Six Part Series of USS Toledo Embark

Six parts and counting of some insights from an embark on the USS Toledo (SSN 769) from Bryan William Jones at War Is Boring. Good stuff.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64) (CTF-151)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) (CTF-151)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198)
USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2)


Boxer Amphibious Ready Group

USS Boxer (LHD 4) (CTF-151)
USS New Orleans (LPD 18)
USS Comstock (LSD 45)


EU NAVFOR

SPS Numancia (F83) (Flagship)
SPS Marques de la Ensenada (A-11)
HS Nikiforos Fokas (F466)
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F-209)
FGS Emden (F-210)
FGS Berlin (A-1411)
FS Nivose (F 732)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS Albatros (P 681)
ITS Maestrale (F570)
HMS Malmö (K12)
HMS Stockholm (K11)
HMS Trossö (A264)


Standing NATO Maritime Group 1

NRP Corte Real (F334)
USS Halyburton (FFG 40)
SPS Blas de Lezo (F103)
HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (F802)
HMCS Winnipeg (FFH 338)


Combined Task Force 150

FS Aconit (F713)
PNS Khaibar (F183)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)


Combined Task Force 151

See USS Boxer (LHD 4) above
See USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) above
See USS Gettysburg (CG 64) above
USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976)
TCG Giresun (F 491)
HMS Portland (F79)
RSS Persistence (209)


In Theater

Ocean 6
ITS San Giorgio (L9892)
RFS Admiral Panteleyev (DDG 548)
FS Forbin (D620)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Dupuy de Lôme (A759)
FS Marne (A 630)
FS Saphir (S602)
HMS Richmond (F239)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Shenzhen (DD 167)
PLAN Huangshan (FFG 570)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Sazanami (DD-113)
JS Samidare (DD 106)
JS Akebono (DD 108)
JS Tokiwa (AOE 423)

The following three ships are also supporting Russian Naval activity in the region near Yemen:

Irkut - tanker
Izhora - tanker
MB-37 - fleet tugboat

Iran has reportedly dispatch 6 unnamed ships to the coast of Somalia. This list is not always accurate, the number of naval forces in the region continues to change. I appreciate everyone who helps maintain accuracy in the comments.

New Doctrines Without Strategic Foundations

I think zenpundit is onto something, although I don't know that he has fully fleshed it out. I have been in a weird place this week, I've actually had time to do little except read books, which is different for me since I am usually all wired up online reading PDFs, something I am much more comfortable with. One book I was able to dive into this week is the Accidental Guerrilla by David Kilcullen.

I am not an expert on counterinsurgency, but ever since the surge and getting turned onto the topic by reading the Small Wars Journal, I have studied it enough to understand when COIN is and is not effective. I don't believe that COIN is a subject anyone will truly master without a great deal of regional centric training, education, and experience, although I really appreciate how many concepts of COIN scale in warfare, in particular the complicated discussions of how to operate military forces in populated environments (like the littoral).

Zenpundit is noting a book review of Kilcullen's book in RUSI written by John Nagl, and makes an interesting observation.

While relatively short and designed, naturally, to help promote a book by a friend and CNAS colleague, Dr. Nagl has also taken a significant step toward influencing policy by distilling and reframing Dr. Klicullen’s lengthy and detailed observations into a reified and crystallized COIN “doctrine”. A digestible set of memes sized exactly right for the journalistic and governmental elite whose eyes glaze over at the mention of military jargon and who approach national security from a distinctly civilian and political perspective:

Quoting from Dr. Nagl's book review in RUSI:

There is much first-hand reporting in this book, based on Kilcullen’s [Robert] Kaplan-esque habit of visiting places where people want to kill him. After chapters detailing his personal experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, he returns to his doctoral fieldwork in Indonesia, discusses the insurgencies in Thailand and Pakistan and evaluates the complicated plight of radical Islam in Europe. While all of these conflicts are related to each other, they are not the same, and cannot be won based on a simplistic conception like the global War on Terror; instead, the enemy in each small war must be disaggregated from the whole, strategy in each based on local conditions, motivations, and desires. One size does not fit all, and there are many grey areas. A ‘with us or against us’ approach is likely to result in far more people than otherwise being ‘against us’ in these conflicts.

This is where I think it gets interesting. Still quoting Dr. Nagl's review:

In direct opposition to the ideas that drove American intervention policy two decades ago, Kilcullen suggests ‘the anti-Powell doctrine’ for counter-insurgency campaigns.

• First, planners should select the lightest, most indirect and least intrusive form of intervention that will achieve the necessary effect.
• Second, policy-makers should work by, with, and through partnerships with local government administrators, civil society leaders, and local security forces whenever possible.
• Third, whenever possible, civilian agencies are preferable to military intervention forces, local nationals to international forces, and long-term, low-profile engagement to short-term, high-profile intervention.

I don't disagree with any of this, but I am beginning to wonder where this becomes a priority towards national security, and how we get to the point this becomes national security as opposed to imperialism. Understanding a culture in COIN is a means by which we implement cultural influence, and potentially force cultural adaptation. Toward what strategic national objective in national security do we participate in this doctrine? This is the question I ask myself when studying COIN.

I ask this question because Zenpundit is on to something when he calls this "The Kilcullen Doctrine." I think there is enormous potential here for positive and effective results, I'm just not sure I see the answer to the "why" question though. For example, based on this prescription for policy the question is what policy should it drive, the national security policy for the United States internationally, or the national security policy for the United States in the inner city domestic areas that are currently populated by gang (read tribe) culture thriving on narcotic and illegal activity (see any similarities)?

My point is actually a basic question regarding Afghanistan. Is the objective in Afghanistan to deny Al Qaeda a safe haven? If so, what do we do about other failed states (Somalia) or weak states (Pakistan) where Al Qaeda has a presence? Why have COIN experts so casually dismissed the lessons of Sri Lanka? From an intellectual view, is the Chinese approach in Tibet not a counterinsurgency campaign simply applied using a different doctrine? Think about it more than a few minutes before reacting to that question...

The reason why there are so many questions surrounding the COIN debate is because considerable intellectual energy is being expended on how to conduct COIN operations based on a necessity to apply our cultural standards in Iraq for economic purposes, but in Iraq there was a strategic purpose with strategic objectives (stabilize the Middle East after starting a war that destabilized the Middle East). However, strategic purpose for a COIN approach doesn't scale beyond any single theater and is only effective when the local population capitulates to the cultural standard being applied at a political level is productive for the majority, which raises all kinds of questions in each theater regarding the most effective way to reach a policy objective, particularly when one applies the intellectual understanding of local cultures as emphasized in the COIN discussion.

In Afghanistan, what is the political objective stated in policy? What is the strategy developed from this policy? If policy drives strategy, and strategy drives operational doctrine, shouldn't we all be a bit concerned that operational doctrine has become the policy talking point rather than a policy itself? Understanding the role of COIN in context of policy is a point Abu Muqawama is constantly making, and I sometimes wonder why this idea isn't getting into our political strategic communications regarding the goals desired in Afghanistan. Why should anyone in Europe commit further assistance in Afghanistan if we cannot articulate our political objective in Afghanistan, much less articulate what strategy will be utilized to implement policy?

With all the intellectual energy being expended on COIN doctrine, we are certainly becoming experts on how to apply counterinsurgency to our military occupations absent a clearly stated objective for the military occupation. What is missing in the open source is the intellectual energy being expended on the "why", which is what would normally constitute the political policy of a country exercising military power in the context of a grand strategy.

I see two things missing from the national security debate under the Obama administration.

1. A clear national political policy for any of the national security debates today, whether it is countries like Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, or Somalia or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2. A clear grand strategy for any of the foreign policy and national security debates today, whether it is the QDR, budget cuts, or operations being conducted globally including 2 wars; not to mention several emerging problems including nuclear level issues in Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. Ends are not well defined and means are being predetermined by budget decisions, and every major public discussion I see focuses on doctrine, education, and training (ways!) leaving strategy an upside down triangle in the context of a global economic crisis. We are missing a solid political and strategic foundation as a nation, and find ourselves literally teetering on the point and with a clear lack of symmetry. There is no question both our partners and adversaries are witness to our condition, which is why we have trouble finding help in places like Afghanistan and look powerless against third world straw men in Iran and North Korea.
   

