe, search, seize, deny, destroy, etc.. - and the execution of these roles can be sustained with public visibility, meaning executed as an enduring political communication. An aircraft returns to base for fuel, while a ship can have fuel brought to where the ship is. I liken the presence of aircraft relative to ships the difference between virtual presence and physical presence, and while virtual presence is better than no presence, it cannot trump physical presence.

Information certainly beings a lot of power to the fleet, and aircraft are certainly viable alternatives for exercising control of the sea during wartime, but it gets highly questionable when information becomes a substitute for physical presence during peacetime.

However, it is the combination of aircraft ISR and the emerging LCS non-combat doctrine that really describes what is taking place in the minds of planners. The CNO has basically outlined the conceptual purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship, as discussed in this AOL Defense article.

the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged that the Navy's prized new Littoral Combat Ship might not survive a shooting war against a well-armed adversary like China. But, Adm. Jonathan Greenert said this morning at a National Press Club breakfast organized by Government Executive magazine, the small, versatile vessel could free up larger warships from the day-to-day policing, presence, and partnership-building missions that are the best way to prevent a crisis from erupting in the first place.

"These are not large surface combatants that are going to sail into the South China Sea and challenge the Chinese military; that's not what they're made for," Greenert said of the LCS class. Even the LCS contingent soon to start operating out of Singapore will focus on exercises, port visits, humanitarian assistance, and counter-piracy operations with Southeast Asian partners -- taking that burden off the more war-worthy carrier, cruisers, and destroyers based in Japan.

Worldwide, said Greenert, "Littoral Combat Ships will tend to displace amphibious ships and destroyers in Africa and South America. That will free up surface combatants, more high-end ships," for East Asia.

The role of the Littoral Combat Ship for the fleet of the future is probably one of the most controversial discussions in sea power theory the US Navy has had since the Navy began fielding the aircraft carrier, and easily one of the most discussed changes taking place in the Navy right now. In my opinion, both the criticisms and defenses of the Littoral Combat Ship have largely become too absurd for just about anyone to be taken seriously anymore, and even several reporters find themselves incapable of looking to the future as they focus entirely on the past. The article about LCS in AOL Defense today that includes an interview with RADM Rowden is both really good and really rare, because it lacks the usual bullshit that accompanies a discussion of LCS. It's also worth noting the discussion over at the CIMSEC NextWar blog on LCS, including this article by LT Albaugh, this article by LTJG Matt Hipple, and this article by LT Scott Cheney-Peters. All in all, this might be the first time in my five years of blogging that 4 different uniformed members of the US Navy who are not PAOs discussed publicly the Littoral Combat Ship in a 48 hour period. It's refreshing, the goggles have been backward facing on LCS for too long, and with it coming - it's time to flip the goggles around and look forward.

It is important to note the Navy has decided the Littoral Combat Ship will be forward deployed to at least two places initially - Bahrain in the Persian Gulf and Singapore in the South China Sea. That's a big damn deal, because that is exactly where the anti-access / area denial threats are being developed with the most rigor - by Iran and China respectively. The places the LCS will be forward deployed flies in the face of what even the CNO is saying about the environment the LCS will supposedly not operate in. All indications are we are leading up to an inflection point with LCS, a pivot that will in some way reflect lessons learned from actually using the ship. With still many, many months before USS Freedom (LCS 1) will deploy to Singapore, I suspect the pivot for LCS will take place long before the first LCS calls a port in Asia home. We probably won't hear about it until the FY15 budget in late 2014 though, because to be blunt, the Navy really can't afford anything new with LCS until the FY15 budget and beyond.

The use of ISR aircraft as a substitute for ships in the South China Sea as per Bob Work's own presentation at SNA combined with the Navy's intent to base Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore for regional port visits are both new operational concepts intended to perform the same function - free up larger surface combatants for other purposes. That raises the question, once larger surface combatants are not being used for sustained presence, what will they be doing? If we follow logic driven by traditional Mahanian naval warfare doctrine, the big blue fleet will then be consolidated and concentrated in task forces towards the traditional role of maritime power projection - to the 5th and 7th fleet according to maritime strategy.

On paper (or better yet in theory) this light footprint forward approach might work, but are the planning assumptions correct? If the Littoral Combat Ship "might not survive a shooting war against a well-armed adversary like China" then why is the first place the Navy sending the Littoral Combat Ship Singapore, in the South China Sea region, where any shooting war involving China is most likely to take place? Since we are talking about the South China Sea, one could presume the challenger is China - "a well-armed adversary," so that raises the question where major combatant forces will be consolidated and concentrated in times of tension, crisis, or at the outbreak of hostilities? With the emphasis on Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles and submarines, and based on what is known about AirSea Battle in the open source - it appears that any initial consolidation of surface forces including aircraft carriers will be outside the South China Sea, indeed outside the range of China's anti-access/area denial capabilities.

