2007 Japanese Deployment

From May 19th to August 19th, a number of JMSDF assets are deployed in a 2007 Pacific Tour.

Three Fleet Escort ships of the 4th Escort Fleet are bringing 600 people:
DD 105 Inazuma
DDH 144 Kurama
DDG 176 Chyoukai

The trip taking them to:
Pearl Harbor (May 29~31)
San Diego (June 8~25)
Pearl Harbor (July 4~18)

And five P-3C Orion of the 5th Squadron, with 110 people:
Anderson Isl. (June 18~19)
Kaneohe (June 19~21)
Weepy Isl. (June 21~29)
Kaneohe (June 29~July 23)
Anderson (July 24~25)

The deployment includes a number of exercices and interaction's with the US Navy.

No navy in the world trains more with the US Navy then the JMSDF, and that is also true for other branches of the Defense Forces.

Shore Leave

When I started this blog, my concern was that I would get it going then go out of town for business just as I was getting some steam into the project. I may or may not be able to post over the next 8 days, much of it depending whether I can post from my blackberry, and if my blackberry has good coverage internationally.

To fill in while I am away I have invited a guest blogger to add a different perspective to the blog while I'm gone. If he is able to, great, if not, *shrug*, I'll be back July 1.

Every time I have left the states in the last few years something 'big' has happened. In 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom began, in 2004 it was the Battle of Fallujah, and last year the Israel-Lebanon war broke out. What does it mean?

I'll let you know next Sunday. Until then, read some of the links I have provided in several articles, many of them prove it is possible for 100+ pages in a PDF to be interesting, if you enjoy reading about naval matters.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group

USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)
USS Antietam (CG-54)
USS O'Kane (DDG-77)
USS Preble (DDG-88)


Nimitz Carrier Strike Group

USS Nimitz (CVN 68)
USS Princeton (CG 59)
USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53)
USS Higgins (DDG 76)
USS Chafee (DDG 90)
USS Pinckney (DDG 91)


Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Denver (LPD 9)
USS Rushmore (LSD 47)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93)
USS Chosin (CG 65)


Task Force 150

HMS Richmond (F 239)
FGS Köln (F211)
FS Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet (F794)
USS Carter Hill (LSD 50)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HMS Cornwall (F 99)
HMAS Anzac (F 150)
HMAS Toowoomba (F 156)
PNS Shahjahan (D 186)
USS Hawes (FFG 53)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

5th Fleet Focus: Stories of the Seas

A very interesting story about a confrontation between the Royal Australian Navy and the Iranian Navy, specifically involving Iranian gunboats and an Australian boarding party doing Maritime Security Operations in the Northern Persian Gulf has come to light. If this sounds a lot like the March 23rd incident where Royal Navy sailors were captured by Iranian gunboats, it should, as the article on the incident points out, there are a number of similarities in everything but how it ended.

The incident, which came to light yesterday, has similarities with the capture of British sailors in the Gulf earlier this year by Iranian forces.

But, unlike the Britons, the Australians refused to surrender.

A BBC journalist who broke the story said: ``The point of this story is not that the Aussies were fantastically brave and the Brits were a bunch of cowards, although I'm sure some people will interpret it that way.''

In the previously undisclosed encounter, 14 Royal Australian Navy sailors were evacuated by helicopter after being surrounded by five Iranian gunboats in December, 2004.

I recommend reading the entire thing. My favorite part:

The BBC reporter who broke the story, Frank Gardner, citing various military sources, said the Australians had pointed their guns at the Iranians and used 'colourful language' to defuse the incident.

It was made very clear the Australians would not surrender or even yield to the Iranians. The blunt language used towards the Iranians was along the lines of 'f... off'.

Commodore Gilmore said: "As Australians, I think we all know our capacity to engage, to defuse by discussion and they indeed did that."

Hmm, that almost sounds like a very American approach to me. If a US Navy sailor is ever in the position where he might "defuse" a situation by pointing his weapon at an Iranian and shouting "colourful language" I for one hope the American sailors takes the Aussie approach over the British approach.

The Disinformation of Military Deployments

I work with a guy who is a staunch independent. He basically has two favorite sayings, "the kooks on my right" and "the kooks on the left." While both the right and the left can fill in the blanks regarding who is the kook, I'll stick with the kooks I see spreading disinformation on military deployments.

One such kook website, one that would qualify as "kooks on the right," would be DEBKA. For some reason people continue to treat what they say as news, as is, as opposed to evaluating what they say as news. Like most on the fringes, they believe in the "alarm" method of reporting, meaning if they aren't scaring you the story isn't written well enough.

This latest alarm follows the general mode of disinformation that can be expected of kooks. The Headline reads:

A third US carrier, the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise Strike Group is speeding towards the Persian Gulf

Actually, the USS Enterprise is in Norfolk as I post this blog, but details like that don't make headlines. The point of the article is the USS Enterprise is soon to deploy to the Middle East. That is about the only part of the story that is actually accurate. It turns out, military.com reported this back in May, but did so professionally as you would expect from a legitimate, non kook, media source on military affairs.

USS Enterprise, At Sea -- The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65) (Big E), got underway May 22 following about one week in its homeport at Naval Station Norfolk.

During their in port period, Big E hosted a change of command ceremony for Commander, Fleet Forces Command, and held its own change of command ceremony for its new Commanding Officer, Capt. Ron Horton. For the next few weeks, Enterprise, along with embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 1 will be conducting carrier qualifications, maintaining combat readiness for its upcoming surge deployment.

While DEBKA is busy raising the alarm, military.com is signaling that the USS Enterprise Carrier Strike Group (CSG) will be replacing the USS Stennis Carrier Strike Group (CSG) that was surged in January. Carrier Strike Groups typically deploy for about 6-8 months, the time period difference usually determined by the arrival of its relief and the distance from homeport. Considering the Stennis CSG deployed in January, it can be expected that the Enterprise would need to deploy either by the end of June or early in July to relieve the Stennis Strike Group so those sailors could return home. With the surge in Iraq expected to last until at least September when Congress intends to evaluate the progress, naturally the extra aircraft carrier surge would last until at least then.

The USS Enterprise Carrier Strike Group is part of a new US Navy strategy to deploy 4 destroyers instead of 2 in Carrier Strike Groups. This reverts back to how Carrier Battle Groups were deployed under cold war doctrine, meaning the Navy has learned a lesson somewhere that 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers simply wasn't enough to provide the services that were expected of Carrier Strike Groups under the Fleet Response Plan.

