New Navy Commercial

I just saw this on the Navy Times Website--news of a new Navy commercial soon to replace the "Accelerate Your Life" campaign. Obviously aimed at the demographic groups most likely to enlist, the commercial features lots of pictures of Seals and inshore types, some ships, some airplanes, and some footage of WWII sailors doing the things they did. (Here is the commercial)

I've had conversations many times with Peter Swartz of the Center for Naval Analyses, a brilliant man, a great American, and one of the godfathers of the 1980's Maritime Strategy. He was particularly helpful to me and the strategy team as we conducted our deliberations, serving as a sounding board for many ideas and putting together extraordinarily helpful workshops that prodded our thinking along. Peter does a wonderful job of sending stuff to me that shows the CNO or other officials making references to the Maritime Strategy--mostly I think to show me that it is still being talked about. Just the other night, he and I discussed the very consistent messaging the Navy is doing with respect to CS21. At the end of the conversation, I repeated something I've said since the document came out--until it moves money, the Maritime Strategy is just good birdcage carpeting.

That said--this commercial is clearly derivative of the Maritime Strategy---especially the key message "A Global Force For Good". The very last paragraph of the Strategy says, "United States seapower is a force for good, protecting the Nation's vital interests even as it joins with others to promote security and prosperity across the globe". Whatever advertising agency the Navy is using has clearly determined that young people with a propensity to join the Navy increasingly see themselves as connected with the rest of the world--in a global system, if you will. Cribbing this theme from the Maritime Strategy is a wise play, and I think it serves as an effective theme for the campaign.

By the way--we stole the "force for good" thing from a Royal Navy strategy document I read. Always thought it was a great way to sum things up.

Bryan McGrath

A Few Good Reads

Who is your favorite Pakistani blogger? Mine is Mosharraf Zaidi, and his analysis of the Kerry-Lugar Bill is brilliant reading. That article is one of the Afghanistan top 5 reads for the week.

This AEGIS BMD essay in Space Review by Brian Weeden will give you plenty to think about. Well, it certainly has given me a lot to think about. You folks who worked on Operation Burnt Frost will enjoy it.

Too many sailors who read here daily not to note this call by ADM Harvey. When a 3-star asks for your opinion, give it. When we raise issues related to gender on this blog, the comments of the post can creep towards 100. Surely you folks can muster a couple dozen comments for the Admiral, and that means you too ladies. ADM Harvey has one of the most useful blogs in the Navy, it is a shame more people aren't using the opportunity it offers.

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) is on deployment. It might be worth watching BHRs Facebook and Twitter pages, and the reason I say this is because in the Pacific right now we have 2 Typhoons and a Tsunami today. Anything can happen, and they are the front lines for the US. Just saying, all kinds of opportunities for BHR to change the way the Navy uses social software, and there are a bunch of smart PAOs in the Pacific who will be backing them up.

Opinion: ARGs with Marines on them is naval diplomacy and soft power. Americans will find the BHR social software efforts to get the word out. In my opinion, the BHR PAOs need to be focused on connecting to audiences in the places you are going, not audiences in the places you come from. The Navy rightfully sees information as a weapon, but that should not apply to CHINFO. However, CHINFO needs to take a different approach to information, and look at information as an influence enterprise.

See the new article at the Jamestown Foundation by Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Overseas Basing? It would appear the conversation of limited forward basing has begun in China. This is still a far cry from the "String of Pearls" theory, but establishing forward bases of any kind would represent a shift in policy.

Israeli Submarines - Maybe Not?

This AFP story is what started the list of news stories claiming Israel had accepted two new submarines.

Now I am hearing from a friend at Janes that "HDW confirmed to us that construction is still in progress and no deliveries have taken place."

I'll take the word of the folks at Janes over the word of AFP every time. I can't imagine Israel would complain about the news article though, this type of military disinformation propaganda is what they do to keep everyone else guessing.

Electronic Attack (VAQ) 132 Good to Go!

One small step for naval aviation, one giant leap for the United States.

Electronic Attack (VAQ) 132 received the official notification in a Sept. 22 Navy message from Capt. Tom Slais, Commander Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, that the squadron was certified "safe for flight operations in the EA-18G."

"Your hard work and dedication is exemplary, and I am confident you will continue to display the same pride and professionalism as you execute safe operations and maintain your aircraft," said Slais.

The first operational Growler squadron to attain "safe for flight" status since the first EA-18G arrived Naval Air Station Whidbey Island in June 2008 recently returned from a successful carrier qualification detachment on board USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) with a 100 percent qualification rate.

I think I have made it clear how much I love this platform. Not perfect, some power issues to work out and a few other kinks in the system, but in all I believe the Growler is the best fighter introduced to the US Navy since the Tomcat, and probably the most important evolution of capabilities in naval aviation since moving to jet aircraft.

New Pictures of Varyag

We are finally getting some new pictures of Varyag before the 60th Anniversary parade. It really looks like they are doing a lot of work, especially on the island. From looking at all the stuff they have on the deck, I think there is more going on then just the work they are doing on the island, but it's hard to tell right now.

Israel Expands Submarine Force

There have been rumors that Israel has been pressuring Germany to finish the 2 submarines under construction. I guess the rumors are true.

Israel has taken delivery of two German submarines ordered four years ago, a military spokesman said on Tuesday...

The submarines, called U212s, can launch cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads, although when it confirmed the sale in 2006 the German government said the two vessels were not equipped to carry nuclear weapons.

The subs were ordered in 2005 and delivery was initially expected in 2010.

Including the two new ones, Israel has five German submarines — the most expensive weapon platforms in Israel’s arsenal...

According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the U212s are designed for a crew of 35, have a range of 4,500 kilometres (2,810 miles) and can launch cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

Very interesting timing. Worth noting, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has 4 U-214 submarines almost completed that were intended for Greece, but were never paid for. Last I heard all 4 were launched, and laying around looking for a new owner.

A good deal for someone. If they are for sale cheap, I think the US should buy them. I'm sure the folks down at Newport News could do something with them to get them to sea.

Then again, maybe Israel will buy them?

The Day the LCS Was Promoted to Warship

Another important planning factor of course does remain capability, especially the capability to account for the trends that we see. Surely, credible combat power is required but we must provide the right types of capabilities to the commander in chief. We continue to see growing demands from our combatant commanders for more ballistic missile defense, more submarines and clearly more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. And what we have seen is that the high-end capabilities have a better chance of going low and the low-end capabilities have a better chance of going high.

Multipurpose ships come into play when you have capacity issues. They can win the battle but they can also perform many other functions. For example, consider the Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyer. It was the platform from which the rescue of Captain Phillips of the Maersk Alabama took place. It was also a source of Tomahawk strikes into CENTCOM. It was also the ship that was selected to carry the first humanitarian supplies into Georgia after the conflict there because it could go in unattended. It's also the ship that's performing ballistic missile defense and long-range search and track in the Western Pacific. And it also is a ship that is currently operating on the East Coast of Africa in an Africa Partnership Station role. It does not mean that everything has to all be at the high end, but balance is the key.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead delivers remarks at the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College (DOC), Newport, R.I. - 16 June 2009

I've been thinking of these words from the CNO ever sense the announcement the Navy will be assuming the Ballistic Missile Defense role for Europe. The assignment to the Navy of this BMD role has serious consequences, and it does not appear the Navy was given much time to prepare for taking on this new role. I can't imagine the CNO has been out making these comments with knowledge that such an important assignment, like BMD of Europe, was on his horizon.

The analogy the CNO uses suggests that no mission profile is too low of a standard for a Burke, and it is easier to go down the mission chain with a more powerful ship than to go up the mission chain with a less powerful ship. At first glance this makes sense, but there is a reason it is not the direction suggested by CS-21. The problem with this argument has always been, if the Navy doesn't allocate the minimal resources necessary to conduct the low-end capability mission set, the Navy will lose presence for those low-end capability missions when the number of high-end capability missions are increased. That is precisely what is happening to the US Navy today, and the result will be that any available asset that provides the low-end capabilities will be asked to take up the slack for missions that require higher-end mission capability sets - exactly what the CNO claimed he was strategically planning to avoid.

The Navy does not have any ship without AEGIS able to deliver firepower above that of a 57mm gun. Consider the fleet constitution strategy of the 2030 US Navy. The lowest high-end warship will have ballistic missile defense (DDG-51), and the highest low-end vessel is the hull used as the future minesweeper (LCS). The US has no warship between those two completely polar opposite warfighter capabilities, and at the same time, every other warship in the entire world (including every single modern corvette operated by a small nation) has warfighter capabilities that fall somewhere between DDG-51 and LCS. In other words, in order to match the warfighting capabilities of any nation in the world, including the little corvette Navies of the world, the US Navy must task a warship with ballistic missile defense capability; as nothing short of that is competitive. Apparently this extreme high-end capability and extreme low-end capability is what the Secretary of Defense believes describes "balance" when it comes to the US Navy.

