Sunday, September 30, 2024

SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) Listing, Returning to Port Sunday

There is some news coming from Neptune Warrior 07 regarding the Spanish frigate SPS Blas de Lezo (F103). Apparently the frigate ran aground off Scotland, and has been limping back to Spain, with a slight list and in rough seas at 6-8 knots. GoGibraltarsite has the latest news.

Following last weeks "Slight Grounding" of the SPS Blas de Lezo (F103) during its participation in the "Neptune Warrior" exercise off Scotland the news followed that things were a bit more serious than first thought. A couple of days ago it was reported in the Spanish press that the ship was making very slow progress back to Ferrol (where it will arrive 30/09/07 through rough seas at approximately 6 to 8-knots with a 'slight' list. Now reports from the same sources suggest that the damage sustained during the incident will cost in the region of €7-8m to repair but the bad news is that the new parts that are required will take nearly 34-weeks to manufacture!

This now throws into doubt the Flagship status of SNMG1 which the SPS Blas de Lezo was due to assume in November taking over from the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96). Now with the SPS Alvaro de Bazan (F101) engaged on qualification trials at Rota, but the logical replacement, the SPS Almirante Juan de Borbon (F102) in Ferrol on maintenance and the SPS Mendez Nunez (F104) not fully operational it puts the Spanish authorities in a bit of a position.

If anyone is able to get a photo post a link in comments.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Enterprise Carrier Strike Group

USS Enterprise (CVN 65)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
USS James E. Williams (DDG 95)
USS Philadelphia (SSN 690)


Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Denver (LPD 9)
USS Rushmore (LSD 47)


Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Kearsarge (LHD 3)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Porter (DDG 78)
USS Carr (FFG 52)
USS Miami (SSN 755)


Task Force 150

FGS Augsburg (F 213)
FS Commandant Blaison (F793)
FS Dupleix (D 641)
PNS Tippu Sultan (D 185)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)


In Theater

Ocean 6
USS Normandy (CG 60)
HMS Richmond (F 239)
HMAS Anzac (F 150)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)


Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 In Theater This Week

USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
HNLMS Evertsen (F805)
HMCS Toronto (FFH 333)
NRP Alvares Cabral (F331)
HDMS Olfert Fischer (F355)
FGS Spessart (A1442)

Friday, September 28, 2024

Noting the News on Iraq

Note all the bad news 'from' Iraq.

You won't, the news is generally good from Iraq, so if you live in the US, where there is rarely good news most of the time, good news is usually substituted by no news. Take note of the changes that are occurring regarding Iraq.

Start with Spook's Inverse Law of Iraq War Reporting, because he has good analysis of this months casualty numbers. You might also want to check out the latest Al Qaeda news in Iraq, their latest top guy just took a dirt nap. In yet another good news story, Iraq and Turkey have signed an agreement to deal with Kurdish rebels.

So how does the US deal with the good news? The Senate has decided to repeat history of almost a century ago, and reinvent a 21st century version of the Balfour Declaration of 1917. In other words, the US will be an imperial power and divide the prople of Iraq based on religion and race, similar to how Israel was created to partition the Jews into Israel. Iraq rejects the idea, and by the way I do too. Someone answer me this question, at what point does an American Senator think it is a good idea that the business of the US government is to pass laws that divide people by religion, race, or otherwise?

Another major talking point is Blackwater, a discussion I am waiting to see more evidence on before commenting. Either way, it is distracting and generally bad so something most likely to be seen on TV.

Why does this matter? Because if you look closely, several of the milbloggers reporting from Iraq have gone EMCON ALPHA, meaning something may be happening on the ground. Whatever it is, if that something is similar to what has been happening over the last few months, it is probably more good news you won't hear about on TV.

Naval Surge Ends as Naval Buildup Begins

While the world is watching the Middle East, the Navy has quietly been rotating its warships in and out of theaters.

As of the end of August, the Navy had 4 Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and 2 Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) at sea. In October, the Navy will enter the month with only 1 Carrier Strike Group (CSG) on deployment (Enterprise), 1 Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) on deployment (Kearsarge), and the surface combatants of the Bonhomme Richard ESG back home with the Bonhomme Richard ESG amphibious ships on their way home.

When you consider the return of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the Kitty Hawk Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), and the Partnership of America's Strike Group (PoA 2007) the Navy begins October with the fewest number of warships on deployment as of any time in 2007. Also noteworthy is only three warships have officially begun their deployments over the last several weeks, all three of which (USS Reuben James (FFG 57), USS Wasp (LHD 1), and USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)) are replacing existing warships in common deployment theaters finishing their deployments. In other words, there are no additional warships deploying.

I have been predicting the Truman Carrier Strike Group would deploy by the end of September. At this point, I appear to be wrong, which I'm actually pleased to say because for the most part, Naval Strike group deployments have been remarkably predictable for the last 18 months or so of the Fleet Response Plan. Why the Truman CSG deployment hasn't been announced is still unclear, it could be next week for all I know, but current events could certainly be a major factor.

First of all, FY2008 begins on Monday, and Congress has not passed a defense budget. It really is a shame the American people watch Congress take off so many days every year, watch them give themselves a raise every year, then shrug when Congress can't do the only thing they are supposed to do every year... specifically pass a budget on time. And they want to call other nations elected officials dysfunctional? Look in the mirror. It could be the Navy is waiting for its budget before deploying its ships. Smart, but Congress should get called out on it in public if true.

Second, it could be an Admiral thing. Roughead's confirmation hearing was earlier this week (coverage here), and lately Fallon has sent signals he wants more control of deployments so he can control the message to Iran. While either or the combination of both is possible, the budget issue is more likely.

Finally, current events within the Navy could be a factor, specifically the upcoming home port change in Japan. While it is true the Navy is entering October with only a single CSG and a single ESG deployed, the US Navy appears to be moving towards 2008 to peak at the highest level of availability I have observed (perhaps ever), which is truly remarkable for a shrinking fleet.

Below are my observations. All information is public record.

On the East Coast, the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) are both in preparations for upcoming deployments, with the Truman ready to go. The USS George Washington (CVN 73) is out of maintenance and is in its preparation for the home port move to Japan. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) is in dry dock with work scheduled to be completed in December. The next carrier to enter maintenance on the east coast is the USS Enterprise (CVN 65), currently deployed to the Middle East. This will give the Navy 3 CVNs on the east coast available by 2008, with a 4th operational as it changes home ports to the Pacific.

On the West Coast, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) is currently in workups for its next deployment. The USS Nimitz, which returns from its deployment on September 30th, will remain available until its next deployment next year, while the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) prepares to enter dry dock for a 6 month maintenance period. Currently in dry dock, due out in November is the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76). Finally, the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) is unlikely to make any more major deployments before it is replaced by the USS George Washington (CVN 73) next year. By 2008, the Navy will have 3 CVNs available with the Kitty Hawk in reserve until retirement.

By my math, that means 6 CVNs, all recently modernized, in some form of preparation or deployment by 2008, and that doesn't include the rotation of the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) and USS George Washington (CVN 73), both of which would be available in an emergency.

I know what knowledgeable people are thinking, 6+2, we can do that today. True, but keep in mind three of those six today would be the Nimitz, Stennis, and Kitty Hawk... all of which would have returned from a deployment at some point over the the last 35 days. 6+2 is great in theory, but it isn't always a reality. I think it is noteworthy that simply because of an interesting scheduling quark of the Fleet Response Plan, started years ago before any current event (Iran is an example) was taking place, the US Navy will just happen to reach a position of peak readiness just in time for the rhetoric of war in 2008.

