“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man.”
― George Bernard Shaw, Man and SupermanOver the course of the past month, I have written two pieces that attempt to lay out my case for a larger, more powerful Navy and the resources necessary to accomplish it. In "The Paradox of American Naval Power" I made an argument that the Navy's ability to meet crisis response requirements has a perverse impact on its readiness to address the growing threat of great power conflict. In "CNO's Losing Battle to Avoid a Hollow Navy" I made the case that even the ability to meet crisis response requirements is in jeopardy as we attempt to squeeze more presence out of a declining force.
The response to both pieces has been gratifying, with some excellent criticism and some welcome support.
One consistent response set is worth addressing. I have a number of correspondents who are incredibly intelligent, thoughtful, and eloquent, who have written me emails or who have included me in email debates they've had among themselves, who take issue with my arguments from the perspective of their own rational and reasonable ideas for how the Navy could more effectively spend the resources that it is given. Their ideas uniformly reflect deep insight, experience, and a dedication to problem-solving. Essentially, their arguments boil down to support for the "capability vs. capacity" approach, and they assume that I am firmly in the "capacity vs. capability" camp. They see the nation's current fiscal condition and the likely resources that the Navy will receive they generally associate themselves with the CNO's approach, which is to privilege capability. They believe that I would privilege capacity, and in doing so, make us less ready over time.
In addition to these (largely civilian) correspondents, there is the OPNAV Staff, one of the most talented amalgamations of human beings with whom I have ever been associated, and the overwhelming majority of them come to work every single day with one underlying goal in mind: how can the Navy spend these dollars in the most effective manner possible? This is good, honorable, and necessary work, it is work that I have done myself in a past life, I know how to do it, and it is work that I would someday welcome doing again. I honor these individuals, and the nation is very, very fortunate to have them.
However, I am not interested in a "capacity vs. capability" discussion, and nothing I write should lead anyone to believe that I am. There are plenty of really smart people already filling that space. Truth be told, if I were interested in that discussion, I would agree with the capability over capacity crowd. But I am irrational and unreasonable. I wish to argue for MORE resources for the Navy in order that it can become larger, more powerful, and more capable. I think this way not because I think big powerful navies are really neat, but because I think a big, powerful Navy is the table stakes for a nation such as ours, with its far flung interests and its favorable geography. I believe such a Navy is warranted even more so when the nation faces fiscal challenges, as there is no element of military power (and by this I mean Seapower, broadly understood) that more effectively protects and sustains our interests. There is no element of military power that is as flexible and adaptable across the full range of grand strategies as Seapower, with clear mandates for a powerful and capable fleet contained in offshore balancing, cooperative security, selective engagement and primacy.
It does not escape me that my position is more extreme than most, nor that it is not particularly helpful to those engaged in the above discussion (how to spend what the Navy gets most effectively). So be it. If I find myself in my dotage an intellectually lonely old man who made wild claims that are ultimately proven wrong, I pray for the poise to admit it and the good spirit to congratulate those whose ideas prevailed. In the meantime, I will continue to push for more--for three deployment hubs, not two. For an INCREASE in the number of carriers (to 13), rather than a decrease (to 9 or 10); for sixty SSN's; for a plethora of unmanned vehicles on, under and above the water; for twelve Amphibious Ready Groups; for more and more capable air wings.
I aim to help define the Navy that the Nation needs, not the Navy that the Joint Force needs. If those two are the same, then I hope to have the wisdom to see it. If they are not, I wish the same on others.
On this subject, I prefer to be The Unreasonable Man.
Bryan McGrath
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