If the US Navy intends to operate 10 Carrier Strike Groups and the Marine Corps intends to operate 9 Amphibious Ready Groups, how many large surface combatant escorts will be needed?

Carrier Strike Groups today usually deploy with 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, and 1 FFG-7 frigate. That suggests the Navy will need 10 cruisers and 30 destroyers for each Carrier Strike Group, and a pair of Littoral Combat Ships will replace the FFG-7 (total 20).

Amphibious Ready Groups have typically utilized 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, and 1 FFG-7 frigate as escort. That suggests the Navy will need 9 cruisers and 20 destroyers for each Amphibious Ready Group, and a pair of Littoral Combat Ships will replace the FFG-7 (total 18).

That comes to 19 cruisers, 50 destroyers, and 38 Littoral Combat Ships as a minimal requirement for strike group escorts.

Now the Navy has a BMD requirement in 5th fleet, 7th fleet, and now 6th fleet. If you presume it takes a minimum of 8 ships, rotations of 2 ships at a time, for each fleet that suggests the Navy needs 24 additional destroyers for the BMD role. That would suggest the total number of large surface combatants could be as high as 19 cruisers, 50 destroyers, and 24 ballistic missile destroyers for a total of 93 major surface combatants. As of today, through FY11 - the last official Navy 5-year plan suggested 19 cruisers, 65 DDG-51s and 3 DDG-1000s for a total of 87 cruisers and destroyers, suggesting the Navy needs at least 6 more major surface combatants for these roles (likely to be built between FY12 - FY15.

Even with 93 major surface combatants, that still soaks up the AEGIS ships for high end escort and BMD tasking, raising the question what about the presence roles and escort roles? Did the Navy just lose AEGIS in the Surface Action Group to BMD, or is BMD the new Surface Action Group?

Clearly the days of using Arleigh Burke destroyers for humanitarian operations in Georgia, Global Fleet Stations off Africa, and anti-piracy operations off Africa will be regulated to low-end assets, which in the US Navy means the Littoral Combat Ship. The question though is what comes of convoy escort in war, say the Persian Gulf or Pacific Ocean, or even presence operations in places like the South America, Africa, the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and anywhere else a Navy ship is required where major strike groups may not be operating?

Will the LCS be asked to take up the role of presence operations off the coast of Lebanon? Under oath, Admirals have consistently testified that the ASCM threat by Hezbollah was threatening enough to cancel the very capable DDG-1000; are we supposed to believe the barely armed LCS can do that role instead? How many missions will the LCS be asked to take over now that tasking for AEGIS ships has been tasked up the mission chain to the high-capability requirements? How many low-end capability missions will be lost because there are no ships dedicated for those roles, and how many higher-capability missions will the LCS now have to fill with the AEGIS missions now expanding towards BMD?

Congress is unlikely to ask the question "How many low-end ships does the Navy need to meet the presence requirements for the maritime strategy?" Congress is much more likely to ask "how many high-end capability ships does the Navy require to meet the emerging BMD requirement?" In other words, the Navy has lost its ability to get more ships at the low end because they never advocated for any ships down there, so those missions will suffer. In its place the Navy will likely buy a handful of high-end destroyers to take on the new mission set for European BMD, and the LCS will be tasked up to higher-end mission sets to fill in the gaps where needed.

The LCS acquisition decision was rushed to hit the news cycle right before the major BMD announcement. It wasn't a coincidence, it was to insure Congressional support so difficult questions regarding Navy fleet constitutional strategy wouldn't be asked. Basically, the LCS has been locked in for 5 years, and the Navy will go into next decade with a fleet designed to do every high end mission with AEGIS, and make do with the short legs of the LCS doing the less sexy, every day grunt work for the fleet. Too bad those missions are almost never ASW, MIW, or ASuW against small boats and are often manpower intensive operations; or said another way; require virtually everything the LCS doesn't have.

Poor planning for low end presence requirements and the focus on large surface combatants has allowed the BMD decision to promote the Littoral Combat Ship to the role of a warship. Too bad LCS neither has the weapons of a warship or the survivability of a warship, meaning the Navy appears to have changed the LCS from a mothership for unmanned systems technology into the expendable low-end frigate every LCS critic has been warning about for years.

Disaster in the Philippines

The flooding in the Philippines has affected at least 450,000 people and has displaced about 150,000 people.

Officials said the economic damage from the worst rains on record in the Manila area was about 1.4 billion pesos ($30 million), including 500 million pesos in lost crops. Damaged roads and bridges accounted for most of the remaining costs.

Officials expected the toll to rise with people looking for missing relatives and residents trapped in flooded houses two days after Typhoon Ketsana dumped about 410 mm of rain in 24 hours, about the average amount of rainfall for an entire month.

Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines has deployed small boats and medical personnel to help in the recovery efforts. So far, no ships have been reported to have responded, but the Reagan CSG may be tasked that direction by the end of the week.

As of September 17, U.S. Navy Sailors delivered medical supplies, food, and rescued more than 52 people in Manila, including one woman in labor.

It also looks like more bad weather may be on the way.

Israel

This is just a bunch of political rhetoric, but I agree with both of them.

Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy

I don't base my assessments on the political rhetoric. I get the sense the military thinks a strike by Israel is better than 50/50, and these guys are simply reflecting that opinion to Chris Matthews.

LCS-1 Has a New Pair of Guns

Looks like USS Freedom (LCS 1) has a new pair of guns.

Still no NLOS. Follow picture to Navy.mil for higher resolution. More here and here. BTW, check out the second link, looks like LCS-1 has a new RHIB instead of a POS captains boat.

She is preparing for a deployment I thinks...

Nobody Knows...

Phil Ewing is writing about the biggest mission the Navy has been assigned in decades, and in asking questions is finding there are few answers.

Which ships will take the patrol mission? What will the deployments look like — will ships participate in exercises, make port visits or be confined to a narrow patrol box? How long will ships be assigned picket duty? Will BMD patrol ships sail with the crews they would have taken on normal deployments, or will they have fewer sailors to account for the narrower mission?

Navy officials had few answers in the week after Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the new BMD mission. Spokesmen at the Pentagon and for 3rd Fleet, which is responsible for Navy Air and Missile Defense Command, said officials were working out the details.

More questions.

There were broader questions beyond crewing and deployments: For the first time, the commanding officer of a surface warship will have strategic responsibilities — the ship could be the only thing standing between a nuclear attacker and its victim. What discretion will commanders have in responding to attacks?

“You’ve put these commanders on a par with [ballistic-missile submarine] commanders,” said Steven Cimbala, an expert on ballistic-missile issues.

“But unlike an SSBN commander, who is unlikely to be under immediate tactical threat, an Aegis cruiser or a [destroyer] could very easily be attacked by surface or subsurface craft, or aircraft, as part of a first strike,” Cimbala said.

A lot of questions, and no one seems to know the answers. This is going to take a lot of time for the Navy to work out the details.

Crew swaps were mentioned, even removing the tail is mentioned as a way to cut crew... this sounds like a lot of early speculation. Still, it goes to the heart of the issue, the Navy conclusion in the Pacific called for 16 AEGIS BMD ships.

It is possible the same number will be necessary for the Atlantic theater. 16 ships allows for a rotation of around 4 ships at a time, which in truth is actually only 2 flanks protected from ballistic missiles since it takes a minimum of 2 ships to perform the mission.

NATO Maritime Strategy

See this interesting eight page paper discussing the development of the NATO Maritime Strategy. Securing the Commons: Towards NATO's New Maritime Strategy by Brooke Smith-Windsor (PDF) gives a nod in the direction of CS-21.

This paper aims to identity the underlying purpose behind the recent NATO involvement in maritime security affairs; to offer a greater appreciation of what objective genuinely is at state and why it is in the national interest of all Allies - whether in possession of coastline or not - to pursue it and to articulate it in the new AMS. In sum, it sets out to explain the enduring requirement for an Allied maritime strategy that underpins United States (US) command of the commons - command of the sea, air, and space above it - in order that they may continue to uphold the shared interests and values of the transatlantic democracies.

The folks at Newport and in N3/N5 will be especially interested to read how much of their work is influential here. That means you too Bryan.

