The Seas and the Information Age

Story here of the loss of internet connectivity to four West African nations when an undersea cable was damaged. Included in service interruptions was a "crippling" blow to Nigeria's bandwidth.

The global economy is tied to the sea--in this case, the sea-bed. There are opportunities here, and there are vulnerabilities.

Bryan McGrath

India, Pakistan, INS Arihant and the Security Dilemma

As probably most readers of this blog know, the Security Dilemma is a concept much discussed in the field of international relations. Brought to wide attention (although not first described) by Robert Jervis in 1978 with his article "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," it describes a mechanic by which interstate conflict can arise or worsen. At its base, the proposition is that actions taken by states to increase their own security can, at the same time, result in a decrease (real or perceived) in the security of their rivals. Arms races can be a result of the security dilemma, as can wider security spirals.

Although India has been quick to declare that the INS Arihant is a deterrent weapon system, a second-strike capability, this may not be the case against all its potential targets. An important part of the 'utility' of a strategic weapon system is the target set it is applied to. While against a distant, heavily armed opponent such as China the Arihant's 12 K-15 missiles may be useful only as a countervalue deterrent, against an opponent with a smaller critical target set this may not be the case.

Pakistan's reaction to the sub has been mixed, with official statements decrying the launch as an arms racing move but editorials within Pakistan stating that the submarine poses no significant threat to Pakistan. Another series of articles has the Pakistani navy head stating that the submarine poses 'no security threat' - although that statement appears most often in Indian news reports such as this one, with a Beijing byline. Heh.

Let's take a quick look at capabilities and targets. Against Pakistan, a nation with a small and slow-reacting nuclear capability, the 12 SLBMs carried aboard the Arihant pose quite a different level of threat. The current range for the K-15 seems to be around 700 km with a 1,000kg payload, rising to 1,200 km with a 150kg payload. While a 700 km range isn't enough to reach the northern half of Pakistan from the ocean, a 1,200 km range certainly can hit nearly all of the country other than a small region north and west of Islamabad (and, of course, Jammu and Kashmir, although it seems highly unlikely that Pakistan would stage nuclear weapons out of these disputed territories). Most importantly, however, it can certainly reach Sargodha and the "Weapons Storage Complex" there.

The FAS estimated that Pakistan had enough fissile material for a force of approximately 60 warheads in 2007. If we assume that these are stored in groups of 5 or more weapons, we have a target set that the Arihant has a very good chance of eliminating. Probably not totally; 100% functionality on an SLBM loadout isn't likely, and 100% Pk for those weapons is even more unlikely - but as the number of storage locations drops, the feasibility of this targeting option goes up.

Unlike the U.S., Russia and most other nuclear nations, Pakistan is balancing a set of problems. On the one hand, nuclear weapons offer it a security 'hedge' against external intervention. India has visibly exercised restraint during prior crises due to the presence of credible nuclear response by Pakistan. However, Pakistan also suffers from internal security threats, most especially in the more desolate northern areas which would offer the greatest concealment and operational security for its small arsenal. In addition, many observers agree that for additional security, Pakistan stores its weapons disassembled, with cores separate from the remainder of the systems. Given the expertise and tools required to properly mate the components of these weapons as well as the requirements for securing them against sabotage and theft, there is pressure on Pakistani commanders to keep the number of such sites low to mitigate risk.

It's a delicate balance. Moreoever, it's one whose likely outcome, at present, would present Indian strategic planners with a small number of extremely high-value targets, at least so long as Pakistan maintains its forces in a low state of alert. And here lies the core of the security dilemma facing Pakistan. The Arihant's missiles, assuming India can engineer a 150kg warhead or boost their range slightly, offer Indian planners an opportunity for a 'splendid first strike' if they can acquire intelligence on the current location of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. While this may not (and probably wouldn't) be a tempting option during times of low tension, as tension begins to ratchet upwards for whatever reason, Indian planners may - no, I'll say will - begin to consider that a strategic first strike might be able to minimize their danger. It's their job. Whether or not policymakers act on this option is a completely different question - but at the very least, it gives India a potential option at an early phase of a crisis which Pakistan's only real defense against is to actively deploy and/or disperse its arsenal. That action, in turn, reduces Pakistan's nuclear force security against internal threat, and depending on the state of Pakistani Command and Control, may force Pakistan to delegate release authority to remote actors - with all the risk that that entails (those who are curious about that risk are encouraged to read Bruce Blair's classic "Strategic Command and Control" for operational risk, or Scott D. Sagan's "The LImits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons" for organizational risk).

This post has minimal numbers in it. I don't claim to have satisfied even myself that the Arihant provides an actual qualitative change in the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean. However, it certainly seems like a question worthy of further research. Perhaps one good starting point would be to examine the state of Pakistan's early warning systems, and their capability versus a near-offshore SLBM launch.

Avoiding the World’s Largest Helicopter Carrier

“I am concerned about the EMALS program for the next aircraft carrier. As the Secretary knows well, I recently visited the production facility and was favorably impressed; however, failure of this one system to deliver on its promises means we are building the world’s largest helicopter carrier. I would like the Secretary to address what additional oversight and continuity of oversight he envisions for this program."

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, Chairman Gene Taylor, Hearing on the Navy FY10 Budget Request for Shipbuilding Programs, May 15, 2009

Back in February I began hearing bad news from several places that EMALS was in serious trouble. The post was immediately attacked, because I apparently don't know anything about anything because I did not provide precise details of the problem. It is July, and EMALS has been widely reported as a problem both in Congressional hearings and in various media stories, and yet, still no precise details exactly what the EMALS problem is.

I have been critical of several freshman in the House this year, primarily accusing them of acting like freshman members of the House (parochial issues only). Apparently I missed graduation, as I was very pleased to come across this Chris Cavas article quoting questions from freshman Rep. Eric Massa (D-NY) (a 24-year retired Navy CDR SWO) discussing the EMALS problems.

"What happens if it doesn't work?" he [Eric Massa] asked.

"The technology now is critical to the ship," replied Architzel, who detailed the Navy's steps in reviewing the program but did not mention an EMALS alternative.

"I say again, what happens if it doesn't work?" asked Massa.

"We have every expectation that it will work," replied Architzel.

"With all due respect," Massa asked again, "what happens if it doesn't work?"

"With all candor, if that new system will not work … we will have to make sure it does work," Architzel said.

