Assessing the Risk to Carriers from Submarines

At first, we were not really sure where the interesting Carrier vs Subs series by Martin Sieff was going, and to be honest, it is still unclear where his conclusions lie, but as a discussion topic we find the series quite interesting and compelling for analysis. The first, second, and third part of his series are all good reads. While we admittedly don't agree with some of what he is saying, we think there are several good points being raised that are in need of attention.

Rather than engaging in a debate of specific points in his analysis, we thought we would offer our own analysis of the subject as a means of comparison.

One reason we don't usually like debates in platform vs platform discussions is because nothing is ever so easily categorized in war. It isn't one against the other, it is what each platform can do, the vulnerability of the platform, and taken in context risk is measured. We typically see these types of submarine and aircraft carrier discussions degenerate into a discussion why the time of the aircraft carrier has somehow passed, how aircraft carriers are somehow too big and too vulnerable to be effective anymore, and are no longer the king of the sea and should be discarded. Nonsense. If the aircraft carrier is still Caeser, which we believe remains true, the submarine is the centurion. In our analogy, one rules the waves while the other rules over it, and no technology has changed this reality of the last 60 years of seapower from our point of view.

Rather than suggesting the aircraft carrier is no longer vital to the US Navy because it is vulnerable to submarines, something that has been true since before WWII, we agree with the analysis by Mr. Sieff in highlighting the risk to aircraft carriers today is greater than ever. That isn't to suggest that what the Chinese are bringing to the table against US aircraft carriers represents the highest threat aircraft carriers have ever faced, rather that conditions of today contribute to elevating the risk exposed by Chinese naval forces in a risk assessment beyond levels of risk of previous eras of naval competition.

The elevation of Chinese naval power and submarine forces, particularly conventional submarines, to levels of unmatched superior power are unfounded, the risk posed by Chinese naval power and submarine forces is no where near the level of danger faced by the US Navy against the Soviet Union during the cold war. The Soviet Union had multiple ways of sinking a US aircraft carrier, and combinations of those methods posed a much higher risk to US naval forces than any combination the Chinese can field today. The Soviets had very long range ASMs of Soviet surface forces, the incredible number of Soviet submarines (in 1990 the Soviet Union operated 210 submarines), the long range bombers armed with very effective high speed, large warhead ASMs, and a worldwide satellite network to support global maritime military operations. The elevation of Chinese naval power, and specifically its submarine force to the level of threat presented by the Soviet Union during the cold war is quite simply intellectually dishonest. We must maintain context.

However, in dealing with the massive challenge of the Soviet Union during the cold war, the US Navy brought to the table an enormous fleet, with high speed carrier based interceptors designed to intercept long range bombers (F-14s), with a network of land based and carrier based fixed wing and RW ASW aircraft, with at least 3 classes of dedicated escorts in the late stages of the cold war specific for ASW and ASuW screening (FF 1052s, FFG-7s, and DD 963s), with long range fixed wing carrier strike aircraft keeping the battle groups well off shorelines safe in blue water (A-6), and as late as 1990 the fleet was supported by an armada of 93 nuclear powered fast-attack submarines. The layers of networked defenses intended to protect US carrier battle groups, almost always screened by a minimum of 7 warships (often many more) occupied a defense network around the carrier of hundreds of square miles of blue water, and was extensive in its depth and operational options.

To suggest that Chinese naval power is anywhere near what the Soviet Union had is false, but to suggest that the US Navy has the same extensive defensive network today for our carrier strike groups as we did during the cold war is also false.

The reason Chinese submarines, and specifically the incredible build rate of Chinese submarines, is such a threat to US aircraft carrier strike groups, or any US naval strike group, is because the layered network defense against submarines has almost completely disappeared.

At the edges of our carrier strike groups land and carrier based fixed wing ASW aircraft would scout for enemy submarines, or provide long range prosecution of enemy submarines that were located. Today the P-3 fleet is barely operational, and the S-3 force isn't operational. That fixed wing layer of the ASW defensive network is gone.

Within the defensive screen of our carrier strike groups the US Navy used to deploy large numbers of RW specific for ASW from a number of dedicated ASW surface ship escorts. That is no longer true. As we have discussed in the past, the MH-60R will provide surface and subsurface warfare support with its Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS), Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Advanced Forward-Looking InfraRed (FLIR), precision air-to-ground missiles, machine guns, and lightweight torpedoes. The MH-60S will parner with the MH-60S for surface warfare missions, carrying the same FLIR and air-to-ground weaponry and machine guns. Additionally, it will be the primary Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) platform supporting Joint Theater operations. The MH-60S will additionally perform the Organic Airborne Mine CounterMeasures (OAMCM) mission using any one of five advanced sensor/weapons packages to provide detection, localization, and neutralization of anti-access threats (mines). The RW plan forward calls for a lot of consolidation, one might want to ask if this is smart.