Book Review: Flotilla

I recently finished Donald Shomette's Flotilla: The Patuxent Naval Campaign in the War of 1812. The United States initiated the War of 1812 in response to the activity of the Royal Navy, including the impressment of US sailors and the restriction of US freedom of trade. Territorial aggrandizement was also a goal; although opinions differ on how serious the US was about the annexation of Canada, the elimination of British influence along the frontier was understood as necessary to further US settlement and expansion. In spite of US growth since the Revolution, Great Britain remained militarily dominant by any metric. It was hoped, however, that the British would be too distracted by the war against Napoleon to devote their full attention to North America. Unfortunately for the Americans, the Royal Navy had largely eliminated the French Navy as a major threat, and was able to devote serious attention to the United States from the beginning of the war. The US coastline was virtually unprotected, leaving American vulnerable to trade blockade and to raids. The Royal Navy decided to concentrate its activity in the Chesapeake Bay area, home of the new US capitol and of the major port of Baltimore.

In response to the overwhelming dominance of the Royal Navy, Revolutionary War veteran Joshua Barney proposed to the Secretary of War a new set of tactics. In order to carry out their raiding operations, large, deep draft Royal Navy vessels had to accept some vulnerability, and had to employ launches in order to deliver and recover troops. Barney reasoned that a flotilla of shallow draft barges could sufficiently harass Royal Navy raiding parties to make the operations too costly and dangerous to carry out. Barney received approval from Washington to build a flotilla and recruit a corps of sailors necessary to carry out this effort; for his pains, he was made Commodore of the flotilla. The organization was distinct from the USN, and was viewed with some hostility by military professionals. Nevertheless, it represented the only chance to break the hold of the Royal Navy over the Chesapeake, a hold that was becoming increasingly intolerable as escaped slaves began to flock to the British flag.

Barney was able to put together his flotilla, but he was unable to stop Royal Navy depredation. The British took the flotilla seriously, and treated it as the major threat in the Chesapeake. They responded by bottling the flotilla up and blockading it on the Patuxent River. This utilized some Royal Navy resources, and the Americans were able to score some minor victories, but no major British vessels were lost, and British raiding activity continued. Local militia had no interest in fighting the British, and typically fled at the first shot. Because of the large number of pro-British slaves (male slaves of age were trained to fight, while the rest were freed and sent either to Canada or British Caribbean possessions), the Royal Marines typically had excellent intelligence as to American capabilities and dispositions.

The Chesapeake campaign resulted in an almost complete victory for the Royal Navy. Atlhough the British were unable to secure and burn the city of Baltimore, they managed to burn and loot much of the rest of the region, including the city of Washington. The British looted an enormous quantity of tobacco, ground regional commerce to a halt, and freed a substantial number of American slaves. Barney's flotilla was scuttled to prevent capture, although his men served heroically at the Battle of Bladensburg and at Fort McHenry. British victory depended not only on vast material superiority, but also on exceptional skill on sea and on land. American militia and regular Army were simply inadequate to the task of fighting the battle-hardened British on anything approaching equal circumstances. It didn't help that the very best American forces were deployed to the Canadian border. Moreover, the outcome of the Chesapeake campaign should have been essentially foreseeable to American policymakers. While Americans lacked the capacity to challenge the Royal Navy in anything but single-ship battles, it was obvious that the British would use their superiority at sea to devastate American coastal areas. The presence of the French and Spanish navies had limited the damage during the Revolution, but neither were a factor in the War of 1812. I think it can be plausibly argued that the War of 1812 represents the biggest "mistake war" in American history; regardless of whether sufficient cassus belli existed, the United States was simply not up to the task of launching and winning a war against Great Britain.

The American strategy in the Chesapeake campaign represents the same kind of asymmetric, small boat strategy that gave the USN fits in the first half of this decade. To be sure, the Americans also employed other asymmetric strategies, most notably a commerce raiding campaign that depended both on USN frigates and on privateers. Nevertheless, as the points of comparison between the Royal Navy of 1814 and the USN of 2009 are obvious, it's not surprising that opponents adopt broadly similar methods. The small boat strategy is not, apparently, dependent upon a particular constellation of technologies. Small boats can always provide some threat to large ships in littoral areas, although I think it could be argued that the development of the torpedo increased small boat lethality. German torpedo boats significantly reduced Allied freedom of action off the French coast in World War II, for example. Indeed, there's nothing new about the idea of blowing up a small boat next to a big ship, although the suicide element is reasonably novel. Of course, small boats can and have also been utilized as part of a larger symmetrical strategy of warfare; the USN PT-Boat campaign of World War II caused the Japanese no end of difficulty.

The experience of Barney's flotilla also brings up some interesting issues regarding the behavior of military organizations. Barney was forced to essentially invent the flotilla, without significant support (and indeed against opposition) from the United States Navy. Barney did his own recruiting, designed his own ships, and procured his own artillery, provisions, and ordnance. To be sure, he didn't do this from his own funds; both the US government and the State of Maryland gave him some support. Also, even a regular naval commander of the Napoleonic Era had to play the role of independent contractor on many occasions, as readers of Patrick 'Brian will be well aware. Nevertheless, the organizational environment that he created is quite distinct from that which exists in any modern military organization. I suspect that it would be nearly impossible to create such an organization today in a modern state; the institutional and legal barriers would be insurmountable. The exception that proves the rule might be Iran's Revolutionary Guard, which has managed to create naval forces independent of the main naval organizations of the Islamic Republic. The Revolutionary Guard, however, enjoys a level of political and organizational independence that is extremely rare in a modern state, and that depends on the peculiar institutions of modern Iran.

Barney's task was undoubtedly made easier by the fact that he could draw upon a population that was familiar with the sea and with boats. This substantially increased the recruiting pool, the interest level (people who depended on the sea were particularly vulnerable to the British), and the skill level of the recruits. I found this interesting in that it supported Mahan's contention that one of the pillars of naval power is a population that is familiar with and interested in maritime life. I have always had some doubt that this is the case in the industrial era; I don't, for example, believe that a serving officer born and raised in Nebraska is any less capable than an officer raised in Maryland or Massachusetts. This is because the tasks of modern naval life are sufficiently distant from the tasks of civilian maritime experience to make any initial differences disappear beneath professional military training. I have no doubt, however, that a population oriented around maritime activities was critical to naval power in the Age of Sail and before. I'm also inclined now to think that the success of irregular naval forces (of which Barney's flotilla is an example) is much more sensitive to the maritime capabilities of a given population than is that of a professional naval organization.

It's odd that the small boat strategy always seems somewhat surprising to established navies, especially given the recurrence of such strategies over the years. One reason might be that navies are organizationally inclined to think about threats that are symmetrical. A Mahanian naval stance requires modern shipbuilding capabilities and a long organizational tail. A commerce raiding or cruiser strategy requires much the same thing, if on a different scale. A small boat strategy, however, can be conducted by organizations utterly unlike a modern Navy. In its relatively ad hoc approach to construction, procurement, and recruitment, Barney's flotillas shares some characteristics with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the pre-independence Israeli naval forces, the Tamil Tigers, and even Al Qaeda. In combination with the above observation regarding the importance of "people of the sea" to irregular naval forces, there's undoubtedly some interesting work to be done regarding the prospects for Al Qaeda penetration into various maritime-oriented tribal networks in SE Asia. I suspect that there are also some interesting observations to be made regarding population, professionalism, and the effectiveness of small boat strategies.

In any case, Flotilla is valuable both to those interested in naval history, and to those focusing on small boat and irregular warfare strategies. I highly recommend it.

Rising India

One of the things I've always enjoyed about this blog is its heavy international flavor, both in the posts Galrahn and others have written and in the responses thereto. Especially gratifying to me has been the coverage of India, a nation whose strategic significance increases with each passing year.

The Washington Post joins the chorus this morning with an article on the opportunity US defense firms see in India's defense buildup. The last administration went a long way in advancing US/Indian relations, and I am hopeful that the present administration will continue the trend.

Eventually, the Taiwan issue will be go away, and the true nature of our competition with China will be manifest. Development of a close friendship with India--perhaps even an alliance--seems to me a prudent topic for consideration as we look to counterbalance China and reassure allies in the Western Pacific.

For in-depth coverage of the Indian Political-Military scene, I recommend 8ak.in "The Only Website You Need For Indian Defence News and Analysis".

Bryan McGrath

Women on Subs: Just Around The Corner

News here of SECNAV and CNO both joining the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as saying that submarine duty should be opened to women. No one should ever make the mistake of thinking that I have a "progressive" worldview, but this decision is long overdue. None of the arguments against having women in subs stand up to the reality that is their everyday performance in every other ship afloat and societal expectations of what equality means.


