New Year Brings New Australian Defense Debacle to Discuss

With the Collins class submarines working better than originally planned, and the Super Seasprite not quite shiny enough to make a big headline, the latest Royal Australian Navy spending debacle has the early makings of something the Australian press can sink their teeth into. What is interesting about this story to me is that it has all the elements needed to create mass disinformation, from politics to foreign influence.

AFTER a $1.4 billion "upgrade" the navy's front-line fighting ships cannot defend themselves and are unable to be sent into battle.

A navy whistleblower says sending the 4000-tonne Adelaide Class Guided Missile Frigates to war would be like sending a VK Commodore to race at Bathurst.

Senior officials admit the 1997 FFG upgrade project was a "debacle" created by the Howard government's decision to maximise the sale price of the Sydney-based contractor Australian Defence Industries when it was sold to the French firm Thales.

The Adelaide Class frigates will eventually be replaced by the Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyer ordered last year. While delivery schedules are preliminary, the Adelaide class is expected to serve in the fleet for about five more years.

Apparently, this problem has had an effect on morale. If the whistle blower is in fact telling the truth, the problems for the Adelaide class are total. Virtually every aspect of systems integration has failed. In several ways, this is difficult to believe, and reminds us of similar issues we have seen with the Super SeaSprite program. How is it that so many proven technologies can produce so many software problems? Australia is unique in regards to this problem as well, as other nations have not experienced similar problems with similar platforms, Egypt and their SH-2Gs comes to mind as an example. Other nations have not had trouble integrating ESSM with other naval air defense systems as another example.

We are unsure where the problem lies exactly, and it will likely not easily be identified, but it raises questions regarding the quality of software engineering in the Australian Defense Industry at a time when the Defense Industry is starting a number of major projects. Whether it is new Amphibious Ships, new Air Defense Destroyers, new fighter aircraft, or other defense priorities this raises serious questions whether Australia will in fact be able to achieve their desired goals for future platforms.

If you can screw up the upgrades for known technologies, how do they expect to get it right for brand new technologies? That isn't a rhetorical question, it should be of major concern otherwise Australians will find themselves with more cost overruns than they can afford, or fewer pieces of equipment than originally intended.