Somali Piracy Continues Expanding

To help understand the point, right click the image to the right and open in a new window. Every icon on the map represents a hijacking this year, and you may be able to make out the month to observe the patterns. The big yellow arrow... lets examine those three in order going from right to left.

BW Lion attacked on 11/9/2009

Somali pirates have launched their furthest attack in the Indian Ocean thus far, according to the European Union Naval Force (EU Navfor).

The attack on the VLCC ‘BW Lion’ was launched by pirates in two fast attack skiffs 400 miles northeast of the Seychelles and 1,000 miles east of Mogadishu.

“Automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades were fired. With increasing speed and evasive manoeuvres, the master managed to evade the attack. No casualties were reported,” EU Navfor said.

NELE MAERSK attacked on 11/10/2009

Danish shipping and oil group A.P. Moller-Maersk's container ship Nele Maersk was attacked by pirates off the Somali coast on Tuesday but evaded them unharmed, a company official said.

"They were approached by white skiffs of the kind Somali pirates often use and believe they were shot at," a Maersk spokesman said. "The ship sped up, made some evasive manoeuvres, and was able to escape."

FILITSA hijacked on 11/11/2009

Somali pirates said Wednesday that they had seized a container ship with 22 crew members on board after a five-hour chase across the Indian Ocean, reflecting both an increase in pirate activity after the end of monsoon storms and signs of increasing boldness among the hijackers.

The African Seafarers’ Assistance Program, based in Kenya, identified the vessel as the Filitsa, Reuters reported. Andrew Mwangura, a spokesman for the program, told Reuters that it was sailing under a Marshall Islands flag and carrying chemicals to South Africa from Kuwait.

There is absolutely no way skiffs can operate that far out to sea without a mothership. Clearly the mothership continued to operate for three days before the pirate band was able to hijack a ship. At 1000 nautical miles, it would would be very difficult to get a warship out that far in less than two days from the escort area in the Gulf of Aden, and nothing smaller than a Burke in the US Navy could do it in 2 days due to logistics over that distance.

Also note, that big red icon labeled October just to the left of the three Novembers I am pointing to with the yellow arrow..., that was the Chinese bulk carrier DE XIN HAI hijacked back on October 19th. There have been at least 20 attacks originating from Somalia in November so far, including five in the last 48 hours and most of those attacks are now in the Indian Ocean, where no convoy system exists.

These four attacks in particular, two of which were successful hijackings, are representative of the expanding regional challenge that unhindered piracy in the Indian Ocean represents. What began as a littoral crime is now taking place way out in the deep blue, suggesting pirates have developed seafaring skills and capabilities that are allowing them to expand their striking range. Compounding the problem, it can take hours to get an aircraft out that far, meaning ships are on their own for extended periods of time without support. Despite government efforts from the worlds economic powers contributing naval ships for escort and investment by the maritime community, the evidence continues to suggest that only mother nature has been effective in curbing piracy, despite the presence of over 30 warships!

For the United States, both CENTCOM and AFRICOM are now tasking warships and aircraft towards the anti-piracy effort, and yet both attacks and hijackings continue at a high rate. Naval presence and scouting with aviation has increased both awareness and information while cooperation has increased both industry countermeasures and international information sharing. The data highlights strong efforts have been made, therefore what is broken is not effort or intent. For me it is abundantly clear that what is broken is the political policy driving the strategy to deal with the problem.

With Army Generals in Afghanistan now pointing out that Al Qaeda has almost entirely shifted out of Afghanistan to Pakistan and Somalia, Somalia should be treated as an emerging asylum for the global jihad with intent to attack the United States. It is unreasonable to suspect Al Qaeda movement and activity in Somalia only to additionally assume they will ignore the incredible effectiveness of piracy originating from Somalia. The tactics, training, technology, and revenue streams surrounding the Somali piracy problem suggests an ideal environment for further expansion of Al Qaeda capabilities and techniques, and the absence of any containment off the coast of Somalia is an invitation to future disaster for western nations that depend on trade at sea. The ranges involved in recent attacks highlight that containment must be examined as the next step, because if the global community does not move to contain the expanding problem of piracy in the Indian Ocean, we are playing with gasoline in one hand, and a flamethrower in the other.

The Obama administration needs only to look at recent history to see what the powder keg Somalia can become for US Presidents. With both diplomatic and military options available, and as international support in both Europe and Asia shift towards greater action to get a grip on this problem, the Obama administration has a window of opportunity that should be realized while it exists, and before the powder keg explodes in someones face.