Polmar on Submarine Numbers

Norman Polmar is asking questions whether two submarines per year is worth it. The key word is "worth" as his point drives to the question whether the Virginia class represents value for the enormous costs involved.

While I support an all nuclear submarine force, I think the Navy would be on a stronger footing with the submarine issue if they traded something like 4 Virginia's for ten conventional submarines. I don't think anyone believes conventional submarines can replace our nuclear force, but to suggest there is no role at all for conventional submarines doesn't really pass the smell test.

I understand why the Navy is scared to build competing systems though, or why they see a conventional submarine as a competing system to a nuclear submarine. The Navy doesn't communicate to the American people the value of their fleet, much less specific types of systems in the fleet. That lack of communication is why Norman Polmar is raising this issue to begin with.

I want to raise a suggestion though, if the US ever looks into building conventionally powered submarines, the biggest mistake the US Navy could make is to look at what the rest of the world is doing and attempt to mimic their ideas. A US Navy conventional submarine need not be large, or manned, or necessarily deployable from a forward base. In fact, I would suggest starting a conventional program with the premise that the conventional submarine will only be around 300 tons, will be unmanned, and will deploy from ships or other submarines.

Now you can take the 4x$2.5B (or 10B) and make ten very useful conventional submarines, and with that kind of money probably the supporting network necessary to put them to effective use. If I was looking for a place to begin for the supporting network, I would start with a LSD-41 and go from there.

Talking Gator Navy

Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong is talking amphibious ships on the Small Wars Journal.

The Navy’s Gators, An Endangered Species?

The Fighter Gap - Easy Call or Tough Decision?

There was an editorial by Robert Diamond in Defense News on Monday regarding the fighter gap. It is very, very tempting to just say buy more F-18s. That is what Mr. Diamond is saying.

There is an old-fashioned showdown taking place in the halls of the Pentagon and Capitol Hill right now. Officials are concerned about the emergence of a so-called "fighter gap" in the U.S. Navy. The gap refers to a projected shortfall in the number of strike-fighter aircraft the Navy requires to meet the needs of its 10 active-duty carrier air wings.

According to the latest figures released by the Navy and the Congressional Research Service, the Navy and Marine Corps will suffer a shortfall of 50 aircraft in 2010. That number could reach as high as 243 when the gap peaks in 2018.

Of course, the fighter gap deeply concerns Navy brass, but it should also worry the Army and Marines, who depend on precision combat air support on a daily basis.

The proximate cause of the fighter gap comes from the rate at which the Navy will retire the backbone of its current strike-fighter fleet - the F/A-18 Hornet-Super Hornet - while simultaneously introducing the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as its replacement.

Admirals, analysts and members of Congress have good reason to argue over the exact size of the upcoming fighter gap; after all, numbers matter. However, we must not allow reasonable disagreements to descend into petty quibbling. Everyone agrees that the problem is unacceptable and that we need an urgent answer to the problem.

Fortunately, the answer to that question is not complicated: Buy more F/A-18E/F Super Hornets.

Easy decision right? Well, there are no easy decisions. I'm not a big fan of the Joint Strike Fighter, and have no intention of being a F-35C fan until it actually takes off an lands on an aircraft carrier with a Navy pilot telling me "That is what I need."

We are a long way from that moment.

But I am also not quite ready to jump on the "buy F-18" bandwagon yet. I am very happy to see the Navy has not jumped the gun and taken the quick fix solution here, and is instead letting the QDR sort it out.

I keep thinking that the Navy might be wise to not buy the full 243 that is being claimed as the gap, and instead only buys a limited number to plug the gap, instead of fill it in completely. I think that approach would make a lot of sense if the Navy also tries to get unmanned vehicles out on to carrier decks.

Yea, UCAS-N is clearly the long term option, but I'd like to see funding to get the Reaper a shot too, because it may be we need both types of unmanned platforms on our carrier decks in the time frame we would be building new F-18s. If the Navy doesn't get the increased range of unmanned systems on its aircraft carriers soon, then naval aviation will not be evolving at the speed necessary to keep pace with innovations in precision weapons, and thus become less affordable for the capability provided.

If buying fewer F-18s puts unmanned strike aircraft on carriers sooner (thinking money here), then I'm for buying fewer.

Another Pirate Fighting Coalition

There is CTF-151, the EU, NATO, whatever we are calling the Chinese and Indian activities, and we don't even count CTF-150...

But soon there will be the Arab anti-pirate force too? Yep.

Arab states of the Gulf and Red Sea said on Monday that they are planning a joint anti-piracy force, insisting defence of the crucial Red Sea waterway was the "primary responsibility" of littoral states.

Saying it was necessary to prevent the spread of piracy to the Red Sea or the Gulf, 11 regional states agreed to set up an all-Arab Navy Task Force, to be led at the outset by the Saudis, the official Saudi Press Agency reported.

The delegates to the conference in the Saudi capital stressed the "importance of the exclusion of the Red Sea from any international arrangements, especially the fight against sea piracy."

At some point partnership needs to be about something besides deconfliction. There are European Navies serving in multiple groups under different commands. I do wonder if what we are seeing is cooperation, or competition.

We have until August before the winds will reduce enough for piracy to potentially return in full. Hopefully by then someone can explain how all of these commands are productive, as opposed to being counter-productive.

Check out this image of Somali piracy at the NATO Shipping Centre. It is enormous, but very well detailed. More images of SNMG2 crossing the Suez here.

Hawaii Superferry May Go Back to the Pacfiic

MarineLink is reporting on a notification sent by The Passenger Vessel Association to its members. The Hawaii Superferry Unofficial Blog has the full notification.

The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) has issued a Market Survey to ask about the cost and availability of U.S. ferry vessels. Anticipated delivery will occur on October 1, although the vessel owner may propose alternate delivery dates. The location of proposed usage will be Guam, Saipan, and adjacent Pacific Ocean waters. The time charter will be for 12 months, with the possibility for three additional year-long renewals.

The closing date for responding to the Market Survey is July 14, 2009.

Secretary Gates announced back in April the Navy was going to increase the charter from two to four JHSVs this year, I think everyone recognized the two Highspeed Superferry's built by Austal for Hawaii were the two that would be leased.

HT to Dave Hart for recent photo of Huakai from March.

"Jim must also learn to speak NATO"

The New York Times has an article on Admiral Stavridis. My favorite line:

“Jim must also learn to speak NATO,” Mr. Gates said.

This might sound like a silly point, but I want to point something out. There are two Admirals with broad appeal and have recognizable names among the regular folk today. One is Admiral Mike Mullen, and the other is Admiral Stavridis. If you don't understand why Admiral Stavridis has such a broad appeal, let me give three examples.

1) He is a different Admiral than every other Admiral, yet he still gets along with everyone including those who served under him. In the Navy leaders tend to have friends lists and enemies lists. His friends list is bigger than other Admirals, and his enemies list is smaller.

2) He is accessible. Unlike everyone else in the Navy, his blog is used to build a network that gives people a peek inside. There are no bumper stickers or slogans, and it is always an opinion instead of a press release. I quote his Change of Command speech, which I found on his Facebook page.

