PLAN: Mine Warfare Wolf Packs as an Anti-Submarine Warfare Strategy - Updated

The Winter 2007 edition of Undersea Warfare Magazine had an article regarding the use of Mine Warfare as a 'poor mans solution' to anti-submarine warfare. As I was reading through the article, I was reminded again and again of the various articles written this year regarding the PLAN underwater warfare strategy unfolding through various, but relatively few sources of information. The Undersea Warfare Magazine article is easily the best researched, but it is noteworthy that other sources reinforce the claims, and as the picture is formed us laymen can get a sense of the PLAN strategy.

Recent Chinese MIW exercises have involved air, surface and even civilian platforms extensively. Of particular interest in this forum, however, is that China’s navy also considers mine laying from submarines to be “the most basic requirement of submarine warfare.” Mine-laying has become an integral component of recently enhanced Chinese submarine force training45 in which crews strive to conduct a wider variety of increasingly challenging exercises attuned to local environmental, hydrographic, and weather conditions. Such exercises are documented in some detail in the PLA Navy’s official newspaper, People’s Navy (Renmin Haijun). In particular, China’s navy views submarine delivery of mines as a critical aspect of future blockade operations. By 2002, mine-laying had become one of the most common PLAN submarine combat methods. Accordingly, PLAN crews train to handle submarines loaded with large quantities of mines. Drill variants include “‘hiding and laying mines in deep water.’” Broad and deep mine-laying against port targets is also emphasized.

Chinese naval officers recognize the challenges inherent in “penetrating the enemy’s anti-submarine forces and laying mines behind enemy lines.” According to one PLA Navy captain, “Secretly penetrating the combined mobile formation deployed by the enemy’s anti-submarine forces is a prerequisite to fulfilling the mine-laying task.” There is some evidence that China may rely on centralized control of its submarines when conducting offensive mining missions. In carrying out offensive mine blockades, notes one Chinese analysis, “…if there is a shore-based submarine command post to handle command and guidance of the submarine for its entire course, it will not only ensure its concealment but also improve the strike effectiveness of the mines… that are laid.”

The Chinese Navy is working hard to improve the quality of its submarine officers and sailors, including their proficiency in MIW. China’s official radio cited PLA Navy submarine detachment torpedo and mine officer Chao Chunyi for achieving sixteen research results in underwater mine-laying training, cutting mine loading time in half, and developing a mine movement control device. Song Submarine 314 Commander Ma Lixin, a celebrity in China’s naval press, recently led an East Sea Fleet submarine detachment to “develop tactical innovations.” In the past year, Ma researched and developed over ten new operational methods “including how to carry out a blockade and how to lay mines using conventional submarines.” In early 2005, Ma “led his unit to participate in live exercises at sea… they arrived at a designated area to… [lay] mines.” In an early 2005 mine exercise, Ma was charged with evading ‘enemy’ ASW airplanes, a mine field, and - most difficult of all - an adversary submarine, in order to lay mines in a nearby area. He used his mastery of the local environment, adopted minimum noise navigation speed, eluded the ‘enemy’ submarine and shore radar and accomplished the mine laying mission on time. In summarizing such achievements, a source notes, “This year there occurred even more enhanced submarine mine exercises with step-by-step progress….”

One of the interesting items that came out after both of these articles were written is how the PLAN has been deploying submarines in exercises. Good content is hard to come by, so I have had to rely mostly on my first hand sources from Asia that base their opinions on mostly their own research. The China Defense Blog reported one such story back in May.

One day in mid May, reporters witnessed a confrontation training involving multiple submarines staged by a submarine flotilla of the East China Sea Fleet. According to the chief of staff of the flotilla, with its successful leap from the primarily single submarine training to the multi-submarine joint training under complex conditions, the flotilla has noticeably hoisted its striking performance.

　　Recent years saw this submarine flotilla growing full-fledged in the course of stretching its reaches from south to north and from the offshore to the open seas.

　　In the evolution from the single-submarine training to the multi-submarine joint training under complex conditions, its sense of mission and sense of responsibility in boosting energetically the transformation of military training are epitomized. With its resolve to drop the traditional "guerillaist" method of single-submarine training, the flotilla spares no effort to seize the initiative in acquiring the long-distance joint maneuver capability. To this end, it has advanced from technical training to tactical training, from element-by-element and separate training to integrated training involving the whole system, from training under uncomplicated battlefield environment to confrontational training under complex battlefield circumstances, which resulted in the all-round rise of its abilities in command and control, rapid response, joint strike and integrated training.

This is a theme I have been reading and hearing a lot about lately. Originally, as one of my Aussie friends puts it, no one believed China had the capability to operate in Wolf Packs because the prevailing assumption was China lacked the technology in undersea communications to coordinate an attack. However, as exercises have been continuously observed, there are observations regarding the Chinese Wolf Pack worth noting. The nuke boats tend to be hunters, and the prevailing theory is the Wolf Pack tactics are being developed for MIW operations as apart of the larger sea denial strategy.

When you consider the presence of an older Ming in these Wolf Packs, one of the common theories in simulation circles is these submarines would be utilized as lures, or bait, for enemy submarine forces to bring them into minefields specifically designed to defeat enemy submarines. In an area denial strategy, these older conventional submarines would optimally be deployed as lures in mined areas where a denial strategy exists against airborne ASW assets.

It was recently reported the Yuan (039A) class has hit mass production, if this is indeed true the Ming's would likely be replaced by the Song's in this role. The use of Kilo's and Yuan's in these type of Wolf Pack roles for MIW would make it very difficult on adversary submarines to operate freely in contested waters without reliable, organic MIW detection capabilities.

The same authors also contributed to the Naval War College Review 2007 paper China's future nuclear submarine force: insights from Chinese writings, which has some overlap but also a lot more content and additional observations regarding the PLAN nuclear submarine strategy specifically. It would be interesting to get an updated opinion from these authors. With the recent photography of the 093 showing the submarine is closer to a Western design as opposed to a Russian design (see picture to right), and word of the 095 now under construction, I would be curious if they would adjust any of their analysis based on new information.

Update1: Just thinking out loud here, but I wonder if Song Submarine 314 is the same Song class submarine able to penetrate close to the Kitty Hawk CSG in November 2005. If you read the story as claimed in the article, well..., it certainly reads like the same incident.