Have Speed and Space, Will Fight When Armed

No combatant commander asked for the LCS. That ship was a product of the imagination of the leaders of the Department of the Navy encouraged by the enthusiasm of those who saw it as part of the transformation mantra that engulfed defense planning in the late 1990s. As retired Navy Captain Robert H. Smith notes, it grew out of an "addiction to the kinds of advocacy that sweeps aside damning truths, with our Navy foremost among the deceived." Only superficial analyses of the missions to be performed were conducted. These descriptions limped enough to be called into question repeatedly by the Congressional Research Service. In what littorals are the ships to be used? How are they to be supported when deployed? What weapon systems would be needed in the missions assigned, and could the LCS bring them to bear?

Building a Small Surface Warship Mission Impossible?, RADM William J. Holland Jr. USN (Ret.), February 2007 USNI Proceedings

Have you ever taken a good look at the top of USS Freedom (LCS 1)? If not, click the image (from here) above to get higher resolution. See the chaff launchers down below and behind the stacks, then behind those there are two big hatches, one on each side of the ship? That is where the Navy intends to put the MK 46 30mm chain guns on the LCS. See the space behind it all the way to the RAM deck? That space will probably look very different by next year, because that is the space that will be adjusted to hold the NETFIRES system. Staying on the same level as the hatches for the MK 46, check out that hatch surrounded by chains on the front of the ship. That can be removed and major part replacements for the turbines can be moved through that space, or put another way, that space is several decks deep.

For all the talk about how unarmed the USS Freedom (LCS 1) is, Lockheed Martin deserves a hell of a lot more credit than they have been given to date, because this ship really is nothing but speed and space, and if you remove the speed, your left with even more space and no longer have so many concerns regarding weight. This ship is clearly designed to be exported as a warship, with plenty of reconfigurable space to insure you can stick just about any weapon system you can afford on that seaframe.

The thing is, the ship has an entire deck above the hanger you can add weapon systems on. It is unclear how much weight allowance there is up there for weapon systems, but how heavy is the MK 46 30mm (video) if it is designed to operate on the EFV? It looked to me like the space where NETFIRES will eventually show up will be modified once the final NETFIRES product is completed. That leaves you with 60 PAM missiles and 2 30mm guns in addition to the RAM and the 57mm, and that wouldn't consume any of the space used in the enormous hanger or the three decks for mission modules.

All the documentation regarding the ASuW module I have seen suggests the ASuW module is 4x15 NETFIRES launch units and 2 MK 46 30mm guns, plus aviation... and that's it. Well, there is no way to move NETFIRES from the mission module bays below deck to the weapons deck, so as best I can tell in the ASuW configuration the ship does nothing with the mission module space on the Lockheed Martin version of the LCS. Why do we need a ASuW module at all, why not just integrate the ASuW module into the seaframe? The answer must be weight, but is the weight issue related to stability purposes, or speed purposes? If the answer is stability that would be an issue that needs evaluation, but if the answer is speed, I would make the weapon systems a permenant addition to the ship for all configurations.

When thinking about the weapon systems, it is interesting where they were designed for the ship. For example, how far will the LCS be able to de-elevate the MK 46 from that position? For a ship designed to fight small boats that are likely to get real close, it seems to me there is going to be several hundred feet out from the ship where a small boat can get under those Mk 46 30mms, and if you take a look at the 57mm in the front of the ship, there appears to be a similar issue. I keep thinking about the little blue boat incident in January, how close would be too close? The ship is designed to attack very small, fast boats at very close range... not warships over the horizon. I'm not sure Lockheed Martin approached the ship with that in mind in the design, because there might be some serious questions that still need to be asked.

There is a flip side to putting the weapons up high though, they have better range.

There are some weapon systems missing, at least in my opinion. For a ship intended to fight submarines, it is noteworthy the seaframe itself has no weapon, even a last resort weapon, to fight submarines with. While I understand that the Helicopter is the primary ASW offensive weapon system, it is never a bad idea to have an option should the helicopter be unable to get off the deck. I thought the absence of torpedo tubes was noteworthy, because as a rule I don't believe you should ever spend half a billion dollars on any ship for the US Navy intended to go in harms way without giving it at least one kill weapon, even if it is a very short ranged kill weapon.

It isn't difficult to see how Lockheed Martin can convert this ship into a fifth rate frigate. Because the weapon systems are all above the hanger, and the hanger is simply enormous, a redesign of that section could easily allow VLS cells to be added along the sides of the hanger, reducing the hanger size for additional weapons. For example, Saudi Arabia is reportedly looking for a frigate with SPY-F, VLS, and a 900 ft mine warfare command center. This ship could certainly support those requirements, adding 16 VLS cells, the radar system and converting part of the mission module space into a MIW section with a RHIB capability certainly seems like a possibility if you are willing to accept the reduction in speed. I have not read much about Israels requirements, but I have seen the LM MMC foldouts regarding Israel (PDF) and I see no reason why what is proposed couldn't be supported.

Because the ship is all speed and space, it really does have "export possibilities" written all over it, and you can do a lot with the space if you are creative, and probably more if you are willing to take a hit on speed. I don't know how the mission modules as planned will work out for the LCS, but assuming the ship can support the crew and weight requirements of the modules, the ship appears poised to introduce some new capabilities to the fleet.

I certainly have high hopes for the MIW module specifically because I think the LCS would be a significant upgrade for the US Navy if we built 26 Littoral Combat Ships to replace the 26 aging and retired mine sweepers (MCMs and MHCs). If the US Navy is able to replace the MCMs and MHCs with the LCS, we essentially deploy our mine warfare force for other mission profiles when mine warfare is not needed, but without reducing the training or capabilities of our mine warfare sailors because they are locked in with the mission modules. As a mine ship replacement, the Navy would gain 26 ships that can self deploy to low intensity theaters taking both speed and space to the fight, freeing up larger warships that currently conduct those mission profiles for other purposes. Integrated with mission modules like a Coast Guard module or even a GWOT SOF module, the Navy could replace the mission profiles most commonly conducted today by the limited firepower Perry class still operating in the fleet in SOUTHCOM, SE Asia, and off the African coast, all of which would be a good thing.

With that said, I still fail to see how the LCS, as currently designed, is a sensible replacement for the Perry class. The US Navy needs cruisers, but the good news is the seaframe I saw can be redesigned to be that too.