Thursday, September 27, 2024

The Navy Learns IT Lessons the Hard Way

The popular term is RAD, it stands for Rapid Application Development, and in the IT business most professionals refer to RAD as an inside joke. Any software rapidly produced from scratch and any hardware rapidly deployed without fully understanding the relationship between value and cost of ownership is asking for one thing. Higher cost.

I have that poster up in my office, more for satire than anything, but also because it is a reminder the statement is especially true in IT, which is why the IT consultants I place are very good, and demand to be paid like it. Done right, and by that I mean once and efficiently, IT can save money. Done wrong, IT raises cost.

From Janes.

The US Navy’s strategy in recent years of acquiring the ‘latest and greatest’ commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, sought to rapidly modernize its fleet, is to be overhauled due to serious maintenance problems, it was announced recently in Virginia.

Tara Copp for Jane’s Navy International reports that the shake-up will affect shipboard command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.

“The lack of understanding of the service-life of all the commercial C4ISR solutions on board leaves a large budget uncertainty for future ship maintenance budgets, at a time when the US Navy is trying hard to rein in maintenance and modernization spending in order to afford its envisioned 313-ship fleet,” reports Copp.

Jane’s Navy International reports that Rear Admiral Charles E Smith, vice-commander of the USN Space and Naval Warfare Systems says that the failure to apply traditional inventory and service-life maintenance schedules to the COTS shipboard systems is foremost among issues.

Speaking at the 2007 Fleet Maintenance Symposium in Virginia Beach, Rear Adm Smith said this lack of information is amplified by the fact that thousands of parts have been procured for transmitter and sensor systems used to operate more than 600 individual communications networks worldwide, without an accurate inventory of when maintenance will be needed on those parts.

He added that the technology pull on COTS has resulted in situations where systems are not tested until just prior to deployment, leaving insufficient time for crew training and creating unresolved communications issues that are fixed only after the ship is underway.

While “we have yet to stop a ship because its C4I did not work,” he said, “we can no longer wait until they sail away.”

“The C4I world has accelerated rapidly and procured a lot and now we have to go do some knuckle dragging,” added Rear Adm Smith, “Rather than driving ourselves to a refresh rate that we can not keep up with, we have asked the hard question: are we being artificially driven and can we slow this process down?”

Jane’s Navy International reports that the service is now trying to slow down the acquisition process, particularly because its next-generation ships are so software-dependent.

The Navy should slow down, this is the right move. Rapidly adapting to new technologies is expensive anyway, particularly hardware which is in a constant state of flux. The latest and greatest is nice, but older systems still become dependencies, and ultimately don't scale which creates a bottleneck anyway. Adm Smith is in a tough position that I appreciate because I see it constantly in government.

COTS means cheaper and easier to acquire up front, but there are cost of ownership issues that don't pop up until you deal with the logistics of the equipment. That process in IT only occurs after ownership, and is almost always a time consuming process in pinpointing systems and components most likely to create problems. When you factor in integration, which is the key technology enabler for the Navy in the 21st century, the challenges are demanding.

My advice, carefully define standards and choose wisely in procurement based on scalability, otherwise your warships, which are slowly becoming floating IT shops, will strain the support system. Lower cost in IT occurs from well determined standards and scalability designed to address total cost of ownership, not from starting sticker prices of COTS options. Ships are designed and built to operate between 25-50 years, while technology changes daily and even the best hardware has a realistic shelf life of 3 years. For a warship that serves for 30 years, if you are not designing your IT strategy around a ten time turnaround, with scalability from one generation to the next that allows for reuse of some components that don't change as frequently, the cost of ownership will be high.

The Bear and the Dragon

The conventional wisdom regarding SCO is that Russia and China are natural allies. Conventional wisdom, as usual, is misguided and mostly uninformed. Russia and China do not have recent history, or even not so recent history of friendly relations. If you recall, one of the popular theories of the K-129 incident involved Russia pretending to be a Chinese ballistic submarine in launching, specifically to start a war between China and the US.

While Russia has been saber rattling the United States with its new found revenues and resurgent economy, China has been kicking Russia to the curb on a number of levels.

What started as an unexpected and unwelcome intrusion by China into areas where Gazprom has held a monopoly has quietly turned into absence at the procurement table.

Due to the recent reshuffle in Russian corridors of power, it appears that the defense minister will have to put off his visit to China, planned for this September, until spring.

This is the second delay of such visit. The first one happened in late March 2007, after Sergei Ivanov stepped down as defense minister and was appointed first deputy prime minister. His successor, Anatoly Serdyukov, who previously headed the Federal Taxation Service, needed time to gain an insight into Defense Ministry affairs.

However, experts believe that the decision to call off the defense minister's visits to China has more far-reaching implications.

Although the world's two largest countries maintain close military ties (including the August international counter-terrorist exercise Peace Mission 2007, which involved the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO, as well as 2,000 and 1,700 Russian and Chinese servicemen), bilateral military-technical cooperation has slowed down in the last few years.

The Russian-Chinese intergovernmental commission, which had previously discussed this issue once or twice a year in Beijing and Moscow, has not met even once in the last two years.

Moreover, the Russian defense industry is not fulfilling any major Chinese contracts at present.

These aren't just chinks in the armor, this is the stuff wedges are made of. China has told Russia "thanks but no thanks" to Russian tech, believing they have accumulated enough technology from Russia to go forward without Russian help.

When you think about the military sales over the last several years, China found a way to keep the Russian military industry alive at a time when buyers were few and far between. With India starting to look west for military equipment, expect Russia to apply intimidation towards India on some of their major upcoming purchases, including fighters and warships.

Unfortunately, the side effect will be a Russian military sales push to other places, including what many have speculated will be a major push in Tehran on October 16th when Putin holds bilateral meetings with Iranian leadership.

Russia Prepares the Insurgency

Ignored in the mainstream.

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili said a Russian military officer was among two people killed when Georgian security forces clashed with Moscow-backed separatists in the breakaway province of Abkhazia on Wednesday.

Russian U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin disputed the Georgian version of events, saying Georgian forces had attacked a training exercise in a move aimed at aggravating tensions between Moscow and the former Soviet republic.

Saakashvili told the U.N. General Assembly: "One of the people was a lieutenant-colonel of the Russian military, and ... he was killed during a law-enforcement operation against armed separatist insurgents."

Pointing an accusing finger at Moscow, he said: "One has to wonder -- what was a vice-colonel of the Russian military doing in the Georgian forests, organizing and leading a group of armed insurgents on a mission of terror?"

Rhetorical question. The real question is, will the West watch your nation be systematically assimilated into Russia? Despite their help on the ground in both wars the US fights, I have serious doubts that Bush will be there for Georgia when the time comes.

Wednesday, September 26, 2024

George Friedman Might Be Right - Updated

On September 17th, George Friedman posted the article Red October: Russia, Iran and Iraq. If you haven't read it yet, you should, as it will give you the reason why a large number of reasonable people who support the President in Iraq are not very excited about the Petraeus strategy. A key excerpt:

The Russians are chess players and geopoliticians. In chess and geopolitics, the game is routine and then, suddenly, there is an opening. You seize the opening because you might never get another one. The United States is inherently more powerful than Russia, save at this particular moment. Because of a series of choices the United States has made, it is weaker in the places that matter to Russia. Russia will not be in this position in two or three years. It needs to act now.