This should address the constant deployments of 'surge' surface combatant task forces that have occurred the last few years under the Fleet Response Plan to areas like the Middle East. The Enterprise Strike Group consists of:

USS Enterprise (CVN 65)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
USS James E. Williams (DDG 95)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 6)
USS Philadelphia (SSN 690)

A few things jump to mind looking at this force. There are 512 VLS cells in this Strike Group, the most I can remember ever in a single Strike Group. The USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) and the USS James E. Williams (DDG 95) are two of the most modern warships in the US Navy. The USS James E Williams (DDG 95) illustrates my earlier point about surface ships having to surge when Carrier Strike Groups were only 1 Cruiser and 2 Destroyers, as its maiden deployment in May of last year was a surge deployment with the USS Trenton (formally LPD-17, which will be commissioned the INS Jalashwa today) and USS Hue City (CG 66). In fact, the James E Williams (DDG 95) actually deployed late, and crossed the Atlantic to the Middle East with the USS Enterprise (CVN 65).

Ignore the kooks on US Navy deployments, because it can be expected the kooks will go crazy when the Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) deploys when it is scheduled to deploy in July, or the Truman Carrier Strike Group which is scheduled to deploy in the fall. Schedules don't matter to kooks though, they just want to raise the alarm by beating the drums of war.

US Navy Ballistic Missile Defense

Even though today's ballistic missile defense test was delayed, I want to talk about the AEGIS BMD program, both for the US Navy, and how it effects allies to date. The test is very timely, as it will be the first intercept conducted by one of the AEGIS 3.7 Destroyers fielding the SPY-1D. The other tests involved AEGIS Cruisers that use the SPY-1B. The test will include the SPS Mendez Nunez (F 104) similar to how the HNLMS Tromp (F 803) back in December. The test, if successful, would prove the SPY-1D can support the AEGIS BMD capability, which is timely because the Australian AWDs that were contracted out yesterday may someday be performing Ballistic Missile Defense Patrol in the Pacific.

The US Navy plans on converting 18 existing AEGIS ships to give them Ballistic Missile Capability. The plan, which continues to evolve due to changing circumstances, has already converted 16 US ships and 1 Japanese Self Defense Navy destroyer.

The best media article to date on the subject is a defensenews article from last year by Christopher P. Cavas entitled " U.S. Warships To Get Missile Defense Upgrades" (you can read it here). The key paragraph:

Eighteen U.S. Navy Aegis ships — three cruisers and 15 destroyers — are being modified for the BMD mission. Two ships already are fitted with Aegis 3.6, the Shiloh and destroyer Stethem, according to Lockheed Martin. The other two cruisers, Lake Erie and Port Royal, will have it by the end of the year, along with the destroyers Curtis Wilbur and Decatur. All the ships will be capable of launching the SM-3 missile, which designed to intercept a ballistic missile or warhead.

Ships already fitted with Aegis 3.0 include the destroyers John S. McCain, Fitzgerald, Russell, Milius, Paul Hamilton, John Paul Jones, Benfold, Hopper, O’Kane and Higgins. Those ships will be upgraded to the full 3.6 version by 2009, according to the Navy.

Bold mine to highlight count. For those not familiar, version 3.6 is for engagement, while version 3.0 is for tracking (also known as Long Range Surveillance & Tracking or LRS&T). The FY08 Budget estimates provided to Congress for Ballistic Missile Defense defines the program objectives for calender Year 2007.

Fixed Site Interceptors

• 21 Ground-Based Interceptors, Alaska
• 3 Ground-Based Interceptors, California

Fixed Site Sensors

• Cobra Dane radar, Alaska
• Beale radar, California
• Fylingdales radar, UK

Mobile/Transportable Sensors

• 1 Sea-Based X-Band radar, Alaska
• 2 Forward-Based X-Band radars
• 7 Aegis Surveillance & Track Destroyers

Mobile Interceptors

• 3 Aegis Engagement Cruisers
• 7 Engagement Destroyers
• 21 Standard Missile-3
• 546 Patriot PAC-3

That article is also the most in depth review of the current US Navy and Missile Defense Agency plans available in the open source that I have found. While it is an outline, much of it depends on funding from Congress, but it does give a reader a good idea of a whole Ballistic Missile Defense concept within the US.

The defensenews article identified 3 of the AEGIS engagement destroyers, meaning by the end of 2007 four more US destroyers will be converted to version 3.6. The 7th destroyer with Surveillance & Track Destroyers capability has not been named, however the JDS Kirishima (DDG 174) does have AEGIS 3.0. According to the Missile Defense Agencies BMD Test and Targets worksheet from earlier this year, JDS Kongo (DDG 173) will be the next Japanese destroyer upgraded, an upgrade that includes engagement capability, and will be apart of JFTM-01 in 1Q FY008 (late 2007) as the interceptor launch platform.

A few points. If you look at the US cruisers and destroyers with AEGIS BMD, take note that the destroyers listed represent all of the Flight I and Flight II Arleigh Burke class destroyers in the Pacific. According to a Congressional Research Service report in April 07, the Navy will convert one more new DDG (#17) to AEGIS BMD LRS&T this calender year, and the 18th DDG to AEGIS BMD in 2008 calender year. That report includes the following 2 slides, the first which outlines the platform upgrade plan, and the second which outlines the cost of AEGIS BMD.





In other words, the most the Missile Defense Agency and the US Navy intends to spend on AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense in the next 6 years is 1,205.5 million, or roughly 1.2 billion. Considering the rewards, the success of the tests, the maturity of the technology being utilized to deploy ballistic missile defense, and interoperability potential with allies this seems like a bargain of an investment in relation to so many other defense programs. Hopefully Congress sees it that way with the Fy08 budget and continues to fully fund AEGIS BMD, as it appears to be the least risky investment in current Ballistic Missile Defense programs.

Royal Australian Navy Chooses F-100 and BPE

The Australian Government picked Navantia for both of its two major Naval projects.

Spain's Navantia is the big winner in an Australian $ 11 billion (US$9.3 billion), five ship expansion of the Royal Australian Navy.

The Australian Government has selected the F100 design by Navantia for three next generation Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD) for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

And a version of Navantia's 27,000 tonne strategic projection ship has also been chosen for two amphibious ships, beating out a design from France's Armaris based on its Mistral Class LHD.

Specific details were not released with the initial major media reports, however there are some details regarding the offer itself.

For the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) the offer was what Armada Española call the "Victor" baseline of the F-100, specifically the baseline used in the fifth F-100 (F-105) purchased last year. Those modifications to the baseline F-100 included the "Victor" standard (SPY-1D(V)) and upgrades the AEGIS Combat System to Baseline 7 Phase II. It also includes new AEGIS integrations of ESSM, AEGIS integration for a Cruise Missile weapon system (presumably Tomahawk), integration for Harpoons, and integration systems like the interface calibration with the US-Navy (I presume this is CEC?), plus modifications in crew reduction. Because my Spanish is decent, not excellent, some of this is lost in translation, except to say that "integration" basically means a commitment to COTS systems and software.

Presumably, given Australia's special defense status with the US Navy, Raytheon will be authorized to provide the very latest mods to AEGIS and COTS integration, which means the AWD will likely be in the league of the DDG-1000 in terms of upgrade potential with its SPY-1D(V) AEGIS system. There are no reports of any redesign regarding an additional helo or more VLS cells.

