Weekend Observations

Note there will be some work on the blog this weekend, probably not much, although I'm considering options.

Picture of 998 stolen from Chinese BBS. See below because Feng has more.

First things first, Captain Bob Wiley of USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) is running a blog. Among the website changes this weekend will be to get a link up to this. Good luck to your ship and your crew, we look forward to getting insights regarding the work you guys do during this deployment off your blog we would otherwise miss relying on media sources. Very good idea.

Robert Farley is having a caption contest for this picture. If I had 5 minutes with the CJCS while I was holding liquor, I have a feeling it would be 4 minutes of the good Admiral telling me I'm an asshole, and 1 minute of me agreeing with him.

Eagle1 is talking about Convoys off Somalia to protect commercial traffic from piravy. Actually, regular readers to Eagle1 know he has been talking about convoys for years. Establishing convoys should be part of the discussion at the UN, because unlike other suggestions, it doesn't create any contested issues with sovereignty.

Compare these two stories... Russian submarines are completely manned vs UK Nuclear Submarines Understaffed.

Feng has new pictures of the 998. The Chinese didn't build that ship for any strategy associated with Taiwan, they built that ship for a strategy associated with Africa. Only a matter of time...

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.


Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group

USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
USS Mobile Bay (CG 53)
USS Russell (DDG 59)
USS Shoup (DDG 86)
USS Momsen (DDG 92)
USS Curts (FFG 38)


Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Nassau (LHA 4)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Nashville (LPD 13)
USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)
USS Ross (DDG 71)
USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)


In Theater

Ocean 6
FGS Emden (F 210)
HMCS Iroquois (DDH 280)
HMCS Calgary (FFH 335)
HNLMS Evertsen (F 805)
ITS Commandante Borsini (P491)
FS Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet (F794)
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51)
HMS Chatham (F87)
HMS Montrose (F236)
HMNZS Te Mana (F111)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)

The Surge Has Spillover

The last few videos that have been released had already tipped off this conclusion. The CIA is now assessing Al Qaeda has been defeated in both Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Less than a year after his agency warned of new threats from a resurgent al-Qaeda, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden now portrays the terrorist movement as essentially defeated in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and on the defensive throughout much of the rest of the world, including in its presumed haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In a strikingly upbeat assessment, the CIA chief cited major gains against al-Qaeda's allies in the Middle East and an increasingly successful campaign to destabilize the group's core leadership.

What changed? The surge. The strategy to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq with the surge is having some very nice unintended consequences for Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Given the political steps observed from the Iraqi government, the war is about over regardless of the domestic political situation. In fact, I'm now thinking it will Obama, not McCain, who declares victory in Iraq first.

Now the question is what can be done in the northern tribal regions of Pakistan where Al Qaeda has made gains, and how can the US turn the tables on Iran nuclear issue without resorting to a military solution. On that last point, I get the impression the US intends to discredit Iran in Iraq the same way they discredited Al Qaeda, but I have a feeling that will be much easier said than done. The politics of Iraq might be ridiculous, but I am so impressed with the job General Petraeus has done. Right man, right place, right time.

HMS Superb (S109): Whitehall We Have a Problem

What do you do with a nuclear submarine that can't submerge? n Tuesday HMS Superb (S109) hit a rock in the Red Sea. The BBC reported the story with these details.

HMS Superb hit an underwater rock on 26 May and damage to its sonar equipment forced it to surface.

No crew members were hurt and the submarine remains watertight, according to a Ministry of Defence spokesman.

He said the submarine's nuclear reactor was "completely unaffected", but a full investigation was under way to determine the cause of the collision.

The 272ft attack vessel had passed through the Suez Canal and was in the northern Red Sea, 80 miles south of Suez itself, when she hit an underwater rock pinnacle.

The good news is, everyone is OK. The bad news is the Royal Navy has a nuclear powered submarine in the Red Sea without a sonar that can't submerge and needs to make port for repairs. Where can you make port and repair a nuclear powered nuclear submarine in the Middle East?

Naval sources told the Herald that the closest friendly port to Superb's operational area is Bahrain, home to the US Fifth Fleet. Other alternatives include berthing at the huge, US-run military base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean or, the least likely option, a long haul back to Gibraltar en route for Britain.

One submarine source said: "Bahrain is the obvious choice, although there might be security concerns in the Persian Gulf. Nuke boats are designed to operate unseen, not become tourist attractions. An attack boat on the surface would make a very tempting target for extremists."

The Herald story is actually about some comments from the MoD that this accident will almost certainly be used as a reason to retire the 32 year old submarine. With the damage already done, it is probably the right move, but that is the long term issue. The short term issue is where does the HMS Superb (S109) go right now?

The Royal Navy has ships in the region, and we imagine tasking orders have already been issued to send an escort to the submarine. HMS Westminster (F237) was originally an escort for HMS Illustrious (R06) for the Orion 08 deployment (which concludes today), but instead of returning home with the carrier, the frigate was sent to Myanmar as part of the Cyclone response. With the HMS Westminster (F237) almost certainly not going to be allowed to help in the cyclone disaster, we see the Type 23 frigate as the most likely warship to eventually become a full time escort home for HMS Superb (S109).

