5th Fleet Focus: The Enemy Exploits the Gaps

The Discussion of Maritime Strategy is on, and it is over at CDRs place and at SJS's place. I intend to be focused on it at least once every day this week, and probably more than that for awhile. We are told the new Maritime Strategy is the "strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security." This was on my mind as I read this today.

Eagle1 picked up two reports of events taking place off Somalia. The first one.

The UN World Food Programme on Monday renewed pleas for deployment of foreign naval vessels to protect food aid in Somali waters, a day after its chartered freighter escaped a piracy attack.

On Sunday, WFP-chartered, Comoran-flagged MV Jaikur II came under attack 60 nautical miles off the Somali port of Brava, south of Mogadishu, where it had had just unloaded 7,275 metric tons of WFP food and was sailing back to Mombasa.

The pirates fired, but the ship managed to escape.

And this one.

Somali pirates have seized a cargo ship off the east African coast, the head of a local seafarer's association said on Monday.

Gunmen attacked the vessel on Wednesday, said Andrew Mwangura, the program co-ordinator of the East Africa Seafarers Assistance Programme, but due to chaotic communications with war-ravaged Somalia the incident had taken several days to confirm.

He did not have details on the number or nationality of the crew members aboard the Almarjan, a cargo ship of over 2 500 tons that was flying under a flag from the Comoros Islands and operated by Dubai-based Biyat International.

...

Somali pirates attacked four ships over two days last week, hijacking a Dubai-based vessel that is still in their possession, the head of a local seafarers group said Monday.

Pirates chased after three of the boats and shot at one of them on October 17 and 18, but the ships were able to escape a hijacking. The other, seized last Wednesday, was not as fortunate.

How timely. As I noted yesterday, the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) exited the region while the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) entered the AOR, both crossing the Suez Canal on Saturday. Somehow I missed that also crossing the Suez the same day was FS Commandant Blaison (F793), replaced by the FS Commandant Ducuing (F795) which entered the AOR. As I noted also entering the Red Sea was SNMG2, although SNMG2's destination is yet unknown.

Is strikes me as more than coincidence that the two ships most reported to be working off the coast of Somalia, specifically USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) and FS Commandant Blaison (F793) just happened to be returning home during these pirate attacks.

It is very clear the pirates of Somalia have excellent intelligence of coalition naval operations taking place in TF150. It also seems to me that somebody over at CENTCOM dropped the ball here. Either the forces covering for the two ships were unequal to the task, or CENTCOM made a conscience choice to not protect the coast due to some other reasons (force limitations perhaps) while rotations were taking place at the Suez. Either way, this has all the appearances of a blunder in dealing with piracy off the African West Coast.

The new Maritime Strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," offers specific guidance for the Navy through 6 Tasks, 6 Capabilities, and 3 Priorities. They are

Six Tasks:
1. Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power.
2. Deter major power war.
3. Win our Nation's wars.
4. Contribute to homeland defense in depth.
5. Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners.
6. Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system.

Six Capabilities
1. Forward Presence.
2. Deterrence.
3. Sea Control.
4. Power Projection.
5. Maritime Security.
6. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.

Three Priorities
1. Improve Integration and Interoperability.
2. Enhance Awareness.
3. Prepare our People.

I want to focus on the Task "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system." The strategy defines it as such:

Maritime forces will work with others to ensure an adequate level of security and awareness in the maritime domain. In doing so, transnational threats—terrorists and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; pirates; traffickers in persons, drugs, and conventional weapons; and other criminals—will be constrained.

By being there, forward deployed and engaged in mutually beneficial relationships with regional and global partners, maritime forces will promote frameworks that enhance security. When natural or manmade disasters strike, our maritime forces can provide humanitarian assistance and relief, joining with interagency and non-governmental partners. By participating routinely and predictably in cooperative activities, maritime forces will be postured to support other joint or combined forces to mitigate and localize disruptions.

I don't know the specific reasons this came to prominence in the new Maritime Strategy, but for us laymen looking for a reason why these types of maritime security issues matter to the larger regional maritime safety, I encourage you to check here and follow the links.

The new Strategy is designed to reach the interested citizens of the nation, what I call the Boston Maggie's of the US, although that might be setting the mark way too high cause she knows her stuff. Basically, interested citizen John's and Jane's who give a shit. So this is my citizen John and Jane test. If NATO, including the US Navy pulls off the coast of Somalia, and several ships get attacked by pirates including a ship chartered for the UN World Food Programme, did the Navy properly execute the strategic guidance as described above? I'd be willing to bet Maggie would say no.

I think it was the 'routine' and 'predictable' nature of rotations that allowed the pirates to disrupt the maritime domain off Somalia. I am pretty sure when the UN World Food Programme chartered vessel is attacked, it falls under the category of either pirate or 'other criminals' as described in the new Maritime Strategy.

In other words, allowing the enemy (pirates, criminals, whatever) exploit the gaps in our "forward presence," these incidents represent a failure in "preventing and containing local disruptions before they impact the global system."

Yes, I am borrowing a bunch of language from the new Maritime Strategy to highlight events. It is what it is, I didn't write it. I point out that the task "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system" is on an equal level as the task "Win our Nation's wars." The Navy has said as much, because the Navy has made a big deal about the task "Deter major power war" being on the same level as the task "Win our Nation's wars." So answer me this...

Is failure in "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system" equal to failure to "Win our Nation's wars?" Somehow, I seriously doubt it, nor would I advocate it to be, but if the Navy is serious about their own strategy they need to take very seriously the failure within the 5th Fleet regarding the recent activity off Somalia, because not to do so cheapens the content of the new Maritime Strategy.

I'll be watching Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, it could be we are seeing the very early implementation of new Maritime Strategy. I hope so, I also doubt it.