Matching the Metrics With the Mission

Sometimes I wonder if the ideas promoted on this blog for peacetime strategic approaches are in line with Navy thinking. Sure we are influenced heavily by those in or retired by the Navy for our ideas, but not so much above 0-6. However, every once in awhile an article comes along that gives us some hope, and this time it comes from Proceedings. Springboard, check your 6, I'm not the only person talking up motherships anymore.

The LHD-1 was designed for amphibious assault, meaning it can embark and support the expeditionary strike group commander or commander amphibious task force, tactical air control assets, VSTOL aircraft, helicopters, landing craft (LCAC or LCU), and a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU)—size landing force of personnel and associated equipment.

But when the MEU and associated gear are not embarked, or when the LHD is in a "ready surge" status with no MEU assigned, the ship's many capabilities could and should be used to support a growing number of non-traditional missions. Recently we have seen examples of the need for these in events such as Hurricane Katrina and tsunamis.

Combatant commanders and task group commanders desire an afloat forward staging base, but what should it carry and be able to accomplish? Some recent LHA/LHD surge deployments in response to emergency situations (Hurricane Katrina and Indian Ocean Tsunami Humanitarian Assistance—Disaster Relief, for example) and the 2007 LHD-1 surge deployment to deliver MV-22 aircraft to Iraq have occurred with minimum embarked assets and did not optimize the capabilities of the ship, perhaps due to a lack of pre-determined force packages.

Bingo. Sounds to us like someone is talking about motherships, although they are proposing the use of the second largest warships in the fleet when they are idle for the mothership purpose. The article goes on to highlight the capabilities of the LHD-1 class, and the authors do a very nice job. The authors don't come out and say it, but they are talking about the same specific metrics we often discuss here as part of motherships, and if you read the article you will find the same mission profiles and descriptions used to describe the intended peacetime roles of the LCS. One exception though, mothership packages are manned AND unmanned, in other words, they are LCS+, and we think it is forward thinking should the Navy examine how best undertake an understanding force packages and requirements for motherships using the existing LHDs, or any L-class ship. Actually, they already do a lot of this, but more is good. Effective motherships in the 21st century will be big, and we believe that upon testing, the Navy will find they don't have to be that big or aviation centric.

The article goes on to list 6 potential mission profiles for the mothership.

• Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)
• Maritime Security Operations (MSO)/Counter-Piracy/ Surveillance
• Strike Support/Counter-Terrorism
• Afloat Staging Base
• Maritime Operations Center Forward Command
• OPLAT Defense/Patrol Craft/Mine Countermeasures Support

Sound like the LCS yet? It should, the LCS is the mothership program of record. The LCS represents the strategic and tactical concepts of our time, no question, and that concept is called the mothership. The capabilities requirements established by SC-21 for surface combatants and motherships was right on metrics, but in our opinion wrong on execution. Rather than a big surface combatant and a bunch of small motherships, we still believe it should be big motherships and a bunch of small surface combatants. 7 DDG-1000s makes no sense at all, and neither do a bunch of small unrated motherships. 7 motherships, or as we would suggest, 9 (1 for each ESG), makes a ton of sense, particularly when supported by a bunch of fifth-rate combatants to execute the currently missing cruiser role.

We observe that a purpose built large mothership would execute these specific peacemaker mission sets for the Navy, but would also transition to warfighting by additionally providing unmanned vehicles for ASW and ASuW in the littoral, and increase scouting capabilities at the Strike Group level. Most importantly, motherships will bring with them the facilities to keep unmanned systems operational (something the mothership program of record can't do).

We note the authors are promoting the use of the LHD-1 class to be for peacetime operations what is supposedly being offered by the LCS. Those who think the LCS is a surface combatant would disagree, but can those critics cite a single surface combatant the LCS will defeat in an actual shooting war? Can those critics answer why the LCS is said to offer these same peacemaking mission sets? If you are looking for evidence, read the comments section of Proceedings last month, you'll find Lockheed Martin making our case. If the LCS can really do it, we won't need amphibious ships to conduct these roles in the future. Who really believes that?

We are very pleased to see this article published in Proceedings. It is a shame the idea and discussion of the concept wasn't expanded to 3000 words, but this is a great start. This is an important discussion on roles and missions, executing strategy, how and why, and we are very pleased to see someone else trying to promote that discussion in Proceedings.



The authors of the Proceedings article served in the wardroom of the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3): Captain Sensi, commanding officer; Captain Pagano, executive officer; Commander Guzman, command and control, computers, communications and combat systems and information (C5I); Commander Hills, prospective C5I; Commander Conner, aviation intermediate maintenance department (AIMD); Commander Henderson, supply officer; Commander Sherck, senior medical officer; Commander Connor, air boss; and Commander Vogt, operations officer.