It is evident, also, that we must not too lightly assume the methods of former days, however admirably they may have been adapted to the ends then in view, as mere precedents, to be followed unquestioningly in our modern practice. We can only safely reason upon the experiences of the past when we have penetrated to, and laid firm hold upon, the principle, or principles, which received recognition and interpretation in our predecessors' methods. When the latter have stood the searching criticism of experience and analysis, we can confidently assert that they were a valid application, under the conditions of one age, of principles that are probably true at all times, and which we may hope to detect by patient study. But when we have correctly stated the principles, it by no means necessarily follows that the application of them will be the same, or superficially even much like those of previous generations.
There is another caution which I think may wisely be observed, namely, not to assume too easily that our forefathers hit upon methods absolutely certain of success in practice—not liable at times to failure. There are few, if any, characteristics of the utterances which I from time to time hear, or read, on the subject of actual warfare, which impress me more strongly than the constantly recurring tendency to reject any solution of a problem which does not wholly eliminate the element of doubt, of uncertainty, or risk. Instead of frankly recognizing that almost all warlike undertakings present at best but a choice of difficulties that absolute certainty is unattainable—that the "art" consists, not in stacking the cards, but, as Napoleon phrased it, in getting the most of the chances on your side—that some risk, not merely of death but of failure, must be undergone—instead of this, people wish so to arrange their programme as to have a perfectly sure thing of it; and when some critic points out, as can so easily be done, that this may happen or that may happen, and it is seen undeniably that it may, then the plan stands condemned. " War," said Napoleon again, "cannot be made without running risks, and it is because my admirals have found out that it can, everything attempted by them has failed."
Blockade In Relation to Naval Strategy, By Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. Navy, Proceedings Magazine 1895
When I first viewed
the presentation at the Surface Navy Association symposium by RADM Frank C. Pandolfe, I knew immediately that something important had happened. When I saw RADM Pandolfe fumble his opportunity to take on the first question directly, I immediately felt like something else important had happened. If you want me to tell you what is important in politics today, I simply can't do it. If you want me to tell you what is of interest and conversation in the Navy network of debate and ideas, the top subject on the minds of most people these days is the Littoral Combat Ship.
The
contracts issued at the end of 2010 for the dual-purchase of both Littoral Combat Ships represented the first major shipbuilding initiative by the US Navy in the 21st century. Since the construction of the first 6 frigates of the US Navy, shipbuilding has always been the most visible and most discussed budget item in the Navy, and force structure is consistently the most debated topic by those with an interest in the strategic roles and missions of the US Navy. Since the beginning of the Littoral Combat Ship, which is still less than a decade ago, the program has been on the receiving end of criticism by committing the single most important sin - the LCS is a 3,000 ton ship that by no definition can be described as a frigate.
As
my post on Monday suggested, the Littoral Combat Ship has been on my mind. The reason is because it is the topic of conversation I have been engaged in since last week. Whatever the medium, including the ever important engagements involving alcohol, the debate between the optimists like me represented by the details outlined by RADM Pandolfe's SNA briefing and the pessimism well represented by
John Patch's January Proceedings article draw clear lines between supporters and detractors in the LCS debate. The Littoral Combat Ship has long been a topic I could discuss on the blog and expect over one hundred comments, but articulate a criticism of LCS in Proceedings and the commentary of comments appears to increase by a factor of ten.
On Wednesday, January 26th at around 12:45pm PST Bob Work stepped to the podium at USNI/AFCEA West 2011 and began talking about the Navy. He talked with an intensity and excitement about the Navy that was clearly evident by audience, and it quickly became clear he had something on his mind. Explaining the role of the Undersecretary of the Navy as the Chief Operational Officer, Bob started by admitting that he doesn't get out much anymore, and soon it became clear that the Marine Colonel buried deep had finally been let out of the cage. The Marine was in full force by the time Bob called the old jammers on the Prowlers "A piece of Shit!" It was part of the build up though, evident the retired Colonel had something he wanted to discuss as he began talking about the Littoral Combat Ship - and flat out challenged the audience to ask him questions about it. With both hands raised, the Honorable Bob Work emphasized to the packed room at USNI/AFCEA West 2011 - "We Do Not Need More Frigates!"
It was at that point it became clear, Bob had the Littoral Combat Ship on his mind and he wanted to talk about it. He made his case, describing why the Navy wanted both ships and how the LCS fits into the force. Describing the force that will result in POM 12 as now 320 ships by 2020, he challenged the audience with the question why the Navy needs frigates when the Navy will have 96 AEGIS CGs and DDGs plus 3 DDG-1000s for a total of 99 major surface combatants. His point was if the US Navy was unable to meet firepower requirements with 99 surface warships of 9000 tons or greater, then the US Navy is doing something wrong. Not every mission requires AEGIS and VLS though, and something needs to be able to carry out the lower level presence role in an affordable way while contributing to the entire battle network of the force - and Bob argued the Littoral Combat Ship can do that and more.
The Littoral Combat Ship isn't a story about a perfect ship design evolving into the perfect program, indeed Bob stated out front the original design is far from perfect. Bob quickly concedes the problems with how the program began, probably because his time at CSBA was spent writing exactly that. He also describes the program in terms I had not heard before, before Stackley and after Stackley. It is an interesting contrast, because there is no question Sean Stackley is doing things to insure the Navy is getting favorable contracts, but the LCS is more than a series of contracts. Not every design element put into the first block are necessarily as important today as they were the ship was originally designed, but the evolution of the class will include addressing the issues learned from experience.
