It is a very long article, and to be honest, I thought the last page was the best.
I have intentionally held off discussing Dr. Barnett's article, mostly because I wanted to observe Dr. Barnett's reactions first. I note that most of the reaction to the article doesn't focus on the profile of Adm Fallon, which I thought was very, very well done; rather the attention span of most readers appears to be on the political context that Barnett gave to Fallon's position. In that regard, we end up with two discussions, one regarding the role of a Joint Combatant Commander, in this case Admiral Fallon of CENTCOM; and another discussion regarding the atmosphere within the Bush administration and how it is presented as political context.
The Military Diplomat Emerges With Globalization
Do you know who Admiral Timothy J. Keating is? Do you know who General Victor E. Renuart Jr. is? Have you ever heard of General Bantz J. Craddock? Who is General William E. "Kip" Ward? If you read this blog, you better know who Admiral James Stavridis is. Yet, it seems most informed Americans know who Admiral William J. Fallon is.
Dr. Barnett's best contribution with this article is lost on most observations I have read, because Dr. Barnett captures in Adm Fallon's own words the emerging dependence on the Joint Combatant Commanders for regional diplomacy. This quote is a small part of how the article captures this role.
Fallon explains his approach to Iran the same way he explains why he doesn't make Al Qaeda the focus of his regional strategy as Centcom's commander: "What's the best and most effective way to combat Al Qaeda? We tend to make too much or too little a deal about it. I want a more even keel. I come from the school of 'walk softly and carry a big stick.' "
Fallon is the American at the center of every circle in this part of the world. And it is a testament to his skill, and to the failure of American diplomacy, that so much is left for this military man to do himself. He spends very little time at Centcom headquarters in Tampa and is instead constantly "forward," on the move between Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and all the 'Stans of Central Asia.
He was with Pakistani strongman Pervez Musharraf the day before he declared emergency rule last fall. "I'm not the chief diplomat of this country, and certainly not the secretary of state," Fallon says in Kabul's Green Zone the next night. "But I am close to the problems." So, he says, that leaves him no choice but to work these issues, day in and day out.
This is something we have been observing, but we note is not actually new. While some want to go back to Macarthur and point out similarities, we think a better example is actually how the Clinton Administration relied on General Wesley Clark for European diplomacy regarding the Serbian conflict, and how the same administration relied on General Zinni in the Middle East when Saddam kicked out the UN weapons inspectors and conducted his usual blustery. While some in the press are trying to create a problem that there is a reassertion of military power against civilians in government today, we think what Adm Fallon highlights is the failure of civilians in their diplomatic work since the end of the cold war.
We note the House Armed Services Committee report the other day calling for a "roles and missions" debate highlights the failure of the State Dept since the cold war, but this opinion is apparently ignored by the media and is outside the scope of partisan thinking.
Today, our national security institutions are struggling to adapt to a new world. Our intelligence community is wrestling with changes forced on it after painful failures. Our State Department is scrambling to shift from a world of genteel diplomacy to demanding volunteers for Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The rest of the government is unprepared to use their expertise overseas. And our military is stressed trying to fill-in for civilian agencies.
Admiral Fallon at CENTOM, like the other regional commanders, represent the military "trying to fill-in for civilian agencies". The reason we know who the names of Gen Anthony C. Zinn, Gen Tommy R. Franks, Gen John P. Abizaid, and Adm William J. Fallon is because they are the last four military diplomats who have been engaging the regional leadership in the CENTCOM theater. It is important to note that only Tommy Franks actually fought a traditional war, while the others have all fought within the context of that same war either before or after General Franks traditional war, but those other three mostly made their marks as military diplomats struggling to find regional peace. The HASC comment in the report doesn't hold back, they say it loud and clear, the State Dept. is broken.
We have observed statements regarding the absence of diplomacy under the Bush Administration. We observe that question requires a selective memory, someone please explain where diplomacy was under the Clinton administration? Clinton was president 2 terms and was unable to find a solution to Saddam in Iraq, was unable to stop the trend of terrorism that struck throughout the Middle East on his watch, and the Clinton administration had to bomb Serbia into the stone age to force that issue, which hasn't really been solved at all with Kosovo recently declaring independence.