With the focus on doctrine, in the end we are building the military for managing the problems that result from a lack of coherent policy and an alignment of strategy to policy. What is it we are trying to achieve with our liberal use of military power in the 21st century? This is not a complicated question, but an answer is a mandatory requirement to avoid the perpetual long war scenario. Did anyone in the Obama policy office ever read Clausewitz? Ironically, the Bush administration knew what political objectives they wanted from the use of military power, they just had no idea how to do it. How does either war end when our national strategy has no end derived by a political objective expressed as policy?

Short answer: it doesn't. Until this country has a public debate on the reason "why" we fight, the discussion will continue to be "how" we fight, meaning doctrine on the "ways" and an industrial driven discussion on what "means" will be purchased to fight will substitute for the public discussion of strategy as a way to avoid articulating a political policy, and in the meantime our military forces are being utilized globally absent a clearly articulated objective.

AFK

My blogging will cease until further notice due to a family issue. Prayers for my oldest daughter are always appreciated.

MEND Attacks Oil Infrastructure, Promises More Attacks to Come

While the international naval presence off the east African coast gets most of the attention, the problems in the Gulf of Guinea remain a serious problem that can spill over into a problem impacting your wallet.

On Monday the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) disabled pipelines used by US owned Chevron over the weekend. On Tuesday a Nigerian navy patrol foiled an attempted attack on an offshore oil facility operated French owned Total on Tuesday.

"Men in speedboats tried to attack our Amenam offshore field and they were driven away by a (navy) patrol team," Total spokesman Fred Ohwawa said.

Amenam lies about 30 kilometres (20 miles) offshore from Rivers State in the Niger Delta.

A spokesman for the Joint Task Force (JTF) protecting oil firms and facilities in the restive region confirmed the incident.

"There was an attempt to attack a Total's offshore facility, but the criminals were driven away," Colonel Rabe Abubakar told AFP.

20 miles offshore is in international waters. The US Navy has been increasing presence in the region with the African Partnership Station, but it does raise the question whether a larger presence is necessary. MEND has a history of attempting to attack these large offshore oil platforms, and the pattern suggests these attacks will continue.

All it takes is one successful attack, or even one attack that goes badly, and we have a potential huge global economic impact on energy or even a regional environmental problem that could trigger a chain reaction of events throughout that region.

It isn't an accident that last year when oil prices at the pump were so high, it was during the height of conflict between MEND and the Nigerian government. Oil production at that time was down to below 1 million barrels per day. After the loss of 100,000 barrels per day due to pipeline damage of the Chevron facility, Nigeria is pumping 1.76 million barrels per day. That compares to 2.6 million barrels per day back in January 2006.

Study after study suggests the western oil companies do a better job than the Nigerian government insuring the local population gets an economic boost in the local economy from the oil production. The Obama administration must do more to encourage the Nigerian government to pump revenues from oil back into the local economy as part of improving security. It is one of many necessary steps needed to fight the MEND insurgency.

Crude oil imports to the United States from Nigeria are down almost half from last year, and it looks like increased crude oil imports from the African nations of Angola and Algeria are making up the difference. Reasons for the decline include the global economic depression, the MEND insurgency, and diversification of supply. The real question is what happens when global demand increases with an economic rebound, and if the Nigerian government starts pulling in huge sums of cash as a result of increased oil demand... how will MEND react?

Great Read

Lex highlighted this story on Saturday, and it is worth highlighting again for folks who may not have read it.

GAO Report on Navy Shipbuilding

This is how gets reported when the GAO states the obvious.

Navy shipbuilding has more technical risk, is costlier and is less efficient than commercial shipbuilding, said the report by the Government Accountability Office. These problems are caused by Navy officials’ willingness to go forward with projects when requirements aren’t locked down, key technology isn’t ready and construction isn’t disciplined.

“[C]ost, schedule, and performance risk in the program resides primarily with the government,” the GAO inspectors wrote. “This risk often translates into cost growth and schedule delays, as lingering technology immaturity destabilizes design development for the ship, and subsequent design changes produce inefficient work sequencing and rework during construction.”

This is not surprising at all. I got sent this link the other day, check it out. This is the breakdown of NAVSEA employees by year.

2001 44,418
2002 45,912
2003 46,612
2004 35,614
2005 34,436
2006 34,205
2007 22,278
2008 22,445

You can access the GAO report here. It isn't kind.

Delivering ships on time and within budget are imperatives in commercial shipbuilding. To ensure design and construction of a ship can be executed as planned, commercial shipbuilders and buyers do not move forward until critical knowledge is attained. Before a contract is signed, a full understanding of the effort needed to design and construct the ship is reached, enabling the shipbuilder to sign a contract that fixes the price, delivery date, and ship performance parameters. To minimize risk, buyers and shipbuilders reuse previous designs to the extent possible and attain an in-depth understanding of new technologies included in the ship design. Before construction begins, shipbuilders complete key design phases that correspond with the completion of a three-dimensional product model. Final information on the systems that will be installed on the ship is needed to allow design work to proceed. During construction, buyers maintain a presence in the shipyard and at key suppliers to ensure the ship meets quality expectations and is delivered on schedule.

Navy programs often do not employ these best practices. Ambitious requirements are set and substantial investments made in technology development, but often the Navy does not afford sufficient time to fully mature technology. New designs often make little use of prior ship designs. As a result, a full understanding of the effort needed to execute a program is rarely achieved at the time a design and construction contract is negotiated. This in turn leads the Navy and its shipbuilders to rely on cost-reimbursable contracts (rather than fixed-price contracts) that largely leave the Navy responsible for cost growth. Complete information on the systems that will be installed on the ship may not be available, leading to changes that ripple through the design as knowledge grows. Starting construction without a stable design is a common practice and the resulting volatility leads to costly out-of-sequence work and rework. These inefficient practices cause Navy ships to cost more than they otherwise should, reducing the number of ships that can be bought under constrained budgets. The Navy’s in-house capability to oversee design and construction has eroded, and it has been slow to build capacity to support new programs. Congress has recently encouraged greater technology maturity and design stability at key points, but required reporting does not directly address completion of a three-dimensional product model.

Differences in commercial and Navy practices reflect the incentives of their divergent business models. Commercial shipbuilding is structured on shared priorities between buyer and shipbuilder, a healthy industrial base, and maintaining in-house expertise. The need to sustain profitability incentivizes disciplined practices in the commercial model. In Navy shipbuilding, the buyer favors the introduction of new technologies on lead ships—often at the expense of other competing demands—including fleet size. This focus—along with low volume, a relative lack of shipyard competition, and insufficient expertise—contributes to high-risk practices in Navy programs. Further, the consequences of delayed deliveries and cost growth are not as severe in Navy programs because of the use of cost-reimbursable contracts.

These are the GAO recommendations.

GAO suggests Congress consider refining required reporting to include additional design stability metrics. GAO is also making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at improving shipbuilding programs by balancing requirements and resources early, retiring technical risk and stabilizing design at key points, moving to fixed-price contracts for lead ships, evaluating in-house management capability, and assessing if the desired fleet size sufficiently constrains the cost and technical content of new ships. The Department of Defense agreed with five recommendations and partially agreed with two. GAO believes all recommendations remain valid.

Given that the NAVSEA workforce is now half the size it was just 8 years ago, it will take awhile to fix problems in shipbuilding.

Everything Hinges on QDR Decisions

“There are some folks that would say that the best way to do cooperative security is with small, cheap and benign little patrol boats operating in various areas around the world,” he said. “I would argue that the model that we have, with the Africa Partnership Station on Nashville, is a great way to do cooperative security.”

- Admiral Gary Roughead, Inside the Navy May 9, 2009

Inside the Navy (subscription only) ran an article on May 9th, 2009 called Roughead Amphibious Force Structure A Top Issue For Navy In QDR where the above quote comes from. Roughead goes on to add some details to his line of thinking.

“If I put five Country X sailors on one of our small patrol boats, and we teach them how to do maritime security, that’s great for those five sailors,” the admiral explained. “But consider what we’re doing with Nashville. She goes into an area and can still do, using the indigenous country’s capabilities, ways to do maritime security patrols. And oh, by the way, she has a well deck where you can bring boats in and teach and work with sailors from that other Navy on boat maintenance and boat repair, which is another way of teaching skills.”

Nashville also hosts officers who teach their counterparts in the various West African navies staff procedures, organization and maritime security constructs. And the ship is large enough “that if we want to have a maritime security conference to bring in other agencies from that country, we can bring them together,” Roughead added.

“At multiple levels we’re engaging and we’re working with not just the sailors who are responsible for the operations of their Navy, but with the leadership, and then being able to work in the broader maritime security construct,” he said. “For me, amphibious ships are great for that.”

