The Tampa Bay Times’ Politicfact.com site undertook an
inquiry recently (“Anatomy
of a talking point: the smallest Navy since 1917”, Monday, August 3, 2015) into
the truth of a statement made by GOP Presidential Candidate Lindsey Graham in
June, when he said “"I'm going to rebuild our military. We're on a course to have…the smallest Navy
since 1915." Author and site Deputy
Editor Louis Jacobson pointed out that this is the second presidential campaign
cycle in which references to the Navy’s fleet size have been made in comparison
to its size before World War I.
Jacobson is careful to note that as a strict exercise in
counting, Senator Graham—and others who have lately made this claim—are
correct. In 1916, the Navy had 245 ships
and today, the fleet size stands at 273.
Where the piece takes issue with Graham’s claim is not in its numeracy,
but in its relevance. Jacobson writes, “The
types of ships active in both years, such as cruisers and destroyers, are
outfitted today with far more advanced technology than during World War I. More
importantly, the U.S. Navy has 11 aircraft carriers (plus the jets to launch
from them), 31 amphibious ships, 14 submarines capable of launching nuclear
ballistic missiles and four specialized submarines for launching cruise
missiles -- all categories of vessels that didn't even exist in 1916. And all
are more effective at projecting seapower than their forebears.” Jacobson here echoes the thoughts of others,
including President Obama, whose 2012 debate riposte to Mitt Romney attempted
to make the point that because of the increased capability of today’s ships,
ship counts have become obsolete as a measure of naval power. This view of course, undercuts the relevance
of Graham’s claim.
The problem though, is that Jacobson, the experts he cites,
and even the President simply get it wrong when they minimize the impact of
fleet size and its connection to a broader understanding of seapower. Here specifically, are four ways this
Politifact.com piece gets it wrong.
1. The Navy is not just sized and equipped to
fight wars, but also to prevent them. The
networks, systems, and precision weapons that give today’s fleet its awesome
combat power have their greatest impact when the shooting starts. No navy on Earth can (yet) challenge our
dominance, and few targets ashore are out of reach of Navy ordnance. But
navies, and our Navy in particular, must do more than fight wars. Ours must sustain the peace and protect our
nation’s prosperity by guaranteeing the freedom of the seas. This it does not do with its precision
weapons and its networks, but with its presence,
grey Navy hulls flying the American flag.
And as amazing as the technology on those ships has become, we have yet
to figure out how to make them appear in two places at once. Given that the geography of the Earth has changed
little since 1916, while the number of and distance to our economic and
security interests have increased significantly, such blithe dismissal of fleet
size is unwise.
2. Adversary capabilities have also improved over
100 years. Today’s fleet is too
small to meet the security requirements assigned to the Navy (which is why the
Secretary of the Navy is trying to increase the fleet to 308 ships); this
condition is doubly dangerous, as there is little or no thought given to
wartime attrition in fleet size planning.
High end adversaries are fielding capabilities that in some cases,
outstrip those we field. In such a war,
ships will be hit and taken out of action.
Modern, sophisticated warships cannot be built nearly as quickly as they
could in 1916, and the number of shipyards capable of doing so is at an
historical low. Not only is the fleet
too small to meet its peacetime commitments, it is unprepared to take losses in
war time.
3. Sequestration is not the only thing
jeopardizing the 308 ship goal. Even
if there were no sequestration, the Navy would be unlikely to meet its goal of
308 ships, as its own 30 Year Shipbuilding Plan acknowledges dramatic funding
shortfalls across the entire plan if historical levels of shipbuilding
resources are applied. The 2015 version
of the plan (released in 2014) put it bluntly, stating that the plan “requires
funding at an unsustainable level, particularly between FY25 and FY34.” The annual shortfalls within the 30 year plan
average between $4B-$6B, without accounting for a single dollar of
sequestration.
4. The piece poses the wrong concluding
question. Turning to Cameron
University military historian Dr. Lance Janda for its conclusion who states
that fans of the talking point will ultimately have to answer this question:
"If you could choose, would you go to war with the Navy we have now -- at
288 ships -- or would you rather have the Navy of World War II, which had well
over 1,000?" While such a question
might provide for good conversation, it offers little insight into the
important questions of the degree to which our national strategy is well-served
by the size of the fleet. A better, more
appropriate question is, “Is the Navy adequately sized for the functions our
national security and prosperity demand of it?”
Sadly, Politifact.com is unlikely to shed any light
on this question.
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