Observing Russian Desires For Naval Aviation

In following several open and closed internet forum discussions of the recent Russian Navy deployment consisting of the Admiral Kuznetsov, we observe how many observers appear to have missed the importance of the exercises in the South Atlantic near the end of the deployment. We have also observed some rather sharp naval observers missing the reasonings for Russian desires for carrier aviation forces in the future.

What strikes us is how these observers note that the strategic environment of the world has changed, and with that the implication Russian naval aviation lacks a purpose. They do not understand what carrier forces offer Russia in the future, and in some cases, we observe some younger folks don't understand Russian naval aviation roles in the past. Many of these individuals believe, as we do, that Russia does not have future plans to confront the US Navy, which leaves them asking why the focus of Russian military forces has shifted to long range bombers and an emphasis of aircraft carriers.

Many people observed the Admiral Kuznetsov deployment to have the characteristics of a western naval doctrine, the implication being Russia is shifting its naval strategy. We tend to agree there is a shift in strategy, but not away from traditional Russian Navy doctrine and tactics, rather the adaptation of both leveraging the Admiral Kuznetsov's capabilities (which was largely not available during the cold war) to the emerging strategic environment. We observe the reasons are not very complex, rather Russia desires to be a super power.

A brief word on the constitution and roles of Russian Naval forces. Russian Naval aviation has served a different fleet function than western naval aviation. In the west, particularly the United States, aircraft carriers are the center of offensive power for the US Navy. Under the Soviet Union, aircraft carriers were the center of defensive power for the Soviet Navy. The Admiral Kuznetsov, for example, fields the Su-33 as its primary aircraft. The primary role of the Su-33 is as an air interceptor, not a strike aircraft. The old Kiev class is another example, the aircraft were primarily ASW helicopters with a limited number of VSTOL aircraft for scouting, illustrating again that naval aviation was used in a defensive role. Under the Soviet Union, offensive power came from a combination of long range missiles on surface combatants, including those on aircraft carriers (Russia calls them aviation cruisers), long range land based bombers, and from their massive submarine fleet. As we observed the Russian fleet exercises last month, we observed that doctrine and tactics didn't appear to change much, with the Admiral Kuznetsov providing a defensive role for long range bombers in the exercise.

The exercises involved the fighter aviation forces onboard the Admiral Kuznetsov in escort of the long range, land based Tu-160 bomber forces at the point of attack. This demonstration highlights that the Russian military has retained the military capability of forward strike, and given the distances involved, is a military capability beyond that of every nation in the world with one exception, the United States.

From a strategic perspective, long range bomber sorties from Russia guarded at the point of attack by forward deployed CV aviation is an enormous capability. With the military option of forward strike supported by sea power comes an option unique to super powers, the ability of Russia for military intervention in forward locations.

The exercises in the Atlantic Ocean was very important to Russia, because with this demonstration comes opportunity. The ability of the United States to leverage military forces in forward locations, in many cases within the context of a strategic defensive role with credible offensive deterrent, has enabled the United States to expand its economic influence into many markets that otherwise would not share interests with the United States, the Middle East being one example. The ability of the United States to influence regional markets through security was part of the global strategy that ultimately defeated the Soviet Union in the cold war, and despite Iraq has been effective in maintaining a long term economic influence. The Soviet Union for its part, tried to accomplish the same with political military influence, which proved less effective influence than economics enabled by trade (just ask the CHICOMs who now use this model).

With the current Russian naval budget strategy concentrated on building SSBNs, and serial production of the Tu-160 restarted last fiscal year, we observe the strategic bomber fleet is slowly being relieved of its nuclear force requirements at the same time it is being modernized for conventional strike capability. As the SSBNs are deployed, should Russian economic growth continue, we observe Russia will in fact have the funds necessary to build CVs in the range of 50,000 tons by 2015 within similar percentages of defense budget allocations, allowing the commissioning of a new carrier by 2018.

This will give Russia the capability to emerge in that time frame as a major military power in a world influenced heavily by the rapid expansion of globalization. The purpose of building these military capabilities is not, as some contend, to compete against the United States as a military power in forward markets, rather emerge instead as an alternative to US military power in forward markets. In that context we see long term plans for expanding Russian carrier based naval aviation, which is defensive in nature per doctrine, aligned within the scope of Russia's strategic goals for economic influence in forward markets.