Evidence of the Devolution of Al Qaeda

It would be impossible for the US government to ever come out and say it, and it wouldn't be very popular for anyone in the media, or another government to point out the specifics, but there is a mounting amount of evidence that Al Qaeda is in devolution.

The most obvious place Al Qaeda is on the run is Iraq. As Michael Yon pointed out earlier this year, the evidence is everywhere that the Sunni tribes have rejected Al Qaeda, in some places in mass. While progress against Al Qaeda in Anbar, and to some degree Diyala, is a sign of Al Qaeda on the run in Iraq, Al Qaeda is a global operation and Iraq is only part of the Al Qaeda problem.

Africa also has an Al Qaeda problem, but the results there are mixed, and the trends are working against Al Qaeda. Morocco has been cracking down hard on Al Qaeda members, and Al Qaeda members have been more apt at blowing themselves up lately than their intended targets. Due to its high profile bombings, Al Qaeda has lost any actual support it may have had in Morocco. Without that base of support, operations have become difficult at best.

Al Qaeda is also losing the hearts and minds in Algeria. The latest news out of Algeria is just plain odd, organizations rarely announce they have had a complete breakdown in command, but that is what Al Qaeda did in Algeria. This could be a major government PSYOP, or it might be a sign of problems with the Al Qaeda leadership in Algeria, but either way the people are turning on Al Qaeda. Algerian media is anything but open, and it has been a hammer on Al Qaeda operations lately in Algeria. Without local support, again Al Qaeda is running for the hills in yet another African country.

Then I read this interesting post about Al Qaeda in Pakistan at Castle Argghhh! It is a personal testimony report on a wave of various operations taking place in Pakistan, and illustrates how the tribes have leverage over Al Qaeda, not the other way around as is often depicted in the media. I dismissed it until I read the same thing today in stratfor from the article Al Qaeda: The Split Between the Apex and the Franchises, posted August 23, 2024

in the bigger picture, AQCAM appears to be falling victim to a common problem confronting the al Qaeda network as a whole: how to maintain viable support networks within its countries of operations. One of the essentials of an effective terrorist organization is the ability to build and maintain a constituency that can provide support, either passive or active, to allow the organization to function without excessively obsessing over operational security concerns. Stratfor noted that the car bombing targeting former Islamist rebel leader Kertali would only exacerbate intra-Islamist tensions in Algeria, with more moderate Islamists building up a stronger incentive to sell out the jihadists in order to secure their own livelihood. If the jihadists have expanded their targeting selection to include their former Islamist comrades, they can very quickly see their safe havens dry up, similar to what the jihadists in Iraq's Anbar -- and to a lesser extent, Diyala -- province are experiencing since the Sunni tribal groups have turned against the jihadists. Local resistance against jihadists in Pakistan also has grown substantially since the Red Mosque episode, placing al Qaeda's apex leadership in an increasingly vulnerable position.

AQCAM = al Qaeda Organization for the Countries of the Arab Maghreb

All of this follows the insistence by Fatah Al-Islam (FAI) (the group that has been fighting Lebanon on the Syrian border) that they are not, emphatically not, associated with Al Qaeda. They don't want that association, because Al Qaeda is no longer vogue. Al Qaeda has a credibility problem, and is being discredited. For states this issue is solved by developing alliances, see the relationship of North Korea and Iran with China as a good example. Islamist resistance alliances may be the only option Al Qaeda has, which could lead them to form relationships with Hezbollah and other strong Islamist resistance groups to better situate the organization to fight Americans. As Egyption editorialist Dyab Abu Jahjah points out, such a tactic wouldn't be the first time "Al-Qaeda would serve American interests while believing it is fighting them."

Now if we can take on Eritrea and Somalia, maybe we can push Al Qaeda out of the Horn of Africa. Regardless, the US and allies are clearly winning the war, and right now looks like a bad time to reduce the pressure.