WHAT I’LL REMEMBER AND WHAT I’VE LEARNED

Good morning everyone, and thank you Secretary Gates for your kind comments. You are a terrific boss and I am so glad you’ve continued your service into this new Administration – and I confidently speak for three million members of your Department, Mr. Secretary.
Two other fine Secretaries of the Navy are with us today, our current leader, Governor and now Secretary Ray Maybus. Sir, congratulations on your new post – as we would have said in the 19th century Navy, “I give you joy of your new command.
To former Secretary Richard Danzig, for whom I worked for over two years, I simply say you honor me with your presence. Thank you.
Admiral Tim Keating … General Norty Schwartz … two of the “beloved directors” of the Joint Staff and two perfect friends and mentors – I cannot thank you enough for being here today.
There are many other friends and colleagues and leaders and mentors – too many to name – I thank you as well.
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome, bienvenue, bem vindo, bienvenidos, and thank you all – colleagues and comrades, distinguished guests and visitors, partner nation representatives and our gracious hosts and friends in the cities of Miami and Doral – for being here today and for joining me in welcoming the second most important person in the world … MY RELIEF.
The MOST important person in my life, of course, is my lovely wife Laura!
It is indeed a pleasure to welcome General Fraser and his wife Rena this morning as Laura and I bid farewell to all of you throughout the Southern Command enterprise and the region.
And I say “¡hasta la próxima!” – see you soon – not goodbye – because a part of me will always remain here with you … just as so much of you will always remain here (point to heart) with me – WHEREVER I go.
What I’ll remember:
- Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Tom Howes – the look on their face as they came off the aircraft into freedom … after five and a half years in captivity
- Being in an eye clinic in Panama on Hospital Ship Comfort, and watching a five year old boy put on his first pair of glasses, and finally being able to see and saying to his mother, “Mami veo el mundo” … Mom I see the world
- Watching our partners take down a semi-submersible submarine, part of stopping 700-plus tons of cocaine from coming to the USA
- Seeing a two star Read Admiral, Joe Kernan, the first commander of the Fourth Fleet, carrying bags of rice ashore from KEARSARGE after hurricanes ripped up the coast of Haiti last summer.
- Walking through the ruins of Machu Picchu and thinking about all the history and culture of this region, and the importance of the indigious societies
- Eating feijoada in Rio with my Brazilian friends like Admiral Moura Neto.
- Riding in a fast boat to a seafood restaurant in Cartagena with General Padilla and Admiral Barrera, talking with them about how to help our Colombian friends
- Working with the Coast Guard – Thad Allen and Dave Kunkle and Rob Parker – learning what interagency cooperation is really about.
- Briefing Secretary Gates on our plan to reorganize the command on an interagency path and winning his approval
- Watching the new HQ rise up in the field across the way
- Pinning a third star on Glenn Spears as a Deputy and welcoming Ambassador Paul Trivelli as our first civilian Deputy
- Smoking cigars with Domincans and discussing the finer points of Dominican, Honduran and Nicaraguan cigars
- Learning Spanish and Portuguese, and reading for the first time Gabriel García Márquez in his native tongue
- Watching the helicopters of Joint Task Force Bravo bringing victims of landslides out of danger
- Sitting in Secretary Gates’s office as he told me my next assignment and realizing suddenly that all of this would come to an end for me … the sadness of that coupled with the excitement of a new challenge
What Have I Learned
Several simple things.
That in this part of the world, security is so seldom delivered by the barrel of a gun
That here – thankfully -- we are not launching Tomahawk missiles – we are launching ideas
That everything we do must be
- International
- Interagency
- Private-Public – Project HOPE, Operation Walk, Business Executives for National Security, Defense Business Board
All undergirded by strategic communications
Above all, I’ve learned to innovate
Just take a quick look at that little boat to your left, for example…
When we first put it up, there were those who said, “Is that Admiral Stavridis’s first command?”
No, that’s not my first command.
It is a first generation self-propelled semi-submersible craft similar to the ones used by drug traffickers to transport cocaine into U.S. waters.
What I learned watching them is that our opponents are SMART. They innovate. They wake up each morning seeking to come up with a new idea.
We need to match that.
At the beginning of the last century, Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher said, “now that the money is running out, we must think.” Good advice.
20th century security is brain-on-brain warfare. We cannot spend our way to success. We must out-think our opponents.
We must move faster, always faster.
The only thing we cannot accelerate is the speed of trust.
As with any relationship, trust must be built over time … one step … one interaction … one exercise at a time.
As is said in Spanish – Paso a Paso.
It is this trust … I firmly believe … along with transparency, friendship, and perpetual cooperation, that will in due course deliver on the promise of security, stability, and prosperity we all desire.
So we must take great care in building it up and do what must be done to avoid tearing it down.
Ladies and gentlemen, today I am a witness, not a judge.
Only history will judge whether or not our deeds and actions … as well as our partnerships will bear good fruit in this region.
Our approach has been simple:
International
Interagency
Private-Public
Strategic Communication
As I step down from this witness stand, I will also attest to the competence and energy of your new leader, General Fraser.
I leave here with a great measure of comfort knowing that Southern Command is in incredibly capable hands.
General Fraser, Rena, all of you – buena suerte – Best of luck.
A last thought – this is a part of the world that is in my heart, now and always.
En Español, Mi Corazón Estará Siempre en Las Américas.
My heart will always be here.
I will miss you all, and return often.
Nunca sabemos los caminos de Dios – one never knows the way of God.
Godspeed and open water …

3) Obviously he understands communication, and I am not talking about his writing and advocacy for other Navy Officers to write. If you don't know anything about Facebook, I think signing up over a weekend and making Admiral Stavridis your friend is probably the best way to get started. Did anyone else notice his first hello from Europe? I quote:

"My first beer in Belgium this time over -- my favorite is Lefe Blonde. I've visited many, many times over the years and truly enjoy this beautiful city"

You can find the quote right under a picture of him holding a Belgium beer. He may be Greek, but that is very American... at least in my corner of the New York. Throw in a PH.d, a fierce study of languages, and cast of hundreds of officers who are fierce about their loyalty to him and you have one of the most popular, well respected, and intelligent military officers of this generation.

It is going to be very interesting to see what happens in Europe under Admiral Stavridis. SOUTHCOM had almost no money, but EUCOM does have some money not to mention he comes in as NATO's top military position. NATO is fighting two fronts right now, the big one on land in Afghanistan, but it should be noted that NATO has essentially adopted the Somali pirate issue at sea as well, with Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 entering the waters off Somalia today.

Observing The Pentagon's Wasting Assets

If you have subscription to Foreign Affairs, this article goes down as a must read. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. is doing what he always does, staying two steps ahead of the pack and about two years ahead of everyone else. Most of what he is calling for is not new, indeed if you don't have a Foreign Affairs subscription, you can get the gist of the article by reading his testimony in the Senate Armed Services Committee (PDF) back on April 30, 2009.

But what makes the article very interesting to me is how the Foreign Affairs article is a shot right across the bow of the Navy, indeed I get the impression he is channeling his friend Bob Work, and sending a message to Navy leadership. On point after point Dr. Krepinevich channels a Navy example.

First he starts with Millennium Challenge 2002 and retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper's wargame effort that resulted in half the US Navy sinking after entering the Persian Gulf.

The Millennium Challenge exercise was a harbinger of the growing problems of power projection -- especially in coastal zones, maritime chokepoints (such as the Strait of Hormuz), and constricted waters (such as the Persian Gulf). As the initial success of Van Riper's "Iranian" forces demonstrated, the risks in such areas are becoming progressively greater, especially when the United States is facing a clever adversary. In the real world, Iran and other states can buy high-speed, sea-skimming ASCMs in quantity. In confined waters near shore, U.S. warships would have little warning time to defend against these weapons. The same can be said of high-speed suicide boats packed with explosives, which can hide among commercial vessels. Widely available modern sea mines are far more difficult to detect than were those plaguing the U.S. fleet during the 1991 Gulf War. Quiet diesel submarines operating in noisy waters, such as the Strait of Hormuz, are very difficult to detect. Iran's possession of all of these weapons and vessels suggests that the Persian Gulf -- the jugular of the world's oil supply -- could become a no-go zone for the U.S. Navy.

Then he follows up with the China scenario, and breaks down numerous options of concern, particularly how China's strategy is clearly to push the US Navy out in an effort to turn the military balance of the region in China's favor, to be utilized how they see fit. Not a good thing considering the way China has begun promoting influence over territorial areas in dispute with regional nations.

Area-denial capabilities are aimed at restricting the U.S. Navy's freedom of action from China's coast out to "the second island chain" -- a line of islands that extends roughly from the southeastern edge of Japan to Guam. The PLA is constructing over-the-horizon radars, fielding unmanned aerial vehicles, and deploying reconnaissance satellites to detect U.S. surface warships at progressively greater distances. It is acquiring a large number of submarines armed with advanced torpedoes and high-speed, sea-skimming ASCMs to stalk U.S. carriers and their escorts. (In 2006, a Chinese submarine surfaced in the midst of a U.S. carrier strike group, much to the U.S. Navy's embarrassment.) And it is procuring aircraft equipped with high-speed ASCMs and fielding antiship ballistic missiles that can strike U.S. carriers at extended ranges. Advanced antiship mines may constrain U.S. naval operations even further in coastal areas.

Then he hits again, invoking yet another Naval example, on the irregular warfare issue. After calling for an institutionalization of the doctrines and lessons developed from the wars this decade, he notes that we cannot turn back the clock on sophisticated technologies falling into the hands of non-state actors, and it is time to face this reality of the 21st century with our eyes wide open.