We note partisans on the right love to blame Clinton for those failures, just like partisans on the left are ready to blame Bush for all diplomatic failures of his administration, but we'd point out that the State Dept. has not done any Presidents favors since the fall of the Soviet Union. As Dr. Barnett highlights in the article, Adm Fallon was instrumental in changing the atmosphere between the US and China because he did what hard liners refuse to do: He talked to, not at, the Chinese.
While some pundits have implied that Admiral Fallon is acting outside the scope of his job by discussing American policy with the nations in CENTCOMs theater, we'd note those partisans weren't concerned when previous CENTCOM Commanders were doing exactly the same thing. What is the difference this time? Honestly, we are hard pressed to find fundamental differences outside of the political environment. US diplomacy since the fall of the Soviet Union has been mostly a one way street. Administrations have established policy, diplomats have relayed policy, but the centrally controlled nature of two successive, secretive administrations has led to central control of diplomacy on the civilian side. Is there really much difference between General Clark's role meeting with European leaders and Admiral Fallon's role meeting with CENTCOM's leaders? You only find a difference if you want to make Europe more important diplomatically than The Middle East, but one reality of diplomacy is, our diplomatic efforts are more important with those we have more differences, not the ones we have more similarities.
Perceptions and Context
Dr. Barnett is an economic genius, and a master at understanding centers of gravity which he leverages brilliantly with his writings on strategic subjects. As a fan of Dr. Barnett's, I note he and I have one thing in common, we aren't too savvy on the changes within politics, and while we both can keep up where the partisans are, it takes us awhile to catch up to where the margins are.
We think much of the fallout and criticism of the article, indeed by Adm. Fallon himself, is a result of the way Dr. Barnett shaped the political context, not the strategic context.
There is a conventional wisdom that Presidents do not change policy within their terms as Commander in Chief. While it is usually not noted until the President is out of office, the contributors of this blog are only now, since the release of the new Maritime Strategy, observing in retrospect that Bill Clinton changed his foreign policy in his second term similar to how George Bush has also changed his foreign policy in his second term. In many ways, both presidents made evolutionary changes that reflected the emerging challenges and characteristics of globalization. We also note that both presidents adjusted based on events of their first presidential term. I want to give credit to Bob Work for pointing out some of the following observations.
In his second inaugural address, Bill Clinton said:
When last we gathered, our march to this new future seemed less certain than it does today. We vowed then to set a clear course to renew our Nation. In these 4 years, we have been touched by tragedy, exhilarated by challenge, strengthened by achievement. America stands alone as the world's indispensable nation...
As this new era approaches, we can already see its broad outlines. Ten years ago, the Internet was the mystical province of physicists; today, it is a commonplace encyclopedia for millions of schoolchildren. Scientists now are decoding the blueprint of human life. Cures for our most feared illnesses seem close at hand. The world is no longer divided into two hostile camps. Instead, now we are building bonds with nations that once were our adversaries. Growing connections of commerce and culture give us a chance to lift the fortunes and spirits of people the world over. And for the very first time in all of history, more people on this planet live under democracy than dictatorship.
My fellow Americans, as we look back at this remarkable century, we may ask, can we hope not just to follow but even to surpass the achievements of the 20th century in America and to avoid the awful bloodshed that stained its legacy? To that question, every American here and every American in our land today must answer a resounding, "Yes!" This is the heart of our task. With a new vision of Government, a new sense of responsibility, a new spirit of community, we will sustain America's journey.
Emphasis ours. The Clinton view of America as an "indispensable nation" was an evolutionary adjustment from his first terms policy. It evolved into an unilateral approach of maintaining security within the emergence of globalization. While not as evident as with the Bush administration, the Clinton foreign policy change began leveraging Tomahawk missile strikes in various nations, but also included military intervention to manage disruptions to the global system. It was unilateral use of military power as a tool of foreign policy that the Clinton administration managed challenges of globalization, specifically against the rise of global terrorism and Iraq, and within that context of defense that those in charge of the joint combatant commands began to speak as a reflection of national policy.
