More Thoughts on the CGN(X)

Adding to my earlier comments on the proposed 25,000 ton CGN(X) that is due to be released in the upcoming Analysis of Alternatives, I think there is more going on here than meets the eye.

As Norman Polmar pointed out, the concept is being driven primarily from the Congressional request to evaluate Nuclear Power for surface ships. Congress, specifically in the House, has been hot on this topic lately. Ronald O’Rourke released a CRS report on nuclear power for surface vessels in April that takes a look at the cost of adding nuclear power to specific types of ships. From the report:

Section 130 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163of January 6, 2024), which called for such a study (see Appendix). The study reached a number of conclusions, including the following:

In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or
amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power
would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement
cost.

— For a small surface combatant, the procurement-cost
increase was about $600 million.

— For a medium-size combatant (defined as a ship with
a displacement between 21,000 metric tons and
26,000 metric tons), the increase was about $600
million to about $700 million.

— For an amphibious ship, the increase was about $800
million.

Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than
conventionally powered ships, they have lower operating and
support costs when fuel costs are taken into account.

A ship’s operational tempo and resulting level of energy use
significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The
higher the operational tempo and resulting level of energy use
assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break
even on a life-cycle cost basis, and the more competitive nuclear
power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost.

- The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even cost-ranges, which
supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look
analysis, are as follows:

— $210 per barrel to $670 per barrel for a small surface
combatant;

— $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel for a medium-size
surface combatant; and

— $210 per barrel to $290 per barrel for an amphibious
ship. In each case, the lower dollar figure is for a high
ship operating tempo, and the higher dollar figure is
for a low ship operating tempo.

Considering the various things happening behind the scenes inside the Navy, one can imagine floating this idea was going to happen eventually. The new Maritime Strategy soon to be released probably has something in it regarding the role of the Navy in the 21st century, and included in that role is going to be something about Ballistic Missile Defense. There are also a considerable number of shipbuilding discussions taking place, ideas to help move the Navy forward and cut cost.

Seems to me that with the Navy resisting nuclear power requirements on the CG(X) program, this was a fairly logical idea to float publicly. Think about it, 25,000 tons can only mean one thing, the LPD 17 hull. Common hulls is a common theme in fixing the shipbuilding issues for future ships. It could be (I am speculating) the AoA comes out and explicitly states common hulls for the US will include the DDG-1000 / CG(X) stealth design, the LPD 17 hull for everything from hospital ships to command ships to amphibious warfare to nuclear powered ballistic missile defense cruisers, and the choosen LCS hull as both the LCS hull and the future DDG(X) replacement hull.

With the LPD 17 program unpopular, the size of the ship making the cost potentially prohibitive, and the BMD role that is still undecided for the US Navy, and the proposal to use the LCS hull as a DDG(X) replacement, this idea being floated sets up these suggestions in the AoA to be unpopular in its final release. Ultimately, that is probably the way the Navy wants it.