Sea Basing: Build the Logistics, Research the Assault

“We are developing joint sea bases that will allow our forces to strike from floating platforms close to the action, instead of being dependent on land bases far from the fight.”

President George W. Bush
2005 USNA Commencement Address

Or so we are told. When I read Admiral Clark's Seapower 21 vision in October 2002, at the time I walked away feeling enlightened somehow. I had no ambiguity regarding the concept, it was simple, smart, and focused. Three guiding principals networked together to define where the Navy is going in the 21st century.

• Sea Strike—Projecting Precise and Persistent Offensive Power
• Sea Shield—Projecting Global Defensive Assurance
• Sea Basing—Projecting Joint Operational Independence

Sea Strike and Sea Shield basically extended existing missions in my mind, but Sea Basing sent my mind wondering the new possibilities. Since then the concept has been a work in progress, starting almost immediately in November of 2002 with a follow up in Proceedings, followed again with more Strategic Depth discussed in January 2003. I thought the Navy was really on to something, and the discussion continued with the Defense Science Board report in August 2003.

A sea base is not just a ship, not just prepositioned materiel, not just helicopter assault - it represents a complex capability. One must think of a sea base as a hybrid system of systems consisting of concepts of operations, ships, forces, offensive and defensive weapons, aircraft, communications and logistics, all of which involve careful planning, coordination and exercising to operate smoothly.”

Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing, Aug 2003

The recommendations (including examples) of the Defense Science Board Task Force MPF(F) kicked of a January 2004 Proceedings issue full of ideas (subscription required, or order the mag for additional offline content). Following the Turkey problem in OIF, the Sea Base concept had fully arrived, and it was time to explore "Joint" Sea Basing the implementation.

But sticker shock had forced the foot to the breaks. The US was now fighting two wars, the cost of both was distracting, and the momentum of the idea had been stalled by political reality. Between January 2004 and August 2005 there were a number of changes to the concept. Globalsecurity's development history of the MPF(F) says it all:

In the FY-05 budget process, appropriators significantly cut the MPF(F) program. The proposed FY-06 budget the Navy submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in August 2004 delayed construction of the lead MPF(F) vessel from FY-07 to FY-09, leaving only four such vessels in the long-term budget.

In May 2005 Secretary of the Navy Gordon England made a decision on the MPF(F) squadron configuration, of 14 ships. The squadron design, as well as the number of squadrons (anywhere up to three), was undetermined as of late 2005.

The FY 2005 budget provided for ships in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF). The NDSF budget includes funding for the development of mission variants for the FY 2007 MPF(Future) and the FY 2009 MPF(Aviation). Budget also includes MPF(F) C2 variant lead hull contruction costs incrementally funded beginning FY 2007. Follow-on hulls (qty 2) remain funded under NDSF BLI 011000.

Acceleration of the lead MPF(F) from Fiscal Year 2008 to Fiscal Year 2007 in the Fiscal Year 2005 budget reflects an emphasis on Seabasing capabilities. The Fiscal Years 2005-2009 plan procures three MPF (F) ships and advanced construction for an MPF(F) Aviation variant.

By early 2005 the two major US shipbuilders - General Dynamics (GD) and Northrop Grumman - proposed alternatives to options to the MPF(F). Rather than a new, single MPF-F ship, both shipbuilders proposed spreading the task among several vessels. This would take ships being built today at a known cost, rather than design new ones like the MPF-F at an unknown price. Using existing design and shipbuilding infrastructure could reduce the cost of the projects.

Thus, the MPF(F) was reduced from a 3 squadron replacement for existing MPF squadrons to a single MPF(F) squadron replacement for a single MPF squadron, plus an entire MEB on L-class ships. However, the requirements had also developed, and the buzzword "Joint" was attached.

Seabasing is the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the JOA. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.

Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), 2005

In the Seabasing JIC, the Joint Chiefs defined the capabilities of the MPF(F).

1. At-sea arrival and assembly of units
2. Direct support of the assault echelon of the Amphibious Task Force
3. Long-term, sea-based sustainment of the landing force
4. At-sea reconstitution and redeployment of the force

“Seabasing is what we saw - or what I describe as the city at sea - that we literally built in Indonesia to help those countries [after the 2004Tsunami]. There is no other institution in the world that could have done that. Seabasing is what we did for Katrina, seabasing was the hundreds of ships off the Turkish coast and all the around the northern Arabian Gulf prior to the commencement OEF.”

Adm Mike Mullen, CNO, 2005

It would appear everyone has weighed in, whether it is the Defense Sience Board, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies (CSBA), RAND, I already mentioned Proceedings (not since 2005 though, but Bob Timberg assured me articles are coming), and even the US Army.

The consensus: Sea Basing is not Joint. It isn't the forcible entry option recommended by the Defense Science Board, it isn't a replacement for existing forcible entry capabilities found in the amphibious fleet, and it doesn't even support the full ACE of the MEB. Under the current plan, the US Navy would have to donate at least 1 CVN to support the rest of the ACE in the MPF(F). In other words, use commercial ships for amphibious assault, convert amphibious ships into commercial ships to support some of the ACE, and take Navy aviation off CVNs to support the ACE CAS. How does this help enhance USMC capability from the sea?

“Today’s amphibious operations focus on assaults over the shore and into seaports, to establish footholds ashore permitting the build-up of sufficient combat power to conduct operations against inland objectives.”

In contrast, “operations from a future sea base focus on direct assault of inland objectives (with no operational pause) followed by moves to capture seaports or safe shore lodgments for heavier follow-on forces.”