The growing range of RAMMs available to irregular forces is not the only, or even the deadliest, problem. The U.S. military has long enjoyed a near monopoly on the use of guided, or "smart," munitions, which offer the enormous benefit of high accuracy independent of a weapon's range. But now guided RAMMs (or "G-RAMMs") are proliferating from powers such as China and Russia. Once these are in the hands of irregular forces, those forces will be able to hit targets with great precision and reliability. Moreover, such weapons do not require a high degree of operator training. As a harbinger, during the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah irregulars hit an Israeli warship with an Iranian-made guided ASCM and destroyed or disabled over 50 Israeli tanks with sophisticated Russian-made guided antitank missiles. The ability of irregular forces to precisely hit critical points, such as airfields, harbor facilities, and logistics depots, will pose serious problems for the U.S. military's way of operating.

Is anyone seeing the pattern I see? Looks to me like Dr. Krepinevich is talking to the Navy. While this section was specific to addressing the emerging challenges of cyberspace, only a fool can't see how this directly relates to Navy doctrine today.

The United States' armed forces also rely heavily on military and commercial satellites. In recent years, the Chinese military has shown that it can neutralize or destroy satellites in low-earth orbit (where most satellites are located) by launching antisatellite ballistic missiles or firing ground-based lasers. As China's lunar exploration program matures, the PLA will likely acquire the ability to destroy the Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation, which is essential for guiding many "smart" weapons to their targets. If China continues to develop and field antisatellite capabilities, the U.S. satellite architecture may also become a wasting asset, one highly dependent on Chinese sufferance for its effective operation.

Now we get to the point where it is time to ask tough questions.

This raises troubling questions. For example, will the United States accept that several areas of vital interest are becoming no-go zones for its military, or will it take steps to address the challenge? Will the United States accept a posture of vulnerability in regard to its satellite architecture and cyberinfrastructure, or are alternatives available to redress the problem? How must U.S. strategy adapt in a world of rising powers and spreading technologies? Are there cost-effective alternatives to accepting growing vulnerability, or must the United States adopt a more modest strategy?

Obviously he couldn't be talking to the Navy, I mean come on, we are building a fleet to fight China but have a policy of avoiding 25nms out from shore, because of Hezbollah...

Read that sentence out loud and tell me how 1) brilliant or 2) realistic it sounds, and then please ask the Navy if they have a new idea for the QDR before someone becomes the next example of the Secretary of Defense exercise of power to end a career.

Then just a few solutions.

Maintaining the United States' ability to project power in an A2/AD environment will require multifaceted responses. The growing threat to U.S. forward air bases from Chinese assassin's mace capabilities might be handled in several possible ways. Bases could be hardened against attack by missiles with conventional warheads, perhaps combined with missile defenses. An excessive reliance on vulnerable bases could be reduced by developing long-range reconnaissance and strike systems. To offset the growing vulnerability of its major surface ships, the U.S. Navy could acquire more large submarines armed with conventional cruise missiles. To avoid operational irrelevance, carriers should reduce their reliance on short-range manned aircraft in favor of much longer-range unmanned aircraft, some of which are now in development. Advances in missile and air defenses could also play a key role in protecting the fleet. Since primacy in undersea warfare is a prerequisite for other naval operations, priority must be given to expanding the navy's edge in antisubmarine warfare. The current plans to increase submarine production must be sustained, and design work on unmanned underwater vehicles and a new class of submarines should also be initiated.

SSGNs, UCAS-N, and ASW... which amounts to innovation under and over the sea. If we count lasers as the innovation in defense, the question remains what the innovations at sea will be on the surface. Somehow I don't think DDG-51 is the answer, but DDG-1000 never was.

I actually quoted a lot in this article, but as a Foreign Affairs gem it is much longer than I could ever hope to quote in full. Get a subscription, read it, and ask yourself how long before this becomes what everyone is calling for.

Because I'm going to wager that with the Obama administration focused on domestic issues, and the progressive base not really concerned about what happens when the US doesn't take its role as the worlds primary military superpower seriously, this is going to be what everyone in the think tanks is saying in two years, as the global economy is recovering and we see a different world than we have been used to since the end of the cold war emerging.

What a USN Corvette Might Look Like

The image is the latest of the Baynunah class corvette being built by UAE. For those who aren't familiar, I quote from the page dedicated to the ship from Naval-Technology.com

The Baynunah programme is a successor to the LEWA 1 programme to replace the six 175t full displacement, 33.5m Ardhana class large patrol class.

The corvettes are named after the Baynunah region of Abu Dhabi. Construction of the first vessel began in May 2005 for launch in early 2009 and commission in 2010.

ADSB is the prime shipbuilder and Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie (CMN) of Cherbourg, France, is a further major contractor. A sister ship is being built at CMN's shipyard in Cherbourg. It will launch in the summer of 2009 to undergo months of tests and trials. The programme includes a technology transfer arrangement between CMN and ADSB. A CMN subsidiary, CMN Divisions Systemes, will carry out the combat system integration in France.

See the link for more information. What the article does not mention is that the original price for 6 corvettes was $500 million, but the latest news suggests the price is now around $877 million, and the price could go higher. As a starting place, the Baynunah class corvette is a good baseline for what I would be looking for in a US Navy corvette, with slight modification.

If we swapped the 76mm on the Baynunah class for a 57mm, and swapped both 27mm guns for 30mm guns, or put another way put the standard 57mm, 30mm, and RAM system the LCS has on the Baynunah stealth hull, one could suggest the Baynunah class is a mini-LCS without the module bay. For a US Navy corvette, I would basically remove the ASMs, the hanger, and shorten the flight deck and replace with a small module bay, extra berthing space, a ScanEagle launcher, and an UNREP station with a small flight deck for receiving. I would keep the ESSM launchers (2x4 I think), which can be seen under the white tarp coming off both sides near the RAM.

The Baynunah class has a 600 ton stealthy hull, 15 knot cruise speed, greater than 30 knot max speed, and is expected to have 2400nm endurance. I do not know if 64 hulls of a similar ship design with the metrics I describe could be produced for $100 million in a US shipyard, obvious they couldn't keep the costs down in Abu Dhabi, but this is the largest warship ADSB has ever produced so that could be why their costs have become so high. The idea would be to keep it simple and function for deploying specialized manpower into theaters for the manpower intensive operations at sea we see required for facing asymmetrical challenges in the maritime domain. Supported by the LCS as a C2ISR platform and using JHSVs as complimentary platforms, I believe this type of corvette would complete the littoral requirements for the US Navy today, enabling a total solution instead of the partial solution represented in the LCS.

Picture is hi-res for those wanting to take a closer look.

Diversity Guidance I Can Believe In...

I was reading the June 26th edition of Rhumb Lines about diversity and really liked the key messages contained. Lets think critically about what this says one key message at a time.

1. Leaders who embrace diversity and differing viewpoints and seek talent that embodies a broad range of life experiences ensure naval readiness today and tomorrow.
2. The Navy must reflect the face of the nation. Further, we want an officer corps that is reflective of the enlisted force it leads.
3. Obtaining talent from diverse populations across the U.S. strengthens the force and ensures forward progress.

The first key message doesn't match the last two, and the last two are exactly how the CNO describes diversity. I think the first key message should be the only key message, but sadly it is rhetoric that does not reflect reality, while the Navy is completely guilty of failing on the last two primarily because the promotion system that deals with an abundance of talented officers really only sucks the same soda through a thin straw.

I would love to see the Navy "embrace diversity and differing viewpoints" but sadly, that isn't reality. The reality is, the way the Navy expects to call itself a diverse officer corps is to align minorities and women into the the right jobs that insure promotions. That is exactly what ADM Roughead told the Current Strategy Forum, nearly verbatim.

You see, on one side the Navy claims it isn't about quotas, but on the other the direction by the CNO is to insure that minorities and women are selected for specific commands because the CNO knows very well that only people with a certain degree and a certain career path insures possible selection for promotion. It has nothing to do with talent, and has never had anything to do with race. The Navy is the furthest thing possible from a racially insensitive organization, because in the end if someone didn't get promoted, it had nothing to do with race or sex. It had everything to do with what your command was, what your degree was in, and what assignments you had. The CNOs plan is to add 'diversity' to those commands, meaning populate with more minorities and women, so that from the pool of eligible promotions (a small pool of a certain career paths and degrees) more minorities will be eligible.

