The Ever Expensive Expeditionary Fleet

The USS San Antonio has become the poster child for raising costs in the US Navy, at least until the LCS hits the seas. On June 22nd Navy Secretary Donald Winter sent a letter to Northrop Grumman that reportedly is littered with frustrating comments regarding the quality, or lack thereof, of the USS San Antonio. Among the comments as reported by Bloomberg:

Northrop Grumman Corp., the nation's biggest warship builder, has mismanaged construction of the first in a class of new Navy amphibious warships, delivering a vessel with ``serious quality problems,'' according to Navy Secretary Donald Winter.

Northrop Grumman Corp., the nation's biggest warship builder, has mismanaged construction of the first in a class of new Navy amphibious warships, delivering a vessel with ``serious quality problems,'' according to Navy Secretary Donald Winter.

The USS San Antonio was commissioned into the fleet during a January 2006, 21-gun salute ceremony at Ingleside, Texas. Yet the Navy says it has suffered from problems ranging from faulty steering and leaks to delays, incomplete work and cost increases.

Because of ``inefficiency and mismanagement'' the Navy ``still does not have a mission-capable ship,'' Winter wrote June 22 to Northrop Grumman Chief Executive Officer Ronald Sugar in a letter obtained from the Pentagon by Bloomberg News.

The ``persistent shortcomings'' of the nine-vessel $13.5 billion LPD-17 program ``are troubling'' and also raise ``grave concern'' about the company's capability to manage the Navy's new $36 billion DDG 1000 destroyer program, Winter wrote.

...

The Navy says it may pay $36 million of its own money to fix these problems because the vessel is no longer under warranty to Northrop Grumman, the Sea Systems Command said.

``By taking delivery of incomplete ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered unacceptable delays,'' Winter wrote. ``These delays create further problems as work must be completed or redone by other shipyards that are not as familiar with the ship's design,'' he wrote.

``It is imperative that Northrop Grumman deliver ships devoid of significant quality problems and that it meet its costs and schedule obligations,'' Winter wrote.

A few points here. First, Secretary Winter was the lead executive for Northrop Grumman Corporation's Missile Defense Program, so he should be more than familiar with the problems there. I think he should be commended for taking a tougher stance, because the lack of a tough stance on shipbuilding problems throughout the current administration by Gordon England was a large contributor to US Navy shipbuilding cost increases.

While many may disagree, there are some serious problems right now in the way the Navy is handling, or mishandling the USMC, which unlike the Navy, is not only currently heavily engaged in the GWOT, but is the tip of the spear for future GWOT type scenario's as well as traditional military roles like that of North Korea. For example.

Lets assume for a minute the LPD-17 cost caps at 1.8 billion as recently reported following the latest round of cost overruns. Lets also assume LPD-18 cost overruns only go to 350 million (which admittedly may be a bit higher than currently expected) for a total of 1.11 billion, and the rest of the class which is reported in better shape rounds out at a cost of 1.2 billion average. In the end, the Navy is getting 9 LPD-17s for the expected 12 billion. While it is certainly a possibility the Navy will get a 10th LPD-17 class in FY08, nothing is certain yet.

But based on those figures alone, if you add in the costs of the MV-22 and EFV, the two specific vehicles the LPD-17 was specifically designed to carry, the Marine Corp appears on a self destructive coarse hand in hand with the Navy on reducing its capability. While it has been reported the MV-22 will be deployed to Iraq in September, I won't be holding my breathe. There is also plenty of reason to be skeptical about the EFV, which just had its entire program reworked. Aviation Weekly reports:

The program now will seek only 573 EFVs, almost halved from 1,013 units previously, and officials have built in a delay of four to five years in the schedule.

Milestone C approval is slated for mid-2011, instead of last January, and full operational capability will not occur until 2025 compared with the last plan targeting 2020.

The estimate for the total program acquisition cost in future dollars of the

restructured EFV program is $15.9 billion, officialss said. That compares with estimates of about $8.7 billion earlier in the 11-year-old effort, according to a Government Accountability Office report in May 2006 (DAILY, March 21).

The average procurement unit cost now is $21.6 million, up $4.2 million from the last Selected Acquisition Report and far more than an early $8.5 million price tag.

The article goes on to point out some reliability issues:

Under the restructured program, the Marines have sliced 750 pounds off the vehicle and leveraged another 1,000 pounds of "trade space" to meet reliability requirements, the cause of the EFV's troubles, Taylor said.

The changes also lower the sea state in which the EFV is designed to operate, from sea state three to two. Sea state refers to the amplitude and frequency of waves.

The problem here is they forgot the most important part of the EFV story.... it turns out the changes made to the EFV has made it extremely vulnerable to IEDs, something Congress isn't happy about. Expect this to get news coverage next time the EFV is discussed in committee. It may be one of the primary reasons the number of EFVs to be procured was cut in half. With only 573 EFVs now planned, the upcoming LCU(X) and LCAC(X) programs are going to become even more important, considering they will have by default become the primary future ship to shore sea based connectors.

What are the answers? Maybe it is time for the Navy to think about Norman Polmar's original advice, and start looking at what other nations are doing regarding Expeditionary warfare. While the capabilities aren't as sexy as those currently being demanded at any cost by the Navy and Marines, at least they are affordable and capable. The LPD-17 class is without question a giant step forward for Expeditionary warfare, but at what cost considering the MV-22 and EFV demands and cost increases?

The LPD-17 isn't a lost cause though, at least as a hull. There is a "plug" version of the LPD-17 that has been touted as a potential mothership, both increasing the well deck and the ships aviation facilities. For subscribers, you can also read InsidetheNavy.com on the new LPD-17 hull proposal for Command Ship variants, hospital ship variants, not to mention the recently proposed sea based BMD LPD-17 proposal.

At the end of the day, the LPD-17 and LPD-18 have been cost nightmares for the Navy and Marine Corp, particularly when accounting for their design for the increasingly expensive MV-22 and EFV. True the rest of the San Antonio class will likely be on budget, but with only 9 or 10, the Expeditionary Fleet will continue to shrink because both the Navy, the Marines, and the Industry cannot find ways to deliver improved Expeditionary capabilities at a reasonable cost.