Observing the Absence of Naval COIN

Some thinkers have the ability to capture profound thoughts in a short paragraph. I do not have that skill, this blog from the beginning was designed to assume the reader is not a professional, rather an interested observer looking to learn something new, follow the links, and keep learning. We detail explanations here so the novice can learn about the Navy, and we have no intention to change our approach for now.

One thinker we read daily is Thomas P.M. Barnett. Today he makes a quick observation that in our opinion is profound in its depth to so many topics we address on this blog. We could go 20 ways with this observation, and feel free to do so in the comments, but we will attempt to stay on topic.

As ground forces increasing induce force requirements (what they must buy) from current operations, and naval/air tend to stick with deep-into-the-future deductive methods for figuring out what to buy (imagine the distant opponent and buy against that target), the green (Army/Marines) and blue (Navy/Air) will increasingly see different worlds.

To me, that is the essential, unavoidable SysAdmin/Leviathan split.

Barnett is acknowledging the challenges, but we note not necessarily challenges without solutions. Shipbuilding represents huge investments in capital for platforms that must maintain relevance over a platforms service life of between 25-50 years.

We always approach from a naval perspective, and noted the irony that on the same day Barnett is making his observation the Small Wars Journal is highlighting the latest edition of the Air & Space Power Journal which has a number of articles related to the roles of air power and Air Force capabilities in a Counterinsurgency / Irregular Warfare environment. If the Air Force is discussing its role in Counterinsurgency / Irregular Warfare, and the new Maritime Strategy specifically addresses the Navy meeting irregular challenges, where are the comprehensive discussions, debates, and ideas in the open source on US Navy approaches to COIN and irregular warfare? I scouted the entire Small Wars Journal, the closest thing to the bible of COIN, and not once have they used the tag "Navy." Proceedings? Don't get me started. The NWC has good stuff in the Reviews, a lone voice perhaps 4 times a year, but not always.

Should the Navy discuss counterinsurgency? We think so, we would love to see the Small Wars Journal expand to include the discussion of COIN for the Navy. The reality is almost all major battles at sea so far this century can be broken down into one of two types, either action taken by a group inside a sovereign nation for the purpose of achieving political power in the host nation, or a criminal action enabled by a permissive political body inside a sovereign host nation. In other words, some form of political insurgency or a form of criminal smuggling/piracy.

From an insurgency perspective, whether you are talking Sri Lanka, Nigeria, or even the missile attack by Hezbolloh from Lebanon to a certain extent, the situations where naval combat has occurred in these areas is enabled by political motivations. These insurgencies can also lead to criminal behavior, as is the case in Nigeria, and can resemble other criminal actions we often see manifested in piracy in other places like Indonesia, Somalia, and Guyana.

We just do not see the Navy taking what Barnett calls a "sysadmin" approach until something changes in the procurement decision making. As we have previously highlighted, naval platforms and technology is more important to addressing irregular warfare challenges at sea than platforms are on land. As we observe current events in the Navy, the only future platform we see dedicated to the roles of irregular warfare at sea is the Littoral Combat Ship, a platform void of manpower, thus we would argue poorly suited for irregular warfare during peacetime. As we see it, unmanned platforms multiply the capabilities of the warfighting at sea, but the Navy needs manpower to multiply the effects of peacemaking at sea.

In the Navy, the buzz word of "littoral" is used to bridge the gap between blue navy and land influence, and all potential missions between. Thus the "Littoral Combat Ship" became the platform to handle all such roles required. While we believe it does indeed take a platform approach, we believe the irregular challenges at sea are broader than what a single platform or capability can provide alone, and as Global Fleet Stations is highlighting, successful approaches will require more than one agency as well, realizing the true meaning of the "Joint Services" concept in both peace and war to include multiple agencies.

While it sounds like another buzz word, the conceptual approach label the Navy really needs is the "Littoral Strike Group" to meet irregular and peacemaking challenges outlined in the new Maritime Strategy. Basically the "other shit" strike group, or as Barnett would say the "Everything Else Strike Group" that compliments phase 0 and post war phase peacemaking requirements at sea, but also has the tools to meet the irregular warfighter requirements outside of the more traditional CSG / ESG organizations and capabilities.

The way we see it, current shipbuilding plans don't have a strategy behind them, and the new strategy doesn't support the current plans. We aren't the only people who sees it that way though, that is how Congress looked at the Navy the other day on Capital Hill. Until what the Navy builds matches what they want to do, everything will continue to be a mess. Now that the Navy has the intellectual basis, the Maritime Strategy, to provide vision for the requirements to be met by the Fleet, the Navy needs the leadership, and perhaps more importantly, the discussions and debates in the open source to intellectually justify new approaches that must be taken if the Navy is serious about dealing with 21st century irregular warfare challenges.