Why the USS Enterprise Is Part of the Big Picture in FY09

The most recognizable ship in the Navy may in fact become one of the most discussed aspects of the FY09 budget. Hidden within the FY09 Long Range Shipbuilding Plan is a little nugget that raises several legitimate questions regarding future fleet constitution. In fact, this is something we are well aware is on the minds of many both in the Navy and in Congress.

The minimum aircraft carrier force level requirement remains at 11 ships. However, the Navy is seeking a Congressional waiver to decrease the carrier force to 10 operational carriers between the inactivation of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) in November 2012 and the delivery of GERALD R FORD (CVN 78) in September 2015. During this 33-month period, Navy will mitigate the operational impact of the shortfall through selective rescheduling of carrier maintenance availabilities and by applying the inherent flexibility of the Fleet Response Plan. This risk mitigation strategy will support presence and surge requirements during this short time period, although it is not sustainable over a long period of time.

33 months is 2.75 years. That is a lot of time to only operate 9 CVNs, after all, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) will be having a nuclear fuel conversion during this time, so the reduction isn't to 10, it is actually 9. We also believe the Navy might be exaggerating the Fleet Response Plan a bit, because basically what they are saying is the deployment tempo will be very high for CVN sailors during that period.

I have heard so many aspects of this discussion I'm not really sure what is real and what is speculation, so I figure I'll share all of it as speculation and we can observe what happens. These are not conspiracy theories, this is open speculation I have heard both in and out of the Navy and Congress. I would bet most media who have covered the Navy have heard variations of this speculation.

First, we must review and understand the Ford class replacements. The first Ford Class CVN began funding in FY08 (this year) and will continue for FY09, FY10, and FY11. The second Ford class CVN is funded in FY12, FY13, FY14, and FY15. The third Ford class CVN is funded in FY16, FY17, FY18, and FY19. If the Navy stays with the split year funding spread over 4 years, which we believe they will, there will not be any CVN funding in FY20. Advanced procurement or funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 is included in the FY09 annual 5 year plan. We believe all three Ford class carriers will be built. CVN-78 is expected to enter service in FY15, CVN-79 is expected to enter service in FY19, while CVN-80 will enter service in FY23. By FY19, when CVN-79 enters service, the Navy is expected under current plans to have 12 operational CVNs.

This is where the speculation begins. Many people, both in the Navy and in Congress, believe one aspect of this Congressional waiver is to get Congress used to the idea of only 10 CVNs. When the USS Ford (CVN 78) enters service in FY15, the Navy will be back up to 11 total CVNs according to current plans, with the USS George Washington (CVN 73) ready for a refueling. The current theory is the Navy would not refuel the USS George Washington (CVN 73) and retire her at that time and maintain a 10 CVN force. The Navy could then choose not to refuel the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) and maintain 10-11 CVNs through 2023, when CVN-80 comes online and replace the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) who would also be retired early.

The idea behind that speculation is the Navy would maintain a force of 10 CVNs and save costs on two Nimitz class that require Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH), Going forward the Navy would evaluate their strategy for Naval Aviation. For big deck carriers, construction of CVN-81 would begin as currently planned in FY21. However, the Navy may also choose to develop a new small deck class of aircraft carriers that capitalize on smaller UCAS-N aircraft beginning construction in FY21.

There would be some cost savings under that plan, a combination of fixed refueling costs and operational cost savings of retiring two Nimitz class CVNs half way into their life span. We note neither of these costs would save on shipbuilding budget costs. For that, we have heard another idea floated.

Existing funding plans for the first three Ford class CVNs and Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) for all Nimitz class CVNs would continue as normal through the FY19 budget. The Navy would then choose not to spend shipbuilding budget money on CVNs as planned in FY21 for CVN-81 or in FY25 for CVN-82. By not building two Ford class CVNs in the 2020s, the Navy is able to save at least 20 billion dollars in the shipbuilding budget at a time when all the CGs, several DDGs, and most of the SSBNs are being funded for replacement. This plan would allow the Navy to maintain 10 big deck CVNs until around Fy2035, when the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) would retire, meaning the Navy wouldn't have to pay for another aviation ship from FY19 until FY29, by which time the Navy would have developed a lower cost aviation ship for deploying UCAS-N systems.

Do we believe any of this? Yep, the Navy is clearly run by bean counters who favor the surface combatant fleet first and foremost, so we'd agree that some of this is possible to happen. We'd also suggest that the big issue begins by the Navy not approaching Congress with a strategy regarding the aging USS Enterprise (CVN 65) during the gap period.

The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) returned home from its deployment in late December 2007. The Enterprise completed the second of 2 major deployments back to back, the first being from May 2006 until November 2006, then again from July 2007 to December 2007. That is basically 14 months deployment time over a 20 month period, and between November 2006 and July 2007 the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) conducted several training cruises off the east coast. The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) will enter the yard this year and basically be out of action for all of 2008, and won't make another deployment until mid to late 2009.

Rather than asking for a "Congressional waiver to decrease the carrier force to 10 operational carriers" simply to retire the CVN early, we would encourage the Navy to ask Congress to invest in the USS Enterprise as a test platform for developing Sea Basing technologies, which would remove it from the operational carrier list but retain the ship for redundancy purposes until 2015. This would remove the need by the Navy to maintain many of the aging aspects of the USS Enterprise, most of which are centered around carrier aviation support. In fact, we would suggest Congress forces this on the Navy to insure the Navy is applying its best ideas to the Sea Basing concept, which is largely missing from the Maritime Strategy. This also gives the Navy a reserve during a period of naval build up around the world, a 'just in case' ace card but at a lower cost to maintain. We would term this a 'Conditional Congressional waiver" instead of simply granting wishes.

We note in all periods of major transition between maritime era's, which is what we call this period of transition after the cold war, naval superiority has historically been retained through operational Research and Development. It is why we would love to see the DDG-1000 in the FY09 budget get the axe in favor of other platforms, including more T-AKEs, LPD-17s, and technology demonstrators of both Littoral Combat Ship Multi-mission combatant versions, all of which offer more to the current war and current maritime environment than the DDG-1000 does. Technology Demonstrators, Prototypes, and the development of new technologies (particularly unmanned) will be critical for the fleet after 2020 for warfighting, around the same time the peer competition is expected to be more clear for the US Navy.

By applying the term technology demonstrator to the first two DDG-1000s, and leveraging the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) as a technology demonstrator for Sea Basing, and building variants of the Littoral Combat Ship to produce operational alternatives at the low end of the fleet, the Navy builds up its most flexible forces currently engaged in the current war (logistics and amphibious ships) while developing multiple technology demonstrators for the future fleet which offers options and flexibility to the Navy who may need to adapt to an emerging maritime era.

We expect the USS Enterprise 'conditional waiver' debate to give us insight regarding not only the future of naval aviation, but also provide us insights regarding the Congressional view of the Navy in the future. Nothing says hard power like an aircraft carrier or a major surface combatant. In that way, how Congress and the Navy reconcile the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) discussion and the 3rd DDG-1000 in FY09 should provide us some revealing insight regarding what the future fleet will look like.