Therefore, Putin will go to Iran on Oct. 16 and will work to complete Iran's civilian nuclear project. What agreements he might reach with Iran could given the United States nightmares. If the United States takes out Iran's nuclear weapons, the Russians will sympathize and arm the Iranians even more intensely. If the Americans launch an extended air campaign, the Russians will happily increase the supply of weapons even more. Talk about carpet-bombing Iran is silly. It is a big country and the United States doesn't have that much carpet. The supplies would get through.

...

Petraeus' area of operations is Iraq. He may well have crafted a viable plan for stabilizing Iraq over the next few years. But the price to be paid for that is not in Iraq or even in Iran. It is in leaving the door wide open in other areas of the world. We believe the Russians are about to walk through one of those doors. The question in the White House, therefore, must be: How much is Iraq worth? Is it worth recreating the geopolitical foundations of the Soviet Union?

The article is a lot longer and more in depth than this small sample provides.

Updated: Stratfor hid the article behind the firewall today, so I am redirecting to one of the dozen places online the article is posted.

France Steps Up on Piracy Off Somalia

France is offering to send a warship to protect international food aid shipments to Somalia.

UNITED NATIONS, Sept 25, 2024 (AFP) - French President Nicolas Sarkozy said here Tuesday that his country was prepared to send a warship off Somalia to protect delivery of international food aid to beleaguered Somalis from attacks by pirates.

"France is prepared to send a warship to protect humanitarian supplies," he told reporters after chairing a Security Council on Africa.

Piracy is common in the waters off Somalia, which has been without an effective government since the 1991 ouster of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre sparked a bloody power struggle.

"France stands ready to ensure security for the assistance provided by the World Food Program in Somalia for a period of two months using naval military resources," the French leader told the 15-member Council. "I call on all those who wish to do so to join this initiative".

Since Somalia's Islamist movement was defeated in January and its leaders routed out of the country.

But violence has raged despite a recent government-sponsored reconciliation conference, which was boycotted by Islamist-led opposition groups, and ended with little progress.

At a time when Lex and CDR Salamander are talking about Letters of Marque as an option for the US to address piracy, and Blackwater is sailing their new naval vessel around Norfolk, it looks like the Europeans are willing to do it the old fashion way.

If the political will existed in the US, the US Navy could handle this problem easily. The biggest problem isn't will though, it is specific to the right of hot pursuit in the waters around Somalia. An example of the issues surrounding the right of hot pursuit is given by Eagle1 this morning, this time in the Malacca Strait.

Tuesday, September 25, 2024

A Good Omen for DDG-1000

I have been very critical of the DDG-1000. I support building two of two different classes as prototypes, and use those two to mature the technologies that will support the 21st century Navy. My opinion is in the minority.

However, I am very much encouraged by this news (From Defensenews):

The U.S. Navy’s first DDG 1000 destroyer will be born in Maine, joining a list of first-of-class destroyers stretching back well into the last century.

General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works will build the first of the two Zumwalt-class DDG 1000 advanced destroyers funded by Congress in 2007, the Navy announced Sept. 25. The decision alters the previous plan to build the first ship at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss.

“The decision was reached after reviewing the current and future workload projections at each shipyard and soliciting input from both shipyards,” said Lt. Cmdr. John Schofield, a spokesman for Navy acquisition chief Delores Etter. “Resequencing of the delivery of the first ship ... best addresses current workload and better balances the surface combatant industrial base.”

The move could help keep costs down on the ships, Schofield said. The Navy estimates each ship will cost $3.3 billion to build, but independent estimates forecast figures as high as $5 billion or more.

If the Navy wants to get back to basics, follow in the footsteps of success. Building the DDG-1000 in Bath follows a historical pattern of success in building new surface combatants.

This is a good omen.

Continuing the Countdown to War

Back in June, there were only 4 more to go.

Now there are only 3 more to go.

Terrorism can change an election...

or November 24th, whichever comes first.

And while people will want to blame the US and Israel, I think this is right on...

They will start by attacking France.

Congress Takes a Shot Across the Iranian Bow

In August there was a lot of talk about the potential of Congressional action against Iran, specifically in the form of sanctions. Congress has taken action by voting to step up the pressure on Iran. HR 1400 passed this afternoon 397-16. Four Republicans and 12 Democrats voted against the measure, with 20 Members not voting.

The next step in increasing Sanctions on Iran is a revised Senate amendment to the 2008 Defense bill, Amendment No. 3017. The Iran Nuclear Watch blog has the amendment details.

The amendment has several pieces in it worth reading, in particular these three:

(4) to support the prudent and calibrated use of all instruments of United States National power inside Iraq, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military instruments in support of the policy with respect to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies.

And

(5) that the United States should designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and

And

(6) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2024 and March 24, 2007, respectively.

It is interesting to note that Congress is leading the push to label the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization. It will probably not be reported in the media that way.

It is unclear if sanctions will work, they don't have a very good track record. To even be effective, they would have to be leveraged against some fairly big European companies, which may or may not be worth it. Considering the rhetoric of Sarkozy, if we have to piss off Europe to prevent war, I'm probably for pissing off Europe.

5th Fleet Focus: Iranian Underwater Warfare Capabilities

In early 2006, Iran successfully cracked down on virtually all Iranian military sites dedicated to uploading pictures and new military information online. Within weeks, the content of those sites dried up on search engines leaving only a few web cached versions of those cites to be reviewed. Today, only 2 Iranian military related sites exist, both of which block search crawlers, and neither of which use DNS to help conceal their locations. The information provided are sources to those sites, so take it or leave it as credible without links to additional commentary.

Eagle1 had an interesting post on Monday about the surface capabilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in small boat, swarming tactics and capabilities. Included is evaluation regarding the complexity in using such a strategy. The US Navy has faced this threat before, specifically in the Tanker Wars of 1987-1988, and in each instance overcame the threat with superior firepower. The only thing I would add to Eagle1's entry is a comment once shared with me by an air force captain who has the opportunity to observe an IRGC exercise, specifically that "a small boat swarm observed by JSTARS looks a lot like a mechanized division rolling through the open desert."

However, it isn't the small boat swarm that presents the largest threat in the Persian Gulf, rather the traditionally disproportionate effect of mines and submarines in any theater of naval combat. Even if not a single ship hits a single mine, insurance costs for shipping in areas where minefields exist will skyrocket in the future, threat alone is all it takes. In the Falklands War, submarines deployed by Argentina had an enormous effect on the Royal Navy, determining where and how it would operate in the early stages of the war.

Mines and submarines are not easily addressed. Countering threats in underwater warfare requires time consuming training that the US most likely has not appropriately allocated for sufficient proficiency. I'm not the only one who believes this, constant pressures by environmental groups regarding sonar and exercises combined with lack of sufficient attention and focus by Navy commanders themselves are the source for most observers concerns.

In this regard, Iran operates a number (assumed somewhere around a dozen) of mini-submarines, 3 Kilo class submarines, and a number of different types of mines that create huge problems for any nation that engages Iran in combat.

Iranian Kilo class Submarines

Thanks to Al Gore, Iran has 3 Kilo class submarines. The recently completed naval station on the Gulf of Oman port of Chahbahar can house all three submarines. With access to open water in the Gulf of Oman, the 3 kilo class submarines which would be difficult to use effectively in the Persian Gulf would be more effective in searching for deeper water targets on the eastern side of the Strait of Hormuz.

While the Kilo class submarines are not likely in good condition, they are an effective weapon, and their presence alone will force major adjustments in tactics by the US Navy. First the US Navy will likely be forced to keep carriers much further away than they normally would in the Gulf of Oman. It would also require a number of submarines to be dedicated to the location and neutralization of the Kilo threat.

