Thomas Barnett calls it: The United States needs a new definition of Grand Strategy. When we learned a few weeks ago he was writing a book on the subject, we have to admit we hope it isn't too little too late. We observe one of the most obvious problems with the new Maritime Strategy is the absence of context.
Barnett is highlighting a new White Paper released by the US Air Force. We note similarities in this document to the Navy's own new Maritime Strategy. We find it noteworthy that in the public strategic planning documents, neither the Air Force or the Navy can publicly name the challengers, and struggle to identify the challenges. Lack of context for strategy has lead to confusion in understanding the purpose of the individual service strategies (ends). The lack of context also fails to convince why the services need to reengineer their methods (ways). Finally, the lack of context in these strategic documents does not offer Congress a compelling reason to rightsize the technologies required for strategy execution (means). Context, ends, ways, means. The Navy only got the ends and ways right, and the Air Force appears fixated on the means.
We agree with Dr. Barnett. Just to start the conversation with what is outlined in the maritime strategy, one basically has to be a student of either Barnett or Huntington to even begin to understand the context of what is being sold as strategy. That is why we have added their most important works on the right side of the blog, so at least we can claim we are trying to help people understand the Maritime Strategy. A military service strategy, for example a maritime strategy, must articulate the strategic purpose of the service; must do so by outlining the strategic methods that will be required for execution; and must define the strategic technologies that will be required by that service to achieve the goals; and should do all of this in context of a Grand Strategy.
We have observed that as the Navy explains its Maritime Strategy, they start by defining its context first, or in other words creating a Grand Strategy as context for the Navy's individual strategy.
We believe until the Navy or the Air Force can articulate the context of their strategy, why they are shifting their priority away from the “functioning core” of globalization toward the “non-integrating gaps” of globalization, and within that context connect the ends, ways, and means as strategy; both services will continue to trip as they attempt to articulate the future.
For context to our point, this is what will happen when strategy fails to impress.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
You're Supposed To Read The Tea Leaves
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