After noting that no similar system is in use by any navy, Massa, a former professional staffer on the House Armed Services Committee, spoke directly to Architzel, sitting only a few feet in front of him.

"I will state for the record that I was against the Navy shifting construction to the Ford class and taking such a large leap of technology," Massa declared. "I think it is a bridge too far with exceptionally high risk.

"I am exceptionally concerned about the inability to extract an answer to the simple question of what happens if it does not work. … the reality is, we have just bought the world's largest helicopter carrier."

You know, "world's largest helicopter carrier" is no longer just a phrase used once thanks to Rep Massa, now it is a slogan... and that is not good.

Speaking to a reporter after leaving the hearing, Massa noted his concern extended beyond the carrier program.

"This actually goes to a larger subset than just EMALS," Massa said. "Across the library of the Department of Defense, we have committed ourselves to taking leaps in the second and third generations of the next great technologies without any fallback positions.

"This is bigger than EMALS. This is about maintaining a carrier strike force that can answer the nation's requirements. We are already accepting an aberration … as to the number of carriers we can maintain on active duty by accepting the early retirement of the USS Enterprise. If [the future USS Gerald R. Ford] is delayed, it has exceptionally significant impacts on our carrier strike force.

"The fulcrum of delay is the electro-magnetic launching system," Massa continued. "The decision has been made to go to Las Vegas, put the Navy's life savings on the crap table, and roll the technological dice. We've never done this before."

Well sir, you were elected because previously elected officials had a really terrible record of oversight so far this decade, so it is only natural that you are going to take the sheets off the bed and discover a few dirty little secrets that tell the story of what business has been like prior to your election. For the Navy, given the state of shipbuilding, can you (or anyone) really say you are surprised? Until Congress, both the House and the Senate, develop some way of enforcing accountability into the system, nothing is likely to change.

Now back to EMALS for a second... since most of you didn't believe me back in February when I discussed the looming problem in EMALS no one else was discussing at the time, there is probably no point in believing me now when I suggest the yet to be publicly discussed Plan B may be just over the horizon.

Just saying...

Wargaming the Future Maritime Environment

In March 2009 edition of Proceedings, under the Professional notes section or page 79 if you subscribe to the print copy, Jose Carreno; Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired); and Antonio Siordia have an article titled The Return of Naval War Gaming: Global 2008. The article explains Global 2008, a wargame conducted at the naval war college back in August of last year to "examine the challenges, issues, and implications of implementing the new U.S. maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."

Reflecting the cooperative theme that underscores the maritime strategy, among the roughly 200 participants were representatives from 19 foreign navies, as well as members from other branches of the U.S. military, several U.S. government agencies, international and nongovernmental organizations, and participants from the defense and shipping industries. The success of this exercise underscores the importance of international and multi-agency cooperation in helping to meet the challenges of the future security environment.

What I find interesting is that this week, the Naval War College published details of the wargame, indeed 80 pages of wargame analysis can be found in this wargame report. I quote some of the findings from the executive summary. I'll comment on each issue independently.

Maritime Security: Game participants unanimously saw maritime security as an important mission, and it was a central focal point of game discussions. International players, in particular, considered maritime security primarily a law-enforcement rather than a counterterrorism function. Many of the participants also preferred U.S. assistance in the form of training and exercises. Finally, most participants perceived the facilitation of maritime security as an activity that could be leveraged to enhance trust between the U.S. maritime services and their counterparts in other countries.

It is noteworthy the executive summary lists this item first, although from an international point of view I can see why it is. From a US Navy perspective however, I do not get the impression it is as high of a priority. Maritime Security is one of those action items that goes on the board, rolls off the tongue, and turns out being very hard to do successfully. According to UN statistics, compared to 2007, in 2008 piracy was UP, illegal trafficking of humans was UP, and the smuggling of narcotics (including simi-submersibles) was UP.

If maritime security is really such a high priority for the US Navy, is it wrong for someone to take an objective look at the global maritime environment and point out the statistics suggest that maritime security efforts have been largely ineffective? If maritime security is a high priority for the US Navy, then who is responsible for the failure? The truth is, maritime security is not a priority, cooperation towards building maritime cooperation is the priority, and the priority has not been producing meaningful results that can be calculated using statistical arguments (which is sad, because statistics can usually be skewed).

If you graph the rise in criminal activity by sea, it is noteworthy the rise in maritime criminal behavior globally is inversely proportional to the size of western naval forces, which are reducing in numbers across Europe and the US. Also important is to note the increase in the size of navies in the Pacific has to date had no influence on statistical trends.

I'm not even counting 2009 statistics to date, which for piracy has already been widely reported to be much higher than last year... and it is only July.

Persistent Maritime Presence: Many participants regarded the regular and sustained presence of forward deployed maritime forces as a critical enabler for all other themes, and an important part of the Navy’s contribution to the national security objectives of the United States. Specifically, forward maritime forces allowed the Navy to meet the challenges identified in Global ‘08 as requiring a timely response.

This is where current talking points define, rather than innovate, the concept of a global power projection fleet that is globally sustained and persistently present in the maritime domain. Where are the logistical innovations that attempt to support several ships off a long coast line? Where is the evidence the Navy has learned a thing from supporting sustained maritime security just off the coast of Iraq protecting a tiny coastline and only two oil terminals? The only service I see innovating logistics at sea is the Marine Corps, looking for better ways to support Marines on land. I would love to see some new innovations towards the support of many, many smaller vessels at sea to sustain presence, but supporting long endurance requirements of inexpensive, smaller naval vessels does not appear to be a priority for the US Navy.

Credible Combat Power: Participants identified five key components of credible combat power: defeating anti-access strategies, providing integrated air and missile defense, achieving sea control, projecting power ashore, and aggregating and disaggregating forces. They further emphasized two key capabilities associated with credible combat power: the ability to exercise sea control and subsequently project power ashore, and deterrence.

This is a huge topic. Anti-access strategies are obviously important, but I still question how this is done with any platform other than an aircraft or a submarine. The US Navy is the best naval force in the world in terms of integrating air and missile defense, but ironically, despite the overwhelming attention the capability gets in terms of funding, the problem is the lack of confidence (due to several reasons) in the existing system. Projecting power ashore is very important to the Marines, but people are running around saying an amphibious assault against another country will never be done again. I hope they knock on wood when they speak such phrases, because amphibious lift sure appeared to be useful to Russia only last year.