Bryan McGrath

Ask a Great Question; Get the Non Answer

Some very interesting questions asked in the Senate hearing on Thursday regarding the new Ballistic Missile Defense plan for Europe (video here). Emelie Rutherford of Defense Daily (subscription only) has the scoop with Navy Ship Role In New Missile-Defense Architecture Questioned.

Her article begins by noting the agreement and disagreement of the plan was not along party lines, it was along industry lines. Most Democrats agreed with the plan being from Raytheon country, except Senator Claire McCaskill, who works in a Boeing state. Joseph Lieberman apparently criticized the plan, which I think is interesting considering the biggest winner in the Presidents decision is Israel. Senator Lieberman doesn't trust Russia though, so that is a big part of it. What caught my attention though was John McCain.

McCain asked Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright if the new arrangement--which relies heavily on the ship-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system and SM-3s, which are intended for future ground installation as well--will spur a budget request for additional Navy ships.

Cartwright, a Marine Corps general, said he would “have to go back and look” and noted existing ships are currently being outfitted with the Aegis BMD system.

McCain replied: “We’re certainly giving (the ships) additional missions.”

Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), a former Army Ranger who spoke favorably about the new missile-defense setup, also questioned Cartwright on Navy ships needed to carry out the new strategy.

Cartwright said Navy cruisers and destroyers are capable of fulfilling the need, without elaborating further on ship numbers.

Under the new four-phase missile-defense arrangement, warships equipped with SM-3 Block IA interceptors will be deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in 2011, and then in a second phase enhanced SM-3 Block IB missiles will be deployed at sea and land locations in 2015. The Navy already is in the process of increasing the number of vessels equipped with Aegis BMD, and requested funding in the pending FY ’10 budget to upgrade an additional six ships.

The panel giving testimony is Honorable Michèle A. Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly (PDF), USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency. These are incredibly smart people, which is why the answer General Cartwright gave doesn't fly.

Senator McCain and Senator Reed are asking the best, most obvious, and most important question regarding the BMD decision; does the shift towards sea based missile defense place a resource burden on the Navy they are capable of dealing with, or do they require more ships? Are we supposed to believe this incredibly smart panel came to the Senate to explain the BMD decision without asking the Navy the same question? General Cartwright has "to go back and look” whether the Navy is resourced properly for this? This question was evaluated before the BMD decision was made, right?

The non answer tells the story. The Navy clearly sees the need for more ships, and the administration disagrees with the Navy. The question is a 'yes or no' question, and the 'pretend to be ignorant' response to the most obvious question regarding the decision means the Navy believes they need more ships, but the administration disagrees.

Lets continue with the excellent reporting by Emelie Rutherford.

The four-star general reiterated yesterday that the new setup would be largely initiated via the fiscal year 2011 budget next year, and thus will be debated on Capitol Hill for “a full year.”

However, O’Reilly noted the Pentagon would like to rejigger previous-year funding as well.

For the new arrangement, Pentagon officials want approval to redirect some funding in the pending FY ’10 budget and also to spend FY ’09 monies--both research and development and military construction monies--that was never spent on the previous Eastern European “third site,” he said in writing.

“So if we had access to that funding (from) FY ‘09, then we have sufficient funding in which to meet the timelines, especially the earlier timelines, of developing the unmanned-aerial vehicles, all the research and development that we refer to, the long-term development, and get it started now, as well as the short term deployments focused on 2011 and the testing, which we are proposing, that goes with this,” O’Reilly told the SASC.

This is a key point for people who disagree with the BMD decision. By moving money in FY09 and FY10 now, the Pentagon can move on the BMD decision now while pretending to entertain the debate over the FY11 budget cycle.

Given the emerging strategic environment, particularly in the Pacific, I think the decision to consolidate funding and research efforts towards a sea based ballistic missile defense system is a smart move.

BUT, there are clearly questions whether the Navy is properly configured and resourced to support this, and everyone needs to be on the same page when answering the questions raised by Senator McCain and Senator Reed. The non-answer suggests there is a difference in opinion. Does the Navy need more ships? With the AEGIS fleet tasked at 160% over readiness according to Colin Clark, not to mention the hit to the FY 2011 shipbuilding budget, it appears the answer is a resounding yes.

Failure to resource the Navy for the Obama administrations first major defense policy decision is the fastest way for the administration to get beat up in public discussion regarding shifting BMD in Europe to the sea based option. I'm still surprised the Heritage Foundation didn't lead with that point, I guess they expected otherwise? If the Obama administration didn't actually resource the Navy for the major policy decision regarding BMD, and expects to follow that up with a poorly resourced strategy for the war in Afghanistan...

I think there are two ways to approach increasing resources. The Navy will say the total number of big surface combatants requirement necessary to fill roles and missions will need to be between 90-100, perhaps higher. The alternative approach is to address lower spectrum warfare and presence requirements with something other than an AEGIS ship. For example, 2-3 AEGIS ships are part of the piracy patrol today, a complete mismatch of resources when AEGIS ships are in high demand for other missions and roles.

I don't see how the LCS can possibly claim to realistically do a presence patrol for the Navy though. The LCS lacks the endurance to do an actual patrol by itself without a significant logistics tail, not to mention there is a mission module mismatch issue. The only way the LCS works as a patrol frigate is to send an amphibious ship with it to keep the LCS gassed up, and if you are going to do that, you might as well take a hard look at Influence Squadrons, or some other low intensity, green water solution.

---

One final thought. Emelie Rutherford's article seeks an opinion from Ronald O'Rourke in this piece. I think that is interesting, since Ronald O'Rourke is actually paid by CRS to avoid offering opinions unless directly asked by Congress, which is exactly what he does in the article. Ron presents the facts and offers no opinion as to what they suggest. I listed the facts on BMD (borrowed in part from Ron's work btw) in this post, so didn't quote that portion of the article.

Where are the think tanks when it comes to the Navy? The only person I ever see publicly commenting on Navy issues anymore is Dr. Loren Thompson, who isn't even really a Navy guy. I guess we can assume the think tank community is swimming in money to the point that putting their brand out there with analysis and opinion from an expert is unnecessary? This is where Bob Work used to be the 'go to guy' for analysis, which might be why he was an obvious choice for Undersecretary of the Navy. I sympathize with Emelie Rutherford here, all that proclaimed intellectual talent in Washington and the only person she can find by deadline to give her analysis of the hearing happens to be the only guy in the Navy discussion who is paid to avoid offering an opinion?

No wonder this silly blog, often unpolished and unprofessional (speaking of my stuff here, the other guys are 100% quality), averages 10,000 visits daily. ID has become one of the only public opinions on Navy issues in all of Washington, and elsewhere. If you work in a think tank and this piece of trivia bothers you, put your name and number on the black book of the DC reports. They may actually call you and ask for your opinion, and your think tank may benefit from the exposure you give. After all, mindshare is a form of influence. The media is an easy way to reach the greater interested Navy community, and giving a smart opinion can shape the opinions of others.

Nuclear Deterrence, Except on Weekends

Gordon Brown is using logic on nuclear weapons that I do not understand. Maybe one of you can explain to me how this makes the world safer under any 21st century geopolitical nuclear theory.

The prime minister was to outline plans to cut the number of submarines from four to three at a special session of the U.N Security Council on September 24, his office confirmed.

But Brown added: "We are making no proposals at the moment about warheads."

"If we are serious about the ambition of a nuclear-free world we will need statesmanship, not brinkmanship," Brown was to tell the U.N. General Assembly in his speech, according to comments released by his office.

However, he was also to reaffirm Britain's commitment to maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent.

Unfortunately, our President shares in Gordon Brown's delusion by wasting time and resources discussing this supposed nuclear free world. I think I may disagree with Gordon Brown regarding what statesmanship and brinkmanship is in this situation though, because negotiations with an end of stopping nuclear weapons development by either North Korea or Iran is neither statesmanship or brinkmanship, because neither country is willing to give up the capability.

North Korea has the bomb, and Iran will have the bomb. If Gordon Brown and Barack Obama want to know what is required to stop Iran from getting the bomb, all they need to do is look at how George Bush dealt with Iraq on WMD. Nothing short of that type of effort stops Iran, so if another Gulf War isn't an appealing option, learn to accept the idea of an Iranian bomb. All this political happy talk of "tough/smart/strong/cunning" negotiations is about as intellectually convincing as the militant threat of air attack by Israel. Neither will be successful, unless Israel nukes the Persians.

