The Fall of Tripoli is the End of the Beginning

This is the latest from Tripoli.

Libyan rebels claimed to be in control of most of the Libyan capital on Monday after their lightning advance on Tripoli heralded the fall of Moammar Gadhafi's nearly 42-year regime. Scattered battles erupted, and the mercurial leader's whereabouts remained unknown.

The international community called on Gadhafi to step down and moved ahead with post-war planning as euphoric residents celebrated in the Green Square, the symbolic heart of the Gadhafi regime. Colleagues warned he wouldn't go easily. Two of his sons were captured late Sunday.

Also noteworthy from the article.

A rebel field commander said reinforcements were arriving in Tripoli by sea from the north, south and southeast.

"Our fighters are coming from all directions and, God willing, today we will liberate the whole city," the commander, Suleiman Sifaw, told The Associated Press.

At the beginning of the siege on Saturday early morning, apparently there were several special operations group from Benghazi that landed from the sea as well. Still haven't seen much detail on that though.

This is the end of the beginning, not the beginning of the end. Apparently Tripoli has been mostly overrun by the rebels to the West who were armed up by France, which goes back to the theory that he with the biggest gun often wins. Those rebels have apparently been working with the rebels from Benghazi, which is a great sign of tactical coordination, assisted by NATO no doubt.

But here is the thing... Gaddafi will likely either be killed or captured soon, and the hunt for Gaddafi loyalists will result in a nasty bloodbath. It's revenge time, and lots of folks are ready to carry out vengeance.

But then what? How many tribes will be left competing for political power in Tripoli? It is worth noting that Libya is about to become the first legitimate revolution of 2011 where rebels have overthrown their hard line government. The flip side is that the moment of power vacuum from revolution has arrived, and everyone looking to take political power in that vacuum is holding a gun.

The military tactics used by NATO in Libya have not been impressive. The Air Campaign almost certainly helped the rebels, but it also extended the conflict longer than it needed to be and was only viable because the Libyan military was one of the smallest, worst trained, and worst equipped military forces in the world. Libya is not a model for the use of military power. The only lesson for the US so far is that Libya is an example how to do the least against the least while expecting the least in return - which may have been the political objective the whole time. Said another way, from the United States perspective, there is almost nothing noteworthy to take political credit for to date from the military aspects of Libya - all credit should be given to NATO and the Libyans.

On the political end, it is a different story. The President has been out front from the beginning calling for Gaddafi to go, and has put the government of the United States on a footing committed to the removal of Gaddafi in every way short of military power doing it ourselves. That might be something to take credit for, but the hard part of political support begins now. The future of Libya from now going forward will be how US political policy towards Libya will be judged. No one will care that the US committed barely any military power towards the removal of Gaddafi as long as the post-Gaddafi political support is productive towards a peaceful transition of government.

The two key questions I see moving ahead:

1. Can the State Department be effective in Libya without US military power to back them up?
2. Is the future on the ground in Libya one of peaceful political power sharing or insurgency?

My sense is Libya doesn't end well once Gaddafi is gone and the euphoria of that moment passes. Libya is still a tribal nation deeply divided and heavily armed with no central power structure or source of unity for the people. My advice on Libya is simple: hope for the best but prepare for the worst, and the lower one sets political expectations the better.