Click the picture above for a detailed tour of the BPE.

For the BPE design, Tenix went all out putting out the capability worksheets. The LHD media kit has just about any general information you would want to know about the offer to Australia, and is a good place to start to get a feel for what the RAN is getting.

CB90 for the NECC

Could it be, the CB90 is in the discussion with the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command? The Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC) the Navy inherited from the Marines appear to be wearing out, so the Navy is in the market for a replacement.

The CB90 (originally a Swedish design) would be a major upgrade, and would probably cost around 3 million US per if built by Safeboat. In my opinion, it is a good investment, one that finally would indicate the Navy is taking the Brown Water Navy role seriously.

The Littoral Combat Ship: History and Future Outline Two Different Visions

In reviewing the recent history of the Littoral Combat Ship, including reading how it is often referred to as a platform intended to fill gaps in the current fleet, I continue to be amazed at how the LCS concept is explained, particularly in comparison to what the LCS actually is.

For example, this months Proceedings edition is the submarine edition, one of my annual favorites. It highlights various submarine activities throughout its pages, including a decent articles on SSK vs Nuke and one particularly interesting read on the SSGN. At the end of the day though, I am left empty thinking about the US Navy's own ASW capabilities. Even while reading the submariners discuss submarines, it feels as if they are resigned to the reality that when it comes to ASW for the US Navy, they are just about the only show in town.

I think there is some truth to that.

Over the last several months, the LCS has had its fair share of problems, from delays to cost overruns, and in many circles the LCS continues to be seen as a platform looking for a mission. I think the mission has become clear, the LCS is a small boat killer.

As I pointed out on Sunday night, the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) (FY2008-FY2013) lays out the LCS program like this:

32 LCS hills
16 SUW modules
11 MIW modules
6 ASW modules

In other words, small boat warfare is the focus of the LCS program. The ASW module purchase for the first 32 LCS ships is only 6 modules, less than 20% of the total number of modules purchased.

The problem is, that doesn't follow the logic behind the LCS concept in the first place. Duncan Long and Stuart Johnson recently reviewed the program history of the Littoral Combat Ship:

The LCS program quickly gathered steam. Analysis from the Office of Secretary Defense, a task force at the Naval War College, and the LCS Program Office (established in February 2002) contributed to developing the ship’s basic attributes. Key points of debate included whether the ship should embark a helicopter, whether it needed to reach speeds of 50 knots, and whether it needed to be capable of self-deploying across the Pacific. A ship that had no helicopter and had no need of self-deploying could be quite small and reach speeds of over 50 knots. This description most closely matches early Streetfighter designs, although some Streetfighter-type proposals had included a helicopter and left questions of endurance to future designers. A self-deploying, helicopter-carrying ship would have to be larger and slower.

Analysis in N-81 and in OSD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E;) strongly supported a self-deploying ship that, primarily for ASW and MIW purposes, embarked a helicopter. This was later echoed by a study team at the Naval War College. The Navy’s Surface Warfare (Requirements) Directorate (N76) tasked the Navy War College to study what the LCS should be able to do and what technologies it should incorporate. A LCS Task Force used a series of workshops to analyze these questions. The Task Force identified three primary missions and three secondary missions for LCS.

The primary missions matched the capability gaps identified by earlier Navy analysis:

1. Anti-submarine warfare
2. Mine warfare
3. Surface warfare (SUW) against small boats

The secondary missions were:
1. Maritime interdiction
2. Special operations forces (SOF) insertion and support
3. Tasks related to command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)

This Analysis of Multiple Concepts was done in place of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) typically required of weapons procurement programs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense determined that the analysis done for the LCS was adequate, the program was faulted for not rigorously considering non-ship alternatives to the LCS missions and for completing the Analysis of Multiple Concepts well after the Navy released the initial request for proposals to industry. This approach created the sense that LCS analysis (or at least the formal Analysis of Multiple Concepts) was being done after the answer had been determined.

In other words, as far back as 2002 the Navy identified ASW as the first primary reason for a new small surface combatant, and MIW as the second primary reason, and small boats the 3rd reason. Why then did the Navy program 16 ASuW modules first, and 17 combined ASW and MIW modules in the first 5 years if ASW and MIW were the priorities? The priorities somehow went from 1)ASW 2)MIW 3)ASuW to 1)ASuW 2)MIW 3)ASW

I though the LCS was supposed to fill the capability gap in ASW. At this rate the US Navy is going to be able to field a total of 6 additional ASW surface assets while retiring somewhere between 20 and 30 current FFGs currently able to conduct that role over the next decade. Why is that important? Because over the same time period...

Navies in the Asia-Pacific are expected to spend 108 billion US dollars to boost submarine and other maritime defences over the next 10 years

Regional countries are expected to acquire a total of 841 vessels by 2016, they said.

Of these, 83 will be submarines, with the most orders coming from emerging Asian power China. This would include five nuclear-powered missile submarines and 30 attack submarines to add to its current fleet, figures released by the organisers showed.

That doesn't even include the recent announcements by Venezuela, which btw, wouldn't be littoral ASW anyway considering the water off Venezuela is fairly deep. The Navy is facing small boat threats today without the LCS, is the threat of these small boats so disruptive they drive the first 5+ years of the LCS program?

The report by Duncan Long and Stuart Johnson does a good job of following the history of the LCS from Concept to Program, but for me they didn't make enough of a case for what I see as the real long term solution (but at least they mention it):

Mothership. One innovative idea for a new class of small ships was to make use of a mothership, from which small combatants would sortie, just as aircraft sortie from aircraft carriers. By adopting such a concept, which was proposed by Hughes and others, the Navy would have been able to build smaller, individually less expensive ships for use in the littoral. Because these ships did not have to self-deploy or sustain themselves for long periods, naval architects could have designed increased speed and payload fraction in place of the endurance needed for transoceanic deployment but not needed for tactical mission execution. Their low cost, low manning, and higher numbers would have made such combatants less costly to lose in combat.

I believe that when it is all said and done, various types of motherships will change Naval warfare in the 21st century similar to how Aircraft Carriers changed Naval warfare in the 20th century. What amazes me is that anyone who is involved in simulation already knows the unique capability motherships add to virtually any scenario, but in fact, nobody bases more decisions on simulation than the Navy does... which makes the LCS push even more puzzling to me. In this months issue of Proceedings, the case is made that SOCOM could use the Sea Fighter (FSF 1) today as a mothership for SOF. It is an interesting idea, one more in many that the Navy ignores while it pushes through the "medium" frigate sized LCS as its "small" combatant.

Senate Bill Slams the Navy and LCS

When I read a NavyTimes article earlier this week titled "Admiral confident of LCS despite setbacks" I thought maybe the Senate was going to fully fund the LCS project for FY08. The House has already passed its bill, and it reduced the presidents request for the LCS from $910.5 million to $710.5 million, which is below the presidents request enough that it became very unlikely the Navy was going to build anywhere near the 3 ships they were hoping this year.