But here is what I just do not understand. Isn't the entire point of a SSBN to insure that a country cannot be destroyed by nuclear weapons, because the SSBN hidden in the middle of the ocean somewhere can retaliate? If you can't maintain a persistent nuclear deterrent at sea all the time, then what exactly is the point? Does Gordon Brown believe that wars start with a phone call from the other guy saying "here we come?" Has any country that is not a democracy ever told another country they intend to attack?

Only Gordon Brown has the strategic vision to believe the nine-to-five working schedule applies to nuclear deterrence. The only way a SSBN is a successful capability is if it is always deployed, and never used. If a country can't meet those two criteria, then you don't have an actual strategy for SSBNs. I've read this argument, and I'm missing the compelling logic that explains how Britain can reduce the number of SSBNs and that will prompt others to follow their lead in reducing nuclear weapons globally.

If the Royal Navy can't build 4 SSBNs, they should build none. The Royal Navy needs a strategy where they can point to something and say "we do that great." Right now the Royal Navy points to their force and says "Can barely do everything but can do nothing well." Time for a new strategic plan if you ask me.

Just thinking out loud here, but the Royal Navy should look at all the low intensity 10% budget solutions the US Navy has been looking at. There are all of these amazing ideas, creative ideas on a low budget for expanding fleet numbers and building robust networks of green water naval forces that the US Navy rejects in favor of risk reduction.

The Royal Navy on the other hand is at the point where even the smallest stuff carries a huge risk, so why not take a risk on something intentionally? I note that taking risks with unconventional, unpredictable approaches is what China is doing, while the US Navy makes conventional, predictable decisions every time.

Forbes, West Point, and Higher Ed

At the risk of re-opening a discussion that has (thankfully) come to a close, I want to briefly revisit Thomas Ricks' proposal to ditch the service academies. Galrahn dealt at some length with Ricks' argument that the service academies should be eliminated, and I contributed a bit to the discussion at my other blog. When Forbes decided to make West Point its number one American college, Hana Alberts interviewed me as to whether I thought such a ranking was plausible. My answer was a qualified yes, with the qualification centering on what precisely was expected from the number one undergraduate institution in the United States. Given that I had also come to qualified agreement with Ricks regarding the shut down of the academies, this probably requires further explanation. To set forth a couple of priors, I am an academic, I believe pretty strongly in the academic project (in the sense that I think that an abstract undergraduate education is good for individuals and good for society), and I teach in a graduate program that is primarily geared towards policy.

Is West Point #1? Sure, depending on what you want from a student. To the best of my recollection, we haven't had a service academy grad at Patterson since I started teaching there in 2005. We have, however, had several VMI grads, and they have been of uniformly high quality. Indeed, I'd go so far as to say that VMI grads have substantially outperformed the expectations generated by GPA and GRE scores. I have no reason to believe that service academy grads would perform any differently, and I think that we would view graduation from a service academy as a significant plus during the admissions process.

This doesn't necessarily mean that West Point/Annapolis/USAFA produce the best students, or the smartest students, or that I would always prefer an academy grad to a elite college grad. Harvard graduates will, by and large, have a stronger academic profile than West Point grads, and in some cases this will weigh in their favor. I also wouldn't want a graduate program (or a work force) composed solely of academy grads, at the expense of elite civilian institution grads. Diversity of viewpoint is extremely valuable in any academic setting, and in most work settings.

Then Why Shut it Down? Primarily, because I think that much of what makes a service academy graduate great is present before the student steps foot on campus. Even considering attendance at a service academy requires an enormous amount of fortitude; I know that I gave up the idea when I was a high school senior because I was convinced I couldn't hack it. Going to Yale, Michigan, UC-Berkeley, the University of Kentucky, or the University of Washington is unlikely to weaken the resolve of the typical service academy applicant; I don't believe that exposure to a more rigorous academic environment will make the typical cadet or midshipmen less capable or dedicated. On the contrary, I suspect that exposure to the wider academic universe, accompanied by capable ROTC training, would produce better officers.

Moreover, I think that it's a two way street. The number of academy students who would be diffused across the American university system is relatively small, but would represent the elite of those interested in military service. I suspect that the diffusion of the very best of America's military officer prospects across America's university system will serve to improve the system, both by providing more diversity in the classroom and by raising the general level of student commitment. It's fair to say that this is not, in academia, a universally held sentiment; while I was always very happy to have ROTC students in my courses, some faculty view them in a less positive light.

But isn't this all academic (heh)? The debate over shutting the academies? Yes. The discussion about the strength of academy grads and about the content of military education, however, will endure. I hope that the next decade will see the end of two things; the exclusion of ROTC from several elite civilian educational institutions, and a series of misunderstandings of military affairs within the academy. The former will likely result from the end of DODT, which almost everyone agrees is on its last legs. The latter will result from generational change in academic faculty. Both developments will, in my view, have significant positive effects for both society-at-large and for the military. For the period 1970-2000, there was an unfortunate disconnect between the military establishment and the system of higher education. The cause was Vietnam, and the effects were all-around negative. I think, however, that this era has already been supplanted by a more modern, sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the academy (writ large) and our military institutions.

Latest FY 2011 Navy Plan Rumor

Tony Capaccio, who always gets brilliant scoops on Navy issues with Bloomberg, has found a copy of the Navy's new five-year budget plan. Some of the proposed cuts.

• SM-2 is reduced to 849 from 1,033
• JSOW-C is reduced to 1,879 from 2,663
• SM-6 is reduced to 637 from 688
• LW MK-54 reduced to 770 from 1,336
• ESSM will be boosted to 236 from 62
• Joint Tactical Radio is canceled
• EP-X replacement delayed
• MV-22 reduced to 132 from 150
• KC-130J reduced to 15 of 28
• 1 LHA(R) canceled
• All Mobile Landing Platforms canceled
• Both Command Ship replacements canceled
• JHSV is reduced to 9 from 11
• 1 Virginia class submarine canceled
• All FFG-7s retired 1 year early

This is the key point.

The service’s proposal to trim planned spending from 2011 through 2015 to $666.3 billion from $698 billion reflects Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s guidance calling for modest growth with emphasis on improving the security of nuclear weapons and upgrading the capabilities to conduct irregular warfare and cyber defense.

President Barack Obama assigned Gates to rein in defense spending, which now consumes about 19 cents of every dollar of the federal budget. Adjusted for inflation, defense spending has grown about 43 percent since fiscal 2000. When war costs are included, the number increases to 72 percent.

Budget cuts are hard, but observe the trends. Fewer Littoral Combat Ships, fewer JHSVs, cutting the Command Ships, and cutting the logistics fleet sea base ships means the Navy is cutting the bottom tier of shipbuilding to support the top tier. Cuts to the Command Ships in the information age suggests the Navy has become too reliant on communication networks in belief that the Virtual Admiral in Virginia or Hawaii can effectively command the fleet during war. While everything else can be legitimately debated as a priority alignment, cutting the Command Ships is a highly questionable decision I think.

The Navy is reducing the total budget $31.7 billion over five years through 2015, an average of $6.34 billion annually, by deferring or canceling weapons programs by $7 billion and cutting the shipbuilding account by $18 billion (an annual average of $3.6 billion). In other words, when it came time to reduce the Navy budget, shipbuilding took over 55% of the cuts! The shipbuilding budget only makes up 10% of the entire Navy budget at around $13 billion annually, but takes more than half the total cut? WTF? With priorities like that, it is legitimate to ask whether the Navy is a sea service, or a government jobs program. Congressman, next time any Admiral says 313 ships under oath, keep in mind the Admiral is knowingly being dishonest to your face.

At a time when we have recently stood up 4th Fleet and 10th Fleet, the shore based Flag staff bureaucracy continues to plow ahead with a cut of only $1.34 billion annually to the entire Navy and Marine establishment. The Navy needs to do some soul searching, and cut deep into the shore based bureaucracy. Some of those Flag commands have staffs that number in the thousands. It is time to move what can be moved onto ships, and reduce the bureaucracy footprint ashore.

It should be noted that one reason why the $1.34 billion cuts outside acquisition is probably so low is because this cut comes as the administration moves forward with expanding the Marine Corps by 22,000. It is likely that even with the $1.34 billion cut to personnel and readiness, that budget will be much higher in FY2011 than just a few years ago.

Fact Check - Technicals of AEGIS BMD

After watching Michael Goldfarb display a remarkable amount of ignorance on AEGIS BMD, I did some heavy duty Google searching to find the political argument that included technical merits in the BMD discussion. Somewhat disappointing, I guess the technical aspect doesn't matter. Given the widespread ignorance to AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense, this post is designed to be the cheat sheet for those who like to be the smartest person in the room on open source AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense discussions.

