"Lack in Strategic Direction" for DoD R&D; Funding

The November edition of National Security Magazine is out, and it has a number of excellent articles. One of the more interesting, and timely IMO, article is the aptly named "Defense Department Should Refocus Technology Spending, Experts Warn" by Sandra I. Erwin.

The Pentagon’s research and development budget has never been bigger. Despite such largesse, investments in technology tend to miss the mark and do little to enhance the United States’ competitive standing as a high-tech powerhouse, said Pentagon advisors and outside analysts.

Defense research and development budgets will exceed $80 billion in fiscal year 2008, of which about $12 billion will be allocated to long-term science and technology projects. Most of the funds pay for so-called “applied research” for near-term needs — including modifications of existing weapon systems and war-related projects such as technologies to help troops detect and disarm roadside bombs.

But despite a steady rise in R&D spending, the Defense Department has not been able to replicate the technological success witnessed during the Cold War, when the Pentagon delivered a string of breakthrough technologies that, to this day, continue to provide military forces major advantages, such as unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, stealth and Global Positioning System satellites.

The problem today appears to be a “lack of strategic direction,” said an April 2007 report by the Defense Science Board, a senior-level advisory panel.

“The Defense Department science and technology programs are not well positioned to meet the nation’s strategic challenges,” the panel wrote. Further, the Pentagon “needs to understand the technological possibilities available to the United States and the options available to adversaries.”

A lack of strategic direction? The new Maritime Strategy, intended to provide vision for the strategic direction of the Navy doesn't help, as it directs the Navy to do everything.

Eighty billion dollars driven by no strategic direction at a time when all services are struggling to fund platforms that are either aging or in disrepair due to the war. To reinforce the point, the article goes on to cite Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter in a recent speech at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s technology symposium.

But Winter also cautioned that a techno-centric view of the world is not helpful in the context of current wars.

“America’s technological superiority has thus far not proven decisive in this war,” Winter said. “Because of the stark differences in literacy rates, in economic development, and in technological advances between those seen in the West and the rest, we have a tendency to underestimate the ability of the enemy — whether a country or a non-state actor — to use technology.”

The 9/11 attacks and the roadside bombs that target U.S. troops in Iraq, for example, were not technology surprises, he said. “Rather, they were unanticipated tactics and uses of technology, not unlike the use of kamikaze pilots in World War II.”

In the near term, Winter said, “We need to defeat this enemy’s ability to make tactical use of technology to strategic effect.”

The U.S. military also must consider that future adversaries will have access to militarily useful technology as readily as Americans do, he added. The harsh reality, said Winter, “is that the most technologically advanced country in the world is finding that its technological edge is not always a decisive advantage.”

This speaks directly to what I was talking about on Friday with the new Maritime Strategy. I see the MS as designed to treat the symptoms in the maritime strategic environment. It addresses everything from dealing with and preventing major power war to irregular challenges that can disrupt global economics in the maritime environment, but it does not focus on the core problems that create the symptoms, in fact it glosses over them and implies them without tackling them directly. America faces four challenges to our maritime superiority; the emergence of competition and/or cooperation with China, the diminishing domestic maritime industrial capacity, the irregular challenges to the global commons related to the rise of Islamic Extremists, and other non-state actors, and our increasing reliance on foreign sources of energy.

I believe that the Navy should have designed a strategy to specifically address the core problems facing the Navy, specifically building upon the traditional strengths of our nation and focusing them on the problems.

To address the rise of China the US needs to leap ahead of current capabilities, so when China arrives to the point we are today, we will be yet another generation --- or two ahead. This is done through R&D and innovation into the future of naval warfare: Unmanned air systems, underwater superiority strategies, and dedicated focus for space superiority. If a Navy has control over the sea and under the sea, a Navy has control of the entire sea. The purpose is to support a fleet to address major war situations.

To address the diminishing domestic maritime industrial capacity, the Navy can refocus its R&D budget to address new technologies, and build a combination of prototypes low cost vessels. The Navy built 8 single class nuclear submarines during the cold war, and built a number of other single class vessels, some of which still serve to this day (USS Enterprise (CVN 65)). The way I see it, the Navy is building prototypes today: LCS-1, LCS-2, DDG-1000, and DDG-1001 represent four different hulls and a variety of brand new technology. Not a single one of those ships currently has a long production run on order, nor will they for at least another year or two.
A shipbuilding strategy that builds single vessel classes insures maturity of design when production starts. It forces competing innovations that ultimately reduce cost. RAND has said as much in several studies of shipbuilding, specifically pointing out that the next submarine design needs to start in 2009 even though the SSBN(X) doesn't need to be fielded until 2024. Noteworthy, RAND pointed out that extra time in design always saves money. See the British recent trouble fielding their new nuclear subs for further evidence, which explains why the UK MoD is committed to keeping R&S funded as a top priority, even if the nation has to give up some of its industrial capacity due to costs. R&D is critical to keeping shipbuilding costs down, which is critical to keeping the domestic maritime industrial capacity healthy.

To address the irregular challenges to the global commons related to the rise of Islamic extremists, the Navy can build many lower cost platforms designed for the soft power mission that accept reduced capability at lower costs. This has been done before, the last time the Navy needed to fill a specialized gap was during the cold war, when the Navy built a reduced capability frigate for convoy escort. The Navy was able to mass produce the ship because of its intentional reduced capabilities, and the vessel is widely considered successful. The purpose is to support a fleet to address irregular warfare situations, and the healthy side effect is plenty of work for the domestic maritime industrial capacity.

Finally, R&D is critical to reducing our nations increasing reliance on foreign sources of energy, and the Navy has a role here. The USS Nautilus (SSN 571), the USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the USS Long Beach (CGN 9), and the USS Bainbridge (CGN 25) all represented a break from traditional power sources for naval vessels in the late 50s and early 60s. All 4 were single class vessels. Where is a similar strategy today? Nuclear technology isn't the only option, Hydrogen power technologies are coming online but suffering from a lack of research funding in fuel cells.

But proactive in new forms of energy isn't the only approach one can take with R&D, nuclear disposal is an alternative. Congress and the nation would be more open to nuclear technology if there was innovative techniques that reduced the cost of dealing with nuclear waste. Funding for that is minimal, but it is a concern soon to directly effect the Navy with the retirements of so many nuclear submarines. Where is the Navy on addressing our nations energy concerns? Out defending oil rigs...

In case you were wondering, other than the JSF, the majority of Navy R&D is dedicated to the development of the surface fleet, including faster, lighter, and stealthy among other things. Tango Bravo, UCAS-N development, and alternative energy funding by the Navy is less than a billion dollars total even if you combine all three.

R&D in the DoD is chaotic suffering from a lack of direction according to the Defense Science Board. Their complaints aren't in a vacuum though, it represents the yearning for a larger strategy based in American innovation for solutions to the problems creating the crisis's that ultimately require the bulk of our military attention in foreign policy. It has been said there is no evidence to support a larger DoD focus to leverage R&D as a strategy, and no pressure on the Navy. From what I can tell, there is plenty of evidence to say that yearning for a grand strategy indeed exists, in fact everyone is looking for one of the services to step up in the role of leadership, but it appears no one is listening, and no one is willing to articulate the vision required for such a strategy.