Recently the H1N1 swine flu popped up among the crew of the USS Dubuque (LPD 8), which had been scheduled to conduct Pacific Partnership 2009, the annual medical diplomacy partnership operation in the southern Pacific. ADM Willard decided to keep the ship home, which turned out to be a smart decision as other crewmembers have come down with the bug. The replacment ship will be USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4). HSV Swift conducted the global fleet station in central America earlier this year. My point is ships other than amphibious ships have been carrying out the security cooperation role even as fewer Marines are available on amphibious ships, so there is plenty of room for a debate whether or not the amphibious ship is the appropriate platform for security partnerships.

In general I disagree with the premise of what ADM Roughead is suggesting, as if the choice is somehow either small patrol boats or amphibious ships. This is an artificial choice, hopefully the QDR rejects these type of myopic opinions and takes a realistic view of ship types and missions.

While I think that is an interesting topic, this was the key quote for me in the article.

An additional key Navy discussion area for the QDR will be irregular warfare, and “what are the components that make that up,” Roughead said, including the role of Naval Expeditionary Combat Command and riverine forces...

“For the first time, we did a force structure assessment on expeditionary combat command, and, remarkably, as we went out into the [combatant commands], there was not a definitive requirement that came through loud and clear on riverine,” he said. “So I want to get into that.”

Roughead noted that holding the discussion about irregular warfare component plans, including NECC, during the QDR process will allow the Navy to more effectively factor in the military’s ambitions writ large.

Riverine gets a lot of attention because of Iraq, but I do wonder where the irregular warfare component plans for the Navy will fit in, and how well will these plans align with the Marine Corps. With the Marines developing the SC MAGTFs, my question is what does the matching Navy component look like? Does it include an amphibious ship? Should it? Is the JHSV a more appropriate platform? Is this where the Influence Squadron has legs?

One last quote from the same article.

In an April 15 interview, Brig. Gen. Ronald Johnson, who directs the Corps’ operations division, told Inside the Navy that the 38 amphibious ship requirement “is the absolute bare minimum,” a figure generated with “an extreme amount of rigor and risk.”

The Marines are sizing their amphibious force based on what operations conducted in Fallujah, which is basically two full Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Is this the proper metric? What about Sea Basing? Why didn't Gates cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle?

These are just a handful of questions I look forward to discussing this week. Be sure and check out the history of amphibious operations between 1990-1999 and 2000-2009 to get a feel for what the Marines have been up to since the end of the cold war.

Happy Memorial Day

I'll be with family, traveling, or attending parades today as I celebrate the holiday. For those of you who are stuck behind a desk looking for something interesting to read, check out the history of Marine Corps amphibious operations between 1990 - 1999 I posted up on the US Naval Institute blog today. I'll post the history of amphibious operations between 2000 - 2009 up on the US Naval Institute blog either later today or tomorrow, as time allows.

This week I hope to focus in on the Marine Corps discussion leading into the QDR. Marines don't do blogs, but I've tried to pull some strings and get a few important folks including some great JFCOM folks I met on General Mattis's staff in Virginia Beach to swing by and look around this week. Keep the quality of the comments high, because as usual you never know who is paying attention.

Have a great holiday as we celebrate and memorialize our veterans today.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64) (CTF-151)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) (CTF-151)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198)
USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2)


Boxer Amphibious Ready Group

USS Boxer (LHD 4) (CTF-151)
USS New Orleans (LPD 18)
USS Comstock (LSD 45)


Taurus 2009

HMS Bulwark (L15) (Heading to Bangladesh)
HMS Ocean (L12)
HMS Somerset (F82)
HMS Talent (S92)
HMS Echo (H87)
USS Mitscher (DDG 57)
RFA Wave Ruler (A390)
RFA Fort Austin (A386)


EU NAVFOR

SPS Numancia (F83) (Flagship)
SPS Marques de la Ensenada (A-11)
HS Nikiforos Fokas (F466)
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F-209)
FGS Emden (F-210)
FGS Berlin (A-1411)
FS Nivose (F 732)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS Albatros (P 681)
ITS Maestrale (F570)
ITS San Giorgio (L9892)
HMS Malmö (K12)
HMS Stockholm (K11)
HMS Trossö (A264)

Standing NATO Maritime Group 1

NRP Corte Real (F334)
USS Halyburton (FFG 40)
SPS Blas de Lezo (F103)
HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (F802)
HMCS Winnipeg (FFH 338)


Combined Task Force 150

FS Aconit (F713)
PNS Khaibar (F183)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)


Combined Task Force 151

See USS Boxer (LHD 4) above
See USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) above
See USS Gettysburg (CG 64) above
USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976)
TCG Giresun (F 491)
HMS Portland (F79)
RSS Persistence (209)


In Theater

Ocean 6
RFS Admiral Panteleyev (DDG 548)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Marne (A 630)
FS Saphir (S602)
HMS Richmond (F239)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Shenzhen (DD 167)
PLAN Huangshan (FFG 570)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Sazanami (DD-113)
JS Samidare (DD 106)
JS Akebono (DD 108)
JS Tokiwa (AOE 423)

The following three ships are also supporting Russian Naval activity in the region near Yemen:

Irkut - tanker
Izhora - tanker
MB-37 - fleet tugboat

This list is not always accurate, the number of naval forces in the region continues to change. I appreciate everyone who helps maintain accuracy in the comments.

More on Varyag + news from Brazil

I've actually had these photos for a few days, but have been too busy to post them. They've been posted in other places already, but I thought I could offer some of my thoughts. Here are the photos (The final one is a rough blueprint of Varyag):





The first thing I noticed was that there are 3 large cranes around Varyag, which means a lot of resources could be devoted to do the intended work. We also see some scaffolding around the island, which should allow workers to access the flight deck and do their work. The entire right side of the flight deck seem to be open. That's where the VLS for shipwreck missiles used to be located. Looks like a lot of work is going to be done there. One of the past theories is that an engine could lowered through there to provide for its propulsion. I guess we will just have to wait and see what they intend to do with it. In the first picture, you can see a circled block there. A lot of people are speculating that it could be a catapult, I think its dimensions don't seem to fit that theory. Again, another thing to watch out for. The other interesting thing is that the huge containers on the flight deck of the Varyag from the move have all been removed now. Maybe all of that stuff have already been installed. If that's the case, then they really have been working pretty fast on it.

That's about all from Varyag front, I'm sure we will get more photos soon.

The other news that came out recently is the visit by the Brazilian President Lula to Beijing this past week. A bunch of deals were signed, but the big news actually came from an interview with Nelson Jobim, the Minister of defense for Brazil. You can see the interview in Portuguese here. The part that interested me translated as follows (using Google translate):

Defense @ Net - A range of military approaches to China. Como o Senhor vê essa aproximações com a China no âmbito do Ministério da Defesa? How do you see this approach with China under the Ministry of Defense?
The rapprochement with China is more directed toward the Navy. They (the Chinese) want the Navy of Brazil is the point of connection for the creation of the Chinese Navy. China has no navy. Also we will bring Chinese official here. Of course they have to learn Portuguese. They will stage the aircraft carrier São Paulo. The Chinese are acquiring aircraft carriers to project power in the region, a situation completely different from ours. I am going to China from September or October.

I think the important part is that Jobim is going to China this fall to basically finalize a deal that will allow Chinese naval pilots to train from Sao Paulo. You can see a little bit about the Sao Paulo aircraft carrier in its Wikipedia Page. I think it's kind of interesting that they chose Sao Paulo, because it's basically the only aircraft carrier with catapult and not serving for a country that current has military embargo on China. US will obviously not let PLAN train on its carriers and French navy probably will not either due to the embargo. I guess it shows that China is looking to build a CATOBAR carrier pretty soon. Otherwise, there really isn't any need to train on Sao Paulo right now. On the other hand, it's kind of curious that China is also planning to use NITKA training center, because that's probably preparing pilots for STOBAR carrier. Obviously, PLAN would be able to do more realistic training on Sao Paulo, but it would only have limited training schedule on Sao Paulo compared to NITKA. So, it looks like PLAN is just covering all the basis with its plans. On the whole, my guess is that Varyag will probably not equip any catapult, but the home built carriers will.