Bob described the LCS problems in the context of schedule, but I don't agree - the problems are really better described in the context of time. Yes, schedule matters, and there has been a serious rush in the program to get the ship built and to sea as fast as possible. Speed is a measurement of time, and speed is a common attribute associated with the Littoral Combat Ship in many different connotations. Time has been the emphasis, but also the enemy of the Littoral Combat Ship from the beginning, and even as recently as the end of the year when the Navy dumped the dual-purchase option for contracts on the folks on Capitol Hill - the pressures of time existed. I'm starting to wonder if the pressures of time have concluded with the contracts. I do certainly hope so.
Bob discussed something I've been thinking about lately - how there are no helicopter hangers on the block I DDG-51, but imperfections do not make that class any less useful today. Most people don't realize that the Block I DDG-51s represent the bulk of our Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers in the US Navy today - a mission that didn't even exist when the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) was commissioned. Will the first block of Littoral Combat Ships have a different mission in 20 years? History suggests the answer is yes, and history also suggests that mission may not even exist today in the fleet.
Julian Corbett described naval strategy as a field of study where lessons have application over time, but Corbett also emphasized that tactics must continuously evolve due to the unresting progress of mankind that causes continuous changes to weapons; and with that must come a continuous change in the manner of fighting, fielding, and the handling of troops and ships. The United States is facing a fiscal crisis, and the economic strength of the United States is now the greatest threat to the country. During the next few years, the US Navy budget will at minimum baseline, and potentially contract in several years over the next decade. Some attempt to use the fiscal stresses on the Navy budget as a reason why the Littoral Combat Ship, and the associated experimentation that is taking place with new concepts and new technologies related to the LCS, is a bad idea at this time. Indeed John Patch's article is titled "The Wrong Ship at the Wrong Time," which may or may not be an editors addition.
I couldn't disagree more, fiscal stress to the budget is the reason why experimentation is so important, indeed it is only through experimentation that the Navy can innovate solutions to meet the challenges of budget stress. The word experiment is important, because experimentation involves both the potential for success
and failure - experimentation involves risk. Does the Littoral Combat Ship involve risk? Absolutely, but these are challenges that can be addressed and overcome. Indeed the entire concept of the LCS, from its small manning profile to the mission modules themselves, represents a series of necessary technology evolutions in naval capabilities that are expected and necessary in order to meet the fiscal challenges to the naval service, so the risk would exist in any program attempting to address those challenges. We have already seen optimal manning fail when the Navy reduced crew numbers on ships that were designed for specific numbers of crew members. The LCS on the other hand was designed for a crew of only 40 people, meaning the number of 40 crew might actually be the right number. Nobody knows yet what the right number will ultimately be, we do know that as a ship designed for 40 sailors - the number is likely to be very close to 40 sailors.
I had originally intended to write a piece that challenged the specific criticisms of John Patch's Proceedings article in this space, but as yesterday unfolded I realized I will not be posting such a discussion until next week. The speech by Bob Work left me endless notes I need to review and consider. Bob's presentation at USNI/AFCEA West 2011 was followed by a short meeting with several reporters and bloggers where the Undersecretary had clearly reviewed criticisms of the LCS on several blogs, and that discussion led to a more detailed but equally passionate discussion of the Littoral Combat Ship. I have no idea if Bob Work has time to read this blog, but I am absolutely assured someone on his staff is because he was aware of every single criticism that gets left by readers in the comments and had his counterpoints prepared. It was actually entertaining, because every question in the media session seemed to take a right turn to discuss directly opinions on issues that have been discussed and debated within the Navy blogosphere.
Even the reporters in the room recognized it.
After that meeting, Nathan Hughes of STRATFOR (and a fellow contributor at the USNI Blog, see
here for good analysis from yesterday's China session) and I were picked up CDR Jason Salata (PAO) and taken over to USS Freedom (LCS 1), where we were able to spend an hour and a half on the ship with the
Commander Jim Edwards and Commander Pat Thien, the CO and XO respectively of blue crew. I really appreciate the Navy providing this opportunity, because for me personally, it gave me the opportunity to collect the information discussed by RADM Pandolfe and Undersecretary Work, discuss topics in details with the sailors on the ship, and allow for depth of knowledge understanding to the issues, challenges, and successes surrounding LCS.
Since I am working with scrambled notes from RADM Pandolfe's SNA briefing, Bob Works USNI/AFCEA WEST 2011 evangelism, and a personal visit to the USS Freedom (LCS 1) - I need to stop, reorganize, and think before discussing the meat of John Patch's Proceedings article.
Final thoughts. Critics aren't going to believe it or like it, but all week I have had a real sense that the Littoral Combat Ship is at a distinct turning point, and the discussion of this program has shifted from a negative perception to one with more balance in the direction of an excited, positive perception. It turns out more information and more discussion of issues by the Navy is a good thing. Yesterday reinforced my belief there is a change underway in the perception of the Littoral Combat Ship.
When one combines the news of the contracts with the clear, concise, and detailed status report that RADM Pandolfe gave at SNA, and follow that up with Bob Work's speech that represents an exciting vision of how the Littoral Combat Ship fits into the big picture of navy force structure, I sense that the vibe of the LCS discussion is shifting. There are still tough challenges ahead for the LCS, but allow me to also suggest that there are still many opportunities represented in the future of the LCS.
Bob Work was pretty clear on a few things. He made clear he believes the Navy should be able to address criticisms on everything the Navy is doing, stating clearly that if the Navy is unable to address criticism then maybe the Navy isn't doing something right. He encouraged the audience to write those criticisms in Proceedings, to ask questions, and to engage the debate and discussion of important topics of the Navy. I don't know if it was little more than his personal opinion, or a message that he sends to the Navy itself, but I thought it was refreshing to hear said anyway.
Today is the last day at USNI/AFCEA West 2011. If anyone still wants to meet up, get in touch with me, I always enjoy shaking hands and talking to blog readers.
From the CNN blog.
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