Last week I asked the rhetorical question, is the LPD 17 program Drama or Comedy? Apparently the question wasn't as rhetorical as I thought, because this weekend we got the answer. The program is drama, and will play the lead character in the movie of the week. If you are an observer of the LPD 17 program, this post is long and detailed and designed for you.The drama started when SECNAV sent a letter to Northrup Grumman. The letter sent on June 22nd was posted in full over at the Military City blog. I have copied it here in full because I think the letter is important to propagate over the web.
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350-1000
June 22, 2024
Dr. Ronald Sugar
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Northrop Grumman Corporation
1840 Century Park East
Los Angeles, CA 90067-2199
Dear Dr. Sugar,
As you know, I am deeply concerned about Northrop Grumman Ship Systems' (NGSS) ability to recover in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, particularly in regard to construction of LPD 17 (San Antonio-) class vessels. I am equally concerned about NGSS' ability to construct and deliver ships that conform to the quality standards maintained by the Navy and that adhere to the cost and schedule commitments agreed upon at the outset by both NGSS and the Navy.
NGSS' performance even prior to Katrina was marginal, resulting in significant cost overruns that forced the Navy to take delivery of LPD 17 (USS San Antonio) with numerous outstanding deficiencies. NGSS' inefficiency and mismanagement of LPD 17 put the Navy in an untenable position. The Navy also took delivery of LPD 18 (USS New Orleans) in an incomplete fashion, albeit more complete than LPD 17.
By taking delivery of incomplete ships with serious quality problems, the fleet has suffered unacceptable delays in obtaining deployable assets. Twenty-three months after commissioning of LPD 17, the Navy still does not have a mission-capable LPD ship. These delays create further problems, as work must be completed or redone by other shipyards that are not as familiar with the ship's design and post-delivery funds are stretched beyond the original budget.
These persistent shortcomings are troubling, causing me not only grave concern about the LPD program, but also the LHA and DDG-1000 programs. For future ships in those programs, the Navy does not wish to find itself in the same situation it faces with LPD 17 & 18. It is imperative that NGSS deliver future ships devoid of significant quality problems and that it meet its cost and schedule obligations.
As LPD 19 (USS Mesa Verde) nears delivery, I want to stress the Navy's standard on all vessels prior to final acceptance: a ship on which all contractual (starred) items from ships' trials are completed and that meets all contractual requirements. While I know that a plan for LPD 19 is in place, I encourage continued, focused management attention to achieve this critical delivery, as well as the remainder of the LPD 17 class and the other ships under contract in the shipyard. It is imperative that NGSS meet its cost and schedule obligations, improve productivity and achieve significant reductions in production hours through learning and process improvements on each subsequent hull.
Dr. Delores Etter, assistant secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), is planning quarterly reviews of the shipyard and all of the ships under contract at NGSS. The Navy is committed to working with NGSS to rebaseline schedules to reflect more realistic delivery dates. Dr. Etter will be closely monitoring metrics with NGSS and the acquisition team as we move forward.
Sincerely,
Donald C. Winter
Running to the defense of his largest campaign contributor, Trent Lott wrote an editorial this weekend in the Mississippi Clarion-Ledger, squarely blaming the shipbuilding problems on the Navy. I am mixed over Trent Lott's editorial, I think Congress needs to engage the discussion, but Trent Lott is ignoring the obvious in his conclusions.
Now there's plenty of blame to go around, and certainly our shipbuilders always should strive to improve cost controls and construction techniques. But when you have ship programs like LPD - a contract the Navy awarded 11 years ago to the high bidder, a smaller yard not equipped to build that ship - it's no surprise that costs are climbing as the Navy now scurries to correct its early errors.
LPD is not the only program troubled by early errors in the design process. It's part of a pattern in which costs for ships are skyrocketing because the Navy is making thousands of excessive changes to original orders as they are executed.
In once instance - with the Littoral Combat Ship - the Navy requested that the vessel be built to commercial standards. Then, after construction had begun, someone at the Pentagon said, "Hey, this is a naval ship. Maybe we should build it to naval specifications." The shipbuilders then had to enact numerous changes to meet those more stringent, heavier naval specifications. And as everyone in business knows, changes cost time and money.
