2010 Counter-Piracy Churn

As noted here and elsewhere, despite CMF’s efforts, Somali pirates enjoyed record successful attacks and revenue from ransoms this year. What follows are my marginally informed, highly unsolicited personal opinions on our counter-piracy efforts off HOA during 2010:

What Works:
1) Embarked security – No ship with an armed security team onboard has been captured by pirates. Despite much wanking about liabilities and escalation by shipping company attorneys, these teams are clearly the most effective defensive counter-measure.
2) Citadels – This passive counter-measure seems to be working when successfully implemented —but only until the pirates discover breaching tools.
3) Proactive hostage rescue – Ref. M/Vs Maersk Alabama, Magellan Star, Moscow University, etc.

What Doesn’t Work:
1) Law-fare – Very few captured pirates have been successfully tried and convicted, either in the courts of US, Europe, or the developing nations upon which they have been dumped and enticed with bribes, err, economic incentives. Jurisdictions are confused, evidentiary standards for successful prosecution are too high and the courts just don’t have the throughput to try and detain every captured pirate. Continued efforts on this line of operation are a waste.
2) Coalition naval ships floating around waiting for something to happen or pirates stupid enough to attack them – Given prolonged global fiscal austerity, how long can navies continue to spend money on these ineffective operations without success?
3) Fixing Somalia's long term governance, terrorist, and human development problems - Books could be written (and have) on the legion issues which contribute to Somalia's instability. But the important thing to note is that Somalia was a basket case before piracy took off in 2008 and will continue to be so long after piracy is finally addressed. I am all for a comprehensive international strategy to assist the Somali people in addressing their country's problems; however, defeating piracy should be divorced from those efforts and could be accomplished long before stability is achieved.

What should be tried:
1) Hit the camps – After several seasons of observation, the pirates’ patterns of life and TTPs are rather well understood by the coalition. Like any significant military operation, pirates rely on a logistics chain consisting of boats, fuel and other commodities that must be assembled before deployment. These assembly areas can be targeted kinetically with no collateral damage and minimal loss of life, while producing significant disruptive effects to the pirate’s operations.
2) Target key facilitators – There are literally tens of thousands of potential recruits with rusty Kalashnikovs in Somalia who can hold hundreds of hostages aboard dozens of ships for months on end. There are fewer, but still many, ex-fishermen/mariners who can navigate a skiff hundreds of miles over the horizon and capture an unprotected merchant. But there are a relatively small number of personalities in Somalia who are fluent in multiple languages, can facilitate hostage negotiations, and coordinate the movement and laundering of large sums of cash internationally. Kill them.
3) Dissuasive Information Operations - Reinforce the effectiveness of 1 and 2 and deter future piratical activity in Somalia and elsewhere.

Maybe piracy matters enough for the United States or another country to finally take the initiative and exert leadership to end the problem -- or maybe it doesn’t and we should just give up. Here's to happy hunting for those involved in 2011.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.