Lockheed Martin Strikes Back

Just in case you were wondering who is out front defending the Littoral Combat Ship, Proceedings opens our eyes. The most interesting section of Proceedings last year was easily the Comment & Discussion section. We note the content so far in 2008 has been outstanding, so naturally other articles have caught our interest, but the March 2008 Comment & Discussion section delivers an eye opening tidbit.

We previously linked to two articles on the Littoral Combat Ship in the January 2008 edition of Proceedings. In the first one, we noted an excellent article by Lieutenant James Rushton to "Fill the Middle Gap: Rediscover the Corvette" in the spirit of Thomas Barnett. His article was excellent, well articulated, and leveraged strategic thinking in his approach. The second article, which we linked to indirectly, is by Coast Guard Captain James C. Howe regarding the use of the NSC as an alternative to the LCS. Admittedly, we aren't sold on this idea, and are unlikely to be.

What concerns us though is that in March 08 Proceedings, the arguments in defense of the Littoral Combat Ship against both articles comes directly from Lockheed Martin. Specifically, Dan Schultz, Vice President and General Manager, Lockheed Martin, Maritime Security and Ship Systems, disagrees with Lt. Rushton; while Captain Moosally who is president of Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors, responsible for delivery of Freedom (LCS-1), and is also responsible for the C4ISR systems on board the first National Security Cutter, doesn't like Captain Howe's argument.

Does it bother anyone else that the most vocal, and apparently in the eyes of the Proceedings editors, most important defenders of the Littoral Combat Ship work for Lockheed Martin? Both Captain Moosally and Mr. Schultz make good arguments, well Capt. Moosally does anyway, but shouldn't the defense of the Littoral Combat Ship come from somewhere other than the handful of people who work on the program? How about a comment from the strategic office in the Navy maybe, or perhaps a comment from a SWO maybe?

I honestly can't argue with Capt. Moosally's argument, he makes a great point.

Design changes to incorporate NVR would result in huge cost increases to the NSC. The notion of waiving these requirements is unlikely in consideration for crew safety during a naval combat engagement. The Navy did not waive the NVR requirements for the 40 Sailors on board the LCS, and I doubt it would consider such a waiver for the nearly150 Sailors on board an NSC configured as a light patrol frigate...

It is quite feasible to examine reducing the speed requirement and increasing the endurance of LCS. However, we must avoid undertaking an NSC redesign for a mission far outside its design parameters. Such redesign efforts have not enjoyed much success over time, and should not be repeated.

Exactly right, after NVR that NSC will be more expensive than its contribution, and it is much smarter to look at adjusting the endurance of the LCS to match an endurance requirement than trying to scale up to NVR with a ship already at the upper ends of the cost curve.

However we aren't impressed with Mr. Shultz's argument. To be transparent here I'll admit that I've met Dan, he is very smart, and this is a talking point that comes with his job, not something I believe he would conclude if he studied it in the context of maritime strategy. He really is a sharp guy, so we will not be holding this comment against him longer than this single post.

Ironically the LCS is precisely the ship that Lieutenant Rushton describes and our Navy needs. The LCS is designed to support a variety of missions across all three tiers, from high intensity (counter mine, antisubmarine, anti-surface warfare) to low intensity (humanitarian, interdiction, disaster relief, etc) and everything in between where "just being there" is important. Mission flexibility will be of paramount importance to the Navy because likely budget constraints will not permit ships designed for each tier. The modular nature of the LCS, and its ability to swap mission packages in 24 hours, will provide the type of flexibility that will become increasingly important.

I have some facts you won't find in Lockheed Martin's brochure. Freedom is at the top of its weight requirement with MIW mission module already, and the MIW module is incomplete. Freedom lacks the birthing for the required module crew, short 4 spaces. It has already been well documented that the ship has an enormous logistical train, so it will be hard to "be there" when it lacks endurance and can't fix the on board module equipment. Mission flexibility, which is important to the Navy, is not the same as platform flexibility. Budget restraints may prevent the design of a dedicated small ship for each tier, however budget constraints do not prevent the Navy from addressing each tier of warfare. Furthermore, the platform (LCS) has absolutely nothing to offer MIW, ASuW, or ASW because it comes only with a RAM missile system, 57mm, and large payload bay which isn't even unique to the LCS, and could easily be any HSV. Everything used to meet those mission profiles are independent from the LCS hull. Mission package swaps that require 24 hours do not in fact count the time it takes to go to a friendly port to do the swap, assuming the modules are there ready to go, then get back to where the mission package is needed. The measurement of days will turn into weeks for multiple platforms because in fact, there are no LCS tenders in the budget and the Navy is on a slow track for procurement of mission modules. In fact, the most expendable aspect of the entire LCS concept is the LCS hull itself.

Dan, if you read this, say this sentence out loud and tell me if it sounds right. "The entire low mix of the Navy's surface combatant fleet should be an unrated vessel, as that is a good tactical and strategical approach for fleet constitution." Sometimes people need to say things out loud, because it helps clarify whether an idea is good or not. The US Navy plan for the LCS contradicts every historical example one can cite, the sum total of all maritime strategy, to believe they can achieve command of the sea in a shooting war solely with first and second rate battleships and the Littoral Combat Ship, which is essentially an unrated vessel.

That is why we know, without question, the Littoral Combat Ship comes from either the industry or the civilians in the Pentagon, and NOT from the Navy, because no one who actually studies maritime strategy would ever advocate for the entire flotilla of a fleet to be unrated.

Dan, think MMC!