Unintentionally Maintaining the Negative Stereotypes

This is something we would like to see more of. Indeed, specifics like this are so incredibly rare it is almost stunning to see this reported somewhere, much less spoken in public by the CNO. The Navy doesn't talk enough about their plans, but Roughead did on Wednesday.

Despite the problems, Roughead said he is "very optimistic" about the program based on the first Littoral Combat Ship's sea trials, and said it brings a much-needed capability to the fleet.

That's not the case with the DDG-1000 destroyer program, he said. The ship simply doesn't have the capabilities the Navy needs to counter future threats, he said.

The Zumwalt-class destroyer was conceived in the early 1990s, when the threats the United States faced appeared very different. The Navy originally planned to buy seven ships, but this summer, after sinking 10 years and $13 billion into the program, the service tried to cancel the remaining five ships (it is already under contract for the first two ships). Congress, however, is pressing for a third ship. A compromise version of the fiscal 2009 Defense authorization bill provides $2.5 billion for a third DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer.

And for the first time I am aware of, we get a target for the CG(X).

"What we will be able to do is take the technology from the DDG-1000, the capability and capacity that [will be achieved] as we build more DDG-51s, and [bring those] together around 2017 in a replacement ship for our cruisers," he said.

All right! I'm loving this article. The CNO is speaking clearly, laying out a roadmap, and everything is looking good until...

A turning point in Roughead's thinking about the Navy's future needs occurred in April 2006. That's when the terrorist organization Hezbollah fired a sophisticated missile at an Israeli ship operating off the coast of Lebanon and almost sank it.

"As I looked at the DDG-1000, it did not give us the capability" to counter such threats, he said. "To be sure, there's great technology on the DDG-1000. The program is well-run. That's not the issue. The real issue for me is capability. When you're talking about buying a ship for a cost that will likely exceed $3 billion, we have to look at capability."

Did no one on Admiral Roughead's staff ever caution him not to say something so profoundly embarrassing? Where are the people who are supposed to be looking after the CNO? Whoever you are, how do you misunderstand how ridiculous that argument is?

In other words, the Navy has spent the last ten years and $13 billion dollars building a 14,500 ton stealth, land attack battleship intended to operate in the littorals, and now, a decade later, the Navy has come to a realization that the enemy actually shoots back, and that is the reason the Navy is canceling the DDG-1000?

YOU HAVE GOT TO BE KIDDING ME! As a citizen of the US, I want to believe his rationale is not really the truth. I'm hoping he doesn't really mean it, and he is just a terrible salesman with a staff sound asleep in the strategic communications bus. That 2006 Hezbollah missile attack rational for canceling the DDG-1000 needs to be shoved as far down the trash compactor as possible and never used again. It is especially frustrating because the discussion that begins in the very next paragraph is all Roughead needs to say, particularly since he says it very well.

In many ways, the DDG-1000 was too ambitious for the time and budget requirements placed on the program. The ship has a revolutionary hull design and aimed to include nearly a dozen cutting-edge technologies, weapons and sensors, as well as a new propulsion system. GAO estimated the software requirements alone would entail 14 million to 16 million lines of code.

"It's very easy in the world we live in to become enamored with technology," Roughead said. "I'm not a Luddite, but I think we need to be very clear when looking at the capabilities we're trying to put into the fleet. You can be drawn away by higher technology if you take your eye off, 'What is it we must give our sailors and Marines to go out and do their jobs?' "

The Navy needs to get their message organized for the NOC to be released in October, because saying this kind of stuff sends the wrong message. The DDG-1000 is too expensive, too ambitious, and too much of a liability in a time of limited resources for the Navy to build. Clearly Admiral Roughead believes it will hurt the Navy to admit a mistake, but the perception of arrogance in avoiding admitting poor decisions were made is the actual message being sent. In Durham, the Navy presents itself with a servants heart in the service of the nation. When it comes to shipbuilding, the Navy is presenting arguments that ring the tune of bravo sierra to everyone in the room.

The next administration (regardless of who it is), both the House and the Senate, and the American people are ready to side with Admiral Roughead and kick the DDG-1000 to the curb. There are two ways to exercise the boot: with credibility and without credibility. When the revelation that the enemy shoots missiles at ships from a truck is the reason the Navy doesn't need a land attack battleship intended to operate offshore, the credibility of the Navy is where the boot lands squarely. After all, isn't blowing up said truck the stated purpose of the stealth battleship in the first place?

Another communication opportunity ruined by forwarding the stereotype of a risk averse Navy. If the DDG-1000 can't deal with the truck mounted C-802, the Navy has no business building two or three DDG-1000s at all, and quite frankly, if it is true then I have absolutely no confidence at all in the requirements planning office of the US Navy. It makes absolutely no sense that the Navy would design a land attack battleship with all of these bells and whistles to give it presence in the littoral, and the ship does "not give us the capability" to counter such threats" like a land vehicle launched anti-ship missile.