The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.
The second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in order to exclude a habit of thought, which is one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation. That error is the very general assumption that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The mere assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure naval strategy comes to an end.
This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth mentioning were it not for the constant recurrence of such phrases as: "If England were to lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her." The fallacy of the idea is that it ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes that if in the face of some extraordinary hostile coalition or through some extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without sufficient strength to keep the command, we should therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy getting it--a negation of the whole theory of war, which at least requires further support than it ever receives.
-Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian S. Corbett
Leading up to the release of the new Maritime Strategy, the warning Kaplan gave us earlier this month did not sit well with me. Kaplan foretold of a shift in naval thinking, a departure from Mahan and an embrace of Corbett as the guidance we should expect in the new strategy. Kaplan was right.
He was also right when he discussed his impressions earlier this week in his column.
In essence, this new maritime strategy represents a restrained, nuanced yearning for a bigger Navy, albeit one whose mission will be cooperation with other navies. That requires more than just new ships. “A key to fostering such relationships is development of sufficient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise among our Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners.” Such training costs money and creates bureaucratic challenges, but it helps lay the groundwork for an exceedingly gradual, elegant decline of the Navy’s capabilities—a future in which it has fewer platforms but gets more out of the ones it does have by working more closely with others.
Kaplan captures the tone precisely, what I have previously labeled confusing language before I realized why I was so confused. Apparently, Strategy1 is getting feedback from some saying that this new MS is not a strategy. I disagree, I find the strategy to be a well constructed, well thought out, well meaning document that does create a strategic vision for the Navy. It is a safe bet, low risk strategy that, as Kaplan noted, is intended to guide the Navy through uncertainty while manging the Navy's decline.
My problem isn't necessarily with the content of the strategy, on its own it is well done, but if the process of taking strategy to focus is the transition from vision to strategy, from strategy to tactical approach (medium-term) and from tactical approach to operational tasks and actions, my problem with the new MS starts with the vision and trickles its way down.
It is noteworthy that Kaplan sets the tone of decline as an accepted inevitability, because I think you have to approach the MS with the same tone in order to buy into it. The new MS is not a strategy for maintaining or extending superiority, rather a strategy to maintain superiority while also conceding it. The strategy vision expressed in the MS (that both Kaplan and I see) stipulates that the United States is in decline of Maritime Superiority, and that the US Navy can manage the decline through cooperation with other nations. By stipulating the vision of US decline, the strategy accepts that the United States will not be able to achieve solutions to prevent the decline, and outlines a strategy for the Navy to manage the symptoms of the decline in a manner to at best maintain Command of the Sea, and at least maintain Uncommand of the Sea in the spirit of Corbett.
When the vision behind the strategy accepts decline, implementation of the strategy will almost certainly insure decline.
It is not difficult to see why such a well outlined, well meaning strategy is so widely rejected. The strategy does not reflect the spirit of Americans, nor the characteristics that best represent the nature of our people. The strategy does however, reflect the Institutional thinking we see coming from the Navy.
Americans are bold, aggressive, and ambitious. It is why Europeans often call us rude, intruding, and meddlesome. We are a people who embrace entrepreneurship, innovation, and confront challenges. We desire to be the best, cheer for winners and do not accept second best as good enough.
I see the MS as designed to treat the symptoms in the maritime strategic environment. It addresses everything from dealing with and preventing major power war to irregular challenges that can disrupt global economics in the maritime environment, but it does not focus on the core problems that create the symptoms, in fact it glosses over them and implies them without tackling them directly. America faces four challenges to our maritime superiority; the emergence of competition and/or cooperation with China, the diminishing domestic maritime industrial capacity, the irregular challenges to the global commons related to the rise of Islamic Extremists, and other non-state actors, and our increasing reliance on foreign sources of energy.
It is said the strategy implies dealing with these issues, but mentioning these issues as part of the environment is not the same as designing a strategy in dealing with them. It is difficult to say the Navy is taking a strategic approach to expand superiority over China. China may not be building a modern fleet today, but everyone knows they soon will be. Where in the strategic vision to invalidate the AIP submarine as a strategic threat? Don't tell me it is "We will continue to hone the tactics, training and technologies needed to neutralize this threat." Is that strategic vision, or sales material?
The protection of foreign sources of energy is why the MS requires "Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces." It seems to me that if the Navy was serious about a strategic approach to securing our nations energy resources, they would invest in technologies like fuel cells, alternative hydrogen energies, etc.. and build an AIP submarine. That is more strategic in solving the nations problems than deploying 60 ships in 20 locations to protect offshore drilling, or competing over polar regions which will require forces to protect territory claims for drilling rights.
I see the MS as a reflection of the same Institutional thinking we have seen coming from the Navy this decade. A Navy that believes in 40 knot minesweepers but has been weak in investing in underwater superiority or alternative fuel technologies. A Navy in pursuit of incredibly expensive, large surface combatants at the expense of more ships, while at the same time complaining about the lack of ships. A Navy that shifts aircraft carriers and submarines to the Pacific because of China, but is reluctant to name China directly in its own maritime strategy.
The strategy itself isn't the problem, it is a reflection of the problem in my opinion. The Navy vision accepts decline, avoids confronting challenges, and emits a tone of pessimism. It doesn't inspire, it doesn't live up to the modern ideals expected from our nations services, because it doesn't reflect the spirit of the American people. I am confident that the new MS will be effective in managing decline under the leadership of the Navy, but in general I am disappointed in the new MS and the Navy for conceding decline by designing a strategy to manage it in the first place.
I don't like strategies based on a vision of pessimism, and I am not surprised others don't either.
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