The other interesting part is that PLAN actually told Brazil that its building multiple carriers for power projection. We also heard a while back where a PLAN officer joked with USN about splitting power in Pacific Ocean (and I think there are definitely elements in PLAN that thinks this way). Also a couple of years ago, I remember reading Admiral Keating saying that PLAN officials were very forward about their intention to build aircraft carrier in private conversations (this was at a time when China was still sort of denying their aircraft carrier ambitions). I think this kind of conversation really contrasts with Chinese government's official statements. It seems like PLAN officers are more relaxed and transparent with their intention in private conversations through military exchanges than their civilian bosses are willing to be. In the past couple of years, I've seen many politicians and military personnel complaining about lack of reciprocal invitations from PLA after they had been fairly transparent toward visiting PLA delegation. I really think that PLA is still learning how to be more open with their intentions and such. And it is clear that contacts with other countries are helping them to build trust and understanding the importance of transparency. We are seeing PLA becoming more transparent recently (with its white paper and the 60th anniversary review). Only positive military engagements can direct PLA to become more transparent and reduce likelihood of a conflict.

Fundamental Changes are Coming

Midshipman Withington has posted the third part of his interview with Vice Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., and the subject of the future officer corps came up. Interesting Q&A here.

When you were Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, your office released a document about language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. Another article recently in the Naval War College Review [found here (PDF)] suggested a three-tiered track for officers. How will my generation of officers look different than previous generations?

Yeah, I think that’s fascinating. As Chief of Naval Personnel, I had the benefit of being able to take a look at the Navy as a whole…and reflected on how we’ve organized that [human] talent in the past—various warfare communities, various enlisted ratings and specialties. Really, we’re focused on the world that doesn’t exist anymore: the Cold War world with a far more predictable set of circumstances and well-defined roles for everybody in the Navy, whether you were officer or enlisted, warrants or LDO. They were set to deliver a very large, blue-water Navy focused on a war at sea, whether it was in the air, on the surface, or underneath and what it took to support that. So now we fast forward to where we are and we see many, many roles and missions we are expected to carryout, ranging from high-end bluewater conflict to the stuff we’re doing today: riverine squadrons in Iraq, suppression of piracy in Somalia, supporting the Comfort on a swing down South…The scope of activity has exploded on us, yet we still have the same structure to bin our talent as we have had for the last 30-40 years.

So, I think, in my little view of the crystal ball, the Naval War College Review article…[is] a pretty good sign of what our future may be…You will see fundamental changes in the construct of the officer corps that gives us a lot more flexibility to put the talent where we need it, when we need it and then make sure those folks are really optimized.

The Navy is a classic battle of jack-of-all-trades versus deep expertise in a particular field. At various times and places, you got to have those deep experts and other times you need people who know a lot about a bunch of things and are able to swing from one particular skillset and field to another, depending on what the situation demands. I see a real unlocking of the career paths and restructuring to open it up to give our talent a chance to get more focused on the wider range of areas; we’ll see how that takes us.

It’s going to be a heck of a challenge, obviously. The structure of the officer corps has deep roots and to change those things take an awful lot of guided effort. You don’t do it lightly at all, you’ve got to give this very, very careful thought…With that said, we have to make some fundamental changes and you all will be in the midst of it.

Read the rest here.

Last week while I was at the Joint Warfighter Conference 2009 in Virginia Beach, Vice Admiral Peter H. Daly was on one of the panels on Thursday. As I was listening to him talk on the panel, I realized that I had never once blogged about VADM Daly, couldn't recall reading anything he had said, and I only knew two things about him.

First, he was recently assistant deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5). As anyone who reads here frequently might imagine, I'll buy beer for the N3/N5 folks any day.

Second, he was commander of Carrier Strike Group 11 during the time period PBS filmed the 10 part CARRIER mini-series.

I decided I would shake hands and introduce myself to the VADM after the panel session, and intentionally positioned myself to be last in line. I also decided not to ask a question, and see whether he starts talking or was looking to get out of there.

After shaking his hand, he asked if I had any questions, and I told him that I didn't. VADM Daly then started a 2 minute discussion about Command at Sea (one of my favorite subjects to listen to naval officers discuss), the responsibilities and what it means to him. He concluded his point by noting how Command at Sea is what separates the Navy from the other services, because it empowers a certain independence streak formed from the requirement demands of Command.

So I countered, "If that is true, then why are Flag officers accused of being part of a group think mentality? Why are there few obvious mavericks among the Navy leadership?"

That pretty much ended the discussion, with him saying the Navy had it better than the Air Force and leaving it there. Then he pointed to a member of his staff that was with him, an 0-4 (whom I really wish I had written down his name) who had just come off an 0-4 Command of a PC in the Gulf.

Nothing personal to VADM Daly, but upon reflection had I known the 0-4 had been a CO of a PC in the Gulf, I would have skipped the handshake and short discussion with VADM Daly and spent the time talking to the 0-4. Claims of independence and experience aside, I just think the 0-3 through 0-6 community generally says things that are more interesting specifically because of that independence VADM Daly is talking about.

I have never met a naval officer who didn't have strong opinions. I think officer development in the US Navy is very effective, because it teaches officers to think. I believe officer development is most effective when it teaches officers how to think, and is not effective when it teaches officers what to think. The tendency of officers to always have an opinion is why I knew VADM Daly would start talking, even in the absence of a question.

A pattern is emerging that I haven't seen in the Navy for about a decade, Navy officers at the Flag level are speaking up and giving opinions in public that are counter to the existing positions of the Navy today. ADM Stavridis and VADM Harvey are two such officers. I think this is important, because we only see this happen when serious issues are on the table and new ideas are being called for from within. The debate is here, and it will influence broadly throughout the fleet. The QDR, which will answer just about every question currently on standby in the public Navy discussion today, is just one part of this debate. Officer development and future leadership is another part I see bubbling up from inside the Navy.

Despite many challenges ahead, my glass is half full regarding the direction of the Navy today. I think VADM Harvey hits a bulls eye in his last statement, fundamental changes are coming to the Navy and the emerging junior officer corps of the Navy will be in the midst of it.

We Need Better International Legal Frameworks

So Obama and Cheney gave a little talk on detainees today... It was interesting, and usually something I would avoid on the blog, except I see the way Obama is moving forward on detainees as part of a larger problem how we deal with international bad guys when by policy the US is dedicated to taking multi-national approaches. From Esquire.

President Obama's decision to stick with a modified version these tribunals — "an appropriate venue for trying detainees," as he called them today — seriously undermines his campaign pledge to turn the page on Bush-Cheney's deeply flawed approach to terrorism. No matter how many times he enumerates the "swift changes" by his administration to ditch its predecessor's out-of-thin-air concepts — "war on terror," "enhanced interrogation methods," "unlawful enemy combatants" — Obama continues to promote Bush-Cheney's isolating notion that detainees should be tried in a special, U.S.-executive-branch-controlled system of alternative justice that lies outside of two proven pillars of traditional justice: the military's ever-effective courts martial and our civilian court system, which is held in place by the same safeguards of the Constitution that Obama invoked so many times this morning.

Beyond the rhetoric, then, Obama has told the world that America's definitions of terror remain its own. He says it's not a reversal? It is. The president has reminded the world of a Cheney-ism: We know terrorism when we see it, and when we see it, we'll let you know.

Which leads to the point.

So the president's invocation of "decisions based on fear rather than foresight" may have been aimed as much at his own party as at the man following his speech, but the political wrangling, the Guantanamo funding votes, and even Obama's promises of more procedural safeguards for defendants at his commissions all miss the larger point: America continues to ignore the utility of building up case law with regard to terrorism — either within our own military/civilian systems or across the international system as a whole, where the International Criminal Court remains a wholly untested option.

The challenges on the legal side of piracy are very similar to the legal challenges we see with the detainee issue, which is why I appreciate the suggestions the article provides in the end.

If the National Defense Policy and Foreign Policy of the United States is to work with allies and partners to deal with transnational actors who are attacking the international community, and the National Defense Policy and National Security Policy of the United States is for military forces and law enforcement to work with international partners to meet this challenge, then it only makes sense that on the enforcement side an international legal framework will be required when US law isn't sufficient to the issue. We aren't the only country who needs the international criminal court system to step up and deal with international bad guys, the Dutch could use it today regarding pirates.

This goes for terrorists, pirates, folks who are engaged in genocide and other crimes against humanity. How is it possible that in both law enforcement and defense, the United States is taking multinational approaches to transnational threats then thinks it makes sense when we come up with unilateral legal solutions to what are also multinational legal problems? Seems to me that the legal enforcement for an international approach must also include an international legal solution (sounds like a no brainer!), otherwise our rule sets end up out of balance and do not develop working international institutions necessary to make international cooperation for security viable long term.

