5th Fleet Focus: Contingency Plans

If you follow my Friday Order of Battle posts, you'll notice I don't list submarines outside of US strike groups. For example, when HMS Cornwall (F99) completed its patrol, it looked like the Royal Navy scaled down its presence, but in fact the opposite is true. The Royal Navy replaced HMS Cornwall (F99) with HMS Talent (S92). In my book, a Trafalgar class submarine is a major upgrade over a Type 22 frigate.

In the spirit of increasing capabilities in the region, the Royal Navy has indicated they intend to increase their naval presence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.

Britain is planning to increase its naval presence in the Persian Gulf by next year, a top British naval commander in the area has revealed.

Deputy Combined Force Commander Royal Navy Commodore Keith Winstanley said Monday that Britain has a range of capabilities deployed at various times in the region ranging between submarines, frigates, and destroyers, and that it plans to increase its naval presence by 2008.

"We will be improving and uplifting that presence next year, so you can expect to see more mine counter-measure vessels in the [Persian] Gulf. We will also put some ships in the Indian Ocean to work with both the Indians and Pakistanis, so they are not all held in this area but they are able to come back to operate as part of the coalition should we require."

This appears to be one of several contingency plans in the works in the Middle East. The Wall Street Journal recently ran an interesting article that discusses some of the other long term plans taking place in the region. While the article is behind their firewall, it was syndicated here.

Now sheikdoms in the United Arab Emirates -- the third-biggest OPECOPEC oil producer -- are looking at projects that would keep oil and commerce flowing if the Strait is blocked. The U.A.E. won't say the projects are a direct response to Iran's threats -- but the plans would clearly help in the event of an emergency.

Many of the plans center on the U.A.E.'s sleepy eastern coast, which is on the open-ocean side of the Hormuz choke point. Abu Dhabi, the key oil producer among the U.A.E.'s seven semi-autonomous enclaves, is planning an oil pipeline to the eastern emirate of Fujayrah, where it can be carried to the sea without passing through the Strait. And a host of other development is being considered for Fujayrah, including a larger port and the world's biggest liquefied-natural-gas storage and trading hub.

In terms of volume, blocking the Strait of Hormuz "is probably the biggest single energy-security risk that exists in the world," says Lawrence Eagles, head of oil markets at the International Energy Agency, the Paris-based energy watchdog for the world's most industrialized nations. "There is a lot of discussion on these issues, and from an energy-security perspective, it would be very welcome to have any opportunity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz."

The devil is in the details. At last count 17 million barrels of crude oil moves through the Strait of Hormuz daily, while the pipeline would only move around 1.5 million barrels per day. Every drop counts, but it is hard to say that 9% recovery is a significant impact, or does it?

Saudi Arabia actually already has pipelines that can bypass the Gulf. Those pipelines can send crude across the country to the Red Sea at an increase over the current rate of 4 million barrels per day. Combined this would represent about 1/3 recovery in a strait blockage scenario, not good, but the difference is the world reserves supplying the loss of Gulf crude for 86 days, or around 114 days. In that regard, it makes a big difference, particularly considering it might take 30 - 45 days just to get heavy salvage ships organized and in position to remove debris from the straits, after a mine clearance operation which could last up to 30 days after hostilities cease. When evaluated in those terms, the extra window means the difference between world supply absorbing the shock, or not.

The implication is Iran, but I actually think the larger threat of a straits shutdown comes from Al Qaeda than Iran. The region has decided to prepare for all contingencies, and in late October the US Navy, Royal Navy, and French Navy intend to exercise with Bahrain and Kuwait near Bahrain. Iran doesn't appear to be very happy about it.

Iran's official news agency IRNA quoted an unnamed foreign ministry official as describing the military manoeuvres as dangerous and suspicious.

Reports say the US is to hold naval exercises at the end of October with Bahrain, Kuwait, France and Britain.

Reports say the US-led naval exercises based near Bahrain will practise intercepting and searching ships carrying weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

The French participation in the region is a good thing. For the most part, France stays in the Arabian Sea and is a constant (and welcome) presence, in fact one could say France has become the anchor of operations off the Horn of Africa. I'm not sure what to make of the Sarkozy speech yet, I haven't had a chance to read the original (Francois care to comment?), but if you pile on Germany's increased naval focus in the Eastern Med (UNIFIL) and around Africa, France's increased rhetoric in Middle Eastern affairs, including Iraq, and something resembling a regional cooperation between the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia emerging... It does appear (on the surface anyway) that not only are we seeing an emerging international cooperation regionally, we are seeing increased presence from the major European maritime powers. It will be interesting to see if any of this makes a difference in political progress regarding the PA situation. Probably not, but shared regional interest is something that can be built on.

Finally, a word on the President Ahmadinejad and President Bush comments. The comments come off as tit and tat, but I don't see them that way. Bush honestly believes that leaving Iraq is going to lead to a disaster in the Middle East. I think the potential is there, although I would debate that there is a difference between a reduction in troops and leaving completely, but I'll wait to see the Petraeus plan before advocating any advice of my own. Ahmadinejad on the other hand isn't talking to the US with his comments, his comments appear to be directed at Saudi Arabia.

I get the impression Iran believes the US is leaving, and when we do Iran believes there is going to be competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia to fill that vacuum. I'll quote my example:

"I can tell you there will be a power vacuum in the region. We are ready with other regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and the people of Iraq to fill this vacuum."

Taken in context with the rest of the speech, to me this looks like a clear threat to Saudi Arabia. There will no doubt be many Americans who think Ahmadinejad is talking to us, but I'm starting to think Iran is convinced we are on our way out, meaning they are already looking beyond us. I imagine most in Congress won't want to hear that, and will ignore the implications. Congress may ignore it, but the Saudi's won't, so it's a good bet they are developing a contingency plan, which could ultimately make what Bush said more meaningful.