Naval Technology is Not a Tactic, Rather One Aspect of Tactical Conditions

Wired is discussing the Russian built "sizzler". The angle taken by Wired is that the Chinese now have this daunting weapon and the US Navy has no defense against it. Here is the gist of what is being said.

The U.S. Navy can't stop China's most sophisticated anti-ship missile -- and won't even start testing a defense until 2014.

The Sizzler starts at subsonic speeds. Within 10 nautical miles of its target, a rocket-propelled warhead separates and accelerates to three times the speed of sound, flying no more than 10 meters (33 feet) above sea level. On final approach, the missile 'has the potential to perform very high defensive maneuvers,' including sharp-angled dodges, the Office of Naval Intelligence said in a manual on worldwide maritime threats.

The Office of Naval Intelligence report is from last year. In fact the Bloomberg article Wired linked to was from last year, but we are taking their word that some new article has been written along these same lines. That another article would be published is very believable.

Of all anti-ship missiles, we admit we like the discussed characteristics of the SS-N-27 "sizzler" (also known as the 3M-54 Klub) the most, it appears to have all the characteristics of a very deadly weapon system. The subsonic approach offers a low observable, low altitude over-the-horizon attack that combined with electronic means can make the system very difficult to detect or track. The supersonic nature of the terminal flight within 10 nautical miles of target offers defenders very little time for self-defense engagement. We are less impressed with sharp angled dodges at Mach 3+, but it isn't impossible. The suggestion that there are no counter systems is one I'm not buying.

This is not an attempt to downplay the threat or capability of the missile system in question, but when I see overhyped media reports claiming "unstoppable" weapon systems, I ask myself at what point any weapon system at sea became unstoppable. The mindset requires a focus on bullet vs bullet intercept scenario's in a vacuum, and almost never accounts for conditions. When it comes to naval war, any discussion that attempts to shape capabilities of any weapon system in a vacuum pretty much invalidates the merit of the discussion, environment and conditions matter. We have highlighted this reality of weapon systems in the past when we explained why we really like the latest Harpoon and Exocet missiles because they adapt to the conditions better than most weapons at sea.

For example, if a missile is 33ft above sea level and makes a sharp-angled dodge at even 1 degree down, the missile just hit the water in less than 1 second after the dodge attempt. If the missile really does make sharp-angled dodging turns, it will almost certainly make it a much easier target for point defenses to intercept, not less difficult, because it will make tracking easier due to the larger RCS.

The underlining suggestion of all discussions is that SM-2 will have difficulty intercepting a supersonic missile at close range. Makes sense to us, without going into the particulars, SM-2s are better at ranges outside of 15-20nms. Guess that is why the Navy puts point defense weapons on our ships, including our CVNs. SeaRAM, RAM, CIWS, etc.. are all capable of intercepting supersonic weapon systems, not sure why they are not discussed in the Wired discussion.

While it may not be appropriate for attacks against very large ships, I'm thinking this weapon system is going to have a hard time taking out a major warship. The best way to defeat missile systems is with a soft kill, it has been the most effective way to defeat missile systems for decades and as both have improved, soft kill still has the advantage. A HVU screen is likely to be out at least 10nm from the threat vector, meaning if a submarine or whatever launches a "sizzler" at the HVU, the escorts will likely have an opportunity to detect and engage the weapon long before it reaches supersonic mode. If the weapon is targeting the escorts, it will go super sonic and be available for a soft kill, without the range at supersonic mode to reacquire a new target and engage.

Conditions, conditions, conditions. Eagle1 once said "amateurs discuss capabilities, professionals discuss conditions." I love that phrase, because it is very accurate regarding war at sea. If the Navy is looking for better ways to fight peer competitors at sea, improving an individual weapon system is only going to get the Navy so far. In the end, the threat isn't one specific weapon system; it is the application of all weapon systems. Such a war in the future will ultimately be a battle of attrition, which highlights the most important aspect of fleet defense is more ships, not better weapon systems. A single missile system that is 'superior' in a vacuum may sound threatening, but wars aren't fought in a vacuum. The "sizzler" is manageable in a layered defense network, the issue is as the network takes attrition, and will enough ships be present to keep the networked defense in tact. In our opinion, the longevity of network cohesiveness will decide the war, and whether one particular weapon system used by the enemy finds success in battle is completely secondary.