The Senate, not to be outdone by the House, has taken the entire matter a step further. The emphasis in bold is mine.

Littoral Combat Ship

The budget request included $910.5 million in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN, line 15) for the construction of three Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The Navy intends this to be a relatively smaller, more affordable vessel that carries modular payloads. The Navy concept is that, on one day, an LCS might be configured to operate as an anti-submarine vessel. However, as a mission needs to change, it could rapidly change the whole mission payload, within a day or so, and operate in an anti-surface warfare or mine warfare mode.

Each of the two prime contractor teams had contracts to build two ships. The prime contractors have teamed with smaller shipyards in both cases in order to keep LCS costs lower than would be possible in one of the major yards that normally build Navy ships.

The first ship (LCS-1) was scheduled to deliver in late 2006. The Navy is now estimating that the first ship will deliver sometime in the middle of 2008. The LCS-1 contractor team had barely started on their second ship (LCS-3) when the program ran into major cost problems earlier this year. The Navy then issued a stop work order on LCS-3 in order to reduce expenditures and limit further cost exposure on the program while it separately re-evaluated program cost estimates.

The Navy entered into negotiations with the LCS-1 team to sign up to a fixed price contract on the two ships or face outright cancellation on the second ship. These negotiations occurred during this past spring. When the stop work order was nearly ready to expire, the Navy announced that it and the LCS-1 contractor team were unable to reach an agreement and that the Navy was terminating the contract for LCS-3 for the convenience of the Government. It is too early to precisely estimate the termination costs, but the Navy has reported that significant funds for LCS-3 are on hold pending completion of the termination negotiations.

The second contractor team has a contract to build two LCS vessels of another design (LCS-2 and LCS-4). The Navy awarded this contract later, so LCS-2 is roughly 1 year behind the LCS-1. Unfortunately, it appears that this team is experiencing similar cost problems. The Navy has not issued the same ultimatum to this contractor team, but has claimed that the Navy will do so if the cost of LCS-2 continues to grow toward the Navy's estimate. Meanwhile, the Navy is proceeding with the start of construction on LCS-4, although it is not clear that the root causes for early cost growth on LCS-2 have been addressed.

The committee is disappointed that the cost of the lead ship has more than doubled and the delivery schedule has slipped several times.

The committee commends the Secretary of the Navy for exercising oversight and for trying to bring cost and schedule discipline to this troubled program. The committee is also interested in supporting the Secretary's efforts to improve the Navy's acquisition process. Reviewing this LCS situation will undoubtedly result in a new set of `lessons learned' that the acquisition community will dutifully try to implement. However, the committee has previously expressed concerns about the LCS concept and the LCS acquisition strategy. The LCS situation may be more a case of `lessons lost.' Long ago, we knew that we should not rush to sign a construction contract before we have solidified requirements. We also knew that the contractors will respond to incentives, and that if the incentives are focused on maintaining schedules and not on controlling cost, cost growth on a cost-plus contract should surprise no one. After the fact, everyone appears ready to agree that the original ship construction schedule for the lead ship was overly aggressive.

The Navy has said that the capability that this vessel will bring to the fleet is of the utmost urgency for responding to asymmetric threats. The committee believes that if the Navy really believed that the threat were that urgent, it might have taken more near-term steps to address it. For example, the Navy might not have cancelled the remote minehunting system (RMS) capability on a number of the DDG-51 class destroyers, ships that will be available to the combatant commanders much sooner than LCS. The Navy might also have taken this modular capability slated for the LCS and packaged those modules to deploy sooner on ships of opportunity. Rather, the Navy is waiting on a shipbuilding program to deliver that capability (in a useful quantity) at some future date.

The Navy now proposes to use the funds requested in fiscal year 2008 to award contracts for two LCS vessels, rather than the three originally envisioned. Given the uncertainty about what is happening with the earlier ships in the program and uncertainties about the options for an acquisition strategy that will remain available to the Navy next year, the Navy does not intend to award these two contracts until late in fiscal year 2008.

The Senate Bill text is as follows:

1. a high degree of cost uncertainty will continue to overshadow the LCS program until the two lead ships execute test and trials, starting late in 2007.
2. the Navy's current estimate is that the approximately $1.6 billion appropriated for the first six ships will be required to complete the three ships currently under contract, with significant additional funding being held for termination of a fourth ship.
3. if the Navy's estimates are correct, or low, then the Navy will be engaging in fixed price negotiations with the second prime contractor for LCS-2 and LCS-4 late in 2007, with the distinct possibility that LCS-4 would be terminated.
4. if the Navy's estimates are high, then sufficient funding from within previous appropriations should be available for a newly procured LCS.
5. the Navy has yet to formulate its acquisition strategy for the LCS program, however, the challenges inherent to fair competition between two dissimilar ship designs have become significantly more complex in light of the recent termination of LCS-3 (or potential termination of LCS-4).
6. the Navy has announced a delay for conducting a program downselect decision until 2010, at which time it also plans to revise the LCS combat system, which raises concerns regarding the infrastructure and life cycle support costs for the three or four ships of the LCS variant not selected for `full rate production.'
7. program delays have pushed the next notional contract award until late in fiscal year 2008.
8. termination negotiations for LCS-3 will likely be proceeding at the same time the prime contractor is being solicited for a proposal to build another LCS ship, in which case the material procured for LCS-3 would likely revert back to the contractor for this new procurement. The net effect is that the current LCS-3 obligations that are fenced for termination costs would sufficiently cover the contractor's fiscal year 2008 obligations for a newly procured LCS.

The committee recommends $480.0 million for LCS in fiscal year 2008, a decrease of $430.5 million. We cannot relive the early days of the LCS program and remember `lessons learned,' but we have the opportunity to take positive steps now to right the program. Before awarding contracts for additional ships in the LCS program, we need to maintain focus on delivering the most capability possible for the $1.6 billion invested thus far for six ships. This would require that we impose accountability for the quality of program estimates; halt further changes to program requirements; and ensure that the contracts provide effective incentives for cost performance.

The Secretary of the Navy has advised the committee that the Navy's estimates appear to be quite conservative based on contractor performance over the past quarter, as measured against recently revised baselines. Although further risk is acknowledged, the Navy has expressed confidence that the program will be able to improve on the Navy's worst case estimates and avoid further termination action. If the Navy and industry are successful in managing costs going forward, this should allow four ships to be delivered within previously appropriated funds.

The committee notes that the LCS-1 contractor was awarded a lead ship contract that targeted a significantly lower price and a significantly more aggressive schedule for starting construction. The risks inherent in this aggressive schedule were exacerbated by changes to Navy requirements. These factors may have contributed to the decision to terminate LCS-3--an outcome referred to as `winner-loses.' The resultant imbalance between the two competing shipbuilders jeopardizes the Navy's ultimate goal for a competitive downselect in 2010, followed by full and open competition for the winning LCS variant.