The photo above is HMS Superb (S109) making port in Gibraltar earlier this month. Looks to us that any significant damage almost certainly means retirement. If the submarine goes to Gibraltar for repairs, expect the Spanish Eco crowds to go ballistic.

A Masterpiece of Asymmetrical War?

It must be a slow news week when UPI dedicated not one, but two articles to the "asymmetrical" merits of the Varyag. No, not that Varyag, the old Soviet era Slava class Red Ukraine cruiser which has been renamed Varyag. Martin Sieff exaggerates with this analogy.

But in strategic terms, the Slavas, especially the Varyag in the Pacific, are the heirs of the major battleships and battle-cruisers of the German navy during World War II. Leviathans like the Bismarck, the Tirpitz and the Scharnhorst were never capable by themselves of disputing British command of the sea: The main threat to Britain's survival came from Nazi submarines, or U-Boats, sinking the convoyed cargo ships bringing the feed and oil from North America to keep Britain in the war.

But the big German battlewagons earned their keep by tying up far larger forces of the British navy to prevent them breaking out and wreaking havoc. The mere fear that the Tirpitz was on its way led Britain's top naval commanders to panic and scatter the Arctic convoy to the Soviet Union's PQ-17 in 1942. Many ships were sunk and hundreds of sailors killed.

This is why we like our modern rating system for surface combatants, it allows us to transcend eras of maritime power in these types of high level discussions.

Under our modern rating system, the Slava class is armed with 16 SS-N-12 Sandbox nuclear-capable supersonic anti-ship missiles, 64 SA-N-6 Grumble long-range SAMs, and 40 SA-N-4 Gecko short-range SAMs. Under our rating system, the short range SA-N-4s do not get counted, so the Slava class rates with 80 battle force missiles as a 3rd rate battleship. The Bismark was hardly a 3rd rate battleship in the WWII era. The second article concludes like this.

Like those famous German warships, the Varyag and its sisters are no paper tigers: Their destructive power is very real. But like the old German ships, the Varyag's larger, strategic purpose is to deter U.S. carrier battle groups from operating freely in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by the very threat of its presence. The Varyag is a masterpiece of asymmetrical war.

The Varyag was recently modernized, currently representing the most powerful surface combatant in the Russian Navy, and yes we include the Pyotr Velikiy which may or may not be capable of a long range deployment. However, the attempt to sell the Varyag as the pearl of the Pacific, much less representing a Bismark battleship of our era, is a bit too much exaggeration for us.

Indeed if we ignore the US Navy in the Pacific completely, we note the two Atago class first-rate battleships and four Kongo class second-rate battleships in service with Japan. Furthermore Taiwan has 4 third-rate battleships with the Kee Lung class, while South Korea will soon have 3 King Sejong the Great class third-rate battleships in the near future.

For some, the cold war will never end. Even in some hypothetical future conflict between Russia and the US in the Pacific, even if the tasking for the Varyag was to sink a US aircraft carrier, the primary concern for the Varyag wouldn't be an air attack from carrier aviation, it would be avoiding contact with US submarines.

The Varyag is a great warship, but teh Varyag is not the masterpiece of asymmetrical war at sea. In the modern naval warfare era it is hard to imagine any warship over 11,000 tons is a masterpiece of asymmetrical war. If one is looking for an asymmetrical weapon at sea, you start by looking to the submarine.

Somalia Pirates Strike Again... and Again

The piracy problems off the coast of Somalia and Yemen continue, with two more ships hijacked on Wednesday.

Two cargo ships have been hijacked in the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and Somalia, a Kenyan maritime official said Thursday.

"The ill-fated vessels under captivity are MV Lehmann and MV Arean," said Andrew Mwangura of the Kenyan Seafarers Association.

The ships were taken Wednesday in roughly the same area where the Dutch-owned MV Amiya Scan was hijacked Sunday, he said. Mwangura did not know who owned the ships and had no more details on the hijackings.

The map above is from the ICC, who tracks piracy incidents worldwide. Yellow represents attacks and red represents a successful hijacking. Canadian naval forces have moved into that region over the last week and will be assuming command of CTF-150 in those waters in June. Interesting timing, because that may be around the same time the UN finally passes a resolution regarding rules for responding to piracy.

We think it is very likely that Canada will be leading any UN approved worldwide Naval Coalition against African Piracy in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea before the end of the summer. The scenario that has unfolded here aligns very well with the role Prime Minister Stephen Harper has talked about in regards to Canada's foreign policy strategy, and I doubt his opposition even saw it coming. Just goes to show, coalition military approaches makes for interesting scenarios. Considering how much oil Canada sells to China, maybe they can get the PLAN to contribute a ship. You never know...

The Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

I'm thinking the Green Water Navy discussion yesterday got off track a bit, but like champs a few commenter's laid down the wood and reset the discussion on the right track. Well done.

The 100 ft metric discussed in the ISN article discussed brought to mind a concept introduced in 2005 as part of the Congressionally mandated Analysis of Alternatives for Fleet Constitution mandated by Congress. Because we all know the Navy would demand a platform be built from scratch, that using an existing platform would simply not happen, we think perhaps this idea would scale very nicely into the technology set and desired requirements for a green water platform.

Admiral Cebrowski's Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100)

Small, fast, modular surface combatant craft
Carried to theater by large support ship
Payload capacity increased as less fuel carried
Full Load Displacement: 100 tons
Speed: 60 knots; Crew: 3
Limited capacity for fixed systems, carries one module at a time
Operated as a unit or in flights of two or more craft
Modules:

• ASW-1: Variable depth sonar
• ASW-2: Towed array, torpedoes, fire control system
• Strike-1: 6-cell launcher, fire control system
• Strike-2: 3 UAVs (for targeting)
• Mine Warfare: 1 UUV, acoustic MCM system, mine neutralization system
• SOF: 2 rigid-hull inflatable boats
• USV: 2 unmanned surface vehicles
• SUW-1: 8 Surface-to-surface missiles
• SUW-2: Close-In Weapon System
• AAW: Launcher, missiles, multifunction radar
• UUV: 12 medium UUVs

Sensors: small sensors for acoustic detection

If the VSC-100 platform was designed to from a Global Fleet Stations host ship, we think this is exactly the type of thing that makes sense for addressing the green water requirements for peacetime operations. Keep in mind, the Navy finds itself in a period of fiscal competition, so any budget resources committed to a peacetime platform must find usefulness in a wartime scenario to justify investment. With weapon centric modular payloads as a core design factor, the Very Small Surface Combatant (VSC-100) does exactly that.

One other thought. We have linked that OFT report twice tonight. I've been thinking about some commentary regarding Admiral Cebrowski's ideas that highlights just how tuned in his concepts were to the time we were in. From Thomas Barnett:

Cebrowski pushed my work, to include the SysAdmin stuff, like crazy throughout the bureaucracy as early as 2002--eventually right up to Rumsfeld himself. I briefed all of Rummy's senior aides, as I describe in PNM, in the summer of 2002.

Tell me, how can Art be a champion of both NCW and SysAdmin stuff at the same time?

Dr. Barnett reminds us that the ideas that Streetfighter is associated with are far more complex than the criticism allowed. The Navy was very resistant to the version of change introduced by the ideas being floated in the late 90s, but that a two star Admiral is talking about building 100 ft ships for green water operations to support Global Fleet Stations today is a sign that change does happen, but at a snails pace.

Regardless, it is very difficult to read that OFT report and not recognize that those ideas in 2005 had evolved in line with the requirements of today. The revolt led by Admiral Cebrowski, Captain Hughes, Thomas Barnett, and many others continues to prove that the ideas really were todays solution. Ask yourself a question: Would the Navy be better off today had it built a bunch of Streetfighters instead of the LCS and DDG-1000s over the last few years? We think so, but we also ask ourselves this question.

If the Navy builds a bunch of 100 ft green water boats instead of 5 DDG-1000s will we find ourselves wishing we had the 5 battleships a decade from now?

We think it depends, if 50 Very Small Surface Combatants (VSC-100) at $100 million per and with modules are produced instead (essentially 50 VSC-100s for the cost of two DDG-1000s), I think the Navy gains more with the numbers.

Observing a Possible Evolution With Sea Basing

The Navy’s Sea Base concept is a key organizing principle of the planned future fleet. The Navy describes it as the foundation from which offensive and defensive fires are to be projected. As enemy access to weapons of mass destruction grows, and the availability of overseas bases declines, the Navy finds it compelling both militarily and politically to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, networked sea bases. Sea Base capabilities include enhanced afloat positioning of joint assets; offensive and defensive power projection; command and control; integrated joint logistics; and accelerated deployment and employment timelines. Netted and dispersed sea bases will consist of numerous platforms, including nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, multi-mission destroyers, submarines with Special Forces, and maritime pre-positioned ships.

A key focus of this report is that the sea base is the sea, not the things on it. The fleet architecture was designed to take advantage of the dynamics of operational maneuver that exploit not only the land commons but the sea commons. Operational maneuver that includes the sea surface expands greatly the maneuver space available to our forces thereby providing our forces with more options and complicating the enemy’s ability to maintain surveillance of our forces.

In utilizing the sea as a base, it is important to maintain connectivity through networking, not to mass at the same physical location. The latter would simply recreate offshore the vulnerabilities of a forward garrison on land to conventional barrage attack or to attack from weapons of mass destruction, albeit at a somewhat greater stand-off distance.

