In early 2006, Iran successfully cracked down on virtually all Iranian military sites dedicated to uploading pictures and new military information online. Within weeks, the content of those sites dried up on search engines leaving only a few web cached versions of those cites to be reviewed. Today, only 2 Iranian military related sites exist, both of which block search crawlers, and neither of which use DNS to help conceal their locations. The information provided are sources to those sites, so take it or leave it as credible without links to additional commentary.
Eagle1 had an interesting post on Monday about the surface capabilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in small boat, swarming tactics and capabilities. Included is evaluation regarding the complexity in using such a strategy. The US Navy has faced this threat before, specifically in the Tanker Wars of 1987-1988, and in each instance overcame the threat with superior firepower. The only thing I would add to Eagle1's entry is a comment once shared with me by an air force captain who has the opportunity to observe an IRGC exercise, specifically that "a small boat swarm observed by JSTARS looks a lot like a mechanized division rolling through the open desert."
However, it isn't the small boat swarm that presents the largest threat in the Persian Gulf, rather the traditionally disproportionate effect of mines and submarines in any theater of naval combat. Even if not a single ship hits a single mine, insurance costs for shipping in areas where minefields exist will skyrocket in the future, threat alone is all it takes. In the Falklands War, submarines deployed by Argentina had an enormous effect on the Royal Navy, determining where and how it would operate in the early stages of the war.
Mines and submarines are not easily addressed. Countering threats in underwater warfare requires time consuming training that the US most likely has not appropriately allocated for sufficient proficiency. I'm not the only one who believes this, constant pressures by environmental groups regarding sonar and exercises combined with lack of sufficient attention and focus by Navy commanders themselves are the source for most observers concerns.
In this regard, Iran operates a number (assumed somewhere around a dozen) of mini-submarines, 3 Kilo class submarines, and a number of different types of mines that create huge problems for any nation that engages Iran in combat.
Iranian Kilo class Submarines
Thanks to Al Gore, Iran has 3 Kilo class submarines. The recently completed naval station on the Gulf of Oman port of Chahbahar can house all three submarines. With access to open water in the Gulf of Oman, the 3 kilo class submarines which would be difficult to use effectively in the Persian Gulf would be more effective in searching for deeper water targets on the eastern side of the Strait of Hormuz.
While the Kilo class submarines are not likely in good condition, they are an effective weapon, and their presence alone will force major adjustments in tactics by the US Navy. First the US Navy will likely be forced to keep carriers much further away than they normally would in the Gulf of Oman. It would also require a number of submarines to be dedicated to the location and neutralization of the Kilo threat.
The Kilo's, while potentially capable of firing anti-ship cruise missiles, would be less effective in this role. As a mine layer the Kilo's could deploy around 36 mines per sortie, and if mated with a merchant ship supplied with mines would be able to conduct 2-3 mine laying sorties per week. This scenario has not only been envisioned by US Navy planners, but is expected.
Iranian Mini-Submarines
Iran is currently known to have at least 3 different classes of mini-submarines, and at least 2 strange single class prototypes for utilization in the Gulf. These submarines are for the most part considered troublesome to operate, but would still likely be effective in limited roles for strike and mine laying, and would be very difficult to detect while submerged.
Iran is reported to have 2 Nahang (whale) class mini-submarines. These submarines, an interesting design for those with a sense of mini-submarine history, are noteworthy because they are the vehicle many experts believe is armed with the Shkval supercavitating torpedoes. Operated by the IRGC, the role is largely a guess, although some observers have questioned whether it would be used for extended surveillance and reconnaissance roles.
Iran is reported to have 5 Ghadir class mini-submarines. The Ghadir appears to be based on the Italian designed MG110 class mini-submarines in use by Pakistan. This class could probably operate close to an oil platform for an extended period of time, supported by a dive team, and conduct mine laying sorties that would be very difficult to detect up to 20nms from the platform.
Additionally Iran has recently received delivery of 4 mini-submarines from North Korea. There has been no mention as to class of submarine, but the smaller mini-submarines are supposedly for commando operation. Iran also operates several strange prototypes that may or may not be in service, but photography exists to their existence.
Sea Mines
Iran is thought to have the 4th largest sea mine inventory (around 5000) in the world behind the United States, Russia, and China. Up to 1000 of the sea mines are of the Chinese EM11 bottom-influence mine; the EM31 moored mine; and the EM52 rocket-propelled rising mine. All of these mines are of Chinese domestically produced designs, and the Chinese are the largest supplier of mines to Iran since 1998.
Lost in the shuffle of the Kilo class submarine purchase was the revelation in 2000 that Russia also sold Iran 1800 mines in the same purchase.
The most dangerous mine in the Iranian inventory is probably the EM-52. As a bottom dwelling rocket-propelled mine, up to 4 can be laid by a single small boat or dhow, and dispersed properly could heavily influence the channels in and out of the Persian Gulf.
While Kilo class submarines, mini-submarines, and mines represent the threats underwater from a technology perspective, Iran has a number of specialized commando diving teams (including specially trained mammals) that could potentially be very dangerous as well.
Are you ready to dismiss some of this as nonsense? That would be a mistake. It was only last summer Israel dismissed the anti navy capabilities of Hezbollah. While some of this sounds like a James Bond movie rejected idea, the truth is the threats are real and if executed, will cause damage in a war. When it comes to underwater warfare, I'd rather the United States Navy make the mistake of being overly prepared than under prepared. While I still dismiss the possibility of war, at least not in 2007 for certain, it may be one day these are the very real threats the US Navy faces in the Persian Gulf.
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
5th Fleet Focus: Iranian Underwater Warfare Capabilities
Posted by Galrahn at 12:09 AM
Labels: 5th Fleet Focus, Iran, Underwater Warfare
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