The current senior generation of officers has answered the nation’s call. It has both staffed and commanded more operations involving joint and interagency activity than any other since the Second World War. But many of these officers were “self-made” or “trained on the job,” gaining the necessary credentials, experience, and foreign-language skills through their own initiative. Just as the Navy formalized the creation of superb pilots and elite nuclear engineers, so should it enhance its formal mechanisms to create the new naval officer,with the ability to work in the joint, international, and interagency arenas.A friend of mine who works in a Washington think tank recently asked if there were any questions I would ask Ray Mabus in the Senate confirmation hearings. Uhm... hell yes! It took me about 2 minutes to get on the phone and go through a short list. Among the many questions one could ask the incoming Secretary of the Navy, the most important question I think that needs to be asked would go something like this:
One important point—at the end of the day, the heart of a naval officer is not defined by training tracts or career patterns, for these will eventually pass away and be replaced, as they always have.
What lies at the heart of this profession are the core beliefs of our lives: the courage, honor, and commitment to duty we must each find within ourselves. Yet beyond those vital and central elements, there lies the terrain of education, training, and experience. Those elements can and must be shaped to best advantage in this emerging and unruly twenty-first century.
A sense of historical perspective may inspire us to action. In 1919, Ernest J. King, then a captain, reflected on the events of the FirstWorldWar. Though the U.S. officer corps appeared to have acquitted itself in battle and had emerged victorious against the German U-boat, King knew it could have done better. He recognized that though the Navy had helped “win” the war, the old officer development system and “prewar career patterns had been overtaken by events.”
King and his generation profoundly reformed the Navy officer corps in the years after 1919 and laid the foundation for the creation of the officer corps that would lead theNavy to victory in the SecondWorldWar. Today we face similar challenges; our officer corps model has been “overtaken by events” and is in need of reform.
The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development, Admiral James Stavridis, U.S. Navy, and Captain Mark Hagerott, U.S. Navy, Naval War College Review Spring 2009
In the 21st century the United States has nearly lost one war in Iraq and may be losing another today in Afghanistan, despite winning every single major tactical engagement on the battlefield. Despite clear tactical and operational success in action on the ground, it has been strategic thinking that has defined the success and failure of our military engagements in the 21st century. As part of the Army's reaction to near fatal strategic failure in Iraq, General Petreaus was pulled off the battlefield in Iraq to chair a promotion board for brigadier generals. It was unprecedented for the commander of an active theater to be brought back to head something like that.
Leading up to this, the Army had long been criticized for rewarding conventional military thinking and experience in traditional combat operations. The Navy has long been criticized for the same thing. My questions would be whether the Navy needs to change the promotion process, and if so how can the Navy inject some new thinking into the promotion process to insure future Naval leadership is prepared properly for the challenges of the 21st century? How does the Secretary of the Navy guard against peacetime processes that fail the service in preparing for war? As far as I am concerned, the CNO hasn't been asked that question enough to produce a meaningful answer.
I spent several hours over the weekend Googling the names of the folks on this list. There are some studs, what I would call "no brainers" on that list. There were also a bunch of folks I couldn't find any information on, which doesn't mean anything. I have no problem with the list, I am sure everyone selected is qualified. However, I do have problems with some of the patterns one finds among the folks on the list. Of all the folks I found information on, all the aviators were basically the same, and all the SWOs were basically the same. I'm not talking about their personalities, I know each individual is unique, but I am saying it is difficult to find very many variations in terms of career path. From a career path perspective, the list is essentially a bunch of clones. In my opinion, the current career track that drives the promotion system is part of the culture of copy I have discussed in the past.
For example, if you are an aviator who is a CO of a special mission squadron, I am sorry to tell you sir but if this list sets the standard you are unlikely to find promotion. If you took time to learn a foreign language, you know, as the maritime strategy suggests... this 0-6 list does not appear based to list your name (unless you squeezed this in during a command assignment, which is not likely). The number of names that turned up something unique was around 30, mostly in the form of a previously earned award, someone who commanded a NECC unit, worked in patrol boats, or was a SEAL TEAM leader. I do not want to suggest I am diminishing the quality of the selections, there are some real studs on that list, but there are also patterns that could suggest the culture of copy is built into the career track promotion system.
Want to be really disappointed? Google the names and look at how folks on that list have written an article, anywhere. Who would have thought when Admiral Stavridis told junior officers to "Read, Think, Write, Publish" he was potentially giving bad career advice.
In the article quoted above, Admiral Stavridis and Captain Hagerott offer an alternative idea regarding the career tracks that would influence the promotion process.
It is possible to structure the line community so as to accommodate new expertise we need now,make the line more adaptive to unexpected changes we know the future will hold, and at the same time preserve core competencies in the platform communities. Specifically, the line could be restructured into three career “tracks” that complement but cut across the existing platform communities; we call them the Joint/Interagency Operations track, the Technical track, and the General Operations track.Like any article published in the NWC Review, this article is comprehensive in explanation and a very interesting idea. I am not sure if it is the right way ahead, but I do think it offers a compelling argument why the Navy needs to make a course correction for a process of developing naval leaders several decades old and clearly in need of adjustment. Today, the Navy promotion system is essentially a culture of copy. A broader demand of skills is being required according to the Navy's own leaders as expressed in the Navy's own strategic concept, and yet the promotion process is a cold war legacy absent reflection of the changing environment the Navy is operating in.
The three-track career construct for the Unrestricted Line explicitly acknowledges that its officers are currently expected to do too much in the time allotted. The three-track system recognizes that a growing number of officers need to develop expertise going beyond the platform. The three-track system would point line officers earlier in their careers to paths that would prepare some for joint/interagency operational careers (language, culture, regional knowledge, interagency activities), some for technically oriented careers, and some for more general and maritime operational careers. The modified system would, however, preserve both core platform competencies and the Navy’s culture of “command at sea.”
Any change to the current system would probably not be in place by next year, so if I was making recommendations, I would review the career tracks and target 2011 for implementing adjustments into the career tracks. For 2010, and perhaps longer if indeed a transition period is required from the current career track system to a new system, I would suggest adopting the Army's model and shaking things up a bit.
For new flag officers, I would suggest that Admiral Roughead appoints Admiral Stavridis to head the promotion board. I would also suggest that Admiral Roughead appoints Admiral Crowder to chair the 0-6 promotion board. If the Navy is serious about executing the maritime strategy, put the Navy's two big name maritime strategists in charge of these two very critical promotion boards. Given how many ships we are moving to the Pacific, it may also be prudent to put Admiral Willard in charge of the 0-5 board, because if the Pacific is the focus of the fleet, would anyone in the Navy know better than Admiral Willard what kind of CDRs the fleet needs right now? Think about it...
I'd like to see Ray Mabus asked about the Navy's career track and promotion systems, a prudent question I think following what many in the Army have called a disastrous peacetime promotion process that nearly lost the war in Iraq. The Navy hasn't faced a major challenge at sea in over 6 decades, so more than any other service the Navy must guard against peacetime processes that potentially fail to keep the Navy preparing leadership for the future. It begins with leadership, not only by executing necessary adjustments to insure the Navy is on the right path, but selecting future leadership prepared for the challenges of the future.
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