Full use of the potential of the sea as a base involves the inclusion of joint and allied forces. While it includes amphibious assault, it is much more than that. Modernizing old amphibious ships and maritime prepositioning ships is only a small part of the overall concept of sea basing. The fleet’s ability to operate anywhere, including along the littoral breaks down the land-sea boundary, expanding our maneuver space, and providing multiple means of bringing military force to bear on the enemy. The architecture of the sea base is open so it can scale to the dimensions appropriate to the mission.

Alternative Fleet Architecture Design, Stuart E. Johnson and Arthur K. Cebrowski, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, August 2005

Before we begin, we want to make it clear that if you look for discussions online for Sea Basing, it is a good bet you will find yourself looking in our archives. Nobody on the internet is a bigger supporter. We offer this reminder because our take is contrary to almost all opinions and reactions I've read on this article.

In today's CHINFO Clips an InsideTheNavy article from earlier this week was included. The article, Navy Seabasing Official: MPF(F) Program Faces Likely Cancellation, is read like a dire prediction that Sea Basing is fading as a priority.

Navy officials are talking about delaying the purchase of three large-deck amphibious assault ships essential to the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) program, a move that would likely doom the program, according to Cmdr. Mark Becker, seabasing pillar lead for Navy Wafare Development Command.

The MPF(F) program is “unfortunately, not going well in my opinion” and faces cancellation in the coming years because the program is becoming Navy-centric, which could prompt the joint forces to stop providing the necessary funding, Becker said May 21 here at IQPC’s Fleet Requirements Summit.(...)

Becker told Inside the Navy after his presentation that MPF(F) looks to be headed for funding problems due to the changing role of the MPF(F) -- from a forcible-entry role involving the joint forces to a Navy-specific supporting role. Moving the three large-deck amphibious ships out of the future-years budget plans, as Navy officials are discussing, would appear to push joint forces out of the picture, the commander said.

“So even if you still go with MPF(F), you might cancel the large-deck amphibs, because they don’t even need it for forcible entry,” Becker said, “and if it’s not going to conduct forcible entry, let’s save that money.”

Becker said this is the “first indication” that joint forces will balk when asked to help fund what will be a Navy-specific program, which would leave the sea service with too large of a funding burden to bear.

“The Navy is not going to just [fund MPF(F)] on its own,” he said.

We have some sympathy for Cmdr. Mark Becker, he has put a lot of effort into the MPF(F) project and now that the project is approaching a critical time period, a fate which may be decided next month, there appears to be some reconsiderations taking place in the Navy. From his perspective this can be seen as a project heading for cancellation, but we see this development as a sign of evolution. There is a lot of good that has occurred even if the MPF(F) in its current design is canceled, specifically the definition of Sea Basing has evolved, and the possibilities for Sea Basing have expanded conceptually.

MPF(F) was an industry driven concept, which we observe means industry clearly has the creative talent to think out of the box, adjust to a new direction, and come up with creative solutions to complex problems. The requirement is still there, the necessity to support joint forces leveraging the Sea as Base is without question still the goal. What we observe happening is a change in approach, rather than starting with a top down Marine centric MEB requirement approach, it appears to us like the Navy and Marines are looking for a bottom up approach, and we observe that to be an exercise in wisdom and a possible evolution towards a true joint solution.

Observe the pattern, the article paints a gloomy outlook for Sea Basing because the MPF(F) may not be bought in its conceptualized form. Pass out the tissues. We observe this is what it looks like to see the Navy and Marines adjust to conditions, establish realistic expectations, approach a new operational concept carefully, and work within its means. How terrible...

Where to go from here?

The reason for the potential LHA(R) delay is probably directly related to the nuclear power issue for amphibious ships. There are several things happening at once, and somewhere something was going to give. The Marines want 11 of each amphibious ship, which means they need at least 2 LHA(R)s and 2 more LPD-17s beyond what has been funded through FY08. It is very possible one LPD-17 will be funded in FY09. The Navy has other evolving Sea Basing requirements, specifically the Global Fleet Stations which is currently producing results right now. The MPF(F) does not address that Sea Basing requirement, nor does it meet the offshore staging bases requirement exercised today for fighting piracy. Not rushing into the brand new MPF(F) concept with $14 billion or more of the shipbuilding budget is hardly a bad decision.

The article goes on to highlight options for existing maritime prepositioning force requirements.

He said that leaves the Navy with three options: convince Congress to continue to lease the MPF squadrons, which Congress does not want to do, according to the commander; come up with the funding to buy the leased ships; or replace the ships with newer ships “of some shape or form . . . where we buy better ships that are still just prepositioned ships.”

Sea Basing will be at least as complicated as taking carrier aviation to sea was a century ago. While ISN makes the delay or potential cancellation of MPF(F) sound terrible, it isn't. Slowing down to take a bottom up approach instead of rushing to meet a top down requirement is how Sea Basing should have been developed in the first place.

The Russian BCVGN(X)

Back in early April, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky discussed some of the intentions behind the aviation ship project Russia will begin designing this year. Last week he confirmed several of those details, and also added that as design begins this year, construction will begin around the 2012 time frame.

