DDG-1000 Takes Major Blows as Nuclear Burke's Enter Stage Left

Could the Zumwalt class be sailing into the sunset after only two ships? Will the first two ships be the modern USS Long Beach (CGN 9) and USS Bainbridge (CGN 25)? It is starting to look like it could happen that way.

I love this time of year, the Navy goes up to Capital Hill, and they get blindsided by something new every time. It is clearly the 4th of July, because every time the Navy testifies in the House, it is all fireworks and flash, and reporters get to write about 3 dozen different stories each. Today's hearing was no exception. Gene Taylors opening comments had an extra zing, and laid the ground for an ugly day for the Navy. Regular readers, we warned ya...

Given the "all ahead flank" attitude the Navy has taken with the 313-ship plan, I honestly wonder if the Navy saw this coming. The whole DefenseNews article is good.

Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the seapower subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, said March 6 he is seeking to add money to the 2009 request to fund an effort to build a nuclear-powered warship that would supplant construction of the DDG 1000 destroyers...

Taylor said he would end the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class at the two ships already ordered and cancel plans to build a total of seven of the ships...

The Navy is working to design a new CG(X) cruiser based on the 16,000-ton DDG 1000 tumblehome hull, but Taylor said he doesn't see the need for that effort...

Taylor said he doesn't see the need for the stealthy, tumblehome hull form of the DDG 1000s. Although Navy leaders speak confidently of the hull's properties, lingering doubts about the ship's stability persist among a number of engineers and naval architects...

"We know that stealth is not an issue," he declared. "The radars are going to be so powerful that there's no way on earth you can make that ship stealthy."

You think that is interesting? That isn't even the good part, that was before things got very interesting.

"I'm more frustrated than most with the slow pace of rebuilding the fleet," Taylor said. "The answer [from the Navy] always is, 'We're studying it.' So we're going to turn the equation around a little bit."

What does Congress have in mind?

The new ship would be a slightly larger version of the 9,200-ton DDG 51s, powered by one nuclear reactor of the type developed for the new Gerald R. Ford CVN 78-class aircraft carriers...

The conventional, flared hull of the DDG 51 is more seaworthy and, Taylor said, stealth isn't that important for the cruiser.

The Navy doesn't like this.

Not surprisingly, the Navy's top leaders balked at Taylor's suggestion of a nuclear Burke.

"There's a significant challenge in and of itself of going nuclear on any surface combatant," Navy Secretary Donald Winter told reporters following the hearing. "To be able to do that within fiscal constraints on an existing platform that was never designed to accommodate a nuclear reactor further complicates the matter. Never say never - I'm sure there's somebody someplace who will figure out how to do it. The question is, does that wind up being a cost-effective solution?"

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, who, as a commander, commissioned the second Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, doubted a reactor could be placed in the DDG 51 hull.

Audio of the days fireworks here (part1) and here (part2). Video here (part1) and here (part2).

Things just got interesting. Like many, I have concerns regarding Congress taking up the responsibility to determine the shipbuilding budget annually, but for a short time, and at this point in time specifically, I think there is an opportunity for Congress to do exactly that.

The Navy will not, and perhaps cannot deviate from the 313-ship plan because the architect of the 313-ship plan is the current CJCS, Adm. Mullen. That means the Congressional control scenario is really the only way to change the direction of the fleet today.

Gene Taylor is exercising power, and until we have a reason otherwise, we support him in this move. He is doing what the Navy won't do, sink (at least part of) SC-21 and start over. Gene Taylor and the rest of Congress can build whatever they want for a few years, but in order to avoid enormous criticism or disruption to the Navy, they have to address three major issues of the surface fleet going forward.

1) Congress must put their money where their mouth is regarding nuclear power. By doing so, Congress takes away the largest complaint regarding nuclear power, but also important, it begins the process that generates an increase in nuclear engineering talent that will be required to support a nuclear surface fleet. For best results, there needs to be support for new nuclear power plant construction in the US, otherwise the nation will spend millions producing some of the best nuclear engineers in the world, only to see them whither skills in the private sector where their talents can't be utilized.

2) Congress must force the Navy to design new SC-21 ships, not only the large nuclear powered warship as discussed, but also a FFG(X) and small combatants for the fleet as alternatives to the LCS. The Strategy emphasizes the low end which means inexpensive peacemakers, but as unmanned motherships that LCS appears ill suited for this role, mainly because it is absent the most important element of peacemaking, human beings. The LCS plan makes the entire small combatant force of the US Navy, the entire flotilla, an unrated mothership while also accepting the absence of the historical role of cruisers. That approach to a future fleet is stunning.

3) Congress needs to force the Navy to design a large unmanned platform mothership. The Navy is borrowing Amphibious ships for this role today, and as we have seen the Navy is wearing out amphibious ships to carry out naval centric roles. The Navy clearly wants a mothership, that is what the LCS is, so where is the large mothership alternative? Motherships will be in the 21st century what carriers were in the 20th century, the entire NCW debate centered on this point and the influence of unmanned systems to the network. The question is, where is this reflected in fleet constitution?

By forcing the Navy to undertake a design program Congress gives both the Navy and themselves options in the future. The lack of designs contributes to the controversy today as the House decides to go a new direction with very few options.

Is this a good thing for the Navy? It could be, and it isn't a bad thing yet. We love the Navy, but the shipbuilding strategy for the fleet has been drifting in the wind for almost a decade. We are resigned to this move, because it appears the only one available. The Navy has about 2 years to get its studies together, match means to strategy (ends and ways), and move forward with a plan that resonates the vision prescribed by the Navy in its strategy. Some aspects of the next few years are fixed as replacements, but there will never be a better time than right now to be flexible with the shipbuilding budget, because this is one of the only times in the next several decades the Navy is not replacing the high end surface fleet or high cost strategic submarines.