Ships

The current 18 warships configured for AEGIS BMD are 15 destroyers and 3 cruisers. The destroyers are USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS Stout (DDG 55), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), USS Russell (DDG 59), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), USS Ramage (DDG 61), USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), USS Stethem (DDG 63), USS Benfold (DDG 65), USS Milius (DDG 69), USS Hopper (DDG 70), USS Decatur (DDG 73), USS Higgins (DDG 76), and USS O’Kane (DDG 77). The three cruisers are USS Shiloh (CG 67), USS Lake Erie (CG 70), and USS Port Royal (CG 73). 16 of these ships are in the Pacific fleet, and it should be noted that the destroyers are all of the Flight I and Flight II Arleigh Burke destroyers (those that do not have a helicopter hanger).

Only the USS Stout (DDG 55) and USS Ramage (DDG 61) are in the Atlantic Fleet.

The Navy has already funded the upgrade for 3 more AEGIS ships (1 cruiser and 2 destroyers), all in the Atlantic, to be upgraded to AEGIS BMD. FY 2010 will fund the upgrade for 6 additional AEGIS BMD upgrades (2 cruisers, 4 destroyers). This will bring the total number of AEGIS BMD capable ships to 27. As part of the Arleigh Burke modernization program to begin in a few years, all 62 Arleigh Burke destroyers will be upgraded to support AEGIS BMD.

AEGIS BMD is able to be installed on 15 of the 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers, basically baseline 3 and baseline 4 cruisers. The eight baseline 2 cruisers (CG52-CG58) use the SPY-1A radar which cannot support AEGIS ballistic missile defense. The remaining fifteen Baseline 3 (CG 59-64) and Baseline 4 (CG 65-73) have the AN/SPY-B radar which can support AEGIS ballistic missile defense. AEGIS BMD is not currently part of the cruiser modernization program, although currently plans will make 5 of the 15 cruisers AEGIS BMD capable warships, 3 of which already are.

Money and Missiles

This is a review of all MDA funding for AEGIS BMD from FY1995 - FY2010:

FY95 $75.0
FY96 $200.4
FY97 $304.2
FY98 $410.0
FY99 $338.4
FY00 $380.0
FY01 $462.7
FY02 $476.0
FY03 $464.0
FY04 $726.2
FY05 $1,159.8
FY06 $893.0
FY07 $1,125.4
FY08 $1,214.1
FY09 $1,170.5
FY10 $1,859.5

Total MDA funding to date = $9399.7
Total MDA funding w/ FY10 = $11259.2

Since the Reagan administrations Star Wars project began in 1983, over $120 billion has been spent on ballistic missile defense, with AEGIS BMD spending accounting for just under 8% of that total.

The FY2010 defense budget requests a total of $1,859.5 million for the AEGIS BMD program, including $1,690.8 million in research and development funding for the program and $168.7 million in procurement funds for the SM-3 interceptor missile. The FY2010 budget request also requests $174.6 million for continued operations of the Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX).

As the AEGIS BMD program has evolved, the costs for AEGIS BMD have increased. AEGIS BMD 3.6, the initial BMD tracking and engagement capability, costs about $10.5 million for ship conversion. Upgrading an AEGIS ship to the latest, more-capable BMD configuration called AEGIS BMD 4.0.1 baseline costs about $45 million, which includes the cost of the BMD signal processor.

MDA has funded 71 SM-3 Block 1 and 1A interceptors, of which 38 are to be in inventory by the end of calendar 2008. Additionally, the Navy (not MDA) has funded the modification of 100 SM-2 Block IV missiles into a fuze-modified SM-2 Block IV interceptor with a blast-fragmentation warhead. By the end of 2008 only 40 of the 100 had been converted.

The FY2010 budget doubles the previously planned inventory of 147 to 329 SM-3 interceptors. The 147 interceptors were expected to be in service by 2013, no timetable has been made public when the 329 interceptors would be available.

It is also important to note that Japan is in agreement with the US to fund about 50% of the $2.1 billion development cost for the SM-3 Block IIA missile. The Block IA/1B version of the SM-3 has a 21-inch-diameter booster stage and is 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of its length. The Block IIA version, scheduled for the end of 2015, will have a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform 21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel and is to give the missile a burnout velocity that is 45% to 60% greater than that of the Block IA/IB version.

According to Ronald O'Rourkes CRS report (PDF):

The Block IIA version would also include an improved kinetic warhead. MDA states that the Block IIA version could “engage many [ballistic missile] targets that would outpace, fly over, or be beyond the engagement range” of earlier versions of the SM-3, and that "the net result, when coupled with enhanced discrimination capability, is more types and ranges of engageable [ballistic missile] targets; with greater probability of kill, and a large increase in defended “footprint” or geography predicted.... The SM-3 Blk II/IIA missile with it[s] full 21-inch propulsion stack provides the necessary fly out acceleration to engage IRBM and certain ICBM threats.

The AEGIS BMD system has been tested 18 times, 14 successful. 2 of the tests were Japanese tests, only one of which was successful. A complete list of tests and results can be found here (PDF), and a thorough explanation of the tests can be found here (PDF). Each test gets progressively more realistic, so while the early tests were simplistic, recent tests have been much more realistic to wartime conditions.

Another important note from the Ronald O'Rourke CRS report:

According to estimates from the U.S. intelligence community, the total number of ballistic missiles other than from the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China is over 5,900. Of that number, short and medium-range ballistic missiles represent 99 percent of the total inventory.

That means AEGIS BMD can already intercept 99% of the worlds ballistic missile inventory, and current development plans should they remain on schedule will have the Navy fielding interceptors capable of engaging some ICBMs by 2015.

Limitations and Concerns

AEGIS BMD is the most tested, most capable ballistic missile defense system in the world with the highest success rate in testing, and the only ballistic missile defense system in the world to undergo realistic scenario testing. That does not make it a perfect capability.

AEGIS BMD by design was intended to work in 2 ship pairs, a ship for tracking and a ship for shooting. Additional capabilities have allowed AEGIS BMD to offload either tracking or shooting to other assets, including SBX, USAF/USN aircraft, Cobra Judy, and land based radar/interceptors; networked together to form an integrated network for ballistic missile defense. Absent land based or other supporting assets, ships must be used for both tracking and shooting, and the limited range and speed of existing interceptors means dispersion of naval assets is required for greater coverage, and ICBMs cannot be intercepted except in terminal phases during flight at this time.

Navy ships, both US and international, use the SPY S-band radar that can support AEGIS BMD. AEGIS BMD is said to be much more capable when networked with a X-band radar system. This suggests in the future the much maligned DDG-1000, which has both a S-band and X-band radar system, would be an excellent addition to a BMD network. Additionally, the same radar intended for the DDG-1000 is planned for the Ford class CVN, and would give Carrier Strike Groups a mobile X-Band radar system to support AEGIS BMD interceptors.

If the Navy must sustain presence for AEGIS BMD in the European theater to protect the United States from ICBM attack in the 2020 time frame, it could require as many as 4-5 ships on station. This would be 1 in the Persian Gulf and 1 in the Black Sea to act as launch detection and tracking ship, and 3 in the northern Atlantic/Baltic seas for intercept along potential trajectory. In order to support 5 ships on station without land based support, the Navy would actually require at least 15 AEGIS BMD capable ships to support 6 month on station/12 month off station rotations and factor maintenance and upgrades. More land based or alternative assets to support regional roles for detection/intercept would reduce this requirement.

By contrast, the six Japanese AEGIS ships when upgraded with AEGIS BMD capability could sufficiently protect almost all of Japan from North Korean ballistic missiles by maintaining only one ship into the Sea of Japan. Spain, South Korea, and Japan are the only countries currently able to support AEGIS BMD upgrades to their ships. The Australian Hobert class, based on Spain's F-100 frigates, can also be upgraded. Ships like Norway's Fridtjof Nansen class that uses the smaller SPY-F radar cannot support AEGIS BMD.

The AEGIS BMD system appears to be slowly becoming an important capability of the US Navy's workhorse Arleigh Burke destroyer platform. Arleigh Burke destroyers today are heavily utilized for a variety of roles, for example, the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) famous for the rescue of Maersk Alabama Captain Phillips, will be an AEGIS BMD warship in the future. Ballistic Missile Defense carries a high demand for ships, the same ships already in high demand for escorting high value units like aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. The existing AEGIS force is already tasked at around 160% because the Arleigh Burke destroyer is the Navy's current workhorse for everything.