Therefore, the committee directs that funds authorized for a fiscal year 2008 LCS ship may only be used when combined with LCS SCN funds appropriated in prior years, to solicit, on a competitive basis, bids for two fixed price LCS ship construction contracts, one for each of the two competing LCS variants. The Secretary of the Navy may waive this requirement only if: he determines that there is only one acceptable LCS variant, based on completion of acceptance trials on the two LCS variants; and he notifies the congressional defense committees 30 days before releasing a solicitation based on that waiver determination.

The committee believes that the history of the LCS acquisition strategy has been one of documenting decisions, rather than guiding and informing decisions. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense is directed to submit a report on the approved acquisition strategy for the LCS program at least 90 days prior to issuing any solicitation or requests for proposal, but no later than December 1, 2008.

The Senate goes on to address the Mission Modules:

LCS modules

The budget request included $80.3 million for assembling and outfitting Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) mission modules. The Navy intends the LCS to be a relatively smaller vessel that carries modular payloads. The Navy concept is that, using these mission modules, an LCS might be configured to operate as an anti-submarine vessel on one day. On the next day, the Navy might change the whole mission payload and operate the LCS in an anti-surface warfare mode.

As described elsewhere in this report, the LCS program has run into serious problems. The committee sees no particular reason to acquire mission modules at the pace planned by the Navy, since there have been significant delays in the ship program. The committee recommends a decrease of $65.0 million for LCS modules.

For background on LCS problems, you can check this out for the Navy statements after the stop order on LCS 3, and here for the Industry statements for the cost problems of LCS 3. Both statements hit home on several points, from the problem obtaining HSLA-80 steel (a topic for another time, but an important topic nonetheless), but more importantly it highlights the LCS priority of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) (FY2008-FY2013). Specifically:

32 LCS hills
16 SUW modules
11 MIW modules
6 ASW modules

In other words, small boat warfare is the focus of the LCS program. The ASW module purchase for the first 32 LCS ships is only 6 modules, less than 20% of the total number of modules purchased. Next time someone says the Littoral Combat Ships is about ASW, tell them that according to the numbers, the Navy respectfully disagrees.

Its ok though, thanks to earmarks, Duncan Hunter wants the Navy to operate a Littoral Combat Ship, specifically Sea Fighter (FSF 1) that the Navy wants nothing to do with. Maybe the Senate version will push it through, and the Navy will end up with 4 LCS hulls after all. I'm not a fan of earmarks, but at the end of the day Sea Fighter (FSF 1) can do more to fight small boats today than the LCS will be able to anytime soon.

The House Bill and Senate Bill still have to be worked out in committee, but no matter what it would not appear the LCS is going to survive FY08 without a bloody nose, or if some of that Senate language makes the bill, a swift kick in the nuts.

Finally, the 313-ship Fleet is dead on arrival. The Navy needs a new plan, so far they have lost 1 LCS in FY 06, 2 LCS in FY07, and at least 2 so far in FY08, and the only gain to offset this is the Sea Fighter (FSF 1) which the Navy doesn't want. Hopefully the next 12 months produces results, because according to the 313-ship plan, next year the Navy buys 12 ships, 6 of which are supposed to be Littoral Combat Ships.

In other words, it not only can get worse for the Navy, things most likely will.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group

USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)
USS Antietam (CG-54)
USS O'Kane (DDG-77)
USS Preble (DDG-88)


Nimitz Carrier Strike Group

USS Nimitz (CVN 68)
USS Princeton (CG 59)
USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53)
USS Higgins (DDG 76)
USS Chafee (DDG 90)
USS Pinckney (DDG 91)

Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Denver (LPD 9)
USS Rushmore (LSD 47)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93)
USS Chosin (CG 65)


Task Force 150

HMS Richmond (F 239)
FGS Köln (F211)
FS Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet (F794)
USS Carter Hill (LSD 50)
RFA Fort Austin (A386)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HMS Cornwall (F 99)
HMAS Toowoomba (F 156)
USS Hawes (FFG 53)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMAS Anzac (F 150)

Counting Down to War

How do you count down until the Summer War that so many people on both sides of the political spectrum have been predicting for the Middle East?

Walid Phares has established a method of measurement, specifically by keeping track of the massacre of legislators in Lebanon . Only 4 more to go.

2nd Fleet Focus: Venezuela's Growing Navy

The US 2nd Fleet's Area of Responsibility is steadily becoming a focus of US policy. The two areas getting attention include the western coastof Africa, specifically the Gulf of Guinea, but also the Caribbean region with the problematic Hugo Chavez. A January 22nd, 2007 CRS report on "Latin America: Terrorism Issues" summed up the concern for the new Congress regarding Venezuela:

According to the State Department’s April 2006 terrorism report, Venezuela has virtually ceased its cooperation in the global war on terror, tolerated terrorist in its territory, and sought close relations with Cuba and Iran, both state sponsors of terrorism. As noted above, Colombian terrorist groups use Venezuela territory for safehaven, although it is unclear whether and to what extent the government of President Hugo Chávez provides material support to these terrorist groups and at what level. According to the State Department report, Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents are easy to obtain, making the country a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. In mid-May 2006, the Department of State, pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, prohibited the sale or license of defense article and services to Venezuela because of its lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts. Other countries on the Section 40A list include Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, not to be confused with the “state sponsors of terrorism” list under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. (For further information, see CRS Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.)

In late May, Chavez declared war on the media within Venezuela. As a follow up, Venezuela is making headlines this week with reports out of Russia that President Hugo Chavez is looking to buy submarines from Russia. This isn't actually new news, it is just details of old news, this time in English. Back in January Mer et Marine ran a story that a Venezuelan admiral was looking to buy 9 SSKs. As the story went, they originally approached DCN regarding the Scorpene, but France wasn't interested. Venezuela then went looking for other options, including the Russian Amur and German U212, but also found Mer et Marine was interested and would sell Venezuela the S-80. Since the S-80 has US equipment in it, the Scorpene is a more likely sell (they are co-owner of the Scorpene project with DCN).

The story faded and there wasn't much news about Venezuelan submarines until now. There are some details that Mer et Marine released back in January regarding the Venezuela purchase, among them 50 days autonomy and an AIP requirement. From the details released in the Russian media, it would appear the Russians would sell Venezuela 5 Kilo class and 4 Amus class. It will be interesting to see what happens, not only to see if the Germans get involved in the competition (unlikely) but if Venezuela actually follows through.

Submarines isn't the only naval equipment Venezuela is buying though, they are in the market for small boats too.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez authorized the Navy Commander Vice-admiral Benigno Remigio Calvo to enter into a USD 261 million "trade agreement" with Spanish firm Rodman Polyships for joint construction of 66 boats and purchase of construction material for other 40 units to be manufactured in Venezuela.

It would appear Iranian Maritime Strategy has made its way to Venezuela. The story of the buy from Rodman Polyships SAU isn't specific regarding the type or weapons, however Rodman offers types in sizes from 10m to 44m with speeds from 30 to 50 knots.