The problem is, the Navy will change the race or sex of a flag position, but the career paths are exactly the same as the folks before them. This means the Navy will not actually "embrace diversity and differing viewpoints" because the promotion system is designed to pick exactly the same people they have always picked, same career path, same degree. As much as the Navy would like diversity to be about differing opinions, the only thing that is actually different is race or sex, meaning it is about quotas and not diversity.

For example, count up the aviators who are flag officers. The fighter jocks make up a minority of the naval aviation community, but an overwhelming majority of flag officers. Why? Because that is how the promotion system is rigged. To call themselves diverse, the Navy is simply encouraging and placing more minorities and women to CO a F-18 squadron. OK, but you still end up with every officer coming from the same command track, with basically the same education, the same experiences both on staffs and in the field, and somehow all of this carbon copy will translate into diversity and differing viewpoints? How? Is the Navy saying that because the promotion isn't a white male, it is diversity and will result in different viewpoints? Basically, yes... that is exactly what the Navy is saying.

How does this meet any metric of different viewpoints if the experiences are the same? How is this diversity if all you have effectively done is change the quota count for women or minorities?

The truth is there are women and minorities that could be promoted today, but because the Navy sucks the promotions soda from the same tiny straw every year those minorities and women aren't actually eligible, and it has nothing to do with anything other than they don't fit the template for flag established by flag officers. The CNO actually says he looks around the leadership of the Navy and they look like him. DUH. The criteria built into the promotion system is so limited to exactly who already dominates the flag ranks why would the Navy expect to have anything but the same resume with a different name? The Navy has been cloning the resume for leadership for decades, which is why it is no surprise the big idea of 2009 is to build DDG-51s, which ironically is the same big idea Navy leadership had in 1989. Transformation has turned out to be a revolution, as in the Navy finds itself going in circles. That isn't the path towards innovation, much less a broad definition of diversity.

If the Navy is serious about embracing diversity and differing viewpoints then the Navy needs to change the way it promote folks as an organization. The Navy picks favorites for promotion, which is why when you read biography's all the SWOs look the same, all the aviators look the same, and all the submariners look the same. Diversity my Aunt Fannie! There were more Army officers with a PH.d on the staff of General Petraeus in Iraq than in the entire unrestricted line of today's US Navy, and they think they are going to find diversity with a sex change or by picking more minorities for flag? If the Navy wants to find more minorities making flag, try picking from the pool of minorities and COs of amphibious ships for a change, or try finding a minority or woman aviator CO who didn't fly the F-18. Don't stop there though, don't end up the organization where all the white folks come from one specific career path, while minorities and women come from another.

If you want to be a diverse organization, then be one by broadening the scope of what makes someone eligible for promotion to 0-5, 0-6, or higher.

When I was at the Naval War College I made every effort to find students and ask questions. It wasn't easy, many were watching over closed circuit TV from the campus. I ran into a pair of RW pilots and asked one of them what his elective was. He answered "counterinsurgency."

In my mind I was thinking 2 things. First, brilliant... a helicopter pilot who is studying counterinsurgency would be the foundation of an asymmetric warfare specialist in the future officer corps. My second thought is how screwed this young man is, because being a RW guy who elected to study counterinsurgency probably disqualifies him from promotion. I didn't tell him that, but he probably already knows it.

My point is simple. If the Navy took seriously the effort to meet the objectives of the very well stated first 'key message' listed above, two and three would take care of itself. If the Navy wants the best of the best in their flag officers, then the Navy needs to expand the pool beyond the same career tracks that make almost every flag officers resume look the same. When that happens, finding a broad pool of outstanding candidates of any race or sex will no longer be the problem. The problem will become picking the best people among a list of great people. What a terrible problem that would be.

--

Photo caption: PUERTO CABEZAS, Nicaragua (Aug. 18, 2008) Capt. Walter Towns, right, commanding officer of the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), and Capt. Fernandez "Frank" Ponds, mission commander for Continuing Promise (CP) 2008, greet Kearsarge crew members selected to play a friendly game of softball against the Puerto Cabezas Veteranos. Kearsarge is supporting the Caribbean phase of CP 2008, an equal-partnership mission between the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Brazil, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana.

Comment: A perfect example of two minority O-6s who will in the future be eligible for flag promotion. I don't know much about Capt. Towns, but I have had a chance to speak to Captain Ponds when he was conducting soft power to South America and he remains the most impressive officer (of any rank) I have interviewed for the purposes of the blog. Big problem though, one amphibious squadron commanding officer was promoted to flag in 2009, meaning these guys have to overcome the enormous Navy bias not against minorities, but against commanders of the amphib force.

Israel Says "No Thanks" to LCS

The Littoral Combat Ship program just hit a speed bump on the way to the export market. Israel has decided they are no longer interested in the LCS, and cite costs as the major reason.

In a radical revamp of its surface fleet modernization program, the Israel Navy has shelved long-held plans to purchase Lockheed Martin-produced Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), as well as a fallback option involving corvetees built by Northrop Grumman.

Instead, sources say, the Navy is pushing to establish a combat shipbuilding industry through customized, locally built versions of a German corvette design.

Now in an exploration phase, the concept calls for a stretched, approximately 2,200-ton version of the Meko A-100 built by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), the Hamburg-based consortium building two Dolphin-class submarines for the Israel Navy. Countries that are building or now operating the 1,650-ton German-designed corvette include Malaysia and Poland.

The interesting part of this story isn't necessarily that Israel doesn't want to buy the LCS anymore, and that is a big deal. The interesting thing is that the US would fund the LCS, but not the MEKO, through FMS grant money. By choosing to buy the MEKO, Israel will try to fudge the system and get some of the parts paid for by buying US, with US funding.

If the system was honest, that should get some attention from Congress.

About two years ago, the LCS was making headlines with all kinds of export possibilities. Lockheed Martin's version wasn't only a possibility in Israel, but it was also an honorable mention at one time for the Indian Project 17A stealth frigate. It is unclear if the General Dynamics/Austal design for the LCS has potential on the export market. With the cost of the first platform of that design much higher than the Lockheed Martin design, it is very much unclear what the future export market looks for any ship built in the US.

This program can't seem to find good news.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198)
USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2)


Bataan Amphibious Ready Group

USS Bataan (LHD 5)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43)


EU NAVFOR

SPS Numancia (F83) (Flagship)
SPS Marques de la Ensenada (A-11)
HS Nikiforos Fokas (F466)
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F-209)
FGS Emden (F-210)
FGS Berlin (A-1411)
FS Nivose (F 732)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS Albatros (P 681)
ITS Maestrale (F570)
HMS Malmö (K12)
HMS Stockholm (K11)
HMS Trossö (A264)


Combined Task Force 150

FS Aconit (F713)
PNS Khaibar (F183)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
FS Marne (A 630)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
JS Akebono (DD 108)
JS Tokiwa (AOE 423)


Combined Task Force 151

See USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976)
TCG Giresun (F 491)
RSS Persistence (209)


In Theater

Ocean 6
ITS San Giorgio (L9892)
FS Forbin (D620)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Dupuy de Lôme (A759)
FS Saphir (S602)
HMS Richmond (F239)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Shenzhen (DD 167)
PLAN Huangshan (FFG 570)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57)
USS James E Williams (DDG 95)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Sazanami (DD-113)
JS Samidare (DD 106)

SASC Cuts One Ship For FY2010

The SASC cut one of the T-AKEs, reducing the total ships for FY2010 from 8 to 7 citing concerns over the Sea Base concept. The House funded 2 T-AKEs, so this will be settled in conference.

One would think the Senators would be more concerned with the small size of the logistics force, of which the T-AKE contributes to with or without the Sea Base...

See the full details of the SASC markup at DODBuzz.

Project 17A of Indian Navy

I read this piece of news a few days ago and found it shocking. Here is the article:

India has cleared its largest ever indigenous defence contract worth Rs 45,000 crore to manufacture seven advanced stealth frigates for the Navy at shipyards in Kolkata and Mumbai.

The P17A warship project, which will be India’s most advanced and stealthy frigates, has been cleared by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) on Friday.

Sources said that brushing aside a request by the Navy that two of the indigenously designed frigates may be manufactured abroad, the DAC has decided that all seven warships will be manufactured in India by the Mazagon Dock Limited, Mumbai (MDL) and the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Kolkata.

The Defence Ministry has allocated a budget of Rs 45,000 crore for the project and the work will be divided between the two shipyards. The P17A frigates will be even more advanced than the P17 Shivalik class warships that are currently being inducted by the Navy.

