The Navy’s top strategist has floated to the chief of naval operations three alternatives to the service’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan that if adopted would radically reshape American naval power.
The three options are contained in a 26-page briefing titled “Three Futures, One Navy, A Portfolio Analysis” by Vice Adm. John Morgan, the service’s strategy chief, which was e-mailed to Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations, just before the Thanksgiving holiday.
OK so it is basically an informal process at this point, but at least there is some process in development.
Each of the notional fleets increases amphibious ships but cuts submarines, while one increases the number of aircraft carriers. Two of the options would dramatically increase the number of small corvettes, patrol craft and riverine forces.
The briefing assumes the Navy’s ship construction budgets will remain constant at about $12.5 billion annually over the coming three decades for a total of $377 billion. But that $12.5 billion figure, sources said, is below the roughly $15 billion annual shipbuilding budget that the service has previously said it would achieve over the coming years, which is critical to the execution of the current 30-year plan.
Each of the options assume the following unit costs: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at $5 billion, big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers of either LHA or LHD classes at $2.5 billion, amphibious ships of LSD or LPD classes at $1 billion, cruisers and destroyers at $1 billion, corvettes of the LCS class at $500 million, patrol craft at $100 million, riverine squadrons at $100 million, submarines at $2.5 billion, and auxiliaries at $500 million.
The devil is in the details here, note some important characteristics of these early discussions. First, it needs to be noted that the Navy is run by surface warfare and aviation officers, so it should not too surprising they would look to cut submarines first, or even look to increase the number of aircraft carriers. Submarines are expensive, and it is an easy place to grab money quickly over an extended period of time.
I'm not too impressed with the costing here, lets face it, the figures are not realistic, but the Navy doesn't have a reputation of realism with their budgets anyway, so we'll let that slide a bit as well. Otherwise, there is great stuff here.

First note that the emphasis is to increase amphibious ships. While the LPD-17 certainly got off to the wrong start, the hull is widely recognized as a terrific platform, and can be reused in a number of ways. The Mesa Verde (LPD 19), commissioned this past weekend, reminds us that after you get through early problems a class of ships can be built to meet price targets and with excellent quality.
I have argued for more Amphibious ships even before the new Maritime Strategy, but with the new Strategy it is almost a foregone conclusion the need exists. The problem of coarse is how do you pay for them, and should the Navy stick with standard configurations beyond the first 10 LPD-17s built. I would argue, emphatically even, the answer is no.
One of the great things about the LPD-17 design is that it is so big, it can be adjusted to give more or less of certain capabilities. I would propose the way forward is to dust off the "50 ft plug" version of the LPD-17, increasing the size of the well deck to support 3 LCACs or 2 LCAC(X), and increase the aviation facilities to support 2 MV-22s, thus building 4 larger LPD-17s specific to the task of "Forward Operating Bases," otherwise known as motherships. Additionally, instead of filling the ship solely with Marines, the Navy should build and deploy surface craft the size of the original LCAC built specifically as small independent FACs, deployable from the improved LPD design.
They should be armed, fast, and able to be logistically supplied by helicopter for extended operations if necessary. These small deployable fast attack patrol craft would replace the $100 million patrol craft described above. By making these patrol craft deployable by well decks, the Navy solves several of the problems associated with deployments and logistics in operating theaters. They should be treated as commissioned warships.
The mothership would be nuclear powered, to give it greater range and faster speed for quick response to regional developments. With a focus on Command and Control and Logistics, they should also be armed for limited strike operations as well, but treated as High Value Units specific to addressing irregular warfare challenges. Roles not only include the capability to be utilized as an Amphibious Ship, but additionally as a rapid response vessel to humanitarian crisis in forward deployed theaters. Consideration should be given to providing the facilities necessary to perform the roles of Partnership Stations, which means first class medical facilities and a machine shop capable of small repairs coast guard vessels of partner nations. Instead of cargo loads of Marine vehicles, detachment vehicles able to be airlifted is all that would be required, instead allowing the Navy to forward stage unmanned systems of all kinds for distribution to other naval assets operating in theater.
Following the construction of the original pair of Littoral Combat Ships, I hope the Navy considers a mix of "naval trucks" and "LCS Corvettes." There is certainly some value for the "naval truck" concept, but without a tender to exchange mission modules at sea, these ships will ultimately fall short of expectation. The OHPs need a replacement just as badly as the now retired Osprey class, mixing the build to include various types of LCS class ships gives the Navy flexibility in developing its concepts for small, fast, low cost warships.
This approach also allows the Navy to test the above LPD-17 "50 ft plug" proposed above as a forward deployed mission module tender for the LCS class. With all that cargo space on the LPD-17 hull, the ship should be able to deploy numerous mission modules, and support the maintenance facilities that are also lacking forward deployed in supporting unmanned systems. We already know the LCS isn't large enough to carry all the toys the Navy wants to move forward, so why not carry the tools forward on a forward operating "Sea Base" and allow them to be swapped in and out as required. This reduces the need to continue requirement creep into future LCS designs, as repairs of UUVs can be conducted by a forward unit, but additionally if a certain unmanned system is needed in greater numbers than the programmed modules intend, that will be available as well. The Navy would end up with a high end naval truck for unmanned systems fully supported by a forward operating "Sea Base," but additionally the same "Sea Base" can support unmanned systems from the smaller "LCS Corvette," other surface vessels in theater, and additionally in smaller numbers from the deployable patrol craft.
How do you pay for these ideas? Well, if the Navy canceled the DDG-1000, they would find $15 billion to buy all of what is being discussed above, and I find it hard to believe, even with nuclear power, what is being discussed would cost that amount of money. This is the first of several ideas on how to free money to expand the fleet.
The above proposal would eliminate 5 DDG-1000s but would add 12-16 additional ships, 4 motherships and between 8 and 12 fast patrol craft, a net gain of 7-11, and additionally move money to allow for a larger variety of options based on the LCS hull designs. Because this proposal removes the need to increase the size of the LCS to overcome shortcomings in the current design, there is a good argument you can also find additional LCS hulls in this proposal.
Is it a cost saver in the operational budget? Over time, nuclear power would probably be cheaper and built in logistics models can certainly save money for small craft and for LCS logistics, but in absolute terms it is difficult to give a definitive answer. It will certainly save money in the shipbuilding budget though.
No comments:
Post a Comment