The real question is what the definition of Sea Control is these days. Aggregating and disaggregating forces is an operational discussion, but I don't think one can begin talking about operations until first agreeing what it means to control the sea. I believe the definition of Sea Control depends upon a specific variable, Rules of Engagement, and depending upon the RoE the level of Sea Control the US Navy is well suited to exercise is quite debatable. The more relaxed the RoE, the better the US Navy is designed to control the sea, but as the RoE becomes more restrictive, I think the US Navy is quite obviously less capable of controlling the seas.

I can sum it up like this. The US Navy is currently designed to be the 99% solution to less than 1% of maritime challenges, specifically unrestricted maritime warfare. The problem is that for the RoE to ever get to the point of unrestricted maritime warfare, the event that triggers the war will have to be on par with Pearl Harbor.

Building Partnerships: For game participants, building partnerships meant developing relationships with allies, friends, and stakeholders across the full spectrum of maritime activities in order to create trust and effectively accomplish shared maritime goals. They applied this concept of partnership across all regions, futures, and the full range of maritime activities, indicating that foreign partners wanted the U.S. to be involved with their maritime security in most conceivable futures. From that perspective, the participants noted that the United States will have to make significant investments in maritime resources on a global basis to build partnerships that meet the expectations of existing and potential partners. As participants and others have stated, “you can’t surge trust.” Building partnerships will accordingly require tolerance, patience, and some willingness to adapt and conform to partner standards.

We may not be able to "surge trust," but reliance on friends and partners has been a losing strategy for the US in Afghanistan. I know a lot of people don't understand how the factors will work together, but the test for both the "Cooperative" strategy and the US Navy is the second half of this year off Somalia. The Global Maritime Partnership is going to look like folly if piracy off Somalia is as bad in the second half of 2009 as it was the second half of 2008, and the credibility of the Navy will be shot to pieces.

Gates has made two things clear: he is retiring after the FY11 budget cycle and his attention is on the Air Force, not the Navy. I think Danzig will be (read - should be) his replacement, and if the press turns sour off Somalia later this year then things will appear to go from bad to ugly in a hurry in the Navy. Piracy is purely a political issue, not a strategic issue, but the politics of piracy will drive more decisions than all but the most brilliantly disseminated US naval strategies, and the US Navy doesn't even have a sub par naval strategy evangelical capacity for itself right now.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA) / Disaster Relief (DR): All of the player cells agreed that HA/DR – defined within the event’s conceptual framework as the ability to “alleviate human suffering and contribute to regional security and stability through deliberate (HA) or immediate (DR) response” – was a valuable component of CS 21. Participants also felt that the role that conducting HA/DR operations and training played in building partnerships and improving coordination with non-U.S. forces was valuable. They articulated three important criteria for the successful execution of HA/DR efforts: timeliness, well-considered strategic communications (in particular, placing a local face on the operation), and preparation (including investment in physical infrastructure and personnel training).

I think the Navy is on the right track here, indeed the whole DoD, plus international cooperation, PLUS non-government organizations...

Wake me up when another US agency gets involved outside the embassy level. The use of HA/DR as a national asset in the arsenal of state power would be more convincing if the Department of State had someone in Washington making an effort that was visible. Can Hillary Clinton make a difference in that organization? If so, it would be an accomplishment on par with anything her husband ever did.

Shared Awareness: Virtually all of the players viewed information sharing between stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental agencies and organizations) as vital to the development of improved situational awareness. They came up with five primary insights regarding shared awareness. First, information sharing is a key enabler, particularly for information-related concepts such as maritime domain awareness (MDA) and common operational picture (COP). Second, the barriers to the successful sharing and exchange of information are policy-related as well as technical, such that policy changes – not just technological advances – can lead to improved information sharing. Third, trust, developed through engagement activities such as coalition exercises and operations, would help expand the range and depth of interaction between the United States and partner countries. Fourth, information sharing must be a two-way street. Finally, ISR, particularly persistent ISR provided by maritime forces, is a key maritime requirement.

I cringe when I see discussions of MDA and COP in this context. What is MDA off the coast of Florida? Observation of the traffic patterns of the American fishing community? What is MDA off the coast of Somalia? It certainly can't be something to sing happy tunes about, the same waters international naval forces have set up a secure transit route against piracy also happens to be one of the largest human smuggling migrations at sea in the world, from Somalia to Yemen.

I look forward to seeing someone define when and why MDA and COP is the environment, and when they are the threat. I don't think these are complicated concepts, but will wait and see what comes of these buzzwords for a few more months before throwing my hat into the discussion ring.

Strategic Communications: All of the cells considered effective strategic communications – defined as the sum of all actions and messages (intentional and unintentional) influencing target audiences – as an integral part of any successful U.S. strategy. An important corollary was that the Navy had to develop and disseminate coordinated and consistent strategic communications. Thus, to be successful, the Navy must establish the ability to design and implement a standardized process at the Navy component commander level for effectively coordinating maritime actions and messages so as to convey consistent U.S. government purposes and objectives.

Very wise words, but this is an enormous topic and really is a sea change for the Navy in terms of how they manage information. If you read it carefully you will note the intent is to develop information as an extension of naval activity with the intent of linking that activity to a public diplomacy effort. I think the strategic communication model the wargame suggests is needed would drive the Navy towards the return of naval diplomacy in the information age.

The current Navy information model is about communication of how and what the Navy does, but it lacks the declaration of why and therefore is not 'strategic' at all. It is a model of information that is absent advocacy, and when absent advocacy the discussion is not diplomacy. It is not enough to just do something; one must also declare why you do something.

The Navy's Strategic communication should be used to convince people of the fundamental ideas we as a nation believe in, and to undermine the support of ideas counter to our national virtues. Strategic communication should declare certain principles and objectives as part of our actions with the intent to create a better understanding of the benefits of Navy activity. Until we add advocacy with the intent to influence into our communications, they lack a strategic objective and any associated information carries no value in the activities naval forces conduct.

Bottom line, strategic communication will remain absent in the activities of the Navy until everyone in Navy public affairs is trained (and legally empowered) to advocate principles and objectives as part of naval activity. CHINFO is not organized, trained, or legally empowered to perform such a function today.

Reading About Fast Ships

Several briefs were presented at a meeting of the International Hydrofoil Society earlier this year, and to put it as plain and blunt as possible.

