
The Littoral Combat Ship is most appealing because of its sophisticated transformational capabilities — as envisioned, it is a unique capability addition to the fleet. Yet, it is the very complexities and costs associated with higher-end capabilities — such as its sleek, stealthy design, its fast speed and maneuverability, and its leading-edge mission module, unmanned vehicle and net-centric systems technology — that may make it impractical and unaffordable. The demand signal from Coast Guard mariners and Navy fleet war fighters for small combatants is loud and clear. The nation's maritime services need an efficient and systematic methodology to produce an effective small combatant today if we are to produce a balanced fleet for tomorrow.
Recent attention on the LCS program is raising questions about its viability. In the midst of press coverage on LCS costs, delays and fleet integration, older debates on fleet force structure are resurfacing. Although the LCS buzz comes from as many patrons as detractors, the fervor behind the current debate reflects lingering unresolved issues that surround the decades-long argument over fleet high/low capability mix and single/multimission vessel theories.
Nonetheless, recent analyses convincingly conclude that there is a dire need for a significant number of small surface combatants. The basic problem with LCS, however, seems to be that trying to design, build, deploy and sustain a small warship to do too many things is too expensive and fraught with difficulties.
It sums up the issues surrounding the LCS current to September 2007 very well, presenting both sides of the issue. A very good read, particularly done well summarizing the relation between the LCS and Deepwater that at one time, was thought to be a combined program to save costs, instead of two programs with out-of-control costs.
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