Eighty Six The Battleship

Congressional Staffer comment, from Thomas Barnett's blog:

Mr. Barnett,

I'm interested in getting your comments on the article Why No One Believes the Navy from Defense News. As a military aide for a Member of Congress, I am consistently frustrated by the Navy's failure to give an accurate picture of cost on everything form the much-maligned LCS to Virginia Class subs. Worsening matters is that even as costs overrun estimates on existing projects, I have shrinking confidence that the Navy has a thoughtful plan for transitioning the fleet to meet 21st Century post-Cold War needs. Just interested in your thoughts. Thanks.

Virginia Class subs? Clearly not an ID reader, the Virginia class unlike everything else is on cost and budget... but we forgive the staffer, there is a lot of FUD out there. Tom responds:

Symptomatic of all services: trying to step up on "now" wars while trying to protect tomorrow's "big war" force.

Something has to give when you deny yourself the rising powers of the age ally status and plan future high- tech wars against them while waging "global war," ostensibly in their name.

Our grand strategy consists of doing all with few friends. As a result, we're breaking the force and no amount of "leadership" changes that.

This topic from Thomas Barnett's blog is among many interesting discussions that have popped up this week regarding the current Navy shipbuilding plan. Christopher P. Cavas's articles (part1 and part2) have apparently raised awareness, and many are beginning to ask questions. There are other discussions as well, CDR Salamander asked some important questions on Monday that didn't generate many comments. It was an important discussion, he is asking the right questions.

With the House and the Senate bills for FY09 on the books, the reconciliation that will take place will be interesting to watch, and the stakes are high. The Senate rubber stamped the Navy/Administrations plan, which is understandable in only one way, the Senate is trying to look after Bath Iron Works. Other than the BIW factor, there is absolutely nothing in the Senate shipbuilding plan worth supporting.

The House decided to go an entirely different direction. The addition of the 10th LPD-17 is the smartest move by Congress in shipbuilding so far in the 21st century. The House is also right to fund four T-AKEs this fiscal year and build an additional submarine. As we point out as often as possible, the three aspects of the Navy actually engaged in the war of today is the amphibious force, the submarine force, and the Military Sealift Command. This isn't discounting the contribution of Big Navy's carrier strike groups and AEGIS warships, rather highlighting these ships have been regulated to a supporting role, and will remain relegated to supporting roles while conditions are absent major maritime threats.

Put another way, the reason the House bill is better than the Senate bill is because it does something nobody thought possible, it aligns the Navy budget with the Navy's strategy. Unfortunately, even the House bill has flaws, specifically the nuclear power issue and the House is replacing one type of battleship (DDG-1000) with another (DDG-51). Someone please stop the insanity.

It is time to eighty six the battleship, and get moving on building small surface combatants. When we say eighty six, we mean the number and invoke the slang. The Navy has already paid for 22 CG-52s, 62 DDG-51s, and 2 DDG-1000s. That is a fleet of 86 battleships, enough already!

Take a look around the world and compare conditions to the Navy's shipbuilding strategy. Japan, the second largest Navy in the world, has 6 battleships. South Korea will soon have 6, Great Britain is building 6, Spain will soon have 6, and no one anywhere on the planet has more than 6 or plans for more than 6, except the United States. I'm counting first-rate through fourth-rate surface combatants, ships armed with 48 or more battle force VLS cells, and/or 48 or more battle force missiles. Japan, South Korea, Great Britain, and Spain are all allies, who exactly are we building more battleships to fight against?

Every analyst is looking to the options between the Senate and House and picking sides. We use Loren Thompson as an example of this group think.

Imagine floating off the coast of China or Iran and firing shells ashore. How long would such a ship survive? The whole idea is improbable. Which is why Congress needs to listen to Rep. Taylor and others who say the best course of action is to end the DDG-1000 effort and continue buying the existing DDG-51 destroyer. DDG-51 only costs half as much to build as DDG-1000, and internal naval studies show it still has plenty of margin for growth in missions such as missile defense, anti-submarine warfare and land attack. It is already the most capable surface combatant operating anywhere in the world, and transitioning its Aegis combat system to a continuously improving open architecture would enable it to stay that way for decades to come, with sizable reductions in crew size. So why would we stop building a winner like DDG-51 when its planned replacement is clearly such a loser?

In other words, because the enormously expensive DDG-1000 battleship doesn't make any sense at all considering its design requirements, we need to build some other battleship instead. We reject the suggestion that the choice is either plow ahead with the DDG-1000 or go back and do waht the Navy has been doing since the end of the cold war. How is doing the same thing the Navy has been doing, essentially building nothing but battleships, going to improve the capabilities of the Navy? It won't, its not strategic and this mindset ignores Corbett's warnings regarding the problems of fleets that build nothing but battleships.

Thomas Barnett is giving the entire DOD forewarning that Grand Strategy is coming as a byproduct of the Iraq conflict, regardless of who it is, because at the cost of the current military operations the American people will ultimately demand change. The calls for Grand Strategy are everywhere, those calls aren't going away, Grand Strategy is going to happen. The Navy needs to anticipate the requirements, and get its resource plan in line accordingly now rather than later. Now is important, because later will carry a heavy cost.

The next 12 years will be the only window of opportunity the Navy has to shape the future Navy, and the fleet for the next 3 decades will be defined by the shipbuilding decisions over the next 12 years. Missing this window of opportunity will go down as the greatest disaster in modern Navy history, and could potentially result in the same decline we are now witnessing in the Royal Navy. Starting in 2020, the Navy will be forced to spend the entire shipbuilding budget for 2 full decades replacing existing ships in todays fleet, meaning the Navy will have to sacrifice some part of its CVNs, CGs, DDGs, SSNs, or SSBN force to make any adjustment in the future force after 2020. That means the time is now to build "the rest of the fleet."

The House bill allows for $400 million dollars to be spent on an alternative to the DDG-1000, it is essentially the Bath Iron Works option. Where is the visionary suggesting the Navy to take the $400 million and design a cruiser that can be built in numbers at Bath Iron Works?

The next three decades, whether it includes major war scenarios, medium war scenarios, or integrating gap scenarios are going to require 2 capabilities absent in the Navy today. The first required capability will be large flexible motherships to enable the information awareness capabilities from the air, surface, and undersea environment, Sysadmin operations like the current Global Fleet Station model being extended to Africa and South America, and robust forward deployable capabilities for major war forcible entry operations (in other words, amphibious ships).

The second required capability will be small surface combatants to support MIW, ASW, and irregular warfare scenarios in 'gap regions' or in support of larger forces for major war. Small combatants to engage with the majority of nations who run small coastal patrol vessels and small warships in defense of their economic systems, an integrating platform for building partnerships.

Given the future conditions, eighty six battleships is more than enough, and it is time to eighty six the theory the Navy needs more battleships. The Navy needs to get to building a force that can support the next 3 decades of maritime requirements, adaptable to the anticipated technological changes but also relevant to the human network element that has proven successful in strengthening the conditions that help maintain peace within the context of a balanced maritime strategy.