The Kilo's, while potentially capable of firing anti-ship cruise missiles, would be less effective in this role. As a mine layer the Kilo's could deploy around 36 mines per sortie, and if mated with a merchant ship supplied with mines would be able to conduct 2-3 mine laying sorties per week. This scenario has not only been envisioned by US Navy planners, but is expected.

Iranian Mini-Submarines

Iran is currently known to have at least 3 different classes of mini-submarines, and at least 2 strange single class prototypes for utilization in the Gulf. These submarines are for the most part considered troublesome to operate, but would still likely be effective in limited roles for strike and mine laying, and would be very difficult to detect while submerged.

Iran is reported to have 2 Nahang (whale) class mini-submarines. These submarines, an interesting design for those with a sense of mini-submarine history, are noteworthy because they are the vehicle many experts believe is armed with the Shkval supercavitating torpedoes. Operated by the IRGC, the role is largely a guess, although some observers have questioned whether it would be used for extended surveillance and reconnaissance roles.

Iran is reported to have 5 Ghadir class mini-submarines. The Ghadir appears to be based on the Italian designed MG110 class mini-submarines in use by Pakistan. This class could probably operate close to an oil platform for an extended period of time, supported by a dive team, and conduct mine laying sorties that would be very difficult to detect up to 20nms from the platform.

Additionally Iran has recently received delivery of 4 mini-submarines from North Korea. There has been no mention as to class of submarine, but the smaller mini-submarines are supposedly for commando operation. Iran also operates several strange prototypes that may or may not be in service, but photography exists to their existence.

Sea Mines

Iran is thought to have the 4th largest sea mine inventory (around 5000) in the world behind the United States, Russia, and China. Up to 1000 of the sea mines are of the Chinese EM11 bottom-influence mine; the EM31 moored mine; and the EM52 rocket-propelled rising mine. All of these mines are of Chinese domestically produced designs, and the Chinese are the largest supplier of mines to Iran since 1998.

Lost in the shuffle of the Kilo class submarine purchase was the revelation in 2000 that Russia also sold Iran 1800 mines in the same purchase.

The most dangerous mine in the Iranian inventory is probably the EM-52. As a bottom dwelling rocket-propelled mine, up to 4 can be laid by a single small boat or dhow, and dispersed properly could heavily influence the channels in and out of the Persian Gulf.

While Kilo class submarines, mini-submarines, and mines represent the threats underwater from a technology perspective, Iran has a number of specialized commando diving teams (including specially trained mammals) that could potentially be very dangerous as well.

Are you ready to dismiss some of this as nonsense? That would be a mistake. It was only last summer Israel dismissed the anti navy capabilities of Hezbollah. While some of this sounds like a James Bond movie rejected idea, the truth is the threats are real and if executed, will cause damage in a war. When it comes to underwater warfare, I'd rather the United States Navy make the mistake of being overly prepared than under prepared. While I still dismiss the possibility of war, at least not in 2007 for certain, it may be one day these are the very real threats the US Navy faces in the Persian Gulf.

Monday, September 24, 2024

Poetic Justice: A Day of Denial

Today was a great day for America. A great many won't see it that way, but I rarely agree with most people anyway. Today a large number of men and women in denial turned their attention New York City, and have paraded their denial as a comfort zone in dealing with the reality of the day.

The major players include Columbia University, in denial of American history and the role of the US Military and in denial of any critical issue facing the United States highlighted by anyone not firmly planted on the left side of politics. Another major player includes Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who is in denial of not only the Holocaust, in denial that homosexuals actually exist in a country like Iran, and in denial that Iran is a source of funding for terrorism in the world including inside Iraq against US soldiers. We also have the right in America, in denial that Columbia is exercising its American blood earned right to free speech for allowing even a despicable tyrant like Ahmadinejad to speak in an open forum, and in denial that free speech could be anything other than a propaganda campaign. Finally, we have the left in America, in denial regarding the role of Iran in exporting terrorism to places like Lebanon or Iraq, in denial of what Ahmadinejad actually says in a public forum, and generally in denial regarding the role and responsibility of academia in not only the exercise of free speech, but the analysis of the speech itself.

While there is a side debate whether or not Ahmadinejad should have been given a forum, and yes I understand that Columbia University is allowing a dictator to speak but denies access to the US military, I still respect their freedom to make the choice regarding whom they can invite to speak. That is how freedom works.

You can read the full transcript here.

My opinion. The media is going to be able to report this however they want. The right is correct, this will be propaganda for President Ahmadinejad, his remarks on the Palestinian situation will play very well among many in the Arab media. It is also unlikely that most people in the Middle East will even hear about Columbian President Lee Bollinger's remarks. However, I still think the exercise was well worth it.

The left is also right, President Ahmadinejad was invited as a guest to Columbia University and was ambushed by Columbian President Lee Bollinger, and to be honest the left has every right to be critical of Bollinger for being a hypocrite. There is no question Bollinger proved to be a hollow man for using the comfort of his bully pulpit on campus to belittle President Ahmadinejad. It says a lot that the man allows President Ahmadinejad to speak but doesn't allow the US military on campus because of the "don't ask, don't tell" law forced on the military by Congress.

The event on Monday did do several things. First, it is impossible for anyone to say that President Ahmadinejad didn't have an opportunity to make his case to the American people. He avoided most questions though, attempting to turn the questions around to advocate his position
on popular political issues on the Middle East. In the Middle East, this probably will go over very well. President Ahmadinejad was in denial regarding the accusations made by a number of credible sources, and sounded silly and somewhat stupid in spinning responses to very important direct questions. On TV, and you can see the video on C-SPAN, the man really looks and sounds pathetic, something of an intellectual lightweight. In the forum of thought, ideas, and debate, avoiding questions and making statements that are completely void of reality, it will not play well over the vast majority of America, no matter how someone tries to spin it otherwise. There are simply no English sound bytes for any questions.

Second, anyone who attempts to engage the realm of ideas in defense of Iran was hurt today. In both Europe and Asia, free thinkers will have access to the entirety of what occurred today at Columbia University, and will be able to make their own judgments. Regardless of ones feelings on what Columbian President Lee Bollinger did with his opening statements, one cannot ignore that the statements were made, the criticism was addressed directly, the questions were posed, and Iranian President Ahmadinejad had no answer and could do nothing but dismiss and ignore criticism, he had no answers. It reinforces the idea that in an open forum, when free speech is allowed in the form of tough, honest questions, the truth will be revealed.

Finally, there were big winners and losers today. America won. The war taking place might be physically in the Middle East in multiple theaters, but intellectually the war regarding the dangers and threats to security in America is being engaged here in the US. The winners and losers of that debate of dangers and security is clear, the diarists are in denial, when the entire event is largely ignored by the front pages, silence speaks loud and clear.

Columbia University is a clear loser. A University that has a clear anti-American biased attempts to exercise a uniquely American value like absolute freedom of public speech, and gets nothing but criticism for it by the very anti-American crowd that it best represents.

Partisans are losers. The right did not get what they wanted, President Ahmadinejad was able to attend and speak at Columbia University. Ironically they got exactly what they least expected but needed the most, a realistic debate regarding the US policy for Iran. The left got exactly what they wanted, a potentially receptive forum for President Ahmadinejad, and ironically the left got exactly what the left needed the most, a realistic debate regarding the US policy for Iran.

I call that poetic justice.

EU, UN, NATO, Oh My!

This sounds like another version of the "Coalition of the Willing" with an EU twist.

NATO is feeling the pinch as the UN and EU both dip into the same resources to fulfil defence obligations leaving the military alliance thin on soldiers.

