Who Will Save the Fleet Before Its Too Late?

Since I am pretty much convinced the Bush administration is perhaps the greatest enemy of the US Navy since.. well, before the Great White Fleet, the gloves are coming off. Partisans on the right don't want to hear that, however the raw facts will leave them disappointed. I hear a lot of former sailors talk about how Clinton really screwed the fleet. Well, I agree, but looking at the data it is hard to argue that Bush hasn't made things twice as screwed. Without action starting this fiscal year, and by action I am talking new ideas and new plans, the Bush administration will leave the US Navy broken for decades to come. This matters to Americans whether they realize it or not, because in the coming decades this nation will need the Navy. People have asked me why I am harsh on both Republicans and Democrats? The answer is, because I have lost trust in the Democrat Party to build a strong military, and any Republican administration like the current one will cripple the US Navy, starting the long fall the British know too well today.

The US Navy is the reason the UK doesn't feel the fall of the Royal Navy, but when the US Navy falls, who will be there to shield us from the pain? Is it in China someone trusts...

From the CBO about CVN-79.

Section 122 of the FY2007 defense authorization act [H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2024]) established a procurement cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors, and a procurement cost cap for subsequent ships in the class of $8.1 billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. The Navy interprets these caps as being expressed in “FY2006 then-year dollars,” meaning the cost of the ship in then-year dollars if the ship were procured in FY2006 rather than in FY2008 (for CVN-78) or in FY2012 (for CVN-79). The Navy states that the estimated then-year-dollar costs for CVN-78 and CVN-79 of about $10.5 billion and $9.2 billion, respectively, de-escalate into FY2006 then-year dollar figures of about $10.0 billion and $7.4 billion, respectively.

That is a lot of money for an aircraft carrier, but the aircraft carrier is the proven superior surface platform of the last 60+ years. The CBO testimony to the House Armed Services Committee back on July 24th lays out the costs of the 2nd next generation CVN. That is a complicated quote, but note that in fiscal year 2012, 4 years from now, CVN-79 is expected to be purchased for $9.2 billion dollars.

This is from the Bloomberg article I linked to yesterday.

England approved adding $693 million through 2013 for the new Zumwalt class DDG-1000 destroyer to be built by Northrop and General Dynamics, bringing funding for its development to about $9.29 billion, the Navy's highest projected cost.

That is the Navy's highest projected cost, lower than the CBO and virtually every NGO projected cost. That is $9.29 billion dollars for DDG-1000 and DDG-1001, and given the horrible track record on cost predictions for ships, we all know the costs will ultimately be much, much higher. At least the CVN is being built based on a proven design, the DDG-1000 is a brand new design for virtually every part of the platform, it's cost will go up, it always goes up.

CDR Salamander makes the argument that the new LCS cuts proposed for FY09 is going to reduce the numbers of the fleet. He has predicted the Navy will drop to 200 ships, I'm starting to think he was right. This blog, his blog, and other blogs have covered problems with the LCS, from crew problems to credibility problems to cost problems. Given the range of problems, I have a hard time not agreeing the LCS program needed a major slow down as a program. In my opinion, and I will debate anyone willing to offer a rebuttal, the LCS is not the platform to blame for the shrinking fleet, the blame needs to be properly directed at the DDG-1000 class.

The DDG-1000 is the primary cause for concern in the shipbuilding industry and the future of the Navy. For a construction run of only 7 ships, 6 of which will be going to a single shipbuilder to conserve costs, the Navy is spending $27.1 billion dollars for the DDG-1000 class. Even after spending $9.29 billion on DDG-1000 and DDG-1001, it should be pointed out the Navy could take the remainder of the DDG-1000 class budget and still buy 40+ Littoral Combat Ships at the way over budget price of $400 million per. This plan will result in the loss of thousands of highly skilled shipbuilders, who would have plenty of work with even 20 ships, but not even close with just 7.

The DDG-1000 is half the cost of an aircraft carrier but intended to have the characteristics of a submarine. The problem is the DDG-1000 is not a submarine, and with the exception of air defense, MSO, and NSFS the Navy already has 4 submarines able to conduct every other mission profile the 7 DDG-1000 will perform, and the SSGNs can perform those roles better. Is the DDG-1000 needed for air defense, MSO, or NSFS? The answer is absolutely not. For air defense, the Navy already has 84 AEGIS ships over 9,000 tons each either already in the fleet or soon to finish construction. These ships do not need to be replaced until 2022, but they will need to be replaced. The DDG-1000 is not intended to be a replacement for any of those 84 highly capable ships. For MSO the Navy has the previously mentioned 84 AEGIS ships, the existing twenty something FFG-7 frigates, and the planned 21 Littoral Combat Ships. For NSFS, the Navy has 106 5" gun systems on the previously mentioned 84 AEGIS ships, all of which could be upgraded in the upcoming modernization program, and the new gun system intended for the DDG-1000 is not platform specific, in fact it could be deployed to an alternative platform at a much reduced cost.