As observers of the Russian Navy, we are curious of Russian ambitions to develop aviation ships, and have been researching all comments that might tip off what Russia is thinking. The following translation is by me, so it may not be perfect, but babblefish is stupid. This comment by Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky back on April 4th specifically caught our attention.

"these will be brand new ships that will carry existing aircraft, but also unmanned flying vehicles and technologies for influence towards space."

We found another discussion translated from an ITAR-TASS article from April 4th of a similar comment.

"these will be the fundamentally new ships, on which, besides usual aircraft, unmanned flying vehicles will be based, and there will also be serious strings to space".

However you want to translate Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky's comments, the last part of his discussion in April with the "space" aspect is the key clue in our opinion.

News agencies have translated the Russian aviation ship discussion as aircraft carriers, but we want to highlight the accurate translation is in fact aviation capable ships, the same words used to describe the Kiev class 20 years ago. The aviation capable ships Russia has suggested they will build have been estimated at 50,000 tons each, support for around 30 planes, helicopters, and UAVs, and it will be nuclear powered.

In following some of the discussions that have come from Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky's comments in April, we are starting to think Russia is planning to build a hybrid ship that crosses a nuclear powered ballistic missile battlecruiser and an aircraft carrier. A 50,000 Kiev II class perhaps?

It will be interesting to see more discussions on this aviation ship topic as the Russian design effort begins. If indeed the Russians are crossing a BMD cruiser and an aircraft carrier, we are observing a trend worth noting as nations look to the future.

Perhaps BAE was simply leading the way with their UXV Combatant, and the design will prove to be a trend in the 21st century instead of a novel concept.

USS George Washington Fire Update

With the USS George Washington (CVN 73) pulling into port yesterday we are starting to get some early details on the events that unfolded during the fire. The Navy's official website is running a story regarding four crew members who were trapped for 4 hours behind the flames. We are not certain, but we got a tip this picture is of Senior Chief Damage Controlman(SW/AW) Dwight Hill discussed in the story.

Extensive efforts were involved to rescue the four Sailors in question, including maintaining communication.

Electrician's Mate Fireman Jase Exum, one of the four Sailors trapped, said the lack of communication in the beginning is what scared him the most.

"I tried to use the sound-powered telephones, but I could not tell if anyone was hearing me," he said. "When the captain got on the 1MC (shipwide announcing system), it was a relief, knowing they knew we were still alive, and they were still out there trying to get to us."

Exum said that the training he had received helped him to remain calm.

"I really did not know what was going to happen, but I was the only one of the four of us that were trapped to go to Damage Control school," Exum said. "I explained what was happening around us, why they lit off fire extinguishing agents to keep us safe. I was trained as a Damage Controlman and I was really glad that I was because that knowledge kept me calm. We could have put ourselves in a lot worse danger if I didn't know certain things -- should we go now, should we wait, should we try to make it up on our own."

The word "shipmate" was used and remembered throughout the day.

Clearly these sailors won't need an essay to define the term once they get settled in the Pacific.

The Navy is doing a very good job handling this incident. I understand there is some frustration with families, communication with families can always be better, but what we are observing is professionalism at every level, in the moments of crisis and afterwards... exactly what we expect and want to see.

The Navy Times is also reporting on the GW fire, and with this quote, our concerns appear confirmed, this was not a small fire.

The fire, which the skipper described as “significant,” had started near an auxiliary boiler space and spread through a cable supply and exhaust trunk. Capt. Dave Dykhoff, George Washington’s commanding officer called it “probably the worst one I’ve been involved with.”

We are not going to speculate damage, no point. We are confident the reporters are going to uncover every angle of that story over time. What we keep thinking is how good a job the crew did. We are getting only small details of the event, details like 15 firefighting teams, crew members trapped for 4 hours, and details regarding the smoke and heat in the area located near No. 3 pump room. There really isn't a lot of room to fight fire back there...

As we think about how the smoke and heat would have just consumed those spaces, we think it is pretty incredible nobody was seriously injured.

Navy Leadership Takes a Broadside

The discussion on Tuesday was unquestionably the editorial written by Christopher P. Cavas. Published in both DefenseNews and Navy Times, Chris's article Why No One Believes the Navy has held little back as he unloads strong criticism in waves against the Navy. The first five sentences set the tone for the analysis.

When U.S. Navy officials tell Congress they have confidence in their shipbuilding cost projections, lawmakers don't believe them.

When flag officers say they've got enough money for maintenance, fleet sailors wonder why high-tech warships aren't combat ready.

When top admirals say they have a new maritime strategy, analysts struggle to match it with the shipbuilding plan.

When business strategies override operational needs, officers wonder if they're war fighters or executives.

Navy leaders are suffering from a credibility gap - with Congress, with industry and, increasingly, with the fleet.