"We are having problems providing troops for all the NATO, EU and UN missions," said NATO spokesperson James Appathurai, according to Austrian daily Der Standard.

The problem has worsened in recent years as both NATO and the EU try to maintain rapid response forces.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is supposed to be kept at a level of 25,000 soldiers. The EU, meanwhile, has 19 of its own 'battle groups' - groups of 1,500 soldiers that can be deployed to the world's hotspots at short notice.

But most EU member states are also NATO member state meaning that they make the same troops available for both organisations.

And given the choice, who wins out?

"Soldiers that are active for the EU will be missed by us and vice versa," a NATO official told Der Standard.

"And in a crisis. To whom do the soldiers then really belong? The EU will lose out," the official added.

Anyone else sense a new effort to 'adjust' EU policy regarding the military forthcoming?

Media Sounds False Alarms on CVN-21

This is what I call a false alarm from Bloomberg:

Northrop Grumman Corp.'s USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, the Navy's most expensive vessel ever, faces "substantial risk'' of cost overruns that may jeopardize plans to increase the fleet, according to a federal audit.

Delays in testing new Raytheon Co. radar and General Atomics systems for launching and landing planes may extend the construction schedule and raise costs, the U.S. Government Accountability Office said.

This "likely'' cost growth "may force the Navy to sacrifice'' other vessels in its 30-year plan to increase the fleet to 313 ships from 278 today, the agency said in an 41-page report.

The CVN-78 Gerald Ford's "cost performance is essential to the plan,'' the GAO said. The ship is so expensive that "even a small percentage of cost growth corresponds to hundreds of millions of dollars.''

The GAO reported July 24 that, even without the Ford, the cost of the 41 vessels now under contract to the Navy was already $4 billion, or 7 percent, over the $56 billion budgeted.

The report cited is the July 24th GAO report, and what is interesting is the report is actually from testimony in front of the House Armed Services Committee that day, something I covered at the time.

Not sure if the audio is still available online, but if you listen to the audio the GAO as well as the rest of the panel sees good things in the CVN-21 program, well managed, and cites the same potential bottlenecks reported in this article then says there is no evidence of any concerns at this time.

In other words, this article is either lazy journalism or a hit job, and this article repeats the mistake, probably written in response to the Bloomberg article.

Nothing new here.

Friday, September 21, 2024

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Enterprise Carrier Strike Group

USS Enterprise (CVN 65)
USS Gettysburg (CG 64)
USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51)
USS Stout (DDG 55)
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98)
USS James E. Williams (DDG 95)
USS Philadelphia (SSN 690)


Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Denver (LPD 9)
USS Rushmore (LSD 47)
USS Milius (DDG 69)*
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93)*
USS Chosin (CG 65)*

*Currently in the Pacific


Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Kearsarge (LHD 3)
USS Ponce (LPD 15)
USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44)
USS Vicksburg (CG 69)
USS Porter (DDG 78)
USS Carr (FFG 52)
USS Miami (SSN 755)


Task Force 150

FGS Köln (F211)
FS Commandant Blaison (F793)
FS Dupleix (D 641)
PNS Tippu Sultan (D 185)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)


In Theater

Ocean 6
USS Normandy (CG 60)
HMS Richmond (F 239)
JDS Kirisame (DD 104)
BNS Leopold I (F930)
HMAS Anzac (F 150)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)


Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 In Theater This Week

USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)
HNLMS Evertsen (F805)
HMCS Toronto (FFH 333)
NRP Alvares Cabral (F331)
HDMS Olfert Fischer (F355)
FGS Spessart (A1442)

Google Earth and World Wind as a Maritime Awareness Interface

The Italian Navy’s Andrea Doria Horizon-Class frigate will be at Maritime Systems and Technology (MAST) 2007 conference and trade show. Tours will be available to pre-registered attendees. I have spoken to some of you who are going, if you get any good photo's or want to generally discuss your observations please let me know, I'm interested to see the Andrea Doria up close.

While looking through the conference sessions, I noticed a session called "Maritime Situation Awareness System Based on Open Source Software and Data" by Livingston Davies, Channel Logistics LLC, United States. The description is interesting.

This paper will describe an inexpensive but powerful maritime situation awareness system named CASA, based on World Wind (an open source interactive world viewer software tool developed by the USA’s NASA).

CASA looks and behaves much like Google Earth but has near real-time weather and cloud cover, multi-spectral satellite and low altitude aerial imagery and a map server that will allow user provided imagery to be stitched and automatically integrated minutes after the imagery has been collected.

Imagery can be projected onto 3D Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) data to provide accurate and realistic perspective. CASA displays vessel locations and tracks based on AIS, long range tracking, or radar. Using CATE, a companion expert system tool, vessels can be evaluated and selectively displayed using a Boolean filtering of any vessel criteria including proximity, vessel type, flag of registry, ownership, Class Society, etc. The system optionally contains a vessel pre-arrival notification system.

This is the first I had heard of using World Wind for maritime situational awareness, although there are a number of applications that use Google Earth for this. Google Earth based maritime tools and services are popular in the commercial shipping industry, particularly in Europe (not sure about Asia or the US), but for many of the services require a ton of fees and service charges some people can't afford. The other problem is that through licensing agreements with Google, ownership becomes an issue.

What I find interesting about a World Wind model is that it is more likely to be something governments would use because it is open source, thus no dependency on foreign companies or code. I'm thinking a World Wind interface for the "Sea Traffic Control" system discussed earlier this week would be ideal, instead of a commercial product using a proprietary standard that some nations may be skeptical to get into business with.

Best Value: Joint Strike Fighter vs F-22A

A poster over at HarpoonHQ pointed out this document which I think is worth the read, particularly for you aviation guys. Price vs. Performance: The Value of Next Generation Fighter Aircraft, Thesis by J. Michael Stelly, Captain, USAF. The thesis has an interesting comparison of the Joint Strike Fighter and the F-22A based on value for price.

No hints regarding the analysis conclusions in the thesis, those interested are better off reading it without any hint from me.

Thursday, September 20, 2024

The Price of War

Steven Kosiak at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies recently released an update to the cost estimates of military operations since 9/11.

Whatever the merits—on strategic and political grounds—of the US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the direct financial costs will be high. The war in Iraq, alone, has already cost the US more in real (inflation-adjusted dollars) than the 1991 Gulf War and the Korean War, and it will almost certainly surpass the cost of the Vietnam War by the end of next year. The 1991 Gulf War cost about $88 billion (FY 2008 dollars) and was paid for largely through contributions from US friends and allies (altogether these contributions offset nearly 90 percent of US costs), while the Korean and Vietnam Wars cost the United States some $456 billion and $518 billion, respectively. Combined, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have already cost more than any of these three previous wars. On the other hand, the financial burden posed by these ongoing military operations is substantially lower when measured as a share of the economy—since today’s economy is much larger than that existing at the time of the Korean or Vietnam Wars. For 2008, funding for national defense is projected to absorb about 4.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). By comparison, at the peaks of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, defense absorbed, respectively, some 14.2 percent and 9.4 percent of GDP.

The article leaves me with a few thoughts. First, 4.2% of the GDP for national defense including the war. Does that strike anyone else as remarkably... low?

Second, it is noteworthy the US is spending big money to insure remarkably low casualties for troops engaged on the front lines. I do not believe most nations in the world would take this approach, in fact I am not certain Britain has taken this approach.

With all the talk of an unstable US economy, I wonder how confident countries really are to put their money into the Euro, knowing Europe probably can't defend its currency without the US military, and in some cases, already isn't. For the first time in awhile, that last comment does not apply to France.