Congress should not be fooled by the hastily thrown together decision of reforming the LCS acquisition program on the eve of the huge East European BMD announcement, which appears clearly orchestrated by the Navy information folks to insure any analysis of the LCS program is lost in the 24/7 news cycle. It is highly suspect to believe that somehow the low endurance Littoral Combat Ship will make up for the global presence requirement current filled by the high endurance Arleigh Burke destroyer in remote places like Africa and South America, particularly when the mission modules of anti-submarine, anti-surface, and mine warfare are specific requirements to the same places where BMD is necessary; near China, Iran, and North Korea.

As the Navy is assuming a new role with Arleigh Burke destroyers, what platform has the endurance to make up for the presence requirements? Unless the Navy intends to build a new ship class, or the Coast Guard intends to increase the number of National Security Cutters, it would appear the Amphibious Ship is about to become the maritime ambassador conducting naval diplomacy globally, as it is the only other ship type that can independently operate with the endurance necessary to sustain global presence. It may sound strange, but given the nature of global terrorism and the engagement requirements by our global partners, in conjunction with an expanded JHSV force it may just be the perfect solution.

Obama Aligns BMD With Global Trends

If you listened to the bloggingheads debate between ID contributor Robert Farley and The Weekly Standard editor Michael Goldfarb, then you may have noticed just how little sense the debate talking points from the Presidents political opponents are. They are essentially making a political argument "F--- the Russians!" and... "Defend Poland?" Other than that, ignorance is bliss when it comes to the actual technical details, much less where the real defense politics of the debate are. I kept asking myself, why the heck didn't the Republicans go straight to Mackenzie Eaglen for a memo?

Then I browsed over to Heritage and found Mackenzie Eaglen's paper on the BMD decision, and...

The decision runs contrary to U.S. strategic interests and will undermine security commitments to America's allies. The new plan to focus on the short- and medium-range threats from Iran:

• Represents a major reversal in American strategic thinking on missile defense,
• Leaves America more vulnerable to the emerging nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea, and
• Betrays key allies in Eastern and Central Europe.

Disappointing. I disagree with the first two points entirely, and believe the third is part of the accepted risk of improvement to our defenses - and can be salvaged. The administration just hanged an off speed curve ball over the plate, and the Heritage Foundation whiffed. Does the Heritage Foundation realize they punted on an opportunity to validate virtually every paper they have written about the Navy in support of the petty "F--- the Russians!" argument? The cold war ended nearly 20 years ago people, let it go.

Lets break this down into two posts, this one concentrating on the global politics of ballistic missile defense. For the technical fact check and background talking points, see here.

Global Politics

Anyone who is taking a myopic view of ballistic missile defense and believes this decision is limited to Eastern Europe is wrong. We are on the verge of global changes, and need to make tough choices given the fiscal environment in the DoD.

The biggest near term challenge for ballistic missile defense is defending Israel from conventional Iranian ballistic missiles, because Israel absolutely is crazy enough to attack Iran over nuclear weapons. When a poorly targeted or intercepted Iranian ballistic missile ends up killing Palestinian's in the west bank, the world is going to ask why the US isn't protecting the Palestinians. The same equipment that would be deployed to Poland and the Czech Republic is being unloaded in Israel today in preparation for the Juniper Cobra exercise in mid-October. Press reports claim the equipment will be staying in Israel following the test of Israel's Arrow 2 ballistic missile defense system.

In other words, the timing of the announcement appears to, at least on some level, insure that the major deployable assets for BMD go to Israel and can stay. I think that is a fairly significant geopolitical detail lost in this discussion, because that same equipment was supposedly heading to Poland - an appointment no longer necessary.

The second biggest ballistic missile threat on the nations radar is the anti-ship ballistic missile in development by China. This is the only conventional ballistic missile with strategic consequences, specifically it has the potential to reshape the balance of power in the Pacific. If China ever becomes capable of targeting an aircraft carrier with a ballistic missile from 2000 nautical miles, the US Navy better have the ability to defeat the weapon. This is a game changing capability if realized, and heavily restricts the options of the United States to support our alliances and strategic obligations with allies, particularly in the Taiwan scenario. Remember, by law the DoD is required to be able to protect Taiwan. That doesn't mean the US has to protect Taiwan, but the DoD must, by law, do everything it can to give elected officials that option. That means the top priority in conventional ballistic missile defense must be the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile threat.

Finally, the last ballistic missile threat is the one posed by North Korea and Iran. Neither country has an operational ballistic missile capable of targeting the United States. Under the assumption both countries will continue development of ballistic missiles for the purposes of building intercontinental ballistic missiles to reach the United States, the US needs to insure that ballistic missile defense between now and then is robust and layered to account for that long term threat while also addressing other, mid-term threats that are more important to our strategic interest.

Superior Globally - Today

AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense is clearly the best way ahead for US ballistic missile defense when evaluating the strategic threats posed by ballistic missiles globally. If war with Israel and Iran broke out today, and the US Navy was tasked today to protect Israel, the USS Higgins (DDG 76) would pull into the Eastern Med, and leveraging radar systems throughout the Middle Eastern region (including the X-Band radar being set up Juniper Cobra) for the SM-3 interceptors on the ship today would give the USS Higgins (DDG 76) better intercept protection of Israel than the Israeli Arrow 2 interceptors. There are AEGIS BMD ships off the coast of North Korea that can do the same thing today, just like there are already two Japanese AEGIS ships with AEGIS BMD ready to contribute. This fact of today flies in the face of the first two arguments presented by the Heritage Foundation.

Furthermore, when you look into your political crystal ball, it isn't hard to see we are about to see what happened in Eastern Europe repeated in the Pacific. The DPJ has already started discussing cuts to ballistic missile defense since winning the election, and politically the DPJ needs to do something in order to stand in contrast to the previous administration. The question for the DPJ is how in the world can they do this in a smart way politically that accounts for both domestic audiences and maintains the desired relationship with the United States? Well, the Obama administration just opened the golden gates and gave them a very useful political avenue.

Japan can keep the radar system but dump the land based interceptors just like what happened in Poland, but maintain a robust ballistic missile defense on their AEGIS ships without any major loss in capability. The lack of ground based interceptors will make it harder on us to intercept ballistic missiles that target the US, but with the PAC-3/AEGIS BMD combination the Japanese will retain a credible point defense capability while keeping them invested in AEGIS BMD, which has assumed a primary role in the United States. It is noteworthy that South Korea isn't interested in being part of a global missile shield network, but does seem open to sea based ballistic missile shield cooperation.

By shifting the Eastern European ballistic missile defense initiatives into the Navy system, the US Navy will now be able to get more funding to ramp up ballistic missile defense in protection of the two primary challenges facing the US today: the protection of Israel and the development towards defeating the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile threat. The evolutions of AEGIS BMD necessary to address these threats are expensive, and had been competing for limited funding. If Japan chooses to also move towards the sea based system, an easy political option for Japan with the recent announcement, it further streamlines our global ballistic missile defense into an AEGIS/THAAD defense model for near term threats while development continues towards a layered system, which in the end, will be built on the back of the existing AEGIS/THAAD defense model.

Mackenzie Eaglen over at Heritage has been pounding sand trying to get politicians to build more AEGIS combatants in support of emerging ballistic missile defense requirements. Now that she was positioned to pound something besides sand on this expanding requirement, the Heritage Foundation went for the "F--- the Russians!" political argument?

The Bush administration was all over the map on ballistic missile defense, and even the Republican Congress prior to 2006 was complaining how disorganized the Bush administration approach to ballistic missile defense was. Congress has been calling for a plan the MDA has never been able to produce prior to this decision. Once the Obama administration produced a BMD plan that increased the role of the Navy, the Heritage foundation should have jumped all over the Obama administration on the issue of funding Navy shipbuilding to support the plan. The Heritage Foundation looks foolish because they produced ZERO talking points of legitimate political merit with the DoD, and has really missed a chance to shine here. The Russian defense industry is in failure free fall, not only can they not get their latest ballistic missile - the Bulava-M - to work, but they are looking to France to buy new warships? Poland is still getting PAC-3s, Gates told Carl Levin the rest of the military deals are going through.

Why didn't the Heritage Foundation, or any think tank for that matter, not jump on the Obama administration on the issue of shipbuilding in support of more AEGIS ships with this announcement? It was the most logical political argument and the most important argument in support of ballistic missile defense given the decision. I don't understand political strategy - CLEARLY - because as a misunderstanding novice all I did was note the Obama administrations new BMD political policy is directly in line with the defense analysis of AEGIS BMD that the Heritage Foundation has been publishing for years, and they forgot to mention it?