For those keeping scores at home, it's around $10 billion for 7 ships or around $1.4 billion per ship. This is an increase over the original announcement in 2006 that put the price tag of each ship at around $900 million. I think India has had some experiences recently with cost escalations in naval projects. They want to make sure to allocate all the necessary funding, so that it does not have cost overrun this time.

To put this into perspective:
A 054A costs around $200-250 million depending on the conversion rate.
I think Singapore paid $1 billion for 6 Formidable class ships back in early 2000s, although that only includes the ToT, weapon systems and the first unit.
The first batch of Talwar cost $1 billion for 3
The second batch of Talwar cost $1.6 billion for 3 (although a lot of that is due to USD depreciation)
The Project 17 Shivalik class apparently costs $650 million each
The most recent order of 4 FREMM class by Italy cost 1.4 billion EUR -> 350 million EUR per or about 500 million USD depending on the conversion we use.
The entire horizon class program cost around $4 billion for 4 ships
KDX-3 is around $900 million
The 6 Type-45 destroyers cost UK 6.46 billion pound, which is anywhere from 8 to 10 billion USD depending on the conversion rate.

It looks like the going rate for a modern stealthy frigate with medium range air defense and good ASW capabilities is around $500 million. The going rate for a larger AAW ship with area defense is around $1 to 1.5 billion.

With the price that India is willing to pay for these 7 ships, it should turn out to be a very capable ship. If you look at the specifications of Shivalik class, its weapon and sensor fit is similar to your average modern frigate like the La Fayette derivatives, Talwar and 054A. $650 million looks to be more than what the other countries paid for comparable frigates, but I think part of the cost goes toward improving Indian shipyard to be able to handle such projects in the future. With more than double the cost, Project 17A looks like it will be a whole different beast. Just looking at the price tag alone, it looks to be an AAW ship with long range SAM and Aegis like combat system. On the other hand, I kept reading Indian sources that said this ship will only be around 5600 ton in displacement. That would make sense because larger Project 17A class would intrude in the territories of Project 15A, which is in the 7000 ton range. Even now, it seems that Project 15A is really not that relevant when the smaller Project 17A might turn out to do the same job much better. So, I think it would be interesting to see what Project 17A turn out to be. If it turns out to be like Horizon class or AAW version of FREMM, it would be well worth the money after we factor in higher than projected inflation, cost of upgrading the shipyards, transfer of technology and such. However, if it turns out to just be a more powerful version of Project 17, I think they are really paying far too much for these ships.

US Now Tracking Multiple North Korean Ships

This is the latest update on North Korean proliferation.

The United States said it was monitoring “multiple” North Korean ships suspected of carrying weapons and that it would discuss with its allies what to do with one suspect vessel it is tracking.

While the United States has been tracking the Kang Nam since last week, the Pentagon said it is closely monitoring several other North Korean ships allegedly carrying weapons. “We have been interested in this one ship [the Kang Nam], but we’ve been interested in, frankly, multiple ships,” Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said.

The article goes on to note all the nations in the region, from Singapore to Myanmar, have stated they know nothing about the North Korean ship.

It is unclear where exactly the ship is going, what exactly the ship is carrying, or if the ship will be inspected once it arrives at its destination... wherever that might be.

Lots of questions, no answers yet. While I think the Obama administration was right to push for this UN Resolution, if the ship is somehow able to deliver its weapons right in front of the whole world there could be unintended consequences. I do wonder how North Korea will react if they feel like their threatening rhetoric contributed to their blatant disregard for the latest UN Resolution.

Gate's 10% Naval Force For Mullen's 1000 Ship Navy

On June 10th, I wrote a post called Theories and Considerations that I will be referring back to on occasion. The post was a generic outline for what I call the Go Big, Go Small Strategy as the Navy looks at the QDR. While I will not presume this is the right strategy for the Navy, it is an outline that fits a model for a number of strategic concepts that I have been developing as part of the collaboration effort this blog represents for the emerging strategic naval ideas of our time. I will not take credit for the ideas, as many are produced by the great strategic minds in the Navy discussion today, and I'm simply accumulating them and organizing them into one potential vision of their manifestation.

On the United States Naval Institute Blog yesterday, I wrote an article outlining the challenge the Navy faces over the next decade in regards to force constitution. The intent of that article was to highlight how the Navy really has very few options unless a shift in thinking is made, a shift that no one inside the Navy is talking about publicly. That shift in thinking is specific to surface warfare. I'd like to offer some ideas to the debate recently called for by the CNO in regards to what a 21st century evolution in surface warfare might look like. I base these ideas on the following assumptions.

• The US Navy will remain the dominate maritime power until at least 2025.
• The US Navy will remain the only maritime power globally postured and capable of global action until at least 2025.
• The United States will maintain sufficient capabilities and capacity to compete against any belligerent power until at least 2025.

The year 2025 is a specific target, as that is the year the current cruiser force begins retirement.

The strategy proposed is called Go Big, Go Small because I believe the Navy must do both over the next decade. I believe that going big and going small must be well defined; articulated in a way that the American people can easily understand the vision, understand how it aligns to maritime strategy, and understand how it aligns to national policy.

On going big, as outlined in Theories and Considerations post, I believe the Navy should build 20 nuclear submarines and 30 major surface vessels as part of the go big strategy over the next decade. Those 30 vessels are 2 DDG-51s, 1 DDG-1000, 2 CGN(X), 1 LHA(R), 2 LH(X), 1 LPD-17, 5 LSD(X), 6 T-AKE, 4 LCS Tenders, 4 MLP, and 2 JCC(X). 19 of the nuclear submarines are Virginia class, while 1 of the nuclear submarines would be a SSBN(X) purchased in FY 2020. I will go into detail on the Go Big portion of the strategy in another post, primarily because I want to see if a ballistic missile defense debate actually takes place as events unfold over the next few weeks, but I will note the three critical aspects of the Go Big portion of the approach is ballistic missile defense, moving up the LSD replacement, and building significantly more logistical capability with 6 T-AKEs and 4 Littoral tenders. As a rule, I believe 21st century fleet structure will include larger ships with smaller crews, and smaller ships with larger crews. The optimization of manpower requirements on ships can never be understated as an operational consideration, but it must also factor costs if the Navy is to develop a larger fleet.

Go Small

I believe the US Navy needs 100 littoral capable combat vessels. I look at the 100 littoral capable combat vessel force as Gate's 10% force of Mullen's 1000 Ship Navy. This force is an enabling capability for meeting operational requirements when facing low intensity, high intensity, and hybrid warfare challenges that naval forces will face in the 21st century. When taking the strategic view of the maritime domain in the 21st century, there are several challenges that must be addressed when applying the Navy's own maritime strategy.

When I talk about 100 littoral capable combat vessels, I am specifically talking about 32 Littoral Combat Ships and 64 PC/Corvettes. I don't have a specific design in mind when discussing the PC/Corvettes, rather a set of requirements.

• 1 57mm
• 1 RAM
• 23 man payload (20 + 3 officers)
  
• 2 module stations for supporting 2 offboard systems up to 12 meters
  
• 1 ScanEagle Launcher w/ 2 ScanEagles
• $100 million cost cap
  

The concept would be to match 1 LCS and 4 PC/Corvettes into a squadron, and build 16 Squadrons. 4 PC/Corvettes produces a capability that can carry up to 60 people supported by the LCS as a C2 node for the squadron. 4 squadrons would then be organized into a Littoral Strike Group. The Navy would operate and deploy 4 total Littoral Strike Groups, with all of the squadrons based forward and all of the larger ships based in the continental US. Conceptually a Littoral Strike Group would be made up of the following ships:

1 DDG-1000 (2 MH-60R/UAVs)
1 DDG-51 (2 MH-60R)
1 LPD-17 (ACE Det)
1 T-AKE (2 MH-60S)
1 Littoral Tender (2 MH-60S)
4 Littoral Combat Ships (Helicopter module, FireScout module)
16 PC/Corvettes (16 ScanEagles)
4 JHSVs (8 MH-60S)
1-2 Rifle Company Marines w/ Equipment

The Littoral Strike Group is a tailored, modular force that can perform across the hybrid spectrum intended to enable maritime awareness, dominance, influence, and engagement as called upon by the Combatant Commander.