Whenever any country puts 9 new SSKs in your backyard, the 2nd Fleet should be concerned. A 2007 Comparative Atlas of Defense and Security in Latin America, prepared by the Network of Security and Defense of Latin America (Resdal), sums up the growing Venezuala military.

The Venezuelan Armed Force comprises 92,350 officers, excluding the National Guard -which is described in the study as an "administrative police corps"- and the complementary "bodies" such as the Military Reserve and the
Territorial Guard.

Including the four branches of the Armed Force (Army, Aviation, Navy and National Guard) the number raises to 129,150 people. Almost half of them (49 percent) are in the Army (63,350 officers); 28.5 percent in the National Guard (36,800 people); 13.6 percent in the Navy (17,500 officers) and 8.9 percent in the Aviation (11,500 people), said Rocío San Miguel, one of the Venezuelan representatives to the network founded in 2001.

The "National Guard" and "Administrative Police Corps" are not what the names imply. These are political military organizations, not law enforcement, that are more akin to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard than the Alabama National Guard. Last December the Federation of American Scientists blog weighed in on the concern of an arms build up in South America, and the problems with Venezuela's current policy. The money quote:

While Chavez’s colorful insults steal the headlines, the issue of greatest importance—the influx of thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition into a region rife with black market arms trafficking—has received scant meaningful attention.

What does the arms buildup mean? A Second Falklands? Probably not, but a review of ASW capabilities in the Caribbean followed by a number of high profile exercises wouldn't be a bad response.

(Bottom Picture Caption) An army sniper takes part in a military exercise in La Guaira, about 30 km (20 miles) outside Caracas June 6, 2006. The exercise for unconventional warfare and resistance is meant to repel a foreign invasion and defend Venezuela's territory and sovereignty, officials said. (VENEZUELA) 06 Jun 2024 REUTERS/Jorge Silva

German Naval Maneuvers

The German Navy currently has 3 ships patrolling off the coast of Lebanon, the FSG Schleswig-Holstein (F216), FGS Dachs (P6127), and the FGS Hyäne (P6130). The Germans have been busy this week in the region, donating a pair of gunboats to the Lebanese Navy, and uhm... this.

The 313-Ship Plan: Iceberg Ahead!

Back in 2003, Congress became frustrated as the Navy constantly changed the rational behind the Navy's fleet operational requirements. At the time, inflation in shipbuilding was becoming a noticeable problem to Congress, so they instructed the Secretary of Defense to submit two "Naval Fleet Platform Architectural Studies" by January 2005.

The Law directed that one of the studies be conducted by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT), Office of the Secretary Of Defense (OSD), and the other by an independent Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), which was conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA).

At the time, Robert (Bob) Work of the independent Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies (CSBA) also conducted his own study. The CNA study has never been released publicly (that I know of), but the OFT report and CSBA report are available online. In April, Ronald O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Office released a final summery that compares all 3 reports.

Personally, I find both the OFT report and the CSBA reports a good read, well worth the time for those looking to understand 'some' of the alternatives to the current USN 313-Ship plan. I will warn traditionalists though, the OFT report is an exercise in theory based on some of the Cebrowski models of the late 90s.

With these reports in hand, and the Defense Science Board's recent report on Sea Basing, Congress should have been ready to take on the Navy when the 313-ship plan was produced. The Bush Administration had spent 5 years producing a shipbuilding plan that indicated what ships would be built the following year, only to change the plan again the next year. FY07 was supposed to be the first year this pattern didn't happen, until Congress decided this year to cancel the 2 FY07 LCS ships and fold that money into the first 3 LCS for cost reasons. That makes the upcoming FY08 budget the first year this may happen, but again because of LCS costs, that may not happen. This volatility in shipbuilding is compounding the inflation problems, and that lack of consistent planning and proper budgeting ships from the Navy leaves many with no confidence for the future for good reason.

The Congressional Budget Office (report), as well as other independent researchers like Eric J Labs, have drawn several conclusions from the 313-ship fleet. Bottom line, itis not affordable.

Graph by Bob Work in his Congressional Testimony says it all.

Assuming no inflation:

The Navy expects Sea Basing to cost $14.5 Billion for a single MPF(F) squadron. The Navy expects the LCS to cost around $18 Billion for 54 LCS and 108 modules. The costs of both have already risen considerably. The Navy expects the DD(X) to cost $20 billion for 7 ships. That is $52.5 billion.

The CBO estimates for all 3 programs are considerably higher, and if you add up their estimates the number is closer to $70 billion. The cancellation of LCS-3 in the first full fiscal year of the 313-Ship plan is an early sign of big problems ahead. While we can't call it the 312-Ship plan until after the FY08 defense budget is finalized, hopefully Congress is paying attention.

We'll see, rumors of more submarines and a 10th LPD means Democrats may be doing their own thing with the Navy, but it is still too early to tell. With Democrats and defense issues, the reason they have earned their reputation for being weak is because on National Security issues, they are too obviously trying to please their base for political points as opposed to publicly addressing a national security issue with wisdom. That type of governance doesn't inspire professionals.

iceberg, dead ahead.

Global Fleet Stations: Gulf of Guinea

The US Navy has announced the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) will represent the 2nd phase of the Global Fleet Stations pilot. While the pilot with the HSV Swift represents a coast guard training deployment with other civil and humanitarian efforts, this Global Fleet Station deployment has an opportunity to truly address Maritime Security issues surrounding the Gulf of Guinea.

The Fort McHenry, homeported in Little Creek, Va., is expected to sail the Gulf of Guinea, working with representatives of participating African nations from Ghana south to Angola. It will also work with representatives of Senegal and Cape Verde.

“Part of the beauty of the Global Fleet Station is that it can be tailored to respond to the needs of the region,” Greene said. “Based on our interaction with the emerging partners and friends, it can be responsive to those [individual nation] desires, in terms of knowledge skills and abilities that they request.”

Back in 2005 the Gulf of Guinea became a focus again for the United States, when apparently someone realized Nigeria imports almost as much oil to the US than Saudi Arabia does. That year the USNS Emory S Land (AS 39) made a 2 month deployment , followed up with another deployment from the USNS Emory S Land (AS 39) in 2006. After the second deployment, there were several professional papers written about the contribution a ship like a sub tender was able to make in the region, ranging from its repair facilities to offshore logistics. One item cited in virtually all the professional papers on why the submarine tender was more successful than other US Naval vessels in maritime training was because the USNS Emory S. Land (AS 39) had 6 small boats. In the end the small boat sailors in foreign Navies related better to small boat sailors of the US Navy, imagine that.

In many ways, the Global Fleet Station in both its pilot and 2nd phase reflects the lessons learned from those two sub tender deployments. With the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), the Global Fleet Station deployment to the Gulf of Guinea will probably look much different than the one currently conducted by the HSV Swift. If it is anything like the last time a LSD deployed to the region, specifically the 2005 West African training cruise, the GFS will probably be more detailed towards security.

