We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior - of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.
One of the challenges facing the Army will be how to incorporate the latest in technology without losing sight of the human and cultural dimensions of the irregular battlefield. For example, we have spent billions on tools and tactics to protect against IEDs. Yet, even now, the best way to defeat these weapons - indeed the only way to defeat them over the long run - is to get tips from locals about the networks and the emplacements or, even better, to convince and empower the Iraqis to prevent the terrorists from emplacing them in the first place.
In addition, arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police - once the province of Special Forces - is now a key mission for the military as a whole. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.
The same is true for mastering foreign language - a particular interest of mine - and building expertise in foreign areas. And until our government decides to plus up our civilian agencies like the Agency for International Development, Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. All these so-called “nontraditional” capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy - where they must stay.
Finally, there is a generation of junior and mid level officers and NCOs who have been tested in battle like none other in decades. They have seen the complex, grueling face of war in the 21st century up close. They’ve lost friends and comrades. Some have been deployed multiple times and want to have a semblance of a normal life - get married, start a family, continue their schooling.
These men and women need to be retained, and the best and brightest advanced to the point that they can use their experience to shape the institution to which they have given so much. And this may mean reexamining assignments and promotion policies that in many cases are unchanged since the Cold War.
Transcript
The differences in thinking between Gates and Rumsfeld is noteworthy. Emerging in the Pentagon is depth in approach to shaping conditions.
In both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches to war, less is now assumed to be more. The targeting process combinations of smaller weapons with precision strike that account for the human cultural dimensions of the target highlights the considerations the military is taking to not only shape the battlefield in the kinetic phase but also prepare the battlefield in the post kinetic stability and support phase.
When you consider the contrast of the new US approach to warfare and the approach of "Shock and Awe" that was designed to impose will through intimidation and fear on the masses, much has changed in only a short time. In the 21st century, I consider it unlikely a western nation will ever attempt to impose its will on the masses through intimidation and fear by kinetic military force without using nuclear weapons. To add an element of fear to a military strike by the US in the future, the US would have to project the potential for mass casualties as a result of our strike. That seems unlikely, as the process of accounting for and avoiding human casualties has become part of the strike process, to produce a result of mass casualties is counter to strike CONOP.
While kinetic striking power may not be capable of producing the result of intimidation and fear on the masses without the threat of nuclear weapons, other offensive military techniques, both new and traditional, can. Whether it is the prolonged loss of electricity in a modern city or the loss of information control in a closed state, globalization and interconnectivity provide alternative strategies in exploiting human cultural dimensions in war outside the traditional kinetic options.
Sometimes we get lucky. Gates appears to be the right man, in the right place, at the right time.
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