There are several interesting things to read at this link, and in particular I recommend Kelly Cooper's T-Craft presentation (PDF) document which is about the best collection of T-Craft information in a single document I have seen yet.

Navy Irregular Warfare

Galrahn's post earlier on Navy Irregular Warfare included this brief, put together by a great American, Captain Mark Mullins. If ever there were an able, enthusiastic, and articulate advocate for IW within the Navy, it is Captain Mullins.

That said, I'm afraid as I read this brief and as I come to understand the OSD view of IW, I find myself thinking that we've cast too wide a net, that IW--at least to my understanding--includes about 80% of what the US Navy does when it isn't fighting someone--which is 99.9% of the time.

Consider then, the impact of this view on partners, allies, and those with whom we would be more cooperative. Are we conducting "irregular warfare" upon a population when we help their fisheries protection authority with small boat engine maintenance training? Are we conducting "irregular warfare" upon someone with whom a ship's crew is cooperating to repaint a school? Are the much bally-hooed deployments of the hospital ships conducting "irregular warfare" upon the populations they are immunizing and to whom they are providing eye-glasses?

Simply put, I believe it important to make clear distinctions between shaping/engagement activities designed to foster cooperative relationships and COIN/Counterterrorism--irrespective of what the end objective may be in the shaping. Placing them under a single rubric of "Irregular Warfare" has the unintended consequence of sending mixed signals to those with whom we would wish to cooperate, something a nation already befuddled by strategic communications concepts can ill afford.


Bryan McGrath

Will Airships Get DoD Funding Priority?

From July 20th INSIDE THE NAVY (subscription only) we learn that the US Army wants an airship.

On July 8, Pentagon comptroller Robert Hale sent all four congressional defense committees a $3.6 billion proposal to shift funds within the fiscal year 2009 budget from lower- to high-priority needs. Within that proposal is a move to direct $5 million for the new LEMV program, which will be run -- with cooperation from the Air Force and Navy -- by the Army Space and Missile Defense Command in Huntsville, AL.

"Funds are required to support the initial acquisition planning and development for a Long Endurance Multi-INT Hybrid Airship," states the reprogramming. "This will provide operational forces with a persistent platform of up to two weeks on-station time, with an integrated multi-INT [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] sensor suite."

And a small sample of the requirements.

A hybrid air vehicle combines the characteristics of a fixed-wing aircraft or a helicopter with a lighter-than-air technology, that uses buoyancy from gas less dense than oxygen to stay aloft.

"Technical objectives for the LEMV include an unmanned aerial system capable of being controlled through an existing Department of Defense ground station, three-week flight endurance, 2,500 pound sensor payload, 20,000 feet operating altitude, multi-intelligence capable, 16 kilowatts of power for payload, capable of station keeping (the capability to loiter or maintain position over a required mission area in different types of weather), recoverable and reusable," states the Army's May FY-10 budget request.

The Defense Department wants the LEMV to spend one week of its total endurance in transit and on station for two weeks, according to a Pentagon official.

A 2,500 pound sensor payload suggests a small airship, but once the services start getting involved in airships it is only a matter of time before they start looking for a larger, lift version. I don't think people fully understand how survivable airships (we are not talking about blimps here) can be.

Experience will reveal many things difficult to see from the design board. Hybrid Air Vehicles (prototype pictured above) is expected to be one company bidding the program.

US Navy Irregular Warfare

I find the information coming out of Defense Tech regarding "Imminent Fury", which appears to be a SEAL naval air support lease program (see here, here, and here) to be pretty fascinating. What really caught my attention though is the unclassified brief (PDF) from the Navy Irregular Warfare Office highlighting some of the efforts underway to support IW from the sea.

If I was being snarky, I would suggest the Navy put IW under N3/N5 to insure IW went underfunded and basically to die as a priority, but after looking around there are several places in the FY2010 budget line item where this stuff does appear funded, so maybe IW is starting to get some traction inside the Navy.

For example, this recent article in Special Operations Technology is excellent, and covers some of the developments with programs like Sea Stalker. For those who don't know, Sea Stalker is a large-diameter Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (38 inch instead of 21 inch) that can be launched from either a DDG or a SSGN via a drydeck shelter designed to lurk off a coast and collect intelligence and/or conduct surveillance.

I was pretty surprised reading that Special Operations Technology article, because this is not the kind of information we usually see discussed, much less printed.

He noted that this summer’s exercise Talisman Saber will include participation by two ScanEagles, providing alternating full motion video (day) and infrared (night) “eyes on” capabilities with the second vehicle shifting to the data relay mission.

In terms of smaller UAV activities, Kenny also pointed to recent Navy efforts involving the BUSTER small unmanned aerial system from prime contractor Mission Technologies Inc.

“We’ve deployed it on a number of naval vessels,” he said. “We’ve also done some very successful operations with allies, doing foreign internal defense, training them to operate this vehicle...

“We currently have got the system deployed on USS Florida and we’re looking at larger and more capable versions of that vehicle,” he said.

And people think blogs are a security problem? I am pretty sure there has never been a blog discuss what kinds of payloads SSGNs are loaded out with.

Very interesting though, because Buster only has about a 6nm radius. As a super cheap UAV, I doubt it is recovered once launched, rather just allowed to sink into the sea or crash out of the sky once out of fuel.

In reading through the slides of the IW brief I note plenty of efforts over the sea and under the sea, but nothing on the sea. I just wonder how long before we hear about the "DDG-51 for IW". Only a matter of time I'd guess. Oh wait, I guess that would be USS Bainbridge (DDG 96), where the destoyer acts as a SEAL sniper platform at sea.

Nukes Go To Sea

There are a few noteworthy submarine stories over the past week, but none are bigger than the launch of India's Advanced Technology Vessel INS Arihant.

The 6,000 tonne Arihant was launched by India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at a ceremony on the south-east coast.

It was built entirely in India with Russian assistance and a second one is due to be constructed shortly.

It will undergo trials over the next few years before being deployed and will be able to launch missiles at targets 700km (437 miles) away.

Until now, only the US, Russia, France, Britain and China had the capability to build nuclear submarines.

This beings India closer to becoming the first nation in decades to develop a nuclear triad, and the first nation to do so in the Indian Ocean area. While this development does not shift any balance of power in the region, it certainly gives both Pakistan and China something to think about. There is something else though, it will also give India a case for becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a discussion the current permanent five members are not looking forward to.