I'm not a huge fan of the International Courts in general, but it does seem to me to be the way ahead for dealing with international terrorists and criminals that our own criminal court system cannot handle. While it is entirely possible that terrorists and criminals who are caught will likely go free, that is part of the price paid for the multi-national approach to security. It isn't like the release program for detainees in the past has been much better, just ask the top Al Qaeda dude in Yemen.

U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian

Has anyone read this? Looks promising...

All Ahead Slow on LCS

The Littoral Combat Ships is a new type of high-speed surface combatant with interchangeable warfighting mission modules optimized for littoral or coastal missions. The ship is designed to defeat asymmetric anti-access threats including mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft.

LCS consists of a seaframe that is outfitted with reconfigurable payloads, called Mission Packages that can be changed out quickly. Mission Packages are supported by special detachments that operate and maintain manned and unmanned vehicles and sensors to counter mine, undersea, and surface threats. There are currently three types of focused Mission Packages that provide potent combat capability in specific warfare areas: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW) and Surface Warfare (SUW). The ship will operate one package loaded at a time, but can swap to a new package in 1-4 days.

The first two ships, USS Freedom (LCS 1) and the future USS Independence (LCS 2), have very different and distinct designs. The Lockheed Martin design (LCS 1) is a high-speed semi-planing steel and aluminum monohull. The General Dynamics design (LCS 2) is an all-aluminum trimaran with a slender, stabilized monohull.

LCS is a warhship, designed to conduct combat operations. It is capable of sustaining combat damage and still perform its mission. To accomplish this, LCS was designed and constructed to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Naval Vessel Rules (NVR). LCS was the first application of NVR to a surface combatant. NVR essentially replaces military general specifications used in past surface combatants.

As a surface combatant, LCS will be crewed by U.S. Navy sailors and officers. LCS is a leap forward in automation and reduced manning. The core ship (seaframe) has a crew complement of 40. The Mission Package brings a maximum of 35 personnel, including up to 20 personnel in the aviation detachment. Total berthing aboard LCS is 75.

Team Ships FAQ - accessed 5/21/09

That typo in the second to last paragraph, fourth word, is an ironic example of exactly how much of a mess the Littoral Combat Ship program has become for the Navy. The LCS is a far cry from a warship in the historical context, so it is appropriate the word warship gets misspelled in the Navy's own description. I personally think that this description for the Littoral Combat Ship does more damage to the platform than it helps, indeed I find the entire narrative of the US Navy regarding the LCS program to be intellectually dishonest. This narrative, if it still exists in five years, will be why the Littoral Combat Ship is the Navy's greatest shipbuilding failure since the 120 gun 34 gun USS Pennsylvania.

Converted from the collier USS Jupiter (AC-3) beginning in 1920, USS Langley (CV-1) was commissioned in March 20, 1922. The Navy had already flown aircraft off the deck of a ship, but on October 17m 1922 Lieutenant Virgil C. Griffin piloted a Vought VE-7 from her decks. This is a momentous occasion in US Naval history, the age of the aircraft carrier for the US Navy was born. Nine days later Lieutenant Commander Godfrey de Courcelles Chevalier made the first landing on the USS Langley (CV-1) in an Aeromarine 39B.

In January the following year, USS Langley (CV-1) conducted flight operations and tests in the Caribbean Sea for carrier landings. Five months later the ship steamed up to Washington DC to give a demonstration at a flying exhibition before civil and military dignitaries. In 1924 the nations first aircraft carrier participated in several maneuvers with other ships and did several other demonstrations for dignitaries before departing for the Pacific at the end of 1924.

For the next twelve years the USS Langley (CV-1) operated in the Pacific training with other fleet units, conducting experimentation, and developing a pilot training program at sea. Operational models, doctrine, and tactics were developed as the aircraft carrier was prepared as a platform to screen the battle line. The USS Langley (CV-1) served as an aircraft carrier until October 25, 1936 when the ship was converted into a seaplane tender.

Despite the long innovative development of the aircraft carrier, five years and two months after the USS Langley (CV-1) was retired as an aircraft carrier, the Japanese Navy demonstrated the utility of the aircraft carrier to the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 6, 1941. In other words, despite conceptual development, conversion, evaluation and experimentation of this very innovative, but complicated technology the US Navy never developed an effective concept of operations for aircraft carriers prior to WWII. The US Navy struggled to understand where the aircraft carrier fit in the fleet, and ultimately the Japanese showed us. With that said, what the US Navy did do is stick with aircraft carriers as a technology, and had not only built but had mastered the construction of the very complicated technologies of aircraft carriers allowing us to build several modern aircraft carriers during WWII.

I believe USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2) represent the USS Langley (CV-1) of the 21st century. I believe that in the 21st century, motherships for manned and unmanned underwater, surface, and aviation systems will be as important as aircraft carriers were in the 20th century. I believe these distributed, sometimes expansive offboard system empowered networks will influence the littoral battlefield and determine who controls the seas.

I see unmanned systems as the dominate warfighting approach towards controlling the maritime battlefield in the 21st century, just as I see manned systems as the dominate peacemaking approach on the maritime battlefield in the 21st century. Motherships, with the ability to deploy both manned and unmanned systems, represent the emerging capability of our time on the maritime battlefield. I believe sea control in 21st century warfighting will require dominance above and under the sea, but 21 century sea control for peacemaking will require a sailor present at the point of contact with the population on the sea.

The Littoral Combat Ship is an innovative, complicated, small modular mothership that introduces the Navy to the technical, logistical, operational, tactical, and doctrinal challenges of the 21st century mothership concept. Just as the USS Langley (CV-1) was a far from perfect aircraft carrier, both LCS designs are far from perfect motherships.

Cost

One of the most cited items of complaint for the Littoral Combat Ship is the cost. For months I have been searching for answers to a few questions: Where did the number $220 million for the hull come from, and where did the number $180 million for the modules come from. The Navy is so wildly wrong on the estimates for both hull and module that I never believed these figures were produced from a technical evaluation of cost. In my search for the truth, it turns out the answer is as I suspected, both figures were a wild ass guess.

Several sources have confirmed to me the way the Littoral Combat Ship estimate of $220 million was reached was that during a visit to Odense Steel Shipyard, ADM Vern Clark asked the shipbuilders how much HDMS Absalon (L16) cost. The answer was $440 million. When the Littoral Combat Ship was developed as a ship about half the size of the Absalon class, Clark used the number $220 million as the estimate for the platform. Half the size meant half the cost, and the number was apparently never questioned. Unfortunately, HDMS Absalon (L16) costs a hell of a lot more than $440 million, because $440 million was the estimate at the time of the contract with Odense Steel Shipyard, and basically included only the hull. $440 million was the estimate for a hollow shell, but became the driving number for $220 million which was supposed to include all of the systems and the hull of the LCS.

Today the LCS cost is still largely unknown. While Congress has established a $460 million cost cap, there is no guarantee this cost cap can be achieved for the hull regardless of how many are built. The mission modules are also very immature, and as such have enormous potential for long term problems. The Navy intends to spend the next five years testing USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2), and the odds that the mission modules of today will look the same in five years is very slim.

The LCS Is Counter Culture

The Littoral Combat Ship is more complicated than people give it credit for, as several aspects of the Littoral Combat Ship represent the antithesis of naval ship development. The engineering for modularity is both new and complicated. The Littoral Combat Ship is a test case for a lot of automation intended to reduce the crew size of ships. The Littoral Combat Ship is a test case for high speed on small crew conventional warships, and has an overly complicated CODAG engineering plant highly dependent on automation as a result. The engineering challenges of the hull are only part of the problem, almost none of the pieces intended to make up the mission modules includes a mature technology. The crew scheme, the doctrine for operating the ship, the concept of operations for the ship type, and the logistics of the mission functions and the hull types are all challenges yet to be fully developed.

The US Navy is a blue water Navy, and the US Navy has not developed a littoral strategy that includes ships intended to operate in the littoral since WWII. During both Korea and Vietnam, the US Navy leveraged vessels either designed or evolved from WWII era ship designs, with small ships like the Asheville class, Pegasus class, and Cyclone class being the rare exceptions. Among the exceptions, only USS Typhoon (PC-5) has served in the Navy consecutively for more than 15 years.