There are so many interesting discussions in this article that we either post the entire thing in full, or assume the reader has already read it in full. We are choosing option #2.

It is easy to choose among the various reasons offered in the article as "symptoms" for why the Navy doesn't have any credibility. At this point almost any reason given would be fair commentary. We have observed a pattern, particularly in front of Congress but also with the media, with the exception of a handful of program managers, the Navy doesn't even attempt to defend itself or its programs anymore. There have not been any reported specific reasons why, whether it is the civilian leadership or the Navy's own leadership, but the Navy has either accepted or has become resigned to its discredited, undefended positions and has decided to go full speed ahead anyway.

The piece only cites by name one source, Bob Work. Considering how tough much of the criticism is, that isn't really fair to Bob, so we figure we will highlight one other source for some of the criticism. We know where this comes from.

A growing number of professionals also sense a leadership vacuum, particularly at the service's top levels. Some wonder whether Mullen's advancement to the nation's top military job - chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - has kept his successor as CNO, Adm. Gary Roughead, from more assertively taking the service's wheel.

That opinion is found only one place in print, right here by us. While we agree with almost every other anonymously sourced comment, and have said as much many times on the blog and highlighted a number of examples, we are among the choir in those cases.

In our opinion, every "symptom" cited is a result of leadership, and leadership is the primary problem facing the Navy today. In a perfect world, change would come from within, but in this world we don't believe change will come at all, at least not anytime soon.

Mullen has done a good job as CNO and now as CJCS, but it has become painfully obvious to everyone that he made mistakes as CNO in regards to the way ahead. Whether the focus is on SC-21 or the 313-ship plan, there is no alignment with resources and maritime strategy, and while new initiatives sound very smart and are very impressive, the entire resource strategy is so far removed from the current conditions and current direction of the Navy credibility has been completely lost. This severe credibility problem for the Navy leaves observers with a decision: either the maritime strategic concept that has been developed is flawed, or the resource plans associated with the strategy is flawed. From our point of view, the maritime strategic concept is incomplete, and the associated resource strategy is a train wreck.

The tension between a flawed strategic vision for resources put in motion by the current CJCS and an incomplete strategic maritime concept by the current CNO means something must give. Who is the leader that will step up? It is this question where the articles criticism finds a conclusion.

The second retired senior officer lamented today's risk-averse naval culture, and bemoaned the lack of a strong Navy leader. That should be the CNO, he said.

"But what does he think? What does he believe? Usually there's a champion, someone who picks people up from the malaise. Where's the champion?"

The current credibility problems are due to inaction in correcting the current course of the Navy by two men; Admiral Mullen and Admiral Roughead. This isn't about blame, one could easily go back before either of these men were in charge and pass blame around, blame is completely irrelevant at this point.

The bottom line on the credibility problem can be summarized thus: In the Navy, leadership is top down. There are only two men who can fix the credibility problems that the Navy is suffering from. The question isn't whether Mullen or Roughead could fix the Navy credibility problem, rather the question is will they even try? We doubt it, but time will tell.

Fleet Constitution Evolution For 2009 QDR

Inside the Navy has an article today called Navy Looking at Potential Requirement for "Green Water" Vessel (subscription only) that discusses the Navy looking into a new ship class. This is the first time we have observed a two-star Admiral discussing a new ship class since the release of the 313-ship fleet.

“We’re contemplating a green water craft of some kind,” Rear Adm. Bruce Clingan said in a May 19 interview at the Pentagon. “That’s one of the things that we will explore” in the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The concept is to field a ship for low-intensity conflicts, irregular warfare, increasing maritime security, and dealing with issues such as human trafficking while connecting with partners who have small navies for cooperative training. Specifically regions like the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa and Latin America are cited as locations where such a ship could have immediate impact to the maritime domain.

“We begin to speak to the green water requirement with [the] Littoral Combat Ship, but it’s a pretty big ship,” Clingan noted. The two LCS hulls under construction, one by Lockheed Martin and the other by General Dynamics, are over 300 feet long.

“There’s a rule of thumb, not scientific, that says a ship can coordinate well with another ship twice its size and half its size,” the admiral said. “And there’s an awful lot of our potential partners with ships from 45 feet to 150 feet. Do we need to look at a ship that’s somewhere around 100 feet, that’s cost-effective, that will help us build these meaningful partnerships working in conjunction with the Global Fleet Stations? Those are the types of things we have to consider as we move forward.”

As they plan for the future, Navy decision-makers are looking at the fleet and evaluating the utility of fielding an additional, smaller boat for use in places such as the Gulf of Guinea.

“To effectively build partnerships -- you know, an awful lot of our partners find it hard to work with a cruiser-size combatant capability -- one of the things in this 313-ship ‘floor’ that we’ll be looking at through the QDR process will be: Does the mix merit refinement? Do we have the right set of capabilities in these multimission ships?” Clingan explained. “This is an ongoing effort.”

What a Navy green water craft would look like remains unclear, the admiral said.