Those RW platforms must operate from ships in a strike group to be effective though, which raises another question. The carrier battle groups of the cold war could easy consist of 10 escorts, and if we assume an example of 2 CGs, 2 DDGs, 2 DDs, 2 FFGs, and 2 FFs for a cold war battle group, you could easily find 10 helicopters on those 10 escorts able and ready for ASW duty. The Navy also had enough ships to build a large protective screen, spreading the ASW escorts out for fast sprint-drift runs using towed sonar arrays and still provide enough AAW defense for both the ASW escorts spread over a large area and the aircraft carrier being escorted. Not today, taking a quick look at the Nimitz CSG currently operating near China, we observe the strike group consists of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68), USS Princeton (CG 59), USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53), USS Higgins (DDG 76), and USS Chafee (DDG 90).

A quick look at this Carrier Strike Group reveals just how high the risk has become for US aircraft carriers. Of the four escorts, only the USS Princeton (CG 59) and USS Chafee (DDG 90) have helicopters, 2 each for a total of 4. Assuming all four helicopters are capable of ASW, it should be noted that the USS Chafee (DDG 90) does not have a towed sonar array, however the two destroyers that don't have helicopters do have towed sonar arrays. Additionally, just in case your not frustrated yet, check out the front of the USS Chafee (DDG 90), where is the point defense system usually occupied in front of the bridge? That might come in handy against a ASM launched by a submarine just outside torpedo range.

Even with only 4 escorts I think the Nimitz CSG is adequately protected against air attack, even noting the strike group has the ships necessary to protect from ballistic missile attack if necessary. This is a CEC force, the way I see it, they are better prepared with these 4 ships than any 20 ships together would have been during the cold war. I also think given the payload options of the Hornet force, the strike group could also adequately defend itself from an attacking enemy surface fleet. The problem is, among the four escorts only the USS Princeton (CG 59), the most important AAW defense ship of the Nimitz CSG escorts, has all the right tools for ASW. Of the other three escorts, none have all of the equipment that would best be utilized for ASW, and with only 4 helicopters to go around, the best you can hope for to be actually conducting an ASW patrol is 1 from the surface ships, and probably no more than 1 from the aircraft carrier, for a grand total of 2.

Compared to what the Navy used in the cold war to defend carrier strike groups, this force has no frigates for sprint-drift, has no fixed wing carrier based ASW, and likely no land based ASW either due to current shortages. The strike group has very few escorts, so if one ship takes a hit in combat there are not enough forces to continue to protect the carrier and the damaged vessel at the same time. There is virtually no layered screen possible with only 4 escorts.

To pour salt on wounds, the Littoral Combat Ship and DDG-1000 adds nothing in this space. Someone explain how the LCS with its ASW module and unmanned vehicles with a top speed of 6 knots is going to contribute ASW to a CSG. Someone explain how the LCS contributes to the CSG in the event one of the CGs or DDGs takes damage, is it going to tow and protect the damaged vessel out of the war zone? With what, SeaRAM and the 57mm? Who wants to make the suggestion the DDG-1000 is being built to contribute to ASW? Is that really what we are spending all this money on the DDG-1000 for, ASW screen for carrier forces?

Aircraft carriers are too important in the 21st century to be so poorly defended by todays Navy, and yet here we are. In the end, the Navy has peeled back the layered ASW defense for the nations carrier strike groups so far that the risk to our carriers appears to be higher than ever, even though the threat isn't close to as high in the past. The Navy is asking a lot, too much in my opinion, of the submarine force to protect carrier forces from enemy submarines. Someone explain to me if this is smart, the Navy is asking the most powerful offensive platform in our inventory (the Virginia class) to be the defensive ASW screen for carrier forces. Does anyone else believe that is an enormous strategic mistake during wartime?

I'll be interested to see how Martin Sieff concludes his series. We can't help but think no matter what he ultimately concludes, fixing the problem requires a major change in the Navy shipbuilding plan, and a major commitment to balance the fleet before the current shipbuilding plan blows the budget. Only 11 years left.