In 2005 the USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44) and the HSV Swift deployed Marines on a six-week deployment to Ghana, Senegal, and Guinea on board USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44) and the high speed vessel Swift (HSV-2). The Marines trained their African counterparts on riverine operations, ambush, counter-ambush, combat patrol, jungle-warfare tactics, and night-vision techniques. Additionally, Navy Seals and special-boat crews embarked on board Swift for riverine and boat handling training.

A background of current Maritime Security issues in the Gulf of Guinea can be found here. but in summery this quote sums up the maritime focus.

Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the centerpiece of the U.S. Navy’s strategy in the Gulf of Guinea. MDA is a broad term that refers to the situational awareness of anything in a nation’s waters or territorial or economic exclusion zone, and anything that could affect the nation’s security, safety, economics, or environment.

Last October, the US donated to Sao Tome and Principe an $18 million radar system to help them keep track of activity in their territorial waters and nearby ocean areas. The system, known as the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) is a relatively cheap way to track shipping. The Global Fleet Station intends to utilize this system to fight piracy in the Gulf of Guinea during the deployment. It is noteworthy that in comparison to economically ravaged Somalia, the US Navy is taking a proactive role in fighting maritime crime in the economically critical Gulf of Guinea region.

A Whidbey Island Class Dock Landing Ship is essentially a mothership, except normally all that well deck space is required to carry ship-to-shore connectors for Marines. In this deployment however, the Marine requirement for ship-to-shore connectors is minimal, meaning the well deck can be loaded with Naval equipment instead of amphibious gear.

The Navy has a real opportunity in the upcoming Global Fleet Station to simultaneously deploy Marines for extended, detailed training beyond what was offered in the 2005 West African Training Cruise, but additionally deploy a large number of smaller navy vessels for maritime training and security.

Global Fleet Stations: Guatemala Ends, Belize Begins

The US Navy Global Fleet Station Pilot mission has arrived in Belize. Navy NewsStand recently posted a few pictures of the GFS training mission with Guatemalan sailors. To be honest I have had high hopes for the Global Fleet Station concept, but the news report from within Belize leaves me with several questions. HSV Swift represents the pilot mission, and while the core activity in Belize appears to be coast guard training, the news reports give the impression someone at the State Dept. was unable to come up with secondary missions prior to arrival.

Thomas Wise:Head of Public Affairs at the United States Embassy in Belmopan

“And as part of their mission here they are going to try look to do a community relations project where they come out and help a group from work.They already have money dedicated for it but they have a lot of bodies that say they are willing to pitch in and help with anybody who needs any help.So if anybody has any ideas feel free to contact us at the embassy if they need ten or twenty guys to come out and do something that would be charitable.”

Someone at the State Dept. dropped the ball here. Off the top of my head, there are any number of projects that come to mind that should have been offered up front. Water contamination tops the list, but sewage projects, flood prevention, waste disposal, drug trade symposiums, and HIV awareness programs make my short list. The Global Fleet Station is supposed to be a service oriented mission, the Navy needs the diplomats to be organized and ready so the Navy can hit the beach running, otherwise lost time becomes lost opportunity.

Wise says the ship is located about a mile off the coast of Belize City and Belizeans can get a sneak peak out by the Radisson or from Old Belize on the Western Highway. Belize is stop number five for the vessel. Other stops include Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Panama. Wise says another vessel is scheduled to arrive in the country shortly. That vessel will be equipped with medical supplies and personnel.

“The other vessel will be coming here on the twentieth and they will be here for a week.That is called “The Comfort”.That is a large medical ship that is going to be conducting surgeries on the ship itself which is free to Belizeans.There are also going to be bringing doctors to Belmopan where they are going to work with the hospitals and they’ll be taking walk in patients there and they are also going to be doing a dental program in Orange Walk for free dental care.”

It is a good bet the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) is going to be busy upon arrival., assuming the State Dept. doesn't drop the ball there too. The USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) deploys for its mission on Friday.

5th Fleet Focus: 21st Century Pirate Coast

CDR Salamander has an interesting post up about "Letters of Marque" as a constitutional enabled mechanism the Congress could take to fight Piracy in the 21st Century, even suggesting the US outsource piracy to BlackWater.

I think there is an interesting intellectual discussion in the idea, but at the end of the day, I think Eagle1 has the right idea, the combination of a Convoy system, small fast boats, and a rapid response force of Helicopters makes more sense.

I would add to Eagle1's comments that there is both a historical and contemporary model on how to approach this problem. If the US Navy is going to get serious about the piracy problems, I think is time to setup Mobile Offshore Bases off Somalia. With Sea Basing on the horizon, 18 billion in spending in the pipeline on the powerpoint concepts, maybe the Navy should explore Sea Base solutions to a true Maritime problem like piracy.

The roots of the Mobile Offshore Base concept go back to Vietnam, where the Navy set up bases both offshore and on rivers to support Navy swift boat operations in the Vietnam War theater. The idea was revived during the Tanker Wars in 1987-1988, when the US Navy deployed the Wimbrown VII and the Hercules in Operation Prime Chance to areas around Farsi Island to deal with Iranian small boat activity and monitor the seas for minelaying operations. In both cases the Sea Bases were very effective, because presence cannot be replaced by 'revolutionary' ideas like unmanned reconnaissance.


That tradition continues today with the Command and Control barge Ocean 6 that guards the Iraqi Oil Terminals ABOT and KAAOT. While Bechtal has some ideas on how large Sea Based platforms can be reliably achieved in the future, to stop piracy now requires easy to impliment ideas on the cheap, or as CDR Salamander calls it, "out of the box" thinking.

Somalia has 3700 kilometres (2300 miles) of unpatrolled coastline. Given that in the past, offshore mobile platform bases (barges) have operated no more than 50 miles apart to cover area, it would seem the barge idea wouldn't work. However, if you look at piracy maps on the ICC website, attacks off Somalia over the last 3 years are concentrated.

3 Barges separated by about 55nms could cover the area from Kismaayo and Mogadishu, while a 4th, larger barge could serve as a CIC platform (similar to Ocean 6) in the Bari region where US military activity in Somalia has been concentrated lately. These Mobile Offshore Sea Bases provide the solution to the small FAC flotilla logistical problem, and additionally put static presence in an area currently hot with both military operations and criminal activity.

The 3 barges in the south, each manned by a Marine Platoon, SEAL Team, and supported by small Navy boats and USMC Hueys/Navy Seahawks provide excellent platforms for Maritime Domain Awareness, and can be both defended and supported against virtually all known regional threats. The catch is that each barge would meed am excellent radar able to support SeaRAM defense, otherwise it provides opportunity to relive an INS Hanit incident.

The Bali region Barge on the other hand would set up an excellent waypoint for convoys moving around the Horn of Africa, while also offering coalition forces a naval logistical base on the opposite side of the Horn from Djibouti.