In other nuclear submarine news, Russia has launched their second Project 885 Yasen (NATO code name Graney) submarine, the latest Russian attack submarine.

The 119-meter-long, 13.5-meter-wide sub will carry a crew of 90, dive to 600 meters, displace 13,800 tons, and run at up to 31 knots. Designed by the St. Petersburg-based Malakhit Design Bureau, the submarine will have eight torpedo tubes and carry 24 long-range cruise missiles of several types, anti-ship missiles, and mines. Malakhit's general director and chief designer, Vladimir Pyalov, said the sub's weapons will have longer ranges and the ability to destroy land targets as well as naval ones.

Pyalov said at the launching ceremony that Severodvinsk will undergo sea tests in summer 2010 and then will be commissioned by the Northern Fleet, the RIA Novosti official news agency reported. All of the submarine's weapons, including cruise missiles, have been tested successfully.

Severodvinsk was the first Project 885 Yasen (NATO code name Graney) submarine launched back in 1993, but has been held up due to lack of funding. As has been pointed out on the blog several times, the Russian Navy continues to get the lions share of defense funding in Russia, and of the defense budget a full 25% of the budget is being spent on shipbuilding both new vessels and restoring older vessels. 85% of that shipbuilding funding is then being spent on nuclear submarines, with most of that money being spent on the Borei (project 955) strategic nuclear submarines and its troubled ballistic missile, the Bulava.

Still, Russia is coming out with a new class of ballistic missile submarine (Project 955), a new class of nuclear attack submarines (Project 885), and a new class of diesel submarines (Project 677). Additionally, the Akula II class nuclear attack submarine K-152 Nerpa appears back on schedule for delivery to India later this year.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
USS Decatur (DDG 73)
USS Howard (DDG 83)
USS Gridley (DDG 101)
USS Thach (FFG 43)


Bataan Amphibious Ready Group

USS Bataan (LHD 5)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43)


EU NAVFOR

SPS Numancia (F83) (Flagship)
SPS Marques de la Ensenada (A-11)
HS Nikiforos Fokas (F466)
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F 209)
FGS Brandenburg (F 215)
FGS Berlin (A 1411)
FS Nivose (F 732)
FS Aconit (F713)
ITS Maestrale (F570)
HMS Malmö (K12)
HMS Stockholm (K11)
HMS Trossö (A264)


Combined Task Force 150

PNS Tipu Sultan (F185)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
FS Marne (A 630)
FS Commandant Bouan (F797)
HMAS Toowoomba (FFH 156)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
JS Akebono (DD 108)
JS Tokiwa (AOE 423)


NATO Allied Mission Protector

HMS Cornwall (F99)
HS Navarinon (F461)
ITS Libeccio (F572)
TCG Gediz (F-495)
USS Laboon (DDG 58)


Combined Task Force 151

USS Anzio (CG 68)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
PNS Badr (D184)
ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976)
TCG Gaziantep (F-490)
RSS Persistence (209)


In Theater

Ocean 6
ITS San Giorgio (L9892)
KD Sri Inderapura (L1505)
INS Talvar (F40)
INS Brahmaputra (F31)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Shenzhen (DD 167)
PLAN Huangshan (FFG 570)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS James E Williams (DDG 95)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Kent (F78)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Rainier (T-AOE 7)
USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Sazanami (DD-113)
JS Samidare (DD 106)s

Harvey Takes Over at Fleet Forces Command

It can be little things that make a difference, and while this may make news like a little thing, it may end up having significant long term influence on the future.

Adm. John Harvey Jr. relieved Adm. Jonathan Greenert as commander of the Norfolk-based Fleet Forces Command during a ceremony on board the carrier Harry S. Truman in a pier-side ceremony Friday where Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead — himself a former Fleet Forces Command commander — was the guest speaker.

It would be easy to say I like ADM Harvey because he is a voice in the blogosphere, but that isn't why this caught my attention.

Harvey taking over at Fleet Forces Command was water cooler talk this week. There are a lot of change of commands every year in the Navy, but this one became the situation where a specific person in a specific position elevated the expectations of several observers within the bubble. I thought that was noteworthy.

Good luck ADM Harvey, and congratulations.

Update: ADM Harvey set up a blog for Fleet Forces, check it out here. See the first post:

I plan to use the USFF Blog to help increase meaningful two-way communication throughout our organization. What I will need from you are straight-forward comments (positive and negative) about specific topics that will help us all learn, grow and accomplish our assigned missions.

I welcome all perspectives, and my first thread will be to ask for ideas from you that you would like me to address in future posts. I will not be able to respond to every post we receive in the Blog, but I will read them and do my best to respond appropriately to the issues that arise.

Are There No Live People Worthy of the MOH?

News yesterday of the upcoming posthumous award of the Medal of Honor to SFC Jared Monti, USA for conspicuous gallantry in Afghanistan. I am humbled and awed any time I read of the bravery and selflessness of those who earn this most sacred of honors, and my debt as an American to SFC Monti is incalculable.

That said, I wonder why it is that this country has been at war for nearing eight years and to my knowledge, not a single live person has been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for action in Afghanistan or Iraq. Yes, I know that the standards are high, and that is where I want them to be.

But I would surely like to see the President draping that Medal over the head of a living, breathing hero. I hope that we haven't reached the point where one must give his or her life for the MOH.

Five Years

I have only been doing this bloggin' thing for just over two years, and can't imagine what it will be like three years from now.

But I went with this guy from the forum at StrategyPage to his blog, and after 5 years he deserves a huge congratulations.

Well done CDR Salamander. Good luck to you looking forward.

Marines and STRATCOM

I was sharing beers last night with folks and somehow the topic of Marines and Strategic Communications came up. I mentioned that as an American, I think Marines best perform STRATCOM with their rifle, and anything else that goes boom.

Looks like the Marines are looking into less violent alternatives.

The Navy and Climate Change

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Tuesday regarding Climate change, and among the topics that popped up was the threat Climate change presented to national security. There is quite a bit of thought going into the potential, but let me ask a question...

If Climate Change is so serious that we would apply a $600 billion cap and trade 'tax' on energy in the US, and we all know this will be largely unsuccessful even if 'global warming' is real, why isn't the Navy getting extra funding to provide disaster recovery along the shorelines of the US in preparation for the awaiting climate caused calamities?

