6th Fleet Focus: 1000 Ship Navy, From Rhetoric to Response

Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE (SNMG 1) has deployed for its circumnavigation of Africa. Consisting of the Flagship USS Normandy (CG 60) the group also includes, HNLMS Evertsen (F805), HMCS Toronto (FFH 333), NRP Alvares Cabral (F331), HDMS Olfert Fischer (F355), and FGS Spessart (A1442). This is going to be an interesting deployment to watch, not only for its efforts later next month in Somalia, but also in its efforts over the coming weeks in the Gulf of Guinea.

This blog has covered the various US Navy activities in the Gulf of Guinea region, starting with the donation of the Automatic Identification System to Sao Tome and Principe ($18 million maritime radar system) to the SeaBee construction for the Sao Tome and Principe Coast Guard to the excellent work frigates like the USS Kaufman (FFG 59) and USS Doyle (FFG 39) as they prepare the way for the USS Fort McHenry Global Fleet Stations deployment.

Back on June 25th Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the current president of Liberia, wrote an OP-ED that ran on the popular allafrica.com news site titled Africa: Africom Can Help Governments Willing to Help Themselves. In the OP-ED, she makes the case for US engagement to Africa.

Since the announcement of the creation of Africom, a new unified American combatant command responsible for Africa, there has been much skepticism over its intent and what it will be able to achieve on the continent. Africom should be seen for what it is: recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relations.

The Africom charter specifies that the new command will focus on conflict prevention, rather than intervention. It will work with African states and regional organizations, such as the African Union and Ecowas, in coordination with other donor countries, to improve security capabilities and promote military professionalization and accountable governance.

In July the Congressional Research Office updated its report on "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa" where it outlines how the United States got to the point of creating AFRICOM. One of the most interesting aspects of AFRICOM most people are not aware of is where the political support comes from. As it turns out, the key politician that has been pushing for the creation of AFRICOM is Senator Russ Feingold. On January 10th, 2007 he used his time on the Senate Floor to outline his expectations for AFRICOM, which turns out, is very much in line with what the Global Fleet Station and the other deployments listed above are.

We have to be strategic and forward-thinking as we create this ne diverse and complex. We have a number of security-related concerns there, ranging from terrorist organizations and safe havens to large-scale corruption, regional conflicts, and the disruption of global energy markets. Continuing to establishing firm and productive military-to-military relations with a number of African nations is also critical.w organization, though. Because we are making such a profound change to our posture on the continent, we need to ensure that the new organization will contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government's overall strategy and objectives for the continent. We also need to make sure that the U.S. military's activities and involvement on the continent do not overshadow, skew, or otherwise hinder our Government's other key objectives.

It is clear that challenges in Africa are

But we have learned that the way to address the underlying causes of the security challenges throughout the continent is not generally through military power. In fact, the best way to address the full range of security-related concerns in Africa is to focus on the underlying conditions that plague governments and societies throughout the continent. Security threats and instability stem from corruption, absence of human rights, poverty, disease, lagging economies, and joblessness. Weak governments are incapable of addressing the dynamics that often contribute to lawlessness or violence, and are often left without any capacity to help defeat trans-national threats.

Bi-partisanship in Washington DC is mostly dead, but through a military effort in a mission other than war there is a chance for bipartisan support to AFRICOM if the DOD is successful early in its "missions other than war" focus. That won't be easy, piracy is an enormous problem in Africa, and local forces simply do not have the capabilities to deal with the problem. Engaging with local maritime forces will be a big part of improving the security situation.

It is still unclear if Nigeria will be exercising with SNMG1 as it approaches the Gulf of Guinea, but the Nigerian Navy deployed NNS Aradu (F89) and NNS Nwamba (???) for the time period SNMG 1 will be in the area. The Nigerian Navy deployment appears to include stops in Monrovia, Liberia and Dakar, Senegal before proceeding to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil for its bicentennial of Joaquin Marques Lisbon, the Marquis of Tamandaré on September 8th.

The NNS Aradu (F89) is a Meko 360 class warship that is returning to sea after a long absence. What does it say for the security of the Gulf of Guinea that the most powerful warship of all the regional nations is returning to sea for the first time in over 12 years? The NNS Nwamba on the other hand has been active since it was acquired. It is the former USCGC Firebush (WLB393), one of four coast guard cutters turned over to Nigeria in 2003 and commissioned into the Nigerian Navy in June of 2004. In 2005, the vessel proved it still has it, despite being 59 years old at the time when it traveled to the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar.

For those who are interested, the other three Cat class ships the US gave Nigeria are the NSS Ologbo, NSS Obula and NSS Kyama. If you have read this far, your probably wondering "why all the detail, what's your point? My point is this.

In 2005 the US Navy sent a single ship to the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar, the USS Saipan (LHA 2), a major diplomatic blunder in my opinion. Personally, I thought it nothing short of embarrassing. This type of blunder can't be made again, and an opportunity is approaching to insure this type of nonsense doesn't happen again. On the east coast of Africa, a natural regional partner in maritime security is emerging with India, and the US appears fully engaged.

The same is also true of the wast coast of Africa, where another natural regional maritime partner is emerging. Just like on the eest coast, the west coast partner is not an African nation, rather South American, and the US can ill afford not to be fully engaged with an emerging Brazil. As blogger Gallant of the Brazil Naval blog (English Link) points out, the SNMG 1 deployment to east Africa should be commonplace for the Brazilian Navy, but it isn't yet for a number of complicated reasons. That doesn't mean Brazil won't be engaged in the Gulf of Guinea region in the future, and the US needs to be ready when Brazil is ready by bringing Brazil into its 1000 Ship Navy model for the region sooner rather than later.

Pulling into Rio de Janeiro to celebrate Brazil's bicentennial in early September with a large Task Force would be a good place to start, hopefully the Bush administration isn't sleeping on South America and will realize such a deployment is anything but a bad investment for an east coast Strike Group at sea on training.