The DDG-1000 is likely the platform people will have the biggest problem with in this model, but I do believe the Navy will have to build a 4th DDG-1000 at Bath to sustain that shipyard until the CG(X) design is ready. Well, 4 DDG-1000s fits right into the rest of the force structure I describe here. The DDG-1000 is built for the littorals, and just fits into an operational construct of several smaller, but not missile armed surface platforms. I don't know if the Navy is ever going to get that gun to work as promoted, but I will say this... If that gun can support fires at 400nms as some PPT advertisements suggest, that offensive capability can provide serious fire support to small vessels operating distributed over a broad area. The DDG-1000 is very well designed to act as a command node for a distributed naval network, particularly in the littorals and specifically when the long arm of violence towards land is required.

The DDG-51 for additional firepower and AAW capabilities.

The LPD-17 would act as the mothership for regional engagement and supports the staff of the Marine Corps or Coast Guard attachment elements. The ship doesn't have to be only for that role though, because LPD-17 has enormous space and flexibility that can be loaded up with any number of NECC capabilities, and can support a variety of aircraft including the CV-22/MV-22 for special operations. A Littoral Strike Group should always include at least 1 Rifle Company of Marines, but preferably 2 Marine Rifle Companies at a time, and the LPD-17 would act in the C2 role for those Marine units.

When operating up to 30 ships in one group, which is what is being suggested as possible here, the necessity to maintain logistics at sea is critical. The T-AKE and Littoral Tender would fill the on station supply and support roles, and would themselves be supplied via delivery from other ships in the MSC. These ships would be specifically for maintaining logistics and support for the 4 Littoral Combat Ships and 16 PC/Corvettes, although capable of supporting the other major vessels in the force. Small ships do not have legs, so logistics will have to be built in.

This is why I also include 4 JHSVs in this type of force. 2 of the JHSVs would act as shuttles for supply and support to the squadrons when they are distributed at distance from the logistics force. A JHSV is a unique capability that can quickly deliver supply, support, and fuel as a payload to a squadron hundreds of miles away. The JHSV as a logistics shuttle enables persistent, distributed presence.

Squadrons

What can a single squadron with 1 LCS and 4 PC/Corvettes do? Well, alot. I am holding onto a post that expand a concept in detail, but let me briefly discuss an idea that really needs some attention. The Navy needs to seriously think about RHIB operations, and do so while looking at Riverine operations. The small unit riverine craft (SURC) and the RHIB used by surface combatants needs to become the same platform. The technology exists to make this happen, and by doing so Riverine becomes a potential capability organic on major surface combatants.

The PC/Corvette has a payload of up to 23 people, and that would assume 3 are officers and 2 are medical. Options would include support for up to 2 SEAL Platoons, a squad of Marines, a Riverine Boat Team, or a detachment of operators for other modular technologies, including EOD. 4 PC/Corvettes with an LCS could then support an entire SEAL Team, a full platoon of Marines, or a Riverine Boat Division.

The payload is intentionally human, modular, and it scales to the skill sets of the maritime services while allowing for unit integrity to be retained. Equipment and detachment support can be provided from either the LCS, a JHSV, or the LPD-17. The LPD-17 matched with PC/Corvette squadrons could potentially field CB-90s to support a Riverine squadron that can land a company of Marines several miles up a river completely saturated with unmanned ISR and supported by multiple MH-60Rs as fire support. If one Company of Marines was operating on 4 PC/Corvettes squadrons, with another Company of Marines on the LPD-17, a LHA(R) could be added to the mix supported by a JHSV to deliver a MAGTF SC or a reinforcing MEU to an engagement, and could even conduct a battalion sized light infantry strike against a specific targets in the maritime places.

Littoral capable small vessels become the capability of delivering manpower to the point of engagement in a hybrid threat environment. Forces can be tailored to meet requirements, and with JHSVs the human payloads can become interchangeable. In theory, the Littoral Strike Group could deploy with 1 Company of Marines and 1 Riverine Squadron, while one of the JHSVs carries equipment for Sea Bee, engineering support, and equipment for a 3rd expected engagement. As a command node, the LCS would act as a C4ISR platform coordinating PC/Corvette squadron operations, and act as the local air support capability with the MH-60R or FireScouts. In a MIW operation, the LCS would act as a command node for mine clearance operations, while both the LCS and PCs field necessary equipment and EOD to remove the minefield. In an amphibious assault, PCs could field USVs and support escort operations through the 25nm zone for amphibious landings, keeping those lanes clear of the local population which could present a threat.

Most 21st century operations in active hybrid threat environments to date have proven to be manpower intensive supported by unmanned systems. The Navy will face similar conditions in the 21st century maritime domain as the population at sea continues to grow. Small capabile littoral ships expand the Navy's capacity to meet with this emerging challenge.

Population of the Sea

If General McCrystal is trying to tell the American people one thing right now in regards to Afghanistan, it would be the simple phrase "Its the population stupid." The reason this is his primary talking point is because US strategy in Afghanistan consists primarily of developing partnerships with with the people who are present in the terrain that is also his battlefield. General McCrystal knows that not everyone who populates that terrain is a partner, or even a potential partner. The challenge is to make sure that those who are partners, or who represent potential partners, remain partners even as he either kills, or prevents action from those who are the enemy.

This human terrain and the challenges of the population can be directly applied to the South China Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Caribbean Sea, and every Bay, Channel, Isthmus, River, Gulf, or body of water not specifically named. Lets use the South China Sea and potential conflict with China as an example.

Every day in the South China Sea there are over 200,000 private and commercial vessels at sea. The majority of these vessels are within 50nms of land, which means almost nothing considering there are over 250 ~1-km² islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars in the South China Sea, most of which have no indigenous people, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The population of just the people on a boat in the South China Sea is estimated over 1,00,000 daily.

In a world of hybrid warfare, how will naval forces identify friend and foe in the populated seas? If the intent is to build partnerships, preferably by avoiding the destruction of the folks we are not fighting, how will the helicopter or UAV know which fishing boat to sink and which fishing boat not to sink? Ultimately operations will require manpower at the point of engagement to identify friend and foe if partnership, and not killing our allies, is a core strategic operational objective (which it is).

I envision the squadron components of the Littoral Strike Groups being forward deployed in specific places. Off the top of my head I would suggest 8 squadrons at Guantanamo Bay, 4 squadrons at Djibouti, and 4 squadrons at Bahrain. For the record I would put the other 16 Littoral Combat Ships at Guam (4) and San Diego (12). All of the larger vessels and the JHSVs that support the Littoral Strike Group would port in either Mayport or San Diego.

In the South China Sea scenario, the Littoral Combat Ships in the Pacific would move quickly to support ISR for any naval assets in the South Pacific. The Navy could also quickly move several of the Middle Eastern squadrons, supported by major naval assets in the Middle East until the rest of the Littoral Strike Group arrives, to the Straits of Malacca for sea denial operations. When one thinks about controlling major sea lanes during wartime, particularly crowded sea lanes like the Strait of Malacca and denying communications at sea to the enemy... small ships are ideal for that role. 16 PC/Corvettes with 2 RHIBs each supported by 4 Littoral Combat Ships conducting ASW can establish a pretty damn good blockade, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where Littoral Combat Ships could fill both the VBSS and ASW roles without those smaller PC/Corvettes.

Small ships are not matching capabilities, because no Navy on the planet can match the capabilities and skill sets of US Navy sailors. Small ships are enablers for that manpower to engage at the point of contact with friends and foes during both war and peace, and as our manpower is paired and enabled by emerging unmanned capabilities the US Navy can do things in large areas of ocean that right now present enormous challenges for the top heavy, shrinking fleet.

One more thing. I don't know if a PC/Corvette can be produced for $100 million and be a stealth platform. I would hope so, because if it can be truly stealthy the Navy would for the first time have a surface warfare capability for that no-go 25nm contested zone that the US Navy must be capable of taking control of. In populated seas with small stealthy PC/Corvettes, I think the Navy can exploit that space on the surface to enable capabilities for exploiting that space under the surface, even against sophisticated anti-access, area denial capabilities.

Important Chinese ASBM Article

When Andrew Erickson is talking about Chinese ASBM development with comprehensive analysis, it is always a must read. This is from the section in the article "Making an ASBM Work."

Chinese schematic diagrams show an ASBM flight trajectory with mid-course and terminal guidance. Second stage control fins would be critical to steering the ASBM through terminal maneuvers to evade countermeasures and home in on a moving target. This makes an ASBM different from most ballistic missiles, which have a fixed trajectory.