As a result, the Task Force “…concentrates on the ship-to-objective maneuver role of the seabase, since it is the most transformational application. However, the seabase will support other concepts of operations, including amphibious, over-the-horizon assaults.”

Defense Science Task Force on Sea Basing, pp. 14-18

The GAO cost estimates (FY07) for the 3 logistical classes in the current MPF(F) squadron:

• Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ship (LMSR T-AKR) - 902 million
• Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) - 784 million
• Advanced Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ship (T-AKE) - 384 million

3 of each would be around 6.3 billion total. The cost would be further reduced if Marine births were not necessary on the MLP as currently planned. These 9 ships represent a truly innovative approach to maritime positioning, selective offloading, and sea based logistics. In my opinion the combinations of these three ships is the innovation and the success story of the MPF(F) concept as currently proposed. Why not build this capability, and take some time to research the assault element of Sea Basing more thoroughly before making a major investment?

According to the JIC, the major assumptions driving the Sea Base concept included reduced access from allies for FOBs and that anti-access environments will exist in the future. If that is true, then how does one go from less cooperative neighbors in more difficult access siutations to reducing overall forcible entry capability in terms of numbers of ships and troops. How does point A imply point B in that scenario?

Why would you then reduce the defensive capability for the largest, most vulnerable assets with men and equipment, and run with an industry driven assault concept that doesn't even meet the requirements of a full MEB without adding 2 existing MPF ships, 3 of the largest amphibious assault ships in the fleet, and borrowing CVN space to house Marine Aviation? If the densely packed existing MPF can operate from the new logistical design contained in the 9 new logistical ships, then why not accept the proposed Sea Based logistical capability and continue to research ways for future amphibious capabilities without reducing current amphibious capabilities?

“Planning for the sea base is still in its infancy. Coordination across the Services is just beginning, with discussions between the Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps, and in response to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives. As a consequence, the details have yet to emerge, especially with respect to joint operations and with respect to the availability and needed development of technology to perform the tasks that are envisioned for the sea base.”

Committee on Sea Basing, Naval Studies BoardNational Research Council of the National Academy of ScienceSea Basing: Ensuring Joint Access From the Sea, 2005

The plan as it exists today is not Joint, not even close. A common set of goals and requirements for Sea Basing does not exist in the agencies. There is no ship that addresses the capability to build a runway for the Air Force, nor is there a logistics model to support more than 2 brigades enough supply from the sea. What is the point of calling it Joint if it completely ignores the other services? This Sea Base idea is more in tune with the Coast Guard than it is with the Army or Air Force.

What is the rush to deploy the currently proposed MPF(F)? The GAO report asks an important question that still doesn't have an answer, who is responsible for the Sea Base design? Given recent Navy experience of shipbuilding projects with seemingly no oversight and management, no single person responsible, is running with an industry driven Sea Base really a smart way to go forward?

If the language stays in the current Senate Defense bill, the Navy will have to submit a report by November 2007 on the 10th LPD-17. While the LPD-17 has its fair share of problems, at least it doesn't appear that forcible entry operations are one of those problems. Why not continuing a build of 3 additional LPD-17s while keeping the 2 LHA(R)s and 1 LHD out of the Sea Base? At least that keeps twelve 3-ship ESGs with the forcible entry MEB level around 2.5, and greatly enhances capability when joined with the 9 new logistics ships. Keep the 2 old MPF ships intended for the Sea Base and the Navy still retains 3 prepositioned MEBs, one of which is enhanced.

Why not explore other options, like taking Marine Aviation back to sea in the form of the LPH? It worked the last time the US deployed a large mobile Sea Base in WWII, we called them escort carriers, but hey, same concept. What is wrong with a cheap platform designed for either 10 JSFs or 12 MV-22s, plus a few helicopters? Wouldn't need more than 20k tons for that, if that much, and could be built to commercial standards to save cost since the LHAs and LHDs are for amphibious assaults. Those LPHs would make excellent independent Aviation Sea Bases that could conduct any number of missions, from anti-piracy to MDA to being able to provide an aviation element for Global Fleet Station support or training.

The Taffy Groups in WWII had 6 CVEs each, today 6 LPHs with 10 JSFs each equals the strike component of the ACE for 2 MEBs. What about Army aviation platforms? Last time the US Navy deployed a Sea Base (not including Ocean 6) it was to support Army aviation, not Marines. The LPHs could join with LCS and become a larger, integrated Sea Based SOCOM solution. They already operate off MSC ships, so the commercial standard shouldn't raise any flags.

Either way, that is a more joint concept than what is currently proposed. It shouldn't be hard for the Navy to sell the 9 logistics ships already planned to Congress even without the full Sea Base concept. With all this political talk of impending Climate Change that is going to bring on natural disasters, name a single program better suited to address any unseen developments as a result of Climate Change than 9 MSC ships designed for selective offload for an incredible amount of supplies to virtually any location in the world. A $6.3 billion dollar investment on Joint Sea Based logistics makes a lot more sense than a $12+ billion program that fundamentally changes the capabilities empowering the USMC operating from the sea.

The logistics plan of the Sea Base is truly innovative, and scales to demand for virtually any scenario where an offshore logistical sea base would be needed. The Assault aspect of the current Sea Base design falls well short of innovative. It doesn't address joint deployment or joint assault, it doesn't address joint forcible entry, and to achieve its zenith in capability, it requires enormous sacrifices of resources that would be required in that situation for something else, meaning the highest achievement potential of 2 MEBs in 1 10 hour period of darkness is questionable at best because the other assets (like a spare CVNs) required to achieve that assault may not be available to support it.

Special thanks to Robert Works slides for some of the quotes.