We can barely find $15 billion for SCN, and OPNAV is ready to cut the amphibious fleet which will be the most useful assets for managing disasters as a result of climate change, and yet response just doesn't seem to be important.

I guess we will all just trust in FEMA!

Anyway, here is John Kerry's opening remarks. I think there is evidence that we are in a natural cycle of climate change, but I am very skeptical of global warming. I am also skeptical of how serious government cares about climate change if it is indeed becoming a serious concern, because the most realistic way to build capacity for response is to increase funding for the maritime services to purchase platforms optimized to deal with emerging climate events. It isn't just homeland security either, the Tsunami response in SE Asia was the best diplomatic event of the first decade in the 21st century, and the polls of that region prove it (even as the response itself was token in context).

Opening Statement by Senator John Kerry

We are here today to discuss a grave and growing threat to global stability, human security, and America’s national security. As you will hear from all of today’s witnesses, the threat of catastrophic climate change is not an academic concern for the future.

It is already upon us, and its effects are being felt worldwide, right now. Earlier this year, a 25-mile wide ice bridge connecting the Wilkins Shelf to the Antarctic landmass shattered, disconnecting the Shelf from the Antarctic continent. In four years, the Arctic is projected to experience its first ice-free summer—not in 2030, but in 2013. The threat is real and fast approaching.

Just as 9-11 taught us the painful lesson that oceans could not protect us from terror, today we are deluding ourselves if we believe that climate change will stop at our borders.

Fortunately, America’s most trusted security voices—including those here today—have been sounding the alarm. In 2007, eleven former Admirals and high-ranking generals issued a seminal report from the Center for Naval Analysis, where Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn serves on the Military Advisory Board. They warned that climate change is a “threat multiplier” with “the potential to create sustained natural and humanitarian disasters on a scale far beyond those we see today.”

This is because climate change injects a major new source of chaos, tension, and human insecurity into an already volatile world. It threatens to bring more famine and drought, worse pandemics, more natural disasters, more resource scarcity, and human displacement on a staggering scale. Places only too familiar with the instability, conflict, and resource competition that often create refugees and IDPs, will now confront these same challenges with an ever growing population of EDPs—environmentally displaced people. We risk fanning the flames of failed-statism, and offering glaring opportunities to the worst actors in our international system. In an interconnected world, that endangers all of us.

Nowhere is the nexus between today’s threats and climate change more acute than in South Asia–the home of Al Qaeda and the center of our terrorist threat. Scientists are now warning that the Himalayan glaciers, which supply water to almost a billion people from China to Afghanistan, could disappear completely by 2035.

Water from the Himalayas flows through India into Pakistan. India’s rivers are not only agriculturally vital, they are also central to its religious practice. Pakistan, for its part, is heavily dependent on irrigated farming. Even as our government scrambles to ratchet down tensions and prepares to invest billions to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to deliver for its people—climate change is threatening to work powerfully in the opposite direction.

Worldwide, climate change risks making the most volatile places even more combustible. The Middle East is home to six percent of the world’s population but just two percent of the world’s water. A demographic boom and a shrinking water supply will only tighten the squeeze on a region that doesn’t need another reason to disagree.

Closer to home, there is scarcely an instrument of American foreign policy that will be untouched by a changing climate. Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean, a vital hub for our military operations across the Middle East, sits on an atoll just a few feet above sea level. Norfolk, VA, home to our Atlantic Fleet, will be submerged by one meter of sea level rise. These problems are not insurmountable, but they will be expensive, and they risk compromising our readiness.

Of course, the future has a way of humbling those who try to predict it too precisely. But we do know, from scientists and security experts, that the threat is very real. If we fail to connect the dots—if we fail to take action—the simple, indisputable reality is that we will find ourselves living not only in a ravaged environment, but also in a much more dangerous world.
We are honored to be joined today by an old friend who needs no introduction in these halls. John Warner served five terms as a US Senator from Virginia. He enlisted in the Navy at age 17, served as a sailor in World War Two, fought as a Marine in Korea, and rose to become Secretary of the Navy.

I met Secretary Warner when he presented me a Silver Star. Senator Warner became a friend, a colleague for twenty-four years, and one of the true gentlemen of this institution. When he retired and I was awarded his old office, Senator Warner’s gift to his fellow Navy man was a binnacle—a tool that sailors use to point out the right direction and light a path forward. Of course, none of us could ask for a better guide than Senator Warner’s own words and his life of service. I am pleased that he continues to use his extraordinary credibility to speak directly to the American people about the urgency of this issue.

Our other witnesses are impressive in their own right. A decorated 35-year veteran of the US Navy, Vice Admiral Lee Gunn now serves as President of the American Security Project.

Sharon Burke is Vice President for Natural Security at the Center for a New American Security, where she directs the Center’s work on the national security implications of global natural resources challenges.

Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn is a member of the CNA Military Advisory Board and former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs. I look forward to hearing from each of you. But first let us turn to a Senator who, for years, has been a Senate leader in confronting non-traditional security challenges from loose nuclear material to food security: Senator Richard Lugar.

Hmm. I guess I think we should be considering how this influences our amphibious ships, the number of helicopters we have for SAR operations, and our capacity to produce fresh water off shore in responses to places where fresh water sources are wiped out by a coastal climate event. If the problem was really as serious as John Kerry claims, one would think the production of a nuclear powered fresh water producing helicopter carrier, painted white for CG or Hospital purposes, would be the right response.

They could even be built to commercial standard for that purpose.

Why the Navy Has a Problem with Its Message

This entry is lifted from an email I received today from a colleague; some things to think about here....

These photos were included in the 12 July DoD "Week in Photos" section of the Defenselink website. All of the other photos were of Soldiers fighting in Afghanistan or in combat training and of a USAF tanker conducting a tanking mission.

The first photo is of AAVs returning to USS BATAAN during a training exercise. This photo could pretty much have been taken at any time since the 1960s, and is of an activity that likely will not again be conducted in a wartime environment. The caption for the first photo is:

SEA ASSAULT

Amphibious assault vehicles from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit approach the well deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan during a training exercise in the 5th Fleet area of operation, July 11, 2009. Bataan is serving as the flagship for the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and the 22nd Marine unit is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command.

The second photo speaks for itself.