Following September 11, neoconservatives expanded the role of America as the "indispensable nation" into what they described as a benevolent global hegemon. In general there is very little difference with one evolutionary exception, the policies of intervention and unilateral action expanded into the concept of preventative wars, which is usually associated with preemptive action. From the period following Sept. 11th until about 2005, this was clearly the policy within the Bush administration. Then something began to change.
Beginning in the second term of the Bush administration we began to see another shift in policy, again a reflection of lessons learned from the first term. Where the Clinton Administration realized the need to leverage military power, the Bush administration has recently learned to pull back from their expanded version of its use. What exact combination of factors has contributed remains illusive in our observations, but we note the neoconservative unilateralism model was beginning to be replaced by an emerging cooperative model of leveraging military force in foreign policy. The National Defense Strategy of 2005 (PDF) made this point, and either reflected or contributed to a shifting policy.
Strengthen alliances and partnerships. We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us. We will help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests...
Internation partnerships. International partnerships continue to be a principle source of our strength. Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide a far greater security than we could achieve on our own. Unpreceedentd cooperation in the war on terrorism is an example of the benegit of strong international partnerships. Today, the United States and its partners are threatened not just by enemies who seek to oppose us through traditional means, but also by an active spectrum of non-traditional challenges. Key US relationships around the globe are adapting and broadening in response to these changes. Also, we have significantly expanded our circle of security partners around the world.
This is one of four key elements within the stated National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. The message is clear, the national strategy will advance through partnership, not unilateralism, and in that context the defense strategy requires those in the Joint Combatant Commands to align our national defense policy with regional partners. In effect, it requires commanders like Adm. Fallon to get out and listen. The realignment of our national defense strategy to match "shared principles" is a major fundamental shift from the neoconservative approach. We note that only the military, under SECDEF Gates, is actually making this transition, and very few observers of politics have even noticed the shift has occurred.
In that context, who is to argue that Admiral Fallon is not in fact doing his job by visiting regional leaders? We note that as unilateralism was on the way out, so were many of its biggest supporters. Rumsfeld was replaced by Gates, and in looking at the joint combatant commanders of EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM all are officers whose careers reflect cooperative models for success. The shift has almost completely occurred, yet very few actually note it. The biggest irony of this entire episode is, Dr. Barnett is one of the few observers who actually has noted the policy shift, he just didn't include those details within the context of his article on Admiral Fallon.
A Messenger and an Important Message
In reviewing the article, it clearly reflects well on Adm. Fallon, and captures well his role and responsibility as CENTCOM Commander. Dr. Barnett does make one mistake though, he settled for a political context of the Bush administration that is historical (and popular among his opponents), but doesn't reflect the shift Dr. Barnett himself has discussed on his own weblog. By choosing not to include that political context, Dr. Barnett set a context that pins Adm Fallon against the President, when in fact Adm Fallon accurately reflects one face of an administration that has more than one face.
Adm Fallon actually dealt with the administration split recently during the Strait of Hormuz incident when his opposition forces inside the Pentagon hyped up the Iranian boat thing. As part of the context of that incident, we learned from the 5th fleet days later that the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) had not only encountered a similar episode, but had actually opened fire on an IRGC boat. Clearly Adm Fallon would have known about the shooting incident, but in the classic Fallon style Barnett highlights, Fallon kept the incident on an even keel.
Is the Esquire article fair? We think so, it is also an important contribution to the strategic discussion. Barnett's only mistake was not to highlight the split in the Bush administration, something Barnett actually does a very good job of on his blog. In that regard, he presented the political context wrong while getting the strategic context right. By failing to highlight that the administration itself is split on policy the article results in pitting Fallon, a combatant commander, at odds with a President.
In that way, partisans have seized upon the article like vultures and have been able to manipulate the presentation, with Ricks being the best example, and unfortunately those partisan reactions have concealed the important strategic content of the article itself. As a fan of Dr. Barnett's I think it is actually pretty easy to explain why Dr. Barnett may not have seen the reaction of Adm Fallon coming, Dr. Barnett simply isn't partisan enough himself to accurately calculate the scope of manipulations to be expected of political partisans.
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