Yet how do Chinese experts envision the “kill chain”—the sequence of events that must occur for a missile to successfully engage and destroy or disable its target (e.g. an aircraft carrier)—beyond the five steps that they commonly list: 1) detection, 2) tracking, 3) penetration of target defenses, 4) hitting a moving target, and 5) causing sufficient damage? A single broken link would render an attack incomplete, and hence ineffective. What would work based on what is known about China's capabilities today, and in the future?

China has also been working on a sophisticated network of ground-and-space-based sensors, including over-the-horizon (OTH) radars and electronic signals detection equipment, which can assist ASBM detection and targeting. While locating an aircraft carrier has been likened to finding a needle in a haystack, this particular needle has a large radar cross section, emits radio waves, and is surrounded by airplanes. Active radar is the most likely ASBM sensor, since its signals can penetrate through clouds. Simply looking for the biggest reflection will tend to locate the largest ship as a target, and the largest ship will usually be an aircraft carrier (if the pre-launch targeting was good).

Just in this section there are all kinds of important things being said, but I want to highlight the giant blinking red light. Andrew Erickson points out the one thing that should elevate everyone's concern, particularly Congress, about the difference between the Chinese ASBM and other ballistic missiles. Think about this paragraph.

Second stage control fins would be critical to steering the ASBM through terminal maneuvers to evade countermeasures and home in on a moving target. This makes an ASBM different from most ballistic missiles, which have a fixed trajectory.

Why does this matter? Because open source information sources describing AEGIS ballistic missile defense note that AEGIS calculates intercept based primarily due to launch trajectory, and I'd bet your paycheck that when the PLA Strategic Rocket Forces realized that, they knew that if they could make a mid-course correction during flight, they would invalidate the AEGIS BMD capability.

You see, if the launch is accurately detected, trajectory can be determined based on the launch. When we shoot our SM-3, because ballistic missiles have a fixed trajectory, our interceptor knows where the missile is going to be and can intercept it.

But if a ballistic missile changes course in flight, our AEGIS BMD interceptor finds itself in the wrong place, because it calculated the intercept based on the initial trajectory, not the new trajectory following the mid-course change.

This technical detail is why I call bullshit with the Navy's suggestion that we have a critical need for more DDG-51s specifically for ballistic missile defense. The Burke is not capable of intercepting this ballistic missile, and we are going to need a new radar that can track the mid-course change accurately, and new software to very quickly do the math for identifying a new intercept point if we are going to defeat this weapon. That is going to be enormously expensive, which is why when I say I think the Navy is going to need $6 billion nuclear cruisers if they are going to evolve ballistic missile defense towards 21st century threats, I'm not kidding. AEGIS is going to require significant investment to evolve towards a course changing ballistic missile intercept capability, assuming AEGIS is even the solution.

The way I understand the Chinese ASBM capability, the ASBM is designed to launch towards carriers known to be operating in an area of water, which can be a quite large area of water, and in flight scan that area of water for the largest target, then use some method of identification to insure this wasn't a false positive or decoy. The ASBM would then make a mid-course correction during flight to target the largest target detected .

In asking around what kind of radar the Chinese would use, several have suggested an ultra-high frequency radar like we use off our southern coast looking for drug smugglers in large swaths of water would be ideal, because it allows the ballistic missile to scan the larger area to find the target making initial detection less important for precise location, as general location would do. I welcome comments to whether that sounds realistic or not.

This Jamestown article asks a number of very important questions regarding this capability. One thing is very clear though, something I very much agree with Andrew Erickson on, the Chinese are a lot closer to this capability than skeptics give them credit for. I don't want to suggest it is panic time, but we have reached the point where it is time to ask tough questions regarding what we should do, and make those tough decisions.

Congress needs to engage, starting with serious questions of the Navy leadership regarding AEGIS BMD and this specific capability. AEGIS BMD can swat the stuff Iran and North Korea are producing from the sky, and has also shown remarkable flexibility in the form of the US 193 shoot down. With that said, mid-course adjusting ballistic missiles changes the dynamics and moves ballistic missiles outside our current capabilities, meaning not only does AEGIS need a significant investment in order to meet this emerging capability, but the radar system better be very, very good at tracking moving objects in space from the sea... and by that I mean good enough to hit a bullet with a bullet.

We have decades of experience to draw upon in finding a solution, but putting the pieces together will require a commitment.

Hell Has Frozen Over...

The US defeated Spain, the worlds #1 team, in Soccer.

GAO Hammers Osprey

The executive summary.

As of January 2009, the 12MV-22sin Iraq successfully completed all missions assigned in a low-threat theater of operations--using their enhanced speed and range to deliver personnel and internal cargo faster and farther than the legacy helicopters being replaced. However, challenges to operational effectiveness were noted that raise questions about whether the MV-22 is best suited to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the helicopters it is intended to replace. Additionally, suitability challenges, such as unreliable component parts and supply chain weaknesses, led to low aircraft availability rates. Additional challenges have been identified with the MV-22's ability to operate in high-threat environments, carry the required number of combat troops and transport external cargo, operate from Navy ships, and conduct missions in more extreme environments throughout the world. While efforts are underway to address these challenges, it is uncertain how successful they will be as some of them arise from the inherent design of the V-22. The V-22's original program cost estimates have changed significantly. From 1986 through 2007, the program's Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation cost increased over 200 percent--from $4.2 to 12.7 billion--while the cost of procurement increased 24 percent from $34.4 to $42.6 billion. This increase coincided with significant reductions in the number of aircraft being procured--from nearly 1,000 to less than 500--resulting in a 148 percent increase in cost for each V-22. Operations and support costs are expected to rise. An indication is the current cost per flying hour, which is over $11,000--more than double the target estimate for the MV-22. After more than 20 years in development, the MV-22 experience in Iraq demonstrated that the Osprey can complete missions assigned in low-threat environments. Its speed and range were enhancements. However, challenges may limit its ability to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the legacy helicopters it is replacing. If so, those tasks will need to be fulfilled by some other alternative. Additionally, the suitability challenges that lower aircraft availability and affect operations and support costs need to be addressed. The V-22 program has already received or requested over $29 billion in development and procurement funds. The estimated funding required to complete development and procure additional V-22s is almost $25 billion (then-year dollars). In addition, the program continues to face a future of high operations and support cost funding needs, currently estimated at $75.4 billion for the life cycle of the program. Before committing to the full costs of completing production and supporting the V-22, the uses, cost, and performance of the V-22 need to be clarified and alternatives should be re-considered.

I am going to have to read the whole report before I comment about it, but my first impression is this looks like a real kick in the nuts to the Marines. I am interested in what are described as inherent design flaws. I've been wondering for awhile now if in an attempt to build a platform that is both airplane and helicopter, the Marines are willing to accept that the MV-22 has properties of both, but can never meet the requirements of either, and should be treated as something altogether different instead of attempting to pile on major vertical lift roles on the platform.

That theory would suggest a need for a medium-lift capability currently not on the drawing board.

I will say this though. The Wright brothers first flight was in 1903, and by 1923 airplanes were not exactly a beacon of reliability. If one considers the first real flight of a helicopter to be in 1924, the one must remember that by 1974, 50 years later, over 8000 helicopters were shot down in just the Vietnam War. The MV-22 is a complicated system, and I am curious if the GAO puts any sort of historical context into its analysis of conclusions.

The reason I say this is because by 1923, despite reliability issues, airplanes were recognized as an important military capability that military forces were investing in, including in the Navy. At no time since 1974 has any military service considered the helicopter too dangerous, despite its Vietnam record, to field as a necessary capability. I guess what I'm trying to say is that the expectations of the MV-22 could be too high, and the GAO response represents a warning that the Marines should take caution in their expectations for the MV-22 capability while it is still, at least historically, relatively young in its development as a reliable military capability.

Do We Need More F-22s?

I really like this Greg Grant article on DoD Buzz. It lists out the talking points for the F-22 and highlights many of the flaws in some of the arguments made for supporting the platform. However, the article also has a paragraph that I believe is where serious consideration is warranted on the F-22 program.

The oddest thing about this whole debate is that it’s not about whether or not to develop and produce the admittedly impressive air-superiority fighter. That has already happened. The F-22 is operational and current plans are to build the final of 187 Raptors by 2011. The argument F-22 advocates make is that 187 is not enough and that only by buying more Raptors will strategic catastrophe be avoided in what has become the ultimate “bean counting” game, conjuring memories of measuring the NATO vs. Warsaw Pact balance, with the difference, of course, that no adversary currently exists to bean count against.