They sure do Mr. Lott, which is why that software glitch the industry made regarding the design of the LPD 17 has contributed to over 1.1 billion in changes to the LPD 17 and LPD 18 so far.
Sen. Mary Landrieu, another Senator high on the campaign contribution list of the Gulf Coast shipping companies, has also taken aim at the Navy over the shipbuilding problems.
Secretary Winter completely disregards the Navy's own responsibility, having repeatedly changed requirements midstream and demanding early delivery of LPD-17 and -18 before they were completed," she said. "Strong oversight is assuredly needed for all our federal contracting, but that oversight should apply equal scrutiny across the entire process -- looking at both contractors and federal agency customers alike."
In my opinion, she gets it right, sortof. Who has oversight over the Navy though? That answer Senators, is you. The shipbuilder doesn't take responsibility because the shipbuilder doesn't have to, why should they, they basically pay off Senators to defend them. If the LPD 17 was the only Northrup Grumman shipbuilding program with problems, the Navy would be to blame, but you can't blame the Navy for the Deepwater. Oh wait, Lott doesn't consider the shipbuilder the problem there either, he blames the Coast Guard.
BUT IT GETS BETTER!
Just when we think this is all there is, this gem pops up in the media on Saturday. It turns out, the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is finally ready to go. The skipper has been replaced, there is one more 4 million dollar yard period, and then (according to the article) its time to get ready for a 2008 deployment.
Additionally, the House Armed Services Seapower subcommittee will hold hearings on Tuesday about shipbuilding. This might be interesting, may not be. Congress needs to step to the plate, they have a role here that has been all but ignored for too many years to count.
So what to make of all of this? Who is to blame?
1) The shipbuilder is solely to blame for any loss of confidence in the LPD 17 class. When you make a 1 billion dollar design mistake that requires you to rebuild two ships, that is one the shipbuilder. When you turn over a ship in such awful shape it can't pass any tests for years after delivery, that is on the shipbuilder. The poor quality of the ship itself has led to the loss of confidence in the entire class, and for that, the shipbuilder bears the responsibility.
2) The Navy is to blame for the delay of the LPD 17 class and the rising cost of shipbuilding in general (including the inflation of the LPD 17 program), but isn't responsible for the 1.1 billion in cost overruns due to the design flaw mentioned above. The LPD 17 program has been a mix and match of capability for 13 years. The LPD 17 was originally an AEGIS ship, it originally had VLS cells, and the LPD 17 was specifically designed for 2 platforms that have had their own problems, specifically the EFV and MV-22. The LPD 17 class has a special 3rd vehicle deck specifically for holding and rapidly deploying an EFV company, but the final size of the EFV wasn't finalized until after the LPD 17 design was finalized, which was after the LPD 17 started construction.
3) Congress shares much of the blame. Whether Landrieu and Lott like it or not, they need to shut the hell up and look in the mirror before pointing fingers. There have been a number of rules and procedure changes the Navy and Congress have taken regarding shipbuilding over the last decade. Too often the Navy lets the industry design ships, when it should be the Navy doing that job. Congress needs to extend its oversight over the Navy to insure that ships being built are done so according to the needs of the Navy, not the needs of the shipbuilder. It is often suggested the acquisition process itself appears broken (I have personal experience with this, and I would agree it is completely broken in favor of the industry), and that is solely Congress's responsibility to address. Congress needs to recognize the strategic importance of multiple capable shipyards, and go out of its way to insure multiple shipyards exist and help the Navy incorporate innovative programs that promote competition in shipbuilding.
The LPD 17 program is only the first program of the 21st century fleet, the lessons learned cannot become lessons lost. The LCS, DDG-1000, CG(X), and Sea Base are coming. If the same mistakes are repeated, the US Navy will not be large enough to safeguards the national security interests of the United States, and that would be completely the fault of Congress for ignoring its important role of maintaining oversight of the US Navy.
Updated 1: Springboard has been all over this all weekend.
No comments:
Post a Comment