Looking for Naval Peacemaking on the Cheap

We have highlighted in the past that the true challenge for the Navy with its peacemaker centric strategy isn't so much dealing with the peacemaker role, rather learning how to do it on the cheap. One of the articles in CDR Salamanders discussion on Monday regarding the Maritime Strategy was an article by Cmdr. Jerry Hendrix called Dead reckoning. It is an interesting article, in fact some of it sounds very familiar. One of the early points of the article reminded me of Mike, it proposes reducing the CVN force to fight the long war, which is the context for this comment.

The remaining carriers could be placed in semi-active status and reconfigured for other mission sets, namely to act as expeditionary sea-base platforms to embark Army and Marine Corps expeditionary brigades during crises. Ever since the introduction of the Sea Power 21 operational construct five years ago, the sea base has been getting the short end of the stick from long-term planners, even though it was touted initially as having the most potential to have a positive effect in the post-9/11 world. The sea base was envisioned not only to serve as the logistical base for combat operations ashore, but also to provide a credible engagement force for the type of conditions that tend to predominate the embryonic cultural conflicts that serve as the precursors to insurgency, terrorism and civil strife.

Congress has committed to buying up to 3 Ford class CVNs at this time. That is one of the reasons why we believe that instead of retiring the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) early, as has been proposed in the FY09 budget, the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) should be converted into a Sea Base technology demonstrator. By testing Sea Basing from a real CVN, the Navy might find design ideas that would be appropriate for the 4th Ford class evolution, allowing the Navy to leverage CVNs in the way described by Cmdr. Hendrix. After all, isn't the best way to learn how to leverage a CVN as a Sea Base to test the concept?

Cmdr. Hexdrix goes on, asking where the cheap alternatives to the amphibious ships are.

The new maritime strategy attempts to fudge on this point, alternatively using the phrases “persistent presence” and “selective control” as if they were interchangeable. Persistence is defined as “lasting without change.” This tempo of operations characterized Navy operations for most of the post-World War II era. “Selective” implies an action of choice — choosing to do one mission or another but not both. Although I recognize that “presence” and “control” are two different missions, let us be clear to the American people where we intend to be and what we intend to do. The U.S. is either present or it is not. If it is not, someone else, either an insurgent group or a peer competitor, can and will attempt to fill the void.

If it is our intention to remain present persistently, we will need more L-class amphibious warfare ships. If we can all agree that it important for the Navy-Marine Corps team in an ESG to provide credible interaction at the lower end of the engagement scale and we agree that the new maritime strategy calls for just this type of capability, then we need to build the type of ships that will allow us to operate in the littoral, close to that 80 percent of the world’s population that lives near the sea. Maj. Gen. John F. Kelly, commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, recently commented that when Marines dream, they dream of L-class ships, and that if you were to open a Marine’s locker, you would find a pin-up of an L-class. Although I think there is something unsettling about this mental image, I will take the general at his word and suggest that Marines instinctively know that L-class ships provide them with the type of stable, sustainable afloat staging bases that will allow them to significantly influence events ashore.

To accomplish a goal of fielding these ships, we need them to be cheap enough to be built in large numbers and simple enough to go through the procurement process quickly. Unfortunately, the U.S. defense industry does not seem capable of this type of effort, nor would it pursue this course naturally if it is attempting to be true to its fiduciary responsibilities to its stockholders. In the end, the Defense Department probably will need to purchase these ships from abroad.

We have a running debate that by 2010 we are going to see the ESG conversation become what ships should be added to the future ESG. We get the impression that the ESG needs to have a new ship specific to being able to handle more vehicle and heavy equipment (a large replacement for the LKA). The article goes on to address several other excellent questions regarding the Maritime Strategy.

We would encourage our readers interested on such topics to read the very interesting article by Cmdr. Hendrix, then head over to CDR's place where Cmdr. Hendrix is engaging the discussion.