While certainly not an ideal solution, and while it is also a manpower intensive operation that consumes at least 1 company of Marines and several hundred sailors for MSO operations on small boats, nevermind the logistical trail, it is an alternative to paying "consultants" like Blackwater to do the job the US Navy has traditionally handled effectively in the past.

Talking Hospital Ships

A couple of items popped up on the web today regarding the US Navy Hospital Ships; USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20).

The first is an article from strategypage that cites statistics on the aftermath of last years South Pacific deployment of the USNS Comfort (T-AH 19).

It was in 2006, after one of those ships spent six months in Indonesia, treating 61,000 patients, that many noted what a powerful effect that had on attitudes towards the United States. Most of the Indonesians received some medicine, or some dental work. Only about two percent involved some surgery. As a result of all this, favorable attitudes towards the U.S. by Indonesians doubled (to 30 percent, so more work is needed.) The Indonesians were getting American quality medicine, which explains the average cost for treating each patient; $280

The article states that an anonymous Admiral suggested giving the ships to the State Dept. The merits of the anonymous Admirals arguments reflected a shortage of funding and the light casualties in the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While I would agree there is certainly a place for the State Dept. on a Navy hospital ship, the Navy role is clear. I'm not sure the Admiral was being serious.

In the hospital ship deployments, including the South Pacific clearly show the Navy is the institution to make these initiatives. In these humanitarian deployments, the Navy is the vehicle while the State Dept. role is that of passenger. We learned in both the South Pacific Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina that the capabilities are best left to the Navy, because while the State Dept. could do the job, the Navy is who has the right tools to get it done right. More importantly though, The US Navy is better suited to respond to a nuclear disaster, not the State Dept., and the United States cannot count on all future wars having small casualties.

As an observer, it appears to me the US Navy understands this, as it is now sending the USS Peleliu (LHA 5) on a similar mission to last years USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) South Pacific deployment.

Speaking of deployments, the Embassy in Guatemala has announced the the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) will be in Puerto Barrios and will remain in Guatemalan waters for one week, starting June 26 through July 1, 2007. (link in Spanish)

Between the Partnership of the Americas 2007 deployment, the Global Fleet Station deployment, and the upcoming deployment of the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) it would appear South America is finally getting the attention the US needs to give it.

LCS Mission Module Production to Slow

Mission Modules will be delayed? Who would have thought? Pretty much everyone last I checked. This will no doubt raise costs on the modules (thus the cost of the whole LCS project), which is sad since costs on the modules is about the only thing the LCS had going for it until now.

Capt. John Sorce, the Navy’s deputy director for surface ships in the chief of naval operations’ office, said May 31 that Navy officials are in the process of redesigning the module program because of delays with the initial LCS ships.

Sorce did not detail what changes would be made because decisions are yet to be approved. Nonetheless, he said the changes would be released in service’s outyear budget plan known as “program review 2009.”

Lt. Cmdr. John Schofield, a spokesman for Navy acquisition chief Delores Etter, said the service continues to evaluate mission package procurement, but was unable to give specific numbers.

Landon Hutchens, a Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman, said the program office has “a plan that is interdependent with other mission system program offices to field ever increasing capability until each of the three mission packages reach a full operational capability” in 2012.

In 2001, the LCS was proposed as a hull and 2 mission modules for $440 million. I'll be impressed if the hull without any modules costs less than $440 million per now.

Build the 10th LPD-17

The House and Senate will be meeting over the next few weeks to hash out the details of the National Defense Authorization Bill for FY 2008. Among the changes that will directly effect the previously proposed Navy 313-ship plan, fewer LCS will be built due to cost overruns with General Dynamics, and apparently the Navy will build 2 Virginia class submarines in FY 2009.

What has caught my eye however is the addition of 1.7 billion for an additional (10th) LPD-17. I suggest build it.

The 313-ship plan for amphibious ships changes the force structure of ESGs (formally ARGs) from 12 to 9, and gives a total of 31 ships. Both the ship number and the loss of 3 full ESGs confused many when it was announced, but it reflected the emphasis on the MPF(F) which is supposed to put Marines on civilian ships for forcible entry operations. uh, ya right, we will see.

The 9 ESG, 31 Amphibious Ship breakdown works like this:


1 LHD, 2 LPD-17, 1 LSD-49 - Forward deployed

1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD-41
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD-41
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD-41
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD-41
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD-41
1 LHD, 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD-41
1 LHA(R), 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD-41
1 LHA(R), 1 LPD-17, 1 LSD-41

If you add that up, it comes in at 10 LPD-17s and a total of 28 Amphibious ships. The Navy intends to use the remaining 3 LSD-49s for Global War on Terror operations, presumably similar to the MSO operations currently being conducted by the USS Carter Hall.

While the merits (or lack) of the MPF(F) is a topic for another time, without the 10th LPD-17 this reduced 9 ESG force won't exist. The 313-ship plan which included a shipbuilding guideline did not account for the 10th LPD-17, even though the Navy lists it as a top 5 unfunded priority in each of the last 3 years.

I encourage the House and the Senate to build the 10th LPD-17. It is smarter to build it this fiscal year than at some later date when the program is shut down and the Navy is in need of surface combatants when the LCS doesn't work out.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group

USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)
USS Antietam (CG-54)
USS O'Kane (DDG-77)
USS Preble (DDG-88)

Nimitz Carrier Strike Group

USS Nimitz (CVN 68)
USS Princeton (CG 59)
USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53)
USS Higgins (DDG 76)
USS Chafee (DDG 90)
USS Pinckney (DDG 91)

Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Denver (LPD 9)
USS Rushmore (LSD 47)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93)
USS Chosin (CG 65)

Task Force 150

HMS Richmond (F 239)
FGS Köln (F211)
FS Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet (F794)
USS Carter Hill (LSD 50)
RFA Fort Austin (A386)

In Theater

Ocean 6
HMS Cornwall (F 99)
HMAS Toowoomba (F 156)
USS Hawes (FFG 53)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

5th Fleet Focus: Persian Gulf Presence

What do these 3 stories remind you of?

BHRESG Completes Presence Ops

U.S. Navy Ships Conduct FAC/FIAC Exercises

Exercise Nautical Union Concludes in the Persian Gulf


Hovercrafts, mine warfare, Persian Gulf, and a presence operation with the locals... reminds me of 1987, Operation Earnest Will, thus the pic of the MK IIIs from that operation.

Specifically for some reason I thought about the Iran Ajar incident, the Iranian minelayer captured while laying mines during Operation Earnest Will and Operation Prime Chance, which ended with a standoff between the US Navy and an Iranian Hovercraft. Makes me wonder if the warfighter wizards used that incident as a model for the FAC/FIAC exercises, or is it just a coincidence?

A book out last year called The Night Stalkers by Michael J. Durant (Author), Steven Hartov (Author) has a couple really good stories in it about Army aviation operations from Operation Prime Chance, including the Iran Ajar incident but also the story behind this story regarding the Hercules.