*sigh*

Sometimes I really miss Bob Work in the think tank community, his absence in the public discussion leaves a huge unfilled void in the expert analysis in the rapid news cycle of Navy news today.

No wonder Michael Goldfarb doesn't seem to know what the hell he is talking about in regards to AEGIS BMD in that debate with Robert Farley, the conservative think tanks let the conservative right down on this one big time. Maybe they can get it right when Japan pulls Act II, because when that happens, the need to build more ships to meet all these new naval obligations is going to be readily apparent - and there is no sign in the QDR rumors that the Obama administration is responding to this obvious increase in high end naval presence requirements appropriately.

For the record, I pick on Heritage Foundation (and specifically Mackenzie Eaglen) because they (specifically she) are the most consistent Washington think tank producing public analysis of naval issues. If you are looking for consistent naval analysis in the public space by any other think tank - good luck. The rest are too busy working on their COIN credentials, which is kind of silly because the result is producing very few original ideas not already discussed to some degree on Andrew Exum's blog. Sad, but true.

I have no idea why N3/N5 doesn't include a public engagement aspect for public dissemination of analysis in their CNA contract. CHINFO can't do it, and the SECNAVs office doesn't do it, so why not get an independent group with a bit of intellectual firepower out there engaging issues as they are hot? It makes a ton of sense, because failure to do exactly that has been identified as part of the strategic problem for the DoD in Afghanistan. Another topic I guess...

Greek Submarine News

Greece has decided not to pay Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH and Hellenic Shipyards SA dockyards 524 million euros ($775 million), so ThyssenKrupp AG, the German shipbuilder and steelmaker, canceled contracts with Greece yesterday for the construction and maintenance of all submarines.

ThyssenKrupp is reducing its workforce and seeking to sell or spin off units after the global economic slump slashed demand for products from raw steel to yachts. Greece’s dispute with the company prompted the opposition socialist Pasok party to accuse the New Democracy government of “indifference and inability” as the nation gears up for elections next month.

The Greek state “can’t pay, won’t pay, or has other priorities,” said Dirk Nettling, a Commerzbank AG analyst who recommends investors buy ThyssenKrupp stock. “It’s not a pretty event, that’s clear.”

Hellenic Shipyards, the largest in the eastern Mediterranean, was awarded the contract to build four class U214 submarines in February 2000, according to the company’s Web site. It got an additional contract to upgrade three class 209 submarines in 2002. ThyssenKrupp said the Greek Defense Ministry now “is in default of its contractual obligations.”

Hard to tell what is happening here. Greece had recently come up with a plan for the Hellenic Navy that appeared to include payments to ThyssenKrupp for all but the first U-214 built, which reportedly has problems. By canceling the contract it is unclear if ThyssenKrupp is attempting to renegotiate, or is simply telling the Greeks to 'work with someone else.'

Robert Farley vs Michael Goldfarb on BMD

For your viewing entertainment: The BMD debate.

Pay attention big Navy, Michael is pushing talking points on AEGIS BMD. If you want the core mission, then tell the American people why you should have it.

Shaping the issues and addressing the argument early: what the Navy does worst.

News of the Day

In case you missed it, the news that seems ready to break out from under the radar is in regards to a letter from nuclear proliferation scientist A. Q. Khan that was sent to his wife. The details of the letter may give us some idea of the questions the US has wanted to ask A. Q. Khan about for some time, although access to the scientist has repeatedly been denied by the Pakistan government.

The story begins with this article in the Sunday Times by Simon Henderson, and is getting more attention in India by The Times of India. I have to be honest, when I first noticed the article, I was very skeptical... but the lack of reaction kind of sums it up - this is almost certainly legit. None of the details are new exactly, most are what has been suspected for some time without specific details.

The bottom line for some will be that A. Q. Khan admits to being the guy who gave the Iranians nuclear technology, but for me the issue is the allegation of Chinese nuclear proliferation. The Sunday Times article notes this was 1982:

“We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km southwest of Xian).” It went on: “The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%).”

This was before the civilian nuclear agreement between China and Pakistan in 1986 and before the Chinese supplied Pakistan with a civilian reactor in 1989. Makes it somewhat tough to believe what the Chinese say when they are proliferating nuclear weapons in private while playing up the non-proliferation position in public.

No wonder the US doesn't want this guy in public, can you imagine what A. Q. Khan would say on 60 minutes? He speaks English very well you know...

Iran Shoots Down UFO

I love Iranian news. This is a new classic.

Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has targeted and downed an unidentified shining object after sighting it over Persian Gulf waters.

"Glowing objects were sighted over the Persian Gulf. IRGC air defense targeted one of the objects successfully, forcing it to plummet and sink in the seas off Boushehr (Province)," said top regional commander, Brigadier Ali Razmjou.

"The three bright objects were detected by our radars when flying over the Persian Gulf Islands of Khark and Khargou," he added, according to a Monday report posted on IRNA.

Brig. Razmjou explained that when the radars indicated that they were not Iranian aircrafts, the IRGC fired at the three objects. He also added that the fallen objects' remains have not been found yet.

The exact time and location of the sighting and downing of the weird aircraft has not been announced.

Serious topics by me shall resume shortly.

Update: Did the IRGC shoot down one of their own? Different area, but the accuracy of Iranian news is always suspect.

Grand Strategy

Check out Dr. Barry R. Posen's presentation on Grand Strategy as part of the Rethinking the Foundations of the National Security Strategy and the QDR Seminar Series.

There are several presentations that are pretty good viewing.

Future Surface Combatant at DSEi 2009

The Royal Navy is beginning to discuss their Future Surface Combatant. Janes covered the emerging ideas at DSEi 2009. The model in the picture is the BVT, described by Janes here.

A model unveiled at the show by BVT Surface Fleet has provided an initial indication of the key characteristics of the C1 variant of the Future Surface Combatant (FSC), intended to begin replacing the RN’s current Type 22 Batch 3 and Type 23 frigates from around 2020. And while officials caution that the model represents only an “early visualisation” of the C1 design concept, it nevertheless highlights some of the key attributes of flexibility, modularity and open architecture desired by the FSC programme.

Initial concept design work for the C1 variant of FSC has been completed by the Naval Design Partnership (NDP), a ‘rainbow’ team of naval architects and engineering specialists bringing together Ministry of Defence personnel and industry resource drawn from BVT Surface Fleet, Babcock Marine, BAE Systems, QinetiQ and Thales. The result is a baseline monohull platform, displacing in the region of 6,000 tonnes, equipped for anti-submarine warfare, naval fires, special forces support and possibly precision land attack.

Then Janes discusses this.

One novel characteristic of the model displayed at DSEi is the stern ramp and aft payload bay area. This concept of a mission bay is intended to afford the ship the flexibility to embark different payloads, such as a towed array sonar, torpedo countermeasures, special forces boats or unmanned vehicles.

There are obviously differences in what the Royal Navy needs and the US Navy needs, but it is worth noting the trend here. The Littoral Combat Ship is essentially an all out effort to maximize flexibility for various deployable payloads, where the Royal Navy needs a Type 23 replacement, a warship capable of independent operations to be the fleets workhorse. For the US Navy, the DDG-51 handles this role, but emerging European designs including FREMM and now the FSC for the Royal Navy are attempting to add partial capability for deployable payloads.

This is why when I look at the LCS, I believe the US Navy has the concept exactly right. Every Navy in the world wants the capability of unmanned vehicles for their fleet forces, but no other Navy can afford to do it in the quantity the US Navy is attempting to do. With that said, it is yet to be determined if either LCS design will be sufficient to effectively bring unmanned technologies for integration with fleet forces. The logistics issue specifically comes to mind, although there are several question regarding the US Navy approach towards unmanned system deployment.

The Royal Navy is already hinting the next round of defense reviews will likely result in even more cuts, which suggests the fleet will potentially fall below 20 surface combatants. This hybrid design example by BVT is about the best the Royal Navy can hope for in efforts moving towards unmanned technology at sea while sustaining a surface combatant force of 20 ships. We will see, this ship is suggested to cost £400 = US$660m, but Royal Navy cost estimates are about as reliable as US Navy cost estimates. I have huge doubts a 150 meter, 6000 ton steel ship will cost less than $1 billion, and I see 0% chance of the US Navy ever building a 6000 ton ship without wanting AEGIS (in other words, only as a competitor to existing DDG-51s).

More on FSC here (PDF).