Mesa Verde Gets Good Review

CNN is reporting the USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) is set for delivery and commissioning.

"The ship performed well and the trial results demonstrate the progress we are making with this ship class," said Philip Teel, corporate vice president and president of Northrop Grumman's Ship Systems sector. "Make no mistake, LPD 19 will provide our sailors and Marines with a reliable and capable platform to perform their mission of defending freedom."

"The completion of acceptance trials is a major step towards bringing LPD 19 into the fleet, and we look forward to ship delivery later this month," said Rear Adm. Chuck Goddard, the Navy's program executive officer for ships. "Mesa Verde performed very well on trials, and its condition and performance is a testament to the craftsmanship of the shipbuilders. I expect this trend to continue as the company completes the rest of this incredibly capable class."

Mesa Verde's mission is to embark, transport and land elements of a landing force in a variety of expeditionary and special operations missions. She will be commissioned in Panama City, Fla. on Dec. 15, 2007.

"I am well pleased with Mesa Verde's performance on acceptance trials," said U.S. Navy Cmdr. Shawn Lobree, LPD 19's prospective commanding officer. "This highly capable ship passed all major testing events and is ready to be delivered to the Navy. As I have often said, it takes teamwork to build such a sound ship, and this is a testament to years of hard work by the Northrop Grumman/Navy team."

As I have mentioned before, I was on her earlier this year and everyone involved was expecting this at the time. With the Trenton class showing their age, these ships can't come online soon enough in my opinion.

Wednesday, September 19, 2024

The Basics of Naval Weapon Technology

When I engage in naval tactical discussions that include technology discussion, I usually start with a single question. Have you ever read Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat by Wayne P. Hughes? In the industry, the answer is usually no, but when it is yes I usually find myself talking to a retired officer or someone who truly understands which technologies in naval warfare matter, and which are simply hype. The reason Captain Hughes book applies is simple, the fusion between tactics and technology Hughes lays out applies as well today as it does when the first edition was written, and the second edition is even better. Bottom line, the utilization of technology in naval tactics requires understanding the conditions, and without that type of objective context to the application of technology in tactics, a technology discussion alone is ultimately futile.

Lets discuss it anyway.

On Sunday DefenseReview.com ran an article called "U.S. Aircraft Carriers Vulnerable to Attack?: The Ticking Time Bomb" which basically claims carrier air power in the form of large carriers has been made by weapons like anti-ship missiles and the Shkval torpedo. The article propagates a number of myths common on the internet about naval weapon systems, and emphasizes the wrong technologies critical in naval tactical discussions.

When you talk about anti-ship missiles you are ultimately weighing factors in performance, specifically speed vs stealth plus range, guidance, and countermeasures. The debate some attempt to exercise is in determination of which weapons are better and why. What is ironic about the naval weapon technology debate is usually the metrics used by some in their proclamation of a weapon system being better is also the reason why it isn't. When you apply the wrong metrics, that can happen. Lets start by comparing supersonic vs subsonic missiles.

The advantage supersonic missiles have over subsonic missiles is speed. The greater the speed of the missile the less the engagement window exists to intercept the missile. The disadvantage of speed is that detection is made much easier, particularly via IR (although there are other methods). In other words, the advantage of supersonic missiles to reduce the engagement window ends up ultimately being negated because the missiles are easier to detect, thus easier to intercept.

The advantage subsonic missiles have over supersonic missiles is stealth. The greater the stealth of a missile the more difficult it is to detect and intercept. The disadvantage of subsonic missiles is that the engagement window is bigger due to its reduced speed. It is noteworthy that since 1982 that most subsonic anti-ship missiles that weren't detected at launch have effectively hit its target, and oh btw, most were not detected at launch. Unfortunately for supersonic missiles, modern detection systems are very apt in detecting the enormous signature generated when launching a supersonic weapon at sea.

Guidance is also critical. The best weapon systems utilize multiple options for guidance in a weapon system, whether it is IR, radar, GPS, Inertial, etc.., the more options for guidance the more effective the weapon system. There are various decoys and electronic warfare options for non kinetic defense against simplistic guidance systems, which is why it is becoming more common to see more complicated guidance capabilities on weapons.

Applying these basics, it becomes easy to debunk myths propagated in articles like the defense update article. For example, the SS-N-22 Sunburn (a.k.a. 3M-82 Moskit a.k.a. P270 Moskit) is the most overrated anti-ship missile you will ever read about. First, it is easily detected not only via IR but by its radar system. The missile has virtually no stealth at all. The missile only has radar guidance, making it easier to defeat without kinetic intercept, and finally the Sunburn has a very limited range and has no countermeasures. In other words, in the various technical categories that determine whether the weapon used to evaluate the capability of a weapon technology, the Sunburn ranks kindof low in each category but speed.

Compare the Sunburn to the latest Exocet missiles. The Exocet has inertial guidance that helps prevent jamming, the missile has protection from EW, it has more than twice the range of the Sunburn, and it has excellent stealth.

The VA-111 Shkval Supercavitating Rocket Torpedo can be judged by the same criteria. The super fast underwater weapon has terrible range, no guidance at all, no stealth at all, and no countermeasures at all. When ranking torpedo's, the Shkval belongs in the same category as the Mk 8 used in the Falklands by the Royal Navy.. better speed, same guidance, smaller warhead.

The Shkval is overrated, a use once weapon that does physical impact to a warship with a WWII era navy mine warhead. In other words, it is an effective weapon against smaller ships, the ships most likely to be able to avoid a hit from an unguided torpedo. It will take multiple hits to sink a larger vessel, and a larger vessel is likely to have escorts guaranteed to know the submarines position and kill it. Sorry, but if using a weapon gets you killed, the weapon might be overrated.

Future anti-ship missiles, and in fact future supercavitation weapon technologies, are attempting to find balance in all of the advantages without the disadvantages. Example, slower approach for stealth, inertial guidance in transit, EW protection, but will be fast (supercavitation or supersonic) in the terminal phase with multiple terminal guidance options.

Needless to say, I disagree with the defense update assessment that large carriers are obsolete solely because of technology advancements in anti-ship weapon technology. Technology has never been and still isn't the primary deciding factor in naval warfare, tactics is that factor.

I expect to see myths in naval weapons technology hit a fever pitch over the next few months as more and more people believe a war with Iran may become reality. The threat of the Sunburn or Shkval may frighten some as their characteristics are touted as overwhelming capabilities to which the US Navy has no counter, but those technologies don't rank in the top concerns I have regarding the threats facing the US Navy from Iran.

The disproportionate effect of mines (both dumb and smart) and submarines simply by their presence alone in naval warfare, combined with the relative simplicity to transport and deploy smaller weapons like the small and simple C-701 from truck sized mobile vehicles near the Iraqi Oil Terminals highlights how a focus on strengths and weaknesses in technology are irrelevant to the wise application of tactics to the battlefield.

Israel Bombs Syria and Nobody Cares

When was the last time you can remember Israel bombing another Middle Eastern country and nobody cared? The answer is this month. The Middle East has changed. To what extent is still unknown, and what the root causes of this change can be debated, but clearly we live in a strange time in history. Despite an unpopular war in Iraq, a 24/7 news satellite TV news cycle, and a robust print media active in propaganda somehow the Middle East is giving Israel a pass. The details remain very sketchy regarding the air strike by Israel against Syria, with rumor driving most of the story so far, but what we do know tells us a lot.

