Littoral Combat Ship: More Dollars, Less Sense, and Critical Gaps

Defense Industry Daily has 2 new articles up on the LCS, specifically an update of recent events in the current Littoral Combat Ship program and news of Navy approval of the SUW module.

Starting with the Surface Warfare Module, NavyNewstand lists the SUW module components:

"...electro-optical/infrared sensors mounted on a vertical take off unmanned air vehicle [the MQ-8B Fire Scout] to provide over-the-horizon detection; 30mm guns to kill close-in targets; four [4] non-line-of-sight launching system [NLOS-LS/ "NetFires"]... container launch units, with each system containing 15 offensive missiles; and the MH-60R armed helicopter for surveillance and attack missions. The SUW mission package has software that interfaces with the LCS command and control system to maintain and share situational awareness and tactical control in a coordinated SUW environment…. The first two [2] SUW mission packages assembled for developmental and operational testing use the Mark 46 30mm gun made by General Dynamics Amphibious Systems."

DID goes on to ask the question for me:

The $400-500 million question is, will this be enough?...

As other DID articles have noted, this array plus a 57mm naval gun is a slim attack punch for a $400 million frigate-sized ship, with no torpedo launchers for snap engagement of submarines, and no missiles that could seriously threaten other warships. Even smaller designs like Denmark's SF300 FlexShips, which inspired the LCS' mission module design, pack both anti-shipping missiles and torpedo tubes.

The Navy continues to move forward despite cancellations and program cost troubles as both classes approach sea trials next year. The evaluation process leading to a Flight 1 design will be interesting to observe for a number of reasons, but beginning to top my list is that the choices for a Flight 1 LCS design have expanded considerably since the original Flight 0 order. While there are gains in modularity, the question that needs to be asked during the fiscal crunch is whether modularity is value for cost, the answer to which may be in the negative as costs continue to rise.

I have previously covered both the General Dynamics Multi-Mission Combatant and Lockheed Martin Multi-Mission Combatant export brochures that arm up the LCS design beyond the US Navy model which focuses on modularity. One of the interesting notes in the DID module article is the brochure for the LCS-I, the Israeli LCS that utilizes a lot of technology India has purchased into, which is noteworthy given a recent announcement that India is interested in the LM version of the LCS. Presumably, India and Israel are interested in the same version of the ship, something that could substantially lower cost.

Also relevant however is the interest of Saudi Arabia in the General Dynamics design. The primary difference in the armament of the two LCS designs lays in the type of VLS cells, the General Dynamics version has 16 tactical length cells for up to 64 RIM-162 ESSM anti-air missiles, while the Lockheed Martin version has strike length cells that could accommodate anti-ship missiles.

However, DID links to this article explaining that the General Dynamics version has recently hit a snag in construction.

Navy inspectors have documented numerous problems with construction of a next-generation vessel known as the littoral combat ship, or LCS, according to government records obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act.

Among the concerns singled out in more than 180 "corrective action reports'' filed between late 2005 and this May: botched welding, employees doing work for which they were not qualified and potentially dangerous misapplication of sound-dampening material.

Both the Navy and the lead contractor, Virginia-based General Dynamics Corp., downplay the significance of the reports. Neither, however, would say how much the rework, as repairs are commonly known, has contributed to the ship's ballooning price tag, now more than $100 million higher than originally expected.

....

When the General Dynamics/Austal team won the Navy contract to build the Independence almost two years ago, the ship was supposed to cost $223 million, with delivery set for this October. Now, delivery won't happen until next June, according to General Dynamics.

In addition, the cost will be at least 50 percent higher, Navy officials say, although they will not furnish a more precise number. In a separate forecast released last month, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office pegged the tab for the ship at $630 million, although that figure wraps in outfitting and other expenses not included in the Navy's original projection.

Many of the problems flagged in the corrective action reports appear to be minor. But at one point, the Navy faulted General Dynamics for "a lack of oversight'' in ensuring that Austal was meeting contractually required production and quality standards.

The price of the LCS has almost made the ship prohibitive, and one would think the class would already be canceled if the Navy wasn't facing critical gaps that are even more apparent given current events. One of the problems facing the Navy is in fact countering that which most people don't believe would ever happen, a first strike by a nation like China or Iran under any situation. Access to blue water for the US Navy tends to mitigate some of the problems the US Navy faces agaonst China, with the exception of MIW clearance, however Iran is a different problem and a situation the US may not have a choice in should Israel take unilateral action.

In an all out war scenario, the combination of small boats, submarines and mines in a condensed region like the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz would make naval operations difficult at best. Current US Navy minesweepers are capable platforms, for mine sweeping, but were never designed to operate in a contested environment and are over matched in firepower by even small boats operated by the IRGC. While the LCS is arguably better armed to deal with such threats, the weak initial armament on the modular version of the LCS, not to mention the relatively weak firepower on the modular version designed for surface warfare, is rightly questionable.

As I have pointed out in the past, the LCS is not about ASW, at least for the mid term no matter what some advocates try to say. This leaves the submariners with double duty during crisis against an opponent that operates submarines.

When the lack of realistic ASW support provided by the LCS is combined with the lack of firepower of the LCS on the MIW package, and the shortcomings of the existing SUW packages, and the incredible cost of the modular design the Navy is hopefully asking legitimate questions regarding the future of the LCS program. Unlike what was available at Flight 0, the Navy has several options for Flight 1 including multi-mission alternatives of the LCS hull design, and potentially other low cost precision weapons available. The FFG-7s are getting old, and need to be replaced sooner rather than later as they are slowly becoming less reliable. The Navy may be wasting time and taxpayer money at this point if the Navy doesn't see the LCS as the solution originally intended.