Again, that leads us back to whether the US Navy has their planning assumptions correct. How does the United States assure allies with naval presence if the primary purpose in execution of both doctrines Robert Haddick hints to in his article is specific to insuring major naval combat capabilities are NOT in the area to support allies, rather out of harms way to insure the US Navy's fleet survives during opening phases of the war. Has the US Navy designed an operational model that insures the US Navy will not be present on the front lines to defend the national interests the fleet exists to defend in the first place? Such an operational theory towards protecting the major battle force elements of the fleet during the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific is not new to the US Navy, the same theory insured the battleships were consolidated and protected at Pearl Harbor on December 1941. With that said, the Royal Navy was on the front lines of the Pacific in December 1941, and one of the most capable battleships in the world at that time - the Prince of Whales - was sunk 3 days after Pearl Harbor.

Work's air reconnaissance doctrine and the expected role for the LCS still require much more intellectual rigor towards explanation that what has been provided to date. Aircraft provide the nation very limited capacity to execute a political responsibility that is inherent to the value of naval vessels in influencing escalation of threat or tension, and the planning assumption that the LCS won't fight in A2AD environments while being forward based in Bahrain and Singapore is intellectually dishonest at best. The Navy has produced both doctrines as ad-hoc fixes to fill the gaps for a fleet that last year had a floor of 313 ships and this year has a ceiling of 300 ships - just so that the Navy can defend present force structure.

I want the LCS to work, but the LCS looks to me like a platform that needs changes right now that reflect the nations recent pivot towards Asia, and I do suspect those changes are coming - eventually. A modular ship with no modules to swap wastes a lot of money on modularity, and that speed requirement is basically a $100 million mistake designed into each hull. The LCS lacks legitimate firepower and still has no payloads to speak of. Regardless, I still believe the concept of motherships is sound and the Littoral Combat Ship makes a lot of sense as an entry level mothership platform. The network side of unmanned systems is going to be a monumental task for the Navy to execute, and assuming the modules ever arrive - that is one issue the LCS can help the US Navy solve in an operational capacity.

But I am having trouble buying into any theory that suggests ISR aircraft can somehow replace a Navy ship, because the planning assumptions of that theory undermines the political value of seapower as part of national power. Manned naval ships have the capacity to influence national interests forward in all kinds of political activities short of major war in ways standing Army's and Air Forces cannot, but the US Navy does not appear to be interested in those aspects of manned surface naval power.

With $1.2 trillion worth of US trade in transit in the South China Sea annually, and over a million people from around the world conducting commerce on the South China Seas nearly every day - the South China Seas represents the center of gravity of the global economy, so every detail in how the US Navy operates and conducts business in the South China Sea matters a great deal, and has global ramifications. Smart people like Bob Work say the size of the fleet doesn't matter as much as it used to, but how can it not matter when the lack of ships leads to promoting theories like aircraft replacing the presence role of warships, LCS replacing the presence roles of high end warships, and maritime power projection in support of allies becomes a task for the small Navy while big blue fleet concentrates out of range of the bad guys.

The US Navy today is trying to rewrite the book on US seapower to reflect our overall decline of maritime power and our numerical decline in naval power by theorizing about advantages we have from our technical and military superiority. It is an absolutely valid exercise, but I have serious questions about the validity of the planning assumptions and believe poor assumptions up front distorts the validity of the conclusions.

Still Working Out the Kinks

I am not sure what I find more frustrating, that the crew is struggling with their role in the maintenance of the ship, or that the contractors are struggling with their role in the maintenance of the ship.

It's a given that by posting this, the content of what is said will get blown out of context, so for those who aren't sure what is going on here - keep in mind the TYCOM Material Inspection (TMI) is a process intended to help ships prepare for INSURV. This is by definition what you would call good work on their part, identifying problems prior to INSURV. There is both good and bad here, as there always is with any TMI.