There are a number of theories and angles to this story, but few have been verified. Every story talks about the censorship, yet all the stories then go on about reported details and few distinguish which are rumor and which is accurate. The silence is helping propagate the myths, which is probably an intentional side effect. The Times story is the best narrative, but it raises even more questions.

Rumors to date include commandos, a North Korean Ship, the possibility the target was a nuclear facility, there is an Iran and Hezbollah link, and that there may have been 2 strikes instead of one. There are also a number of noteworthy facts including assistance by the Turkish military in some capacity for Israel and a lack of outrage in the Middle East.

That second point can't be stressed enough.

On the political side is it noteworthy that North Korea, Iran, Syria, and a few voices in Turkey is about the only outrage you can find, unless you are counting Ron Paul and the Jewish military industrial complex conspiracy angle. Both China and Russia have been mute, in fact China canceled the upcoming nuclear talks with North Korea without explanation, adding more to the nuclear angle mystery. With Israel continuing down its path of peace negotiations with Syria despite the event, things appear to be settling down.

Syria originally filed a protest at the UN, but withdrew the protest when they realized the UN wanted to see what happened up close. Syria appears to have something to hide, and that took the wind out of their outraged sails.

Assuming Syria has something to hide, Israel did something serious enough not to talk about, North Korea is angry about something, Iran got quiet really quickly, and everyone in the US has a different opinion regarding what happened, I'm starting to buy a combination of two theories.

The first comes from the conclusion following a detailed summery to date in the Wall Street Journal:

Could we have just lived through a partial reprise of the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor?

It certainly looks like that might be what happened, but it doesn't tell the whole story. Kenneth Pollack at the Brookings Institution tells the rest of the story:

"But no one knows what the Syrians were up to," he says. "People are wondering if it was a very nascent nuclear program and no one wants to see that."

Those two statements sum up how I see this saga to date. BTW, I'd love to know which country helped Israel insert the commandos (if they were even involved), unless you actually believe they deployed directly from Israel to north Syria. In my opinion, that is the most interesting story yet to be told, more so than the bombing itself.

Tuesday, September 18, 2024

6th Fleet Focus: Security Does Not Substitute Defense

Eagle1 spotted an excellent article by Thomas P.M. Barnett regarding a global maritime network for sea born traffic monitoring and information sharing strategy being forwarded by Admiral Ulrich. The analogy is described as:

Worldwide, aircraft are transparent, because they're all required to carry an "identification friend or foe" beacon that allows them to be tracked leaving and entering airports by aircraft-traffic-control systems and monitored between airports by sensors distributed across a global network. Trip the wire that defines "suspicious activity" and somebody's fighter aircraft will soon be on your tail. NATO alone routinely launches two or three fighters a week to identify unknown aircraft.

No such pervasive system currently exists globally for maritime traffic. If a ship any bigger than a small freighter is flagged by a nation belonging to the International Maritime Organization, it carries an ID beacon similar to aircraft. But without a shared monitoring network, that's like tracking only selected commercial jets part of the time and giving everyone else a pass.

This blog is in full support of this initiative, I believe it is a key enabler for security across the spectrum for maritime commerce, and I think Admiral Ulrich deserves credit for pushing the concept, particularly in the African maritime domain, where it can do a lot of good.

Then I read this quote, and can't shake that tightening feeling in the pit of my stomach.

"I don't do defense; I do security," he (Ulrich) says. "When you talk defense, you talk containment and mutually assured destruction. When you talk security, you talk collaboration and networking. This is the future. This is the thousand-ship navy, except there are no ships."

In any context, that is a scary statement. Not only do I disagree with his simplistic characterization of what defense is, I think he is clearly saying something profoundly...dumb, since he is substituting security for defense.

I'm not really sure what "collaboration and networking" means, but security is not a substitute for defense. If "collaboration and networking" means anything similar to international partnership in mutually agreed cooperation, and security provided by such framework is being treated as a substitute for defense, then I have a serious problem regarding what he should be doing compared to what he is doing.

With the rhetoric regarding Iran hitting a fever pitch, we have the top guy in U.S. Naval Forces Europe claiming he doesn't do defense? We could potentially be months away from the largest naval actions since the Battle of Leyte Gulf, with economic ramifications well beyond the impact of 9/11, and Ulrich thinks his role in defense is limited to containment and mutually assured destruction? Sir, your articles in Proceedings have shown you to be a thoughtful person, but in the media you give a completely opposite persona.

This doesn't give me much confidence, in fact it is flat out frightening that the Navy would have a 4 star Admiral seemingly repeating the same mistakes thought to be lessons learned by the 1930s era Navy. History is full of examples where mutually agreed security failed to provide for defense, examples for the United States would include Washington Naval Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Treaty, among others. If US Navy leaders, and it is hard to call Admiral Ulrich anything but a naval leader due to his command, are seriously treating global mutually agreed maritime awareness of commercial traffic security initiatives or the 1000-ship fleet security initiative as a substitute for defense, they are building a Maginot Line at sea in false belief they are defending the nation.

Am I making something out of nothing? Maybe, but it is a bit troubling that the last merchant ship and the last warship to get hit by an anti-ship missile happened in Ulrich's area of responsibility, just last year and by a group closely associated with the before mentioned Iran. It was just last month the most recent sea mine was found and destroyed, also in his area of responsibility. Those aren't "security" issues, those are "defense" issues, and no amount of security substitutes exist as substitutes for the defense strategies required to counter these real and present dangers,

We don't live in an 'either/or' world. The Navy and its leaders had better be taking serious both security AND defense, or the strategy is wrong, and we are on a road of surprise not seen in the Navy since 1941. How Ulrich allowed such a stupid thing to not only fly out of his mouth, but get reported by a reporter who is clearly sympathetic to him leaves me searching for the confirmation of Vice Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, which in my opinion, can't come soon enough.

Admiral Ulrich deserves credit for his security initiatives which are very smart and will make a positive impact if implimented, but he is first and foremost a US Navy 4 star Admiral. If he has lost focus on his primary responsibility, which would be the defense of the United States of America and our interests, it may be time for him to move into a more academic role where his ideas can be promoted without the apparent distraction of his primary responsibility.

Admiral Vladimir Masorin Dismissed

SteelJawScribe has the details from various angles, a good read for the whole story.

This is certainly a strange story. While it is true that Masorin only had 2 years when appointed before mandatory retirement, according to the Russian press he was basically replaced unceremoniously. It is also strange that the Russian media speculates the reason he got the rude end of the boot was because of he was honored by Admiral Mullen last month. The message there seems pretty clear, don't be nice to Yanks.

As I mentioned back in July, some officers I have interacted with who had met Masorin had nothing but respect for the guy. When I read SJS's story on Monday, I made a few calls asking about Vice-Admiral Vladimir Visotskiy, who is Masorin's replacement.

The word I'm getting is that he is "an aggressive, cold man; and yes the word cold applies to cold war." That is one European officers opinion, but it is a well informed opinion. For those keeping score at home, that means the Russians are probing the NATO defenses by air, while replacing Admirals in their Navy services who are more aggressive towards the west at sea.

Until a few weeks ago I was in denial regarding Russia wanting to bring back the cold war, but I'm starting to believe Putin has every intention to sell the image. Too bad they are spending all their money on their SSBNs, or I might take the threat posed by their sea services seriously.

Instead the Russians are participating in Operation Active Endeavor, probably hoping NATO will teach them how to sail their fleet. Yes, that was a cheap shot, but until I see more than 70% of their entire naval budget for the construction new SSBNs forgive me if I remain unimpressed by the Russian Fleet full of sailors who rarely see the sea.