The article then turns towards a technical report released late last year from students at the Navy Postgraduate School called A Systems Engineering Approach For Global Fleet Station Alternatives in the Gulf of Guinea. Is the Navy looking for a high-low mix for peacemaking? For those who haven't read the report, the GFS ship design calls for a ship between 5,000-10,000 tons with a draft of 15 feet or less, a top speed around 15 knots, a minimum 5,000 nautical mile range, and a crew of no more than 50 with additional berthing availability.

One aspect of the NPS report we found interesting is that it recommends and cites metrics why the LPD-17 class is the best existing platform for conducting this role if a new ship was not to be developed. Metrics for measurement included size, cargo-carrying capability, aviation and small boat capability, speed, communications, and command and control, which we find very interesting because with the exception of high speed, we have used the same measurements to describe the requirements for a large mothership.

Naturally we believe the developments being discussed are a move in the right direction, but it requires some critical thought prior to moving forward. While Global Fleet Stations is an important mission, and nobody on the internet has given more attention to Global Fleet Stations than we have, we observe there must be proper consideration for balance and alternatives built for the Global Fleet Station design must justify the costs of peacemaking. An inexpensive armed 100 ft Corvette makes a ton of sense, but a 10,000 ton ship intended solely for peacemaking is a rather large investment that simply cannot be justified for the Navy unless it brings needed capabilities to the warfighter.

Is it possible the Navy is reading and listening? While the NPS design is very interesting, in fact we like it a lot, we observe that major investments towards soft power must also scale towards a hard power profile to justify costs. For us, that means amphibious ships are the best investment for Global Fleet Station mission profiles, even if they aren't perfect for the role. We note that if the Navy can sustain the existing AEGIS fleet until 2020-2025 time frame, the shipbuilding budget is well positioned to invest in peacemaking over the next decade while also building redundancy and options for the joint warfighter in planning for a future challenger.

Should the cancellation of the DDG-1000 occur, the Navy could choose to take an interesting step towards aligning resources for the Maritime Strategy by moving up the replacement date for the LSD(X) to now and building LPD-17s to fill that role. By doing so, the existing LSDs can then be utilized for the emerging requirements of motherships for unmanned combat systems and peacemaker roles including MDA and GFS. By using the existing 12 LSDs as motherships, this allows the Navy to go with an often discussed Flower/Fletcher model for small surface combatants, essentially a new 100 ft fast corvette and reuse the existing LCS hull for a fast frigate. While this may sound like a cost nightmare, it really isn't if you think about it. The Navy would essentially be trading the existing budgets for the remaining 5 DDG-1000s, 51 LCS, and the planned 12 LSD(X) for what amounts to 12 LPD-17s and a mix of frigates/corvettes.

The Navy would also have 8 of the existing LSDs as motherships until 2030, when the planned Littoral Combat Ships would start needing replacement anyway. This approach would ultimately save the Navy money in shipbuilding while allowing the Navy to use the 12 existing LSDs to further develop important 21st century strategic concepts, including Motherships, GFS, and MDA on a Sea Based platforms. By focusing all shipbuilding resources towards the small surface combatant, amphibious force, logistics force, and submarine force the Navy becomes well positioned to focus its shipbuilding budget to replace the existing large surface combatant force and SSBN force when that time arrives.

Embracing Opportunity With Soft Power

Lawrence J. Korb and Max A. Bergmann had an editorial last Tuesday in the Baltimore Sun regarding the role of the US Navy in humanitarian operations. We really like this article for a number of reasons, but mostly because it does a good job of describing the maritime strategy, particularly the role of maritime forces in peacetime.

The article begins by following the history of humanitarian responses by the US Navy starting with the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia, highlighting that following the American response a Pew Poll noted that 80 percent of the citizens of Indonesia had a more favorable opinion of the United States after our response. We are still not sold on polling as a useful unit of measure for peacetime strategy, but as we search for better metrics we believe it does count for something.

The article makes four good points in favor of the maritime strategy that promotes an active role for the Navy in humanitarian operations. Read in full here.

First, such missions act to maintain precious stability. After the 2004 tsunami, there was a real danger that chaos, even unrest, would spread beyond the disaster zones. Our response not only saved lives but also helped stabilize the area.

Second, it improves the image of the U.S. Responding to disasters demonstrates to the world the goodwill of the American people and can serve to improve our standing in world opinion, as it has in Indonesia. As Admiral Mullen explained, the tsunami intervention showed another side of "American power that wasn't perceived as frightening, monolithic or arrogant."

Third, such missions help cast our global military posture in a better light. Countries will be more accepting of a U.S. military presence in their neighborhood if they know that our military will be there to help if disaster strikes. Adopting this role also enables the U.S. to build closer relationships with countries, as in Bangladesh, where joint preparations helped avert an even worse disaster and improved our relations.

Finally, responding to natural disasters is the price of being the world's largest superpower. As the guarantor of global security, the U.S. is looked to not just for its ability to deter threats but also for its ability to help when countries are in need.