FEET FIRST

A USS Bataan sailor jumps from the ship's hangar bay during swim call in the Gulf of Aqaba, July 11, 2009. Bataan is serving as the flagship of the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group, supporting maritime security in the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet area of operations.

Hard for the nation to take the Navy seriously. We could be highlighting the work of the Seabees, the Navy Riverine units, the EA-6B squadrons, the P-3 squadrons, the Navy PRTs in Afghanistan, the Navy Individual Augmentees everywhere, or Navy medical, all of whom are doing a lot of heavy lifting in the CENTCOM AOR...

I Expect More from John Lehman

The best SECNAV of my lifetime sorta phones this one in.

Bryan McGrath

The Bear Tries To Outwit BMD

This spring saw a lot of discussion of the counter-BMD capabilities of China's new ASBM system along with ongoing debate over the value of U.S. BMD systems and plans, particularly as these systems impact our relationship with Russia. Well, if Roger McDermott at the Jamestown Foundation is to believed, it looks like Moscow is more worried about U.S. BMD capability than previously expressed.

On July 15, sources within the Russian MoD said that two missile launches, using a flattened trajectory, were conducted by submarines the previous day. In particular, they alleged that U.S. and NATO intelligence were "surprised," not by the launches but that they were unable to determine the source of their launch. "The American missile defense system of course detected the missile launches themselves, but the area from which the launches were conducted was completely unexpected for them," the source said. Reportedly, attack submarines from the Northern Fleet arrived in the Arctic Circle, closed the area to tracking, and from beneath the pack-ice two Delta IV submarines conducted launches. "In its turn, the U.S. space detection equipment, as an element of the missile defense system, cannot track the presence of submarines under the Arctic ice," the source claimed. The deployment of submarines in this area, and the apparent absence of sufficient operational information, reduces the time it takes to reach a target and until the launch it is effectively invisible to tracking systems (RIA Novosti, July 15).

This, coupled with Russian protests over U.S. plans to array missile defense assets across Eastern Europe, reminds me of something Chuck Yeager used to say: "Anything that makes the Russians squirm has to be good." After all, you don't look for ways to stop or defeat systems that don't work.

Mug Shot

This is my first trip to the Naval Postgraduate School. The campus is very nice, much nicer than the Naval War College where I made a visit last month. The first priority Monday afternoon was to get my mug, since I intend to be here all week I had to make sure I was getting the best price for beer. Priorities. The picture is very high resolution if you need a better view.

I am here for about two dozen reasons, only one of those reasons I am not allowed to discuss on the blog for the time being.

Because blog content will be inconsistent as I spend most of my time networking, I wanted to leave a very complex thought question to discuss regarding the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile.

What will be the ramifications of a successful PLA anti-ship ballistic missile demonstration? You can take any approach you want to the answer: regional, political, domestic in China, domestic in the US, or internal to the DoD? It is one thing to say the DoD has noted the development of a weapon in its annual report, but a successful demonstration against a moving target in the South China Sea is going to send shockwaves across the Navy.

I think it will be like Восток-1, except I don't know what the equivalent of Alan Shepard on Freedom 7 a month later will be.

* Yes, that is my non-marked (read: beat to hell from overuse) version of Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, and you are damn right I'm going to ask for an autograph before I leave. The other book is War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age by Thomas Rid. I'm only a few chapters into it, but it is a lot better than I expected, so far.

Introduction: Data and Decisions - The Rising Cost of Useful Information

This morning after a late breakfast, I was strolling down Cannery Row in Monterey, California browsing the shops, and I happened into a modern art gallery. I am not a fan of modern art, I prefer classical styles if art must be visual, and I prefer dance and music to other types of art. In an effort to hit every shop I stopped in anyway. As I entered I found myself struck by a painting on the wall. There was something familiar about this painting, although I had never seen it before.

I kept browsing the gallery and came across another painting, similar and familiar, but I had never seen it before. This time I looked at the tag, and the artists name was Eyvind Earle. I walked back to other painting and sure enough, Eyvind Earle was the artist of that painting as well. After admiring both pieces of art, I continued through the gallery until I came across yet another painting that I really liked. Again, Eyvind Earle was the artist. These were all original paintings, and well outside my price range, but there was something very familiar about the art, a feeling of comfort and familiarity. I began to think, who is Evyind Earle?

I asked the gallery shop keeper who Evyind Earle is and it turned out, Evyind Earle is an artist who worked for Walt Disney, and he drew the background for several movies, including my youngest daughters favorite movie that I have seen 1,000 times (it seems) lately Sleeping Beauty. Was this the reason that of the hundreds of paintings and dozen or so gallery's I walked though this morning, I kept getting pulled back to paintings by Eyvind Earle? Is my unfortunate attachment, as a father of a 4-year-old princess lover, to the never-ending Sleeping Beauty DVD the subconscious reason why Eyvind Earle was 'familiar' to me?

The question I kept asking myself, as I attempted to drown out my thoughts at the Scheid Vineyards wine tasting store a few doors down was whether my subconscious knew the painting before I did, after all, in one of the early scenes of the Sleeping Beauty DVD we own, there is a short story about the background and making of the movie. I have seen that introduction before, and without seeing it again I'd place a $1000 right now Eyvind Earle's name is mentioned.

As I do before all long plane flights, I loaded several books onto my iPod for this trip just in case the stereotypical Manhattan mom is taking her kids on a trip. You know the type, the parents whose reliance on the nanny becomes obvious, because they have no connection or authority over their own young children, and forgot to pack the "essential tools of the traveling trade" that regular parents and grandparents get gold stars for having readily available.

(Tip for parents and grandparents, always bring Ring Suckers to help with the ear popping and lack of entertainment after 3 hours of flight, and you too can be a gold star parent or grandparent of kids 2-5 years old on a plane. I happily gave out 8 ring suckers yesterday to one such parental couple behind me on the plane, and between becoming the most popular person in my section of the flight and the iPod books, I enjoyed my proverbial 'nanny' gold star in peace on the 4+ hour flight from Chicago to San Jose.)

One of the books I added this time was Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking by Malcolm Gladwell. Blink is a great book, and includes a very interesting analysis regarding Millennium Challenge 2002 btw, but covers two topics that I have been thinking about lately. The first is the subconscious reaction to information, and the other is rapid "thin-slicing" of data into useful information. Both subjects are beginning to get a lot of attention in the military lately, but should get more.