Just keeping it real. Ships don't determine how good a Navy is. Sailors do.

Monday, September 17, 2024

5th Fleet Focus: MV-22 Deploys to the Gulf

From the Navy Times:

The first MV-22 Ospreys to make a combat deployment are on an amphibious assault ship heading for Iraq, according to a Marine Corps headquarters spokesman.

Ten Ospreys and roughly 200 leathernecks and sailors with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 flew out of Marine Corps Air Station New River, N.C., and landed aboard the Wasp on Monday, Maj. Eric Dent said.

He did not know where the Norfolk, Va.-based ship was when the Ospreys boarded. The ship was diverted from an international exercise in Panama on Sept. 5 to the Nicaraguan coast to assist with disaster-relief efforts in areas affected by Hurricane Felix.

VMM-263 is heading for Al Asad Air Base for a seven-month deployment; the Ospreys will provide tactical assault support for Marines and soldiers.

The Corps decided to deploy the tilt-rotors via ship, in part to allow the aircraft to do shipboard integration operations. Corps officials would not say where the Ospreys will leave the ship and move into Iraq.

The USS Wasp (LHD 1) will probably replace the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) which deployed on April 10th and will soon be on its way home. Originally deployed with the USS Wasp (LHD 1) are elements of Mine Countermeasures Squadron (HM) 15 and Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 28, it is unclear if these helicopter squadrons are deploying to the 5th Fleet area of responsibility.

My guess would be yes.

Fallon Chimes In

I have been looking for this story as an answer to the curious reporting last week. Navy Times is running an article on Admiral Fallon's response to some recent questionable reporting, and he doesn't sound very happy.

Fallon was clearly irked by the stories about his supposed disagreements with Petraeus over the pace of that withdrawal and all-around disdain for the Army general published in outlets ranging from The Washington Post to various blogs. One story cited an unnamed senior official who said “bad relations” between Fallon and Petraeus was the “understatement of the century.” Another quoted Pentagon sources as saying Fallon openly derided Petraeus during their first meeting last March after Fallon took the CentCom reins.

The latter story particularly galled Fallon, who called it “scurrilous,” adding that the characterizations of a dysfunctional relationship with Petraeus are “just absurd.”

That Gareth Porter article pissed me off too, clearly a hit job by someone who I doubt has ever met the Admiral, much less researched his character in any way. I have reviewing this guys articles on Navy affairs and cannot find a single one that makes any sense at all, each of them with made up details that simply don't add up.

With sources that claim clairvoyance to thinking or have access to the minutes of discussions on other continents, call me a healthy skeptic.

While I see the hitjob against Fallon for what it is, the Navy Times article appears to reinforce my belief that Fallon has a different vision for the region than one of Bush. I found this comment telling:

Fallon, to whom Petraeus reports, does not deny that the talks leading up to Petraeus’s report and recommendations for future strategy included some lively arguments. “Everybody’s going to have a difference of opinion,” Fallon said. “We are where we want to be right now. How we got there is our business.”

Fallon became popular because of how he changed the tone between the US and China after that EP-3 incident in 2001. Few people outside the Navy remember that incident today, lost in the pre-9/11 world, but it is noteworthy that interaction between the US Navy and China derive directly from the fallout of that incident, and Fallon ran the show.

It is also noteworthy how Fallon ran the GWOT in the South Pacific, a theater in the larger war most Americans know virtually nothing about, but where the US and allies are kicking the snot out of the bad guys. By expanding influence in places like Singapore and leveraging soft power in the Philippines, the US has quietly concentrated pressure on extremest in the theater without generating much if any headlines, a model difficult to apply to the Middle East with troops engaged in mass on the ground.

Neptune Warrior 07 Begins

Official Royal Navy Announcement:


The UK’s largest maritime training course and a major air exercise are being brought together beneath, on and above the waters of the majority of the UK for the first time later this month (17-28 September 2007).

Neptune Warrior, a twice yearly Royal Navy and Royal Air Force run exercise, which qualifies British forces to work and fight in a task group this time will be coordinated and integrated with the RAF’s Exercise Sky Lance which aims to offer similarly aligned training.

The combined forces of Neptune Warrior and Sky Lance will feature a total of 17 warships and around 100 aircraft from the UK and eleven allied nations. The UK forces will be joined by forces from the United States, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Netherlands, Spain and Norway.

Order of Battle:

USS Cole (DDG 67)
USS McFaul (DDG 74)
USS John L. Hall (FFG 32)
USS Nicholas (FFG 47)
USS Elrod (FFG 55)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 204)

HDMS Absalon (L16)

SPS Blas de Lezo (F103)

FS Latouche Treville (D646)
FS Casabianca (S603)
FS Andromede (M643)

HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMS Montrose (F237)
HMS Westminster (F238)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Walney (M104)
HMS Shoreham (M112)

four nuclear-powered submarines

Farewell HMS Gotland, We Don't Need Ya Anymore

The departure of HMS Gotland in July ended the two year lease of the submarine. Several observers were disappointed to see HMS Gotland go, but not this one. The HMS Gotland has been only 1 piece of a larger 6 year old program called the Diesel Electric Submarine Initiative (DESI), a program few non submariners know much about. While HMS Gotland has captured all of the headlines over the last few years, DESI has been very active behind the scenes.

Last month the Brazilian submarine Tikuna (S 34) visited Mayport during its first deployment to a foreign country Aug. 3-13. Deployed in May, the submarine recently completed its exercises with the US Navy and is expected to return to Brazil in October.

Units from Canada, England, France and Peru worked together with Tikuna and the U.S. Navy to train in anti-submarine warfare. Tikuna participated in the following exercises: Composite Training Unit Exercise; Antisubmarine Warfare Exercise; and joint-service Exercise Valiant Shield 2007, which included Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower Strike Groups, along with British carrier HMS Illustrious (R06).

The unit from Puru mentioned in the article the submarine Chipana (SS 34), a Type 209 German-made diesel-electric submarine. The Chipana (SS 34) deployed in April for SUBDIEX 07, and is scheduled to return home on September 30th.

During SUBDIEX, Chipana, homeported Callao, Peru, will train in anti-submarine warfare with U.S. ships off the coast of Mayport and Norfolk. This is the 6th annual SUBDIEX, which started in 2002.

“This exercise is very important to Peru; we have the chance to work with the U.S. Navy, the most important and powerful Navy in the world. This is an excellent opportunity to train and improve the level of operation for both of our countries,” said Chipana’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Alessandro Mogni.

Chilean Type 209 CS Simpson (SS 21) arrived in San Diego last week to begin exercises in the Pacific until November.

“DESI brings South American submarines to train with our strike groups,” said Cmdr. Dan Bacon, Jr., anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training officer at Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet. “Their abilities, tactics and capabilities allow our strike groups to test and enhance our ASW aptitude.”

During their three-month deployment to North America, Simpson will conduct training with Tarawa and Abraham Lincoln Strike Groups as they continue to make preparations for future operations and deployments.

I for one think this is a much better way to run the program than the lease of the HMS Gotland, because while the Gotland is a fine submarines with a fine crew (I can verify that btw, I drank with them last year), increasing partnership with South American nations through ASW training is a smarter way to go. Partnership trumps contracting every time.

Also noteworthy, Chile the Type 209s for Chile and Peru were commissioned in the 80s, the submarines for Canada and Brazil have only been added into service since the Gotland lease for the most part. For the South American Navies the US Navy offers a unique training capability that many nations simply don't have easy access to due to distance. In many ways this is a major win in training for both participants.

Hat Tip: Bubblehead