The Littoral Combat Ship: History and Future Outline Two Different Visions

In reviewing the recent history of the Littoral Combat Ship, including reading how it is often referred to as a platform intended to fill gaps in the current fleet, I continue to be amazed at how the LCS concept is explained, particularly in comparison to what the LCS actually is.

For example, this months Proceedings edition is the submarine edition, one of my annual favorites. It highlights various submarine activities throughout its pages, including a decent articles on SSK vs Nuke and one particularly interesting read on the SSGN. At the end of the day though, I am left empty thinking about the US Navy's own ASW capabilities. Even while reading the submariners discuss submarines, it feels as if they are resigned to the reality that when it comes to ASW for the US Navy, they are just about the only show in town.

I think there is some truth to that.

Over the last several months, the LCS has had its fair share of problems, from delays to cost overruns, and in many circles the LCS continues to be seen as a platform looking for a mission. I think the mission has become clear, the LCS is a small boat killer.

As I pointed out on Sunday night, the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) (FY2008-FY2013) lays out the LCS program like this:

32 LCS hills
16 SUW modules
11 MIW modules
6 ASW modules

In other words, small boat warfare is the focus of the LCS program. The ASW module purchase for the first 32 LCS ships is only 6 modules, less than 20% of the total number of modules purchased.

The problem is, that doesn't follow the logic behind the LCS concept in the first place. Duncan Long and Stuart Johnson recently reviewed the program history of the Littoral Combat Ship:

The LCS program quickly gathered steam. Analysis from the Office of Secretary Defense, a task force at the Naval War College, and the LCS Program Office (established in February 2002) contributed to developing the ship’s basic attributes. Key points of debate included whether the ship should embark a helicopter, whether it needed to reach speeds of 50 knots, and whether it needed to be capable of self-deploying across the Pacific. A ship that had no helicopter and had no need of self-deploying could be quite small and reach speeds of over 50 knots. This description most closely matches early Streetfighter designs, although some Streetfighter-type proposals had included a helicopter and left questions of endurance to future designers. A self-deploying, helicopter-carrying ship would have to be larger and slower.

Analysis in N-81 and in OSD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E;) strongly supported a self-deploying ship that, primarily for ASW and MIW purposes, embarked a helicopter. This was later echoed by a study team at the Naval War College. The Navy’s Surface Warfare (Requirements) Directorate (N76) tasked the Navy War College to study what the LCS should be able to do and what technologies it should incorporate. A LCS Task Force used a series of workshops to analyze these questions. The Task Force identified three primary missions and three secondary missions for LCS.

The primary missions matched the capability gaps identified by earlier Navy analysis:

1. Anti-submarine warfare
2. Mine warfare
3. Surface warfare (SUW) against small boats

The secondary missions were:
1. Maritime interdiction
2. Special operations forces (SOF) insertion and support
3. Tasks related to command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)

This Analysis of Multiple Concepts was done in place of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) typically required of weapons procurement programs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense determined that the analysis done for the LCS was adequate, the program was faulted for not rigorously considering non-ship alternatives to the LCS missions and for completing the Analysis of Multiple Concepts well after the Navy released the initial request for proposals to industry. This approach created the sense that LCS analysis (or at least the formal Analysis of Multiple Concepts) was being done after the answer had been determined.

In other words, as far back as 2002 the Navy identified ASW as the first primary reason for a new small surface combatant, and MIW as the second primary reason, and small boats the 3rd reason. Why then did the Navy program 16 ASuW modules first, and 17 combined ASW and MIW modules in the first 5 years if ASW and MIW were the priorities? The priorities somehow went from 1)ASW 2)MIW 3)ASuW to 1)ASuW 2)MIW 3)ASW

I though the LCS was supposed to fill the capability gap in ASW. At this rate the US Navy is going to be able to field a total of 6 additional ASW surface assets while retiring somewhere between 20 and 30 current FFGs currently able to conduct that role over the next decade. Why is that important? Because over the same time period...

Navies in the Asia-Pacific are expected to spend 108 billion US dollars to boost submarine and other maritime defences over the next 10 years

Regional countries are expected to acquire a total of 841 vessels by 2016, they said.

Of these, 83 will be submarines, with the most orders coming from emerging Asian power China. This would include five nuclear-powered missile submarines and 30 attack submarines to add to its current fleet, figures released by the organisers showed.

That doesn't even include the recent announcements by Venezuela, which btw, wouldn't be littoral ASW anyway considering the water off Venezuela is fairly deep. The Navy is facing small boat threats today without the LCS, is the threat of these small boats so disruptive they drive the first 5+ years of the LCS program?

The report by Duncan Long and Stuart Johnson does a good job of following the history of the LCS from Concept to Program, but for me they didn't make enough of a case for what I see as the real long term solution (but at least they mention it):

Mothership. One innovative idea for a new class of small ships was to make use of a mothership, from which small combatants would sortie, just as aircraft sortie from aircraft carriers. By adopting such a concept, which was proposed by Hughes and others, the Navy would have been able to build smaller, individually less expensive ships for use in the littoral. Because these ships did not have to self-deploy or sustain themselves for long periods, naval architects could have designed increased speed and payload fraction in place of the endurance needed for transoceanic deployment but not needed for tactical mission execution. Their low cost, low manning, and higher numbers would have made such combatants less costly to lose in combat.

I believe that when it is all said and done, various types of motherships will change Naval warfare in the 21st century similar to how Aircraft Carriers changed Naval warfare in the 20th century. What amazes me is that anyone who is involved in simulation already knows the unique capability motherships add to virtually any scenario, but in fact, nobody bases more decisions on simulation than the Navy does... which makes the LCS push even more puzzling to me. In this months issue of Proceedings, the case is made that SOCOM could use the Sea Fighter (FSF 1) today as a mothership for SOF. It is an interesting idea, one more in many that the Navy ignores while it pushes through the "medium" frigate sized LCS as its "small" combatant.