The DDG-1000 does not fit the new Maritime Strategy. As we and others have discussed, the Maritime Strategy the Navy released last month expresses greater emphasis for a fleet that is expeditionary in nature with persistence on its operational area as a primary objective, and the strategy implies a Navy with credibility to prevent conflict. Presence is emphasized. The characteristics of Expeditionary platforms with the capability for sustained presence include metrics of sustainable logistics, deployable forces capability, endurance, and credible deterrent capability in the form of firepower designed to prevent conflict in troubled, loosely governed regions of high commercial traffic locations for economic security. The DDG-1000, and the Littoral Combat Ship, do not fit these metrics.

The Future begins now, because it takes years to build even a single warship. Shipbuilding takes time for design and deployment, and a fleet able to meet the requirements of the United States of America requires careful planning and strategic vision. The Navy appears determined to build a fleet that does not match the stated metrics of its own strategy, a fleet designed before the 9/11 world, a fleet based on the lessons of the cold war, and a fleet that further reduces the industrial capacity of the nations few remaining shipyards in the process. If action is not taken, the further eroding industrial capability supporting the US Navy will not be available in the future when required to do so.

Under the Bush administration, the Navy has built 50% FEWER ships than under the Clinton Administration at over 50% more dollars per long ton. The Bush administration has recorded some of the largest budgets in history, and yet the Navy has been downsizing its naval aviation budgets, AND its R&D budgets for new technologies, just to sustain the slowest annual shipbuilding rate for the Navy since WWII. The people appointed by the current president (specifically Rumsfeld and every SECNAV except Winter) have been absolute failures by ANY measurement. The health of the shipbuilding industry has been so bad that Congress has had to pay to maintain its second shipyard that builds nuclear submarines, one of only two shipyards in the nation able to build nuclear powered vessels.

The Bush administration has not been friends with the USMC at sea either. The USMC has already lost the capability to deploy a full brigade from sea, a critical requirement highlighted in the 1997 QDR with virtually the same language the Navy reused for the new Maritime Strategy which emphasizes Expeditionary capabilities. Current plans for future USMC sea based capability move Marines off the Marine L class ships, in favor of a new industry created plan intended to deploy Marines from unarmed commercial ship designs used by the Military Sealift Command, which btw is unable to deploy Marines against a hostile coast (nor should it considering its vulnerability), which is the primary capability of the USMC.

Under the Bush administration, the metrics for the future fleet have been to build a 'destroyer' class of 15,000 tons, at the cost of an aircraft carrier and characteristics of a submarine; surface combatants nearly three times larger than the largest, most capable 'destroyers' built by Europeans. Meanwhile the metrics of the Littoral Combat Ship, a barely armed naval truck, are high speed instead of endurance, less armor protection to save weight, with a modular payload system that can't be swapped at sea, instead forcing the little crappy ship to return to a port of not only a friendly nation who gives permission, but with a port that has the facilities necessary to exchange a mission module. The emphasis to save money with fewer sailors on ships has resulted in a LCS ship design that doesn't have enough sailors to manage the primary systems, nor enough capacity to hold enough crew for the proposed mission modules. This smaller crew size requirement is directly counter to traditional maritime theory that requires sailors in disaster management, meaning not only is the crew expendable on this barely armed or armored super ferry warship, but without enough sailors to manage fire or battle damage the ship itself is apparently expendable as well.

Finally, the Bush administration has retired more Navy warships than any other president in the last 4+ decades, but instead of saving the ships in reserve, has additionally sunk more tonnage in weapon testing than any administration since nuclear testing against warships early in the cold war. This leaves the nation with few recapitalization options in reserve, forcing the nation to build new ships in order to sustain a credible sized fleet.

The last three first in class Navy ships designed include the LPD-17, SSN-774, and LCS-1 which have experienced cost increases of 70%, 11%, and 80% respectfully. The submarine cost increases have been the lowest by percentage, but as a reward this administration has built fewer submarines resulting in the smallest submarine force in the US Navy since WWII, at a time when submarine exports across the world are at the highest level in history, with the future market prospects at an even higher level of expectation.

Where is Congress? Where are the talking heads in the media? Why did Congress ask for alternative fleets in 2004, then accept the unrealistic fleet produced by the Navy? Where is the Analysis of Alternative's for a shrinking fleet? Who is going to highlight the problems, articulate them, explain them, address them, and save the fleet while the nation still has one? Where is the leadership? Are there enough Americans out there left who care?