I am often struck by how critics misunderstand how the Littoral Combat Ship represents something so unique in US Navy culture that we haven't seen anything like it in over 5 decades. This is a relatively small ship being developed specifically for the littorals intended to serve longer than just 2 decades. It seems to me that critics too easily dismiss or fail to recognize just how foreign it is that the US Navy would operate a small vessel for any meaningful period of time. I'm not saying that corvettes won't happen, but the suggestion the US Navy will build small platforms for the littoral simply because someone else does is crazy talk, it is completely against the US Navy culture and will require a major mindset adjustment.

Where is LCS Going?

Critics of the LCS suggest the US Navy should be building safe, proven hulls instead of the wild combination of capabilities represented in the Littoral Combat Ship. I only disagree with one aspect of that line of thought, the whole idea of "instead." The rest of the world is building nice, safe ~3000 ton hulls with designs that are decades old and barely innovative. FREMM is nowhere close to as flexible as the Littoral Combat Ship in terms of modularity, and comparing the Absalon to the LCS in terms of systems support demonstrates pure ignorance. Absalon has space, but it takes a lot more than space to support unammned systems. No question FREMM and Absalon are excellent ship designs, but there is nothing truly innovative about them, and they cannot support flexible, interchangeable modular payloads.

Innovation is the bane of contracting, indeed contracting by nature is a risk averse exercise that draws criticism at a rate consistent with the level of risk involved. The LCS is a combination of several innovations including modularity, unmanned systems, smaller crew size, automation, and speed. I personally don't think all of these combination's add up to a 'littoral combat ship' nor even a ship with well designed requirements, but I appreciate the fact the Navy needs to get all of these innovations into the future fleet (thus to sea). The only way that happens is to build a few Littoral Combat Ships and see what they can do.

Other than the LCS, right now the US Navy has nothing on the chalkboard smaller than the DDG-51s, and nothing on the chalkboard that can act as a mothership smaller than the LPD-17. If the LCS was canceled today, what would the US Navy build? MSC ships like T-AKE or JHSVs? I'll take more Littoral Combat Ships instead. The QDR is going to hopefully change what goes on the chalkboard, but even that will take a few years. For now, the Littoral Combat Ship is an excellent way to move ahead with mothership development in my opinion.

Change the Narrative!

The Navy needs to change the narrative for the LCS. There are at least 5 very difficult years ahead of the Littoral Combat Ship where testing and evaluation will be conducted. It is intellectually dishonest every time a flag officer claims to know what the LCS is, or what it can do. The fact is, nobody knows what the LCS will be or what it will do well, or do poorly. Anyone suggesting the Littoral Combat Ship is going to be excellent at some specific task in 2009 is basically the fool suggesting what the aircraft carrier is going to mean to the 20th century back in 1923. Nobody in 1923 knew how the aircraft carrier was going to influence naval warfare, the predictions were much more generic. Nobody in 2009 knows for sure how motherships are going to influence naval warfare, we can only make generic predictions.

The Littoral Combat Ship program is likely to be the most innovative and influential development for surface warfare in the first half of the 21st century, a unique opportunity for today's surface warfare community to be the pioneers in how surface warfare will operate in the 21st century. The layers of awareness in the maritime domain that motherships will enable, the networked capabilities motherships will empower for the both the warfighter and peacemaker, and the development of the concept of operations for motherships will all combine to influence the way surface warfare will command the sea in the 21st century.

The Littoral Combat Ship itself is almost certainly going to be looked back on through the prism of history in the same context we now look at the USS Langley (CV-1) and see a poorly designed aircraft carrier. But that isn't how we look at the USS Langley (CV-1) today, is it?

I hope the Navy continues with the LCS despite the critics. I also hope the Navy slows down with the LCS and develops a new narrative central to innovating towards a conclusion without attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole. The LCS is not a solution to anything other than challenging assumptions, innovating motherships and associated technologies, and developing a new concept of operations for surface warfare.

What Does a Duck Look Like? Naval Flag Officers in 2002

This article was originally submitted as a special research project for the Naval War College in October 2002 by the LCDR Michael Junge, United States Navy. Purchased but never published by the United States Naval Institute for publication in Proceedings, this article seems to align itself very well to recent discussions regarding leadership and promotions tracks.

CDR Michael Junge is currently assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Emerging Capabilities Division. He previously commanded USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41).


Introduction

When asked why officers with specific records or jobs seemed to screen over those who had done something else, a Navy Flag officer replied “Ducks pick ducks.” No matter how large, every organization’s actions devolve down to the personalities of the senior leadership. Those personalities are shaped by many factors, where one grew up, went to college, the course of instruction, tour patterns, supervisors, subordinates. All of these form the frames of reference from which leaders think, decide, and act. This study is a very limited attempt to look at the potential frames of reference that bound the current U.S. Navy Flag Officer Community. Diarist Anais Nin aptly describes my purpose: “We don’t see things as they are, we see things as we are.” Or, we can say that this is an attempt to picture a duck, the 2002 model.

Methodology

For this project I reviewed biographies of the 197 Flag Officers and Flag selectees from the Unrestricted Line communities serving on active duty between April and August 2002. The Unrestricted Line was chosen in order to reduce the sample size as well as to review those officers who lead the operational forces, as opposed to purely support forces, of the United States Navy. 164 of the biographies were considered complete enough for analysis beyond the basics of rank and designator, forming the sample set for this study. Though the data analyzed is self-reported, because of the official nature of the biographies obtained from the Department of the Navy Chief of Information, it is assumed to be factually correct. However, as there are no official standards for these biographies, there is a significant variance in the data contained therein. At the very least, these biographies illustrate that career information which each flag officer finds important or relevant. In the case of missing information, statistics were derived only from those officers who reported for that area being evaluated. Unless otherwise noted, all statistical derivations are made from those biographies and the Naval Flag Officer database available from the Bureau of Personnel.

In 1972 historian Peter Karsten published “The Naval Aristocracy.” His review of the geographic, social, economic, and political background of the nineteenth century/early twentieth century Naval officer provided much of the conceptual format for this study.

Statistical Distribution

Flag Officers make up less than one half of one percent of the officer corps, and one tenth of one percent of the overall force. 75 percent of the population of Navy admirals comes from the Unrestricted Line (URL) community while the URL makes up only 50 percent of the overall officer community. 24 of the 30 Vice Admirals and all eight full Admirals come from the URL.

Designator

41 percent are naval aviators, 34 percent surface warfare officers, and 20 percent submarine officers. The remaining 5 percent are from the special warfare (4) and fleet support (6) communities. While these percentages are somewhat aligned with the Navy officer corps at large, there are some differences. Aviation officers make up 47 percent of the URL – an under representation of 6 percent. Surface warfare officers, who make up 31 percent of the URL, have slightly more than a “fair share” of flag officer billets while submarine officers, who fill 20 percent of flag officer billets, make up only 13 percent of the URL. Fleet Support and Special Warfare are comparatively more significantly under represented with only 5 percent of flag officers while making up almost 10 percent of the URL.

Community and Sub-community

Within each of the communities there also exist sub-communities – often unofficially. As a result of the varied types of platforms, these are most prominent within the surface and aviation communities. Because of the smaller number of platforms and common training pipelines, the submarine community has instituted personnel control policies that move officers back and forth between the two types (SSN and SSBN) of vessels they operate.

Within the careers of aviation flags there have been over a dozen different types of aircraft – usually exclusive of the others. Among the current flag officers, 70 percent come from the fixed wing communities, 58 percent from carrier based fixed wing, and 56 percent carrier based, jet propelled, fixed wing. Yet, this subset makes up only 27 percent of naval aviation officers. Aviators choose their aircraft type (or have it chosen for them by the needs of the Navy) during the early stages of flight training, usually around the second year of commission service. As a result, an action that is taken very early on in ones career can greatly increase, or decrease, the potential that one is selected to flag rank.

Surface Warfare is also broken out into three distinct communities, surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates), amphibious forces, and combat logistics forces. Since 1965, surface combatants have averaged 52 percent of the force (ranging between 40 percent in 1965 and 65 percent in the mid 1990s). Combat logistics forces have averaged 28 percent but over the last decade have been transferred to the Military Sealift Command – counting among the force but not manned by U.S. Navy personnel. Amphibious forces have averaged 18 percent with little variation. Yet, 75 percent of surface warfare flag officers have come from predominantly surface combatant careers and 81 percent have served onboard surface combatants. In the accession years studied, Combat Logistics force ships comprised a third of the force and were manned and operated by U.S. Navy personnel – but only 2 of today’s flag officers have any experience in combat logistics force ships. Amphibious experience has also not fared well. While 21 percent of the surface flags have some form of amphibious ship experience, only 4 (6 percent) have had what can be characterized as predominantly amphibious backgrounds. All four of them have served at least one tour in surface combatants.