R 071920Z MAY 12
FM COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
TO USS FREEDOM
INFO COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
PRESINSURV VIRGINIA BEACH VA
COMLCSRON SAN DIEGO CA
COMLCSRON ONE
BT
UNCLAS
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA/0805/MAY//
SUBJ/TYCOM MATERIAL INSPECTION REPORT FOR USS FREEDOM (LCS 1)//
REF/A/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/28FEB2008/4370.1//
REF/B/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/06JUN2008/4730.3//
REF/C/MSGID:DOC/COMUSFLTFORCOM/11MAR2008/4790.3//
REF/D/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/26OCT1999/4730.11//
REF/E/MSGID:DOC/OPNAV/26DEC2007/5090.1//
REF/F/MSGID:DOC/OPNAV/30MAY2007/5100.19//
REF/G/MSGID:DOC/NAVSEA/15APR2004/9593.2//
REF/H/MSGID:DOC/CNSP/22SEP2011//

REF A IS INSURVINST 4730.1 SERIES, MATERIAL INSPECTIONS OF SURFACE SHIPS.
REF B IS INSURVINST 4730.3 SERIES, TRIALS OF SURFACE SHIPS.
REF C IS COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 SERIES, JOINT FLEET MAINTENANCE MANUAL (VOL IV).
REF D IS INSURVINST 4730.11 SERIES, DOCUMENTATION OF DISCREPANCIES.
REF E IS OPNAVINST 5090.1 SERIES, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAM MANUAL.
REF F IS OPNAVINST 5100.19 SERIES, NAVY SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH) INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR OIL POLLUTION ABATEMENT (OPA) SYSTEMS IN U.S. NAVY SURFACE SHIPS AND CRAFT.
REF H IS CNSPINST 4730.2, TYCOM MATERIAL INSPECTION (TMI) PROCESS.//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/
1. A TMI WAS CONDUCTED ON USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) IN SAN DIEGO, CA FROM 3-5 MAY, 2012. THE TMI TEAM (TMIT) ASSESSES FREEDOM AS A HIGH RISK TO PASS THEIR SPECIAL TRIAL AND DOES NOT RECOMMEND THE SHIP PROCEED TO THEIR SCHEDULED SPECIAL TRIAL UNTIL THE SHIP COMPLETES A SATISFACTORY RE-DEMONSTRATION.

2. SENIOR INSPECTOR COMMENTS: USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) IS EVALUATED AS A "NO-GO" AND IS NOT RECOMMENDED TO PROCEED WITH THE SCHEDULED SPECIAL TRIAL (ST). FREEDOM'S CREW AND CONTRACTORS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR THE INSPECTION. BOTH ENTITIES WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CONDUCT OF INSURV MATERIAL CHECKS. EXECUTION OF THE SOE WAS VERY POOR. THERE WAS CONFUSION BETWEEN CONTRACTOR AND CREW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT CHECKS. THE INSPECTION EXPERIENCE LEVEL FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE CREW IS LOW ALTHOUGH THEY DID DEMONSTRATE A GOOD POSITIVE ATTITUDE. THE CREW AND CONTRACTORS NEED TO CONTINUE TO FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE SHIP'S EQUIPMENT, OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, IMPROVE IN PRESENTATION/DEMONSTRATIONS AND AGGRESSIVELY MANAGE/COORDINATE SOE. THE SHIP WAS CLEAN. SEVERAL AREAS REQUIRE PRESERVATION. SAFETY PROGRAMS ABOARD THE SHIP ARE NON-EXISTENT. THE SHIP DID DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO SELF-ASSESS. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT AGGRESSIVELY REPORTING AND PURSUING RESOLUTION OF THE DEFICIENCIES THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED.

3. DEMONSTRATION RESULTS:

A. FULL POWER-RED
B. QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN-RED
C. QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD-RED
D. STEERING-GREEN
E. ANCHOR DROP-YELLOW
F. AFFF TEST-RED
G. SD DTE-YELLOW
H. LONG RANGE AIR SEARCH- GREEN
I. 57MM LIVE FIRE-GREEN

4. FUNCTIONAL AREA RESULTS:

A. AVIATION-RED
B. COMMUNICATIONS-RED
C. INFO SYSTEMS-GREEN
D. NAVIGATION-YELLOW
E. OPERATIONS-RED
F. WEAPONS-YELLOW
G. AUXILIARIES-RED
H. ELECTRICAL-RED
I. MAIN PROPULSION-RED
J. DAMAGE CONTROL-RED
K. DECK-RED
L. ENVIR PROTECTION-YELLOW
M. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH-RED
N. MEDICAL-YELLOW
O. VENTILATION-YELLOW
P. HABITABILITY-GREEN
Q. SUPPLY-YELLOW
R. ABILITY TO SELF-ASSESS-GREEN
S. 3M SPOTCHECKS-RED
T. ATIS DATABASE-NOT DEMONSTRATED//