Now Greg Grant is a smart guy, but he clearly hasn't been hanging out with many strategic thinkers to make the last comment. The threat based analysis strategic planning approach is a failing myopic view that reporters like Greg Grant should call people out on when they suggest it in the Pentagon, because unfortunately it is something some people in DoD are doing a lot of lately.

Two things happened last week that grabbed my interest regarding the F-22, and neither was the stunt in the House to keep the F-22 line open in the HASC bill. The first thing I find pretty incredible is the rumor mill that in virtually every force structure analysis and operational planning capability study prepared by the Air Force for the QDR, the necessity for more than 187 F-22s continues to pop up. In other words, the analysis consistently says the Air Force needs more F-22s to meet existing requirements, and only the Secretary of Defense is saying otherwise.

I didn't really believe the rumor though, surely this isn't true or someone would be speaking up, right? Next thing I know, this article shows up in CQPolitics.

Gen. John D.W. Corley, the four-star chief of Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, Va., wrote a letter to Sen. Saxby Chambliss , R-Ga., about the impact of Obama and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ’ decision to limit the number of F-22s in the U.S. inventory to 187.

“In my opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid term,” Corley wrote in the June 9 correspondence. “To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate that 187 F-22s are adequate to support our national military strategy.”

When 4 star Generals are saying this with full knowledge of previous firings by Secretary Gates, people should be giving this issue a lot more attention, and more importantly, asking tougher questions of Gates even after he gets dismissive.

For years the F-22 requirement was always 381, a specific estimate intended to provide teh Air Force one F-22 squadron per Air Expeditionary Force [AEF]. That is a perfectly rational analysis that never gets enough attention. What has been bothering me in the F-22 discussion is why nobody is asking the question: What are the absolute consequences of building only 187 F-22s? Because there was no study that recommended 187, you can bet your press pass that no one ever studied the consequences to existing operational profiles by stopping the purchase at 187. Well, absent anyone else doing it, I solicited a few opinions from some Air Force dudes and I think there is something there.

First, it should be noted the F-22A is in the field and is operational, in fact, there is very often if not always a 1 squadron requirement from the PACOM Combatant Commander for the F-22. If that is the requirement today, and has been the requirement for over a year now, we can expect this requirement to exist for many years and potentially increase or decrease depending upon the intentions of China and North Korea over the next few years.

Well, we don't have very many F-22A squadrons, which means our limited number of squadrons will be on a sustained, regular rotation to and from the Pacific as the Air Force meets existing mission requirements with fewer platforms. Has anyone stopped to consider the effects of this sustained rotation? If so, that study was classified.

We have every expectation that the F-22A is going to provide the nation with decades of service in providing air superiority, but with fewer platforms and a very high operational tempo, that is a very unreasonable expectation. Due to fewer total F-22s, we are going to pile on the years of flight time on these planes much quicker than originally intended, which has several consequences.

1) We will have to start a program for the F-22A replacement sooner than we expected, likely at very high cost removing any potential cost savings of not building more F-22As. Why? Because if you know jack about the F-22, you know the Air Force has spent on average more developing the F-22 than it does actually building the damn thing (about $200m per plane R&D, while a new F-22 costs less than $175m today). Anyone who suggests truncating the F-22 for cost purposes is making a very shortsighted, like incorrect opinion.

2) The F-22s we have will be fatigue faster and require a lot of money to sustain their full lifetime due to having to conduct the same mission requirements with fewer platforms. This is not the cold war when the Navy F-14s added redundancy to Air Forces air superiority fighters, there is no other air superiority fighter except the F-22 in the US military today. The idea behind the F-22 was that the Navy could move towards a multi-mission capability aircraft as the F-22 provides the absolute air superiority required to win major war against other powers with air capabilities. The existing requirement for the F-22 does not change simply because we build fewer, and it is noteworthy that as the F-22 is canceled, the DoD failed to produce any alternative, whether a F-16 Block 60 or even more F-18s to fill that gap, to make up for the reduced number of F-22s.

Lets be honest, if the Air Force was dropping the F-22 to build F-16 Block 60s, or even the latest F-15 models instead, the argument would be centered completely on capability vs numbers. But with aviation shortfalls in the Air Force, Navy, and even the Marine Corps right now, the DoD is canceling the F-22 with zero alternatives presented, and zero reductions in requirements from the combatant commanders. In the end, the DoD is telling Congress the Air Force of the future will do more with less, and we do it for cost purposes. That doesn't add up, and I honestly see the whole suggestion as something of an insult to the intelligence of Congress. Does the DoD really think Congress is that stupid, or does the DoD believe they have that much power over them? The second part could be true, there are a lot of freshman Senators and House members you know, and the historical record suggests the DoD is better than anyone in exploiting that.

But here is the real problem with the F-22 debate, and actually, it may be a reflection of a much larger narrative driving the long view. I was very happy to see Stephen Biddle hit this point in his CFR article today. If we were any good at predicting the future, and suggesting we knew what the 'threat' would be, there would never be a debate regarding what was needed in defense procurement. Since fortune telling is an inexact science, only fools look out decades and suggest what the world will look like.

When people ask who or what the F-22 is intended to fight, it ignores a very important point about the F-22. Whatever that fight looks like, history tells us that if it was to happen 10 years from now we likely don't even see it today, and it could be remarkably dangerous and we still wouldn't see it today. We live in a very strange time where the three enemies that topped our list of bad actors over the past decade; Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; are all nations that we have been engaged militarily against for several decades. North Korea going back to the 1950s, Iran since 1979, and Iraq every year since 1991. Expectations that the trend of knowing which specific enemy we will be engaged in conflict with in the future are highly dubious in my opinion, because the current global economic situation is changing the future even as we speak.

I am disappointed that the Naval War College did not put up Kenneth Rogoff's presentation on their Current Strategy Forum page, because that presentation was fantastic. I hope they put it up, because when economists take a strategic view into the future, I think sound defense planning discussions result.

The debt is reducing the value of the dollar, and of all the plans of the current administration, there is no plan for dealing with the debt. The value of the dollar will likely remain low for awhile compared to other currencies, and that will have an effect on energy prices. We are already seeing the price of oil rebound, up to around $70. When the global economy rebounds, knowing that the debt will still exist, what do you expect that will do to the price of oil as demand globally shoots up, likely to a higher point than anytime in history? You know, Obama may be very prescient in how he has dealt with the automobile industry, because when oil becomes static at a minimum $150+ a barrel that brand new hybrid fuel GM could look like one of the smartest domestic political moves in decades.

But at $150 a barrel, a bunch of countries are going to be flush with cash, including countries like Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and many others. Unless you haven't watched the news recently those authoritarian oil nations don't really care about their people and have no problem using a club or pistol to prove it. We can expect those nations to spend their influx of cash on military capabilities to consolidate their power internally while expanding their influence regionally, and we can expect that because that is their historical pattern.

This will be particularly dangerous with countries like Russia, because they are soon to modernize their nuclear forces. That is no small achievement. We are soon going to have to modernize our nuclear forces, and the costs of such an undertaking are going to limit what else we can do, particularly when the Navy has to replace the SSBNs.

For Russia, that means they get to build all kinds of conventional capabilities instead, and since their R&D for aircraft has remained solid over the years, very modern latest generation fighters is likely to be a big part of that purchase (and exports to virtually any buyer are also very likely) because it is one of the few industries Russia has a workforce that can step up quickly.

Want to know what keeps strategic forecasters up at night? Ask them what they expect to happen in all the oil rich authoritarian places of the world when the next global economic rise makes those nations flush with cash while the US struggles to pay debt, manage the bills, and play the global strategic balancing act role.

Don't use the argument that the F-22 is for fighting some unknown adversary, because the bottom line is We Don't Know. All we can do is plan and address the capabilities we know we need to meet our requirements, and not get sucked into the often fluid and constantly changing threat matrix that ebbs and flows too rapidly for our defense acquisition process to attempt to maintain pace with.

Take the long view. Do we need more F-22s? If not, how do we meet the mission requirements that fewer F-22s than originally planned cannot meet as to not strain our smaller but vital F-22 force over the expected duration of that platforms life? Requirements planning begins with our requirements for the capabilities we need, not by adapting to the fluid threat matrix of the other guy. If we are basing requirements planning on the emerging threats instead of the emerging trends, the enemy is already inside our OODA loop and we need a new requirements planning process, and not the one where the analysis is trumped by theories absent supporting analysis.