Age

While biographies do not list age, an assumed college graduation age of 22 provides an average age range of 50 to 54 with an assumed low of 46 and a high of 58. Predictably, the higher ages are provided by the senior ranks of Admiral and Vice Admiral while the younger age groups are the more recently promoted Rear Admirals. There are some exceptions – RADM Rempt is a contemporary of three more senior officers commissioned in 1966 and a number of other two-star admirals were also commissioned in the late 1960s. The newest selectees, however, were commissioned between 1971 and 1978, with the majority clustered between 1974 and 1975. In all, the current inventory of flag officers generally began their quest for a commission between 1962 and 1974, with the overwhelming majority in some form of officer training during the height of the Vietnam War.

Sex

190 of the 197 total URL flag officers are male. 194 are married (1 man and 2 women are not). While much could be made of this portion of the analysis in comparison to today’s force and society, it is far more indicative of the force twenty-five to thirty years ago. The repeal of the Combat Exclusion Law in 1994 has the potential to alter the makeup of the future flag inventory, though it is likely that the unusual demands of the Navy will prohibit exceeding the ability of industry to promote and retain women in senior executive positions. It is important to also recognize that the selection of RDML(sel) Deborah Loren marks the first flag selection of a “warfare qualified” woman in the history of the Navy.

Geographic

The 1997 TISS study of civil-military relations made much of the influence (and difference) of geography in the accession and retirement patterns of military and civilian leadership. The oft quoted finding that the military was largely southern and conservative does not necessarily hold true with this group of flag officers. Using 1969 census data, 33 percent of the nation’s population was from the south, but only 27 percent of today’s flag officers originated there . 39 percent claim the northeast, far over representing the then population statistic of 22 percent - and higher than 2000’s 27 percent. The West and Midwest, like the south, also showed less than expected representation among flag officers. A note of caution with these numbers, however. Of the 164 Flag Officers who had relatively complete biographies, over two thirds (69 officers) did not list an accession state potentially biasing the results.

Commissioning Source

56 percent of the surveyed admirals were graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy. Officer Candidate School and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps were more evenly matched at 20 percent and 18 percent respectively. In 1998 Naval Academy accessions comprised 26 percent of the URL, comparable to ROTC’s 24 percent with OCS providing the remaining 50 percent. This is a difficult comparison to the 1969-1978 yeargroups that saw the Vietnam buildup and drawdown but is illustrative for those attempting to compare today to yesterday. In making such a comparison it would be very easy to find “proof” of a modern Annapolis aristocracy in charge of today’s Navy. Seven officers have prior enlisted service. Two of these officers graduated from the Naval Academy, the others from either Aviation Officer Candidate School or Officer Candidate School.

Undergraduate Education

A basic requirement for commission as an Unrestricted Line officer is the possession of a baccalaureate degree. Of the 164 biographies reviewed, 98 did not disclose their undergraduate major. Of those who did, 47 (71 percent) were technical or science degrees. Math (10) was the most commonly listed major. There was no detected rationale behind not listing undergraduate major or degree. Naval Academy graduates neglected this information at nearly the same proportion as existed within the sample. Among Naval Academy graduates of the time period, Management, Oceanography, Math, Aeronautical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and International Security Affairs provide nearly fifty percent of overall majors. While not necessarily degree graduates, 27 officers attended Harvard – usually as a member of the Executive Training Program. Of note, 36 officers listed no educational accomplishments, either undergraduate or graduate.

Graduate Education

In contrast, 110 officers listed at least one graduate degree (67 percent), 14 percent indicated two or more graduate degrees; eight officers posses doctoral degrees. Again, limited information with regards to major was provided, but there was a significant drop from the undergraduate 71 percent technical majors to only 23 percent (32 officers). The most common source of graduate education was the Naval Post Graduate School (25 percent) followed by the Naval War College (16 percent) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The belated accreditation of the various war colleges potentially limits the number of graduate degrees conferred. While few of the biographies provide attendance dates, given the commissioning years studied, only the most recent (1975-78) would have had the opportunity to attend the Naval War College’s College of Command and Staff after the 1991 accreditation by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges.

Joint Education and Experience

JPME

52 officers (30 percent) reported attendance at one of the nation’s service colleges. 31 attended the Naval War College, 14 the National War College, and 8 the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Only one (a surface warfare officer) attended the Air War College, one the Army War College (Fleet Support who also attended the Naval War College), and one National Defense University. Four officers attended service colleges more than once. Yet, despite the 1986 requirement by the Goldwater-Nichols Act that all flag officers receive joint professional military education, 91 of the 164 biographies had no mention of any form of joint education.

JCS or Joint Command

There is a commensurate scarcity of joint experience prior to attaining Major Command. 134 of the 164 Flag officers had no joint experience. Of those that had experience, most were assigned to the Joint Staff, many as members of a personal staff. There was no correlation between assignment to a joint billet and corresponding joint education. Half of the officers who had served in Joint billets made no mention of Joint Professional Military Education in their biographies. In contrast, 35 officers were assigned Joint Duty after major command.

Tour Patterns

All unrestricted line officers are expected to gain some level of proficiency in management, fleet operations, and equipment operation and maintenance. Officers are encouraged to broaden their experience through tours that span the spectrum of operations and equipment within their medium (air, surface, subsurface) and even across geographic locations. Each of the communities follows a similar path of increasing responsibility from division officer to department head to executive officer and finally command. Each of these tours is separated by assignment to shore duty to allow for maturation and broadening experience between operational tours. The primary differences occur in timing, selection flow points, and retention percentages.

Aviators undergo basic flight training, then an initial operational tour within a squadron. This is followed by a support tour in either a training squadron, teaching new aviators, or in some other shore support role. A “disassociated” tour follows as aviators go to sea in broadening roles as division officers in aviation focused ships or staffs. This is followed by a department head tour and, hopefully, a rotation among the major departments (maintenance, operations, training) within the squadron. A second shore tour brings staff experience followed by command screening and assignment as executive officer with subsequent command of the same squadron.

Submariners and surface warriors follow a similar path. Initial training is followed by division officer tours. Surface Warfare officers serve in either an operations, combat systems or engineering billet for twenty-four months with a transfer to a second ship and broadening tour for an additional eighteen months. Submariners (ideally) rotate among departments over a thirty-six month tour. Both move to shore duty in either training, education, or staff commands followed by department head tours. Surface Warfare uses two succeeding tours to specialize within one of the major departments (operations, combat systems, and engineering). Submariners generally serve a single longer tour leading one department (navigation, combat systems, or engineering). A second shore tour provides staff experience and, following screening for executive officer, assignment as second in command. A third shore tour is an opportunity for assignment to additional staffs or the War College. Command screening brings the officer to their “Commander Command”, followed by another shore tour and then Major Command as a Captain.

It is important to note that the aforementioned paths are by necessity notional. No two career paths are likely to be the same. That said, there is a nominal expectation to remain within the general bounds of the notional path. Among the biographies reviewed, there were no major deviations noted from this career path. There were, however, some interesting patterns.

Personal Staff

72 officers (43 percent) had served at least once as member of an admiral’s personal staff as an aide, flag secretary, or executive assistant. For those officers who served on a personal staff, 13 began as Lieutenants, and 6 of those have served on a personal staff more than once. 30 served on personal staffs as early as the rank of Lieutenant Commander – 9 having served more than once, five more than three times. Only 7 officers served for the first time as Commanders and 12 as Captains. Only four of them served more than once.

Washington DC

156 officers (95 percent) served in at least one Washington DC area staff position prior to being promoted to Flag Officer. However, only 100 of these officers were assigned to the DC area prior to attaining a position in Major Command. 42 officers served more than once in DC with four serving almost all shore tours in DC. Many of these tours were on personal staffs.

Navy Staff

47 percent did a tour with the Navy Staff.

Bureau of Personnel

28 percent served at least once with either the Naval Military Personnel Command or the Bureau of Personnel.

