The Mystery of the Empty Expeditionary Strike Group

Navy Times is reporting the Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group will be deploying in February, and it will be deploying without Marines. The 24th MEU, which has been training with the Nassau ESG for months is being sent to Afghanistan. At that point, the story starts raising some interesting questions. These are two good ones.

While it’s not yet clear why a trained Navy strike group is not transporting the Marine contingent, a Navy official with knowledge of the operation said the strike group may be broken up due to the new orders. “The sealift portion of the Marine deployment will be done by [Military Sealift Command] ships. None of the ships in the Nassau strike group will deploy any earlier than planned,” said the source. “The surface combatants will deploy in support of maritime security operations and options for deployment of the amphibious ships are still being evaluated.” Asked why MSC and Army ships were chosen over Navy ships for the job of transporting the Marines and their gear overseas, the source said: “When planning the lift of Marines to Afghanistan, the use of MSC ships was determined to be the best of many options considered.”

When asked what makes MSC “best,” the official said that’s what the Navy and Marines decided, without elaborating.

We don't have any details to elaborate on ourselves, but gladly open the floor to comment and speculation. What do we make of the Marines choosing to use the Fast Sealift Ship Algol? The Marines picked the ship specifically, because usually the Algol is in reserved status. In operational use, the Algol would deploy around 70% of the materials of an Army Stryker brigade. It isn't often we see a CONUS based prepositioning deployment for a MEU that intentionally splits man and machine. Obviously the details are sensitive, but also obvious is this complex deployment approach strange on a number of levels.

Algol then set out for Wilmington to onload the Marines’ gear.

Boulay said the MRAPs are not part of the MEU’s gear; once in the Persian Gulf, the Algol will transfer the Marine equipment to Army-owned cargo ships for the final leg to an undisclosed port, where the vehicles can get to landlocked Afghanistan.

The Algol has capacity for 150,000 square feet of cargo. Boulay said this shipment of MEU gear will occupy only 66,000 square feet of space.

The Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Nassau (LHA 4)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Nashville (LPD 13)
USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)
USS Ross (DDG 71)
USS Bulkeley (DG 84)
USS Albany (SSN 753)

When the Nassau ESG arrives in the 5th Fleet AoR, the Tarawa ESG will be about 4 months into its deployment, so it is understandable that the Nassau group is deploying. That the Navy is deploying an ESG empty raises a red flag. Even if we assume the Algol is going to deliver the supplies to Bahrain, and all the equipment is transported to Afghanistan, there really isn't a scenario where the Nassau could evacuate the equipment by sea out of Afghanistan even if it had to.

So why deploy a LHA, LPD, and LSD empty? Remember, the 24 MEU is taking its aviation, so we are basically observing 3 highly capable expeditionary platforms to influence the maritime environment deploying --- empty! If that turns out to be true, I think it would be an enormous missed opportunity.

Three motherships, and the Navy has no equipment to load? With all the tech generated so far in the 21st century, the Navy doesn't have a plan to leverage the aviation spaces, the well decks, or any of the other broad metrics these three platforms provide empty of Marines? I find that depressing, it requires the absence of vision to fail to leverage existing platforms like a LHA, LPD, or LSD for new alternative purposes when opportunity presents itself. It used to be a theme of Seapower 21 to exploit existing platforms in new and innovative ways. I guess innovative ideas never made it off the Powerpoint.