There is a steady drumbeat in military circles of the opinion that data is becoming more and more costly, and by that as we accumulate more, it is becoming less valuable because it is so expensive for the military to turn massive amounts of data into the useful chunks of information needed for an efficient decision process at all levels. I don't know if the problem indeed exists, but given the immaturity of the tools for data dissemination in the private sector, and known interoperability problems across military services with data, I imagine there is probably some truth to the issue. For 9/11 the data was there to prevent the attack, but dissemination of the data into useful information didn't exist.

But I have a feeling, and I note theory, that this is a generational problem and would resolve itself over time even if nothing was done proactively. My problem has been, I can't explain why I have this theory, what makes mass data dissemination generational and why do I believe future generations will have a better grasp on managing the problems? In Blink, I think I found part of the justification for my theory.

In describing the process of 'thin slicing' data in Blink, Malcolm Gladwell notes that thin slicing is skill, not art, and can be trained. Web 2.0 has created an internet data flow too massive for many to keep up, even organizing data via RSS and making information search capable doesn't resolve the issues with data dissemination, because dissemination of data requires a decision process that turns data into useful information. I believe that because Generation Y has grown up, evolved and trained in massive data flows they have developed natural skills for thin slicing data with available tools, be it cell phones, computer software, or simply how they how they follow streaming data. I liken it as similar to how code breakers in WWII were able to naturally, and with a high degree of success, follow specific units around Europe based on the communication habits of coders in the German Army.

I don't want to give the impression that thin slicing could ever replace research, we are talking about two very different types of information dissemination of large amounts of data, but I believe it will be the natural thin slicing skill of Generation Y that will demand, thus force the evolution of data dissemination tools to resolve some of the costing issues of data today.

This is just an primer on the topic, if I get a chance this week I want to open the discussion up and apply what I am trying to say to a specific example, which is the topic of Maritime Domain Awareness. For those who want to get ahead of the discussion, consider this July 2009 article in Proceedings by LT Mark Munson. There are a lot of great points made in this article I very much agree with. There are also some gaps in the argument, small but critical in my opinion. I think Lt Munson is both right and wrong at the same time, and I hope to tie in where thin slicing applies to my thoughts on that Maritime Domain Awareness article later this week, time permitting.

What to Watch For - LCS

On Wednesday the House Appropriations Committee will do the full defense markup. Obviously everyone's eyes are on the F-22, but based on the reporting people should also keep their eye on the Littoral Combat Ship. This program could not get any stranger.

According to news reporting the last few days at InsideDefense (subscription only), there are two LCS issues specifically worth watching. The first is that John Murtha wants to add authorization for a 4th LCS in FY 2010. The second is that the Navy wants to cut funding for LCS mission modules.

The other day Bryan was discussing the Navy talking point about alternatives to the LCS that those platforms don't "meet the requirement." Will someone tell me how a Littoral Combat Ship without modules will be able to "meet the requirement?" Give me a break, the Navy has a requirement for a very fast, empty 3000 ton 'war'ship built like a logistics ship and armed with a 57mm and RAM launcher? I thought the requirement was the payload, not the hull.

I am sure there is a reason the Navy wants to cut funding for LCS modules, but that reason cannot possibly jive with the same arguments used to challenge LCS critics. It is pretty clear why now, at this very late hour, the Navy would suggest cutting LCS mission module funding. They do it after Gene Taylor (D-MS) has held hearings, because had the Navy suggested cutting LCS mission module funding during those hearings, the Navy would have had difficulty with his questions how the LCS is a better option than other frigate options, including a version of the National Security Cutter being built in Mississippi.

Mission module funding was reduced from the Presidents budget in FY 2007, FY 2008, and FY 2009. I do wonder, is it because the mission modules are less expensive (there is some truth to that) or just poorly managed or not a priority? Very hard to tell, but I do wonder what the final mission modules will look like. At some point Congress should have the Navy explain which is more important, the LCS or the modules. These are different programs with different priorities, and I am curious, is the hull more important than the modules or are the modules more important than the hull.

For me, the modules are much more important, but I don't think that is how the Navy looks at it. There are probably good reasons for the decisions being made to cut the mission modules, but it sure seems odd to me. Without the modules, what is the LCS?

I only have one thought regarding adding a 4th LCS for FY2010 - where does the money come from? Why not spend any new LCS hull money on developing LCS modules other than these 3, for example, where is the LCS mission module for Sea Control. If the LCS is so 'perfect' for fighting pirates, where is the pirate fighting LCS module? That module would, presumably, include a holding facility for example since the ship doesn't really have any spare bunks for sailors, much less prisoners.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
USS Decatur (DDG 73)
USS Howard (DDG 83)
USS Gridley (DDG 101)
USS Thach (FFG 43)


Bataan Amphibious Ready Group

USS Bataan (LHD 5)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43)


EU NAVFOR

SPS Numancia (F83) (Flagship)
SPS Marques de la Ensenada (A-11)
HS Nikiforos Fokas (F466)
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F 209)
FGS Brandenburg (F 215)
FGS Emden (F 210)
FGS Berlin (A 1411)
FS Nivose (F 732)
FS Aconit (F713)
ITS Maestrale (F570)
HMS Malmö (K12)
HMS Stockholm (K11)
HMS Trossö (A264)


Combined Task Force 150

PNS Tipu Sultan (F185)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
RFA Wave Knight (A389)
HMS Cumberland (F85)
FS Marne (A 630)
FS Commandant Bouan (F797)
HMAS Toowoomba (FFH 156)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
JS Akebono (DD 108)
JS Tokiwa (AOE 423)


NATO Allied Mission Protector

HMS Cornwall (F99)
HS Navarinon (F461)
ITS Libeccio (F572)
TCG Gediz (F-495)
USS Laboon (DDG 58)


Combined Task Force 151

USS Anzio (CG 68)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
PNS Badr (D184)
ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH 976)
TCG Gaziantep (F-490)
RSS Persistence (209)


In Theater

Ocean 6
ITS San Giorgio (L9892)
KD Sri Inderapura (L1505)
INS Talvar (F40)
INS Brahmaputra (F31)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Shenzhen (DD 167)
PLAN Huangshan (FFG 570)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS James E Williams (DDG 95)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Rainier (T-AOE 7)
USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Sazanami (DD-113)
JS Samidare (DD 106)