Notes on the Flag Officer Selection Process

There have been some criticisms of the current system but almost no academic research. One criticism is that selection boards have tended to look primarily at assignment patterns and for the absence of negative material rather than attempting to measure performance under difficult or stressful conditions, without exclusive emphasis on outcome or results. Another is the assertion that in too many instances, officers are selected on the basis of whom they have worked for. In 1963 the Secretary of the Navy commissioned a board to examine the criteria for selection to Flag Rank. The three major findings are still relevant. The board recommended that the Navy keep the basic selection system as it was, to shift towards subspecialist relevance, and to “select, educate, and train the numbers of officers in lower rank to meet the Navy’s requirements for special, professional, and technical qualifications at all levels.” After a review of the last five years’ selection board precept letters, there is no evidence that the system for selection is any different today.

Conclusions

Modern Implications

Peter Karsten found that the nineteenth century Naval officer was part of a “strikingly homogeneous, socio-professional group with a remarkably stable pattern of thought and behavior. ” This could be said of today’s flag officers as well. While there may have been some diversity prior to their entry upon active duty the modern flag is now an officer of limited variation in their operational experience, extensive time assigned to personal or Washington area staffs, limited (nonexistent?) experience or education within Joint operations, and while valuing post-graduate education, has done so without much regard for the subject matter.

Their experience up to the point that they were selected as Flag officers was within defined and restricted communities. Mavericks who specialized in naval warfare were less likely to rise than those who settled into a specific warfare area (especially carrier based attack aircraft or surface combatants). When ashore they spent time at staffs – either fleet or administrative, but nearly all have served in the Washington area.

They have broad education, both undergraduate and postgraduate, but few appear to take pride in those accomplishments. The possession of the post-graduate degree is more important than either the subject, and in many cases the school. For undergraduate, the reverse is true – the school is more important than the degree.

Finally, less than a third have attended Joint Professional Military Education – or cared enough to mention it within their biographies. As a result, their education in important concepts of fleet and national strategy has been taught on the job – removing the important theoretical components and replacing them with pragmatics. Only 31 officers (19 percent!) indicated attendance at the Naval War College. In 1957, Retired Vice Admiral George Dyer began an article for the Naval Academy Alumni association with a bold title: Only One Flag Officer in Seven is a Naval War College Graduate. “At the start of World War II every Flag Officer of the Navy qualified for command at sea, except one, was a graduate of the United States Naval War College. ” While today’s 19 percent is an improvement over Dyer’s recognized failing at 14%, it does not bode well for the Naval War College. The knowledge gained in Newport will be considered increasingly irrelevant if this percentage remains constant.

However, to properly discuss today, we must first look at yesterday. When today’s flag officers were first commissioned the Navy had an average strength of 700,000 personnel, 61,000 officers, and over 700 ships. Today the Navy hovers around 300 ships, 370,000 personnel, and 51,000 officers. While the Navy’s warfighting capabilities have expanded and the individual contribution of a sailor, officer, or ship is far better than it was thirty years ago, the requirements for presence and visibility of the Navy overseas have not dropped to the same degree that force structure has.

When these Flag officers were commissioned the Navy was in the final stages of the disastrous. Vietnam War and headed for drastic cuts, an oil embargo, and recession. In the middle of their career they lived the Reagan/Lehman 600 ship Navy and then as senior commanders, captains, and in some cases already Flag officers, oversaw the post-Cold War drawdown. It is not farfetched to think that many of them expected the return of a Republican administration to herald a military resurgence – and to plan their budgets accordingly, only to be caught in the reform and transformation minded fiscally conservative Bush (43) Administration.

Similarly, these officers have witnessed a quantum change in the position of minorities and women within the Navy. They entered an officially desegregated, but still divided, Navy. Women were barred from serving onboard ships. Today, we are a culturally and racially diverse force with appropriate representation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in positions of responsibility. We have seen the first warfare qualified woman officer selected for flag rank and can expect to see more in the near future.

Two final areas of modern concern are the lack of amphibious and joint experience. While it is obvious that the primary forces of the Navy are those that are capable of offensive operations, amphibious forces are rapidly becoming a primary Naval weapon system. Likewise, the ability to interact at a junior level with officers of the Army or Air Force provides an ability to understand joint operations at the operations, vice command, level. This is not a new problem. In his 1989 study of the “personalities of the armed forces, Carl Builder quotes General David Jones, who in 1982 wrote “The Department of the Navy is the most strategically independent of the services – it has its own army, navy, and air force. It is least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all the assets, and be left alone. ” Jones further illustrates the Navy’s reluctance towards joint or unified operations by relating a story that President Truman was brief that “the only way to overcome the Navy’s resistance was to do away with the War Department, transfer all of it’s elements to the Navy, and redesignate that organization as the Department of Defense. ” Until we can promote more officers who have served within the staffs of the Unified Commanders, we will fail to realize the benefits that true Joint interoperability can bring.

Given the decades long emphasis on Joint education and operations, how have we chosen a cadre of flag officers without either? The simple answer: Ducks pick ducks. Flag officers are chosen by other flag officers, and what they value is what they generally expect of their successors. It is rare that an officer values experience that they have not had. Joint experience is scarce, despite annual exhortations that “the Navy’s ability to operate effectively with the other services is vital to [the Navy’s] warfighting capability.” Because they and their predecessors did not have it, Joint education and Joint operations experience were not stressed to the officers who chose today’s flag officers – and the cycle continues. Post-graduate education is a similar commodity and also specifically listed within the board precepts as important. The reality of past experience led decision making is best exhibited by a recent initiative within the Surface Warfare community to alter the accession training given to junior officers. The current flag officers predate the current training plan, and simply, since they were trained in a shipboard, hands on training environment, they have ended initial classroom training in favor of shipboard assignment. Apparently they have done so without analysis or study of the alternatives. Anecdotally the rationale was “I didn’t have it that way and I made flag…why do we need to waste our junior officers time?” Rather than indict they decision, I simply offer it as an example of the experience based, vice analytical, decision process.

Future Implications

There is a cyclic theory of history that recognizes patterns of thought and action that span, on average, fifty years. This theory recognizes at least nine patterns of ideas dating to the 16th Century and calls these periods “long waves.” In 1990, Carl Builder used this theory and conducted a study for RAND the results of which were published as “Patterns in American Intellectual Frontiers.” The intellectual frontiers he describes peak at approximately fifty year intervals, rising and falling over the course of a century. As one wave is on the rise, another is declining. In 1990, Builder placed U.S. in the declining phase of the “Technological Frontier.” The frontier rested on the idea that scientific knowledge was being deliberately applied for the invention of “gadgets” whose principles were not obvious of fully understood by most of society. This is the frontier that dominated the early career of all of our current flag officers – and in some cases still does. In this same study, Builder predicted the rise of the (then) next frontier – that of Information. The Information Frontier – which included the idea that enough information could even prevent or win war - was expected to peak in the year 2000. This is the ascendant frontier that has molded the environment of the latter half of the modern flag officer’s naval career as they have replaced those who grew up in Korea and led through Vietnam and the end of the Cold War. Yet, if we accept Builder’s hypothesis, the Information Frontier is failing. There is evidence all around us, from the declining stock market to the tragedy of September 11th, 2001, to support the idea that like the industrial and technology frontiers, the information frontier is not the panacea it was thought to be five to ten years ago. Regardless of what the next frontier is; whether it is bio-genetics, neuro-computing, or space exploration, the critical ability of Navy leadership to recognize and capitalize on those changes are what will ultimately determine her success in politics as well as battle. The flag officers of today are at a critical point in history – as critical as those who led at the transition from sail to steam, wooden to steel hulls, and industrial to technological war. The very fact that today’s flag officer has seen the change of generations and waning of not one but two frontiers positions him to train and educate those who follow to look for the same changes tomorrow. The limitations of specialized experience and limited joint exposure will, however, continue to limit them.

Postscript: Areas for further study

In 1972, Peter Karsten, quoting from 1940, wrote that “there has been no first rate study of the philosophic inspiration of modern navalism.” In conducting research for this project, that quotation is as true today as it was in 1940 and 1972. Given the small amount of academic research in this area the field is ripe for further study. Comparisons between flag officer sub-communities as well as more detailed analysis of the major communities within the Unrestricted Line, as well as the incorporation of the Restricted Line are possible. Surveys of current flag officers to better determine career paths, especially to a detail not exhibited within the self-provided biographies, would allow for an examination of the name recognition versus. patronage question. Likewise, an exploration of former supervisors would be of interest. Do future flag officers learn specific traits and ideas from other, more senior, officers destined to be flags? Or, are flag officers chosen from among the best - by those who know them personally? How does a duck recognize a duck? Regardless, where an officer has come from, where they have been, and what they have learned, shape the decisions they make in the future.

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