Responding to disasters should therefore not be seen as a burden on the U.S. military, but should be embraced as an opportunity.

We have stated many times that we believe the great challenge for the US Navy in our time is to develop our nations strategic capabilities to leverage the maritime domain in support of our nations interests during peacetime without eroding the nations wartime capabilities. It will not be easy, because on the surface requirements can be very different, but we believe a well thought out resource strategy can accomplish this objective within the nations means of our era if the Navy is able to align its means with ends and ways.

We observe the forward deployed presence of Expeditionary Strike Groups specifically has enhanced the Navy's ability to respond to peacetime challenges. The adaptable nature of these resources means the Navy is there, prepared.

We would like to see more articles, perhaps more research and study put forth by Lawrence J. Korb through the Center for American Progress discussing the importance of the Navy's Maritime Strategy, and in particular its dual role for warfighting and peacemaking. Why? Because CAP has been noticeably absent from discussions regarding the Navy in the 21st century, which is ironic, because it appears to us that Admiral Roughead would be listening.

5th Fleet Focus: Patterns of Piracy and the Potential for New Partners

On Sunday the Jordanian vessel that was taken by Somalian pirates was released. There have not been any details regarding the terms of the release, only that Somalian soldiers were aboard and the ship would make port in Mogadishu. The ship was previously described as an aid ship, and there were also claims of weapons aboard, however it is difficult to piece the story together without more details.

The pattern we have observed this year is that as one boat is released, it doesn't take long before the pirates off Somalia strike again, and predictably news broke yesterday the pirates had captured the Dutch ship MV Amiya Scan that had recently departed Kenya. Negotiations are underway.

A Dutch shipping company negotiated with Somali pirates Tuesday, seeking the release of nine crew members on a freighter that was hijacked in the latest attack on merchant shipping off the coast of Somalia.

Lars Walder, spokesman for the ship's owner Reider Shipping BV, said his company is in contact with the hijackers and "as far as we know none of the crew has been injured or worse."

The crew were four Russians and five Filipinos, he said.

This is the second Dutch ship captured in a year with Russian crew members, and with recent news that the Russian Navy is stirring, questions are being asked in Russia about what the Russian Navy intends to do about piracy. Today Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo responded. Translation from the Russian Navy Blog.

"Coordination of naval fores in the zones where pirates are confirmed to operate will help to partially resolve this problem. Russia's Navy has actively participated in exerciese which have dealt, partially, with the issue of piracy in the last couple of years," [Navy spokesman Igor'] Dygalo said.

"The fact of pirate attacks on Russian and foreign ships confirms the correctness of the course taken by the military decision makers in the Russian Federation and the General Staff of the Navy to renew the presence of Russian warships in all areas of the world ocean, especially in regions of intense fishing and shipping activity."

Last week all the discussion surrounding the Russian Fleet plans, and in particular the expectations of upcoming operations, had several observers asking what would the Russian Navy do? Based on the Russian media reporting and discussions on Russian forums, we got the impression Russia has every intention to integrate with international partners in providing safety and security, and based on some of the comments we observed they did not intend to shy away from the trouble spots.

Eagle1 posted on this issue earlier tonight as well, and his comment sounds right to us.

This may not be a good time to be going into the pirate business.

We agree completely. The Russian Navy has a chip on its shoulder, with money to burn and ship condition steadily improving throughout the fleet, a consistent presence of a Russian warship off the Horn of Africa is starting to look like a very likely scenario in the near future.

This kind of low intensity, real world operational scenario is exactly what the Russian Navy needs right now for rebuilding the fleets training and morale, much less national pride. We expect Russia to take full advantage and start rotating a ship once the UN works out the rules of engagement.

In the 90s some cold warriors I know half expected the Russians and the US to fight side by side on the same battlefield. It didn't turn out that way, but in the very near future the US Navy and Russian Navy could be operating side by side in mutual cooperation trying to put down the rise in piracy off Africa. It isn't as sexy as tank divisions rolling together as allies in some distant desert, but the mutual interest in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean is an interesting starting place for better military relations between old rivals.

Photo: Ionian Sea, 15 February 2024: The British destroyer HMS Nottingham and the Russian cruiser Moskva during training activities conducted to help prepare Russian Navy crews for participation in Operation Active Endeavour

5th Fleet Focus: CNN Does CTF-150

I'm not a big fan of TV in general, but if one of the news networks is going to put a reporter with CTF-150 and do reports about piracy off Somalia, I'll support that.

CNN's David McKenzie aboard the USS Shoup, with a video here.

By the way, David McKenzie calls the Shoup a battleship. While it is unlikely, we will give him the benefit of the doubt and assume he is using our modern warships rating system and is smarter than everyone else.

The Tactical Node and the Strategic Network

Milan Vego continues to offer hard hitting pieces in the Armed Forces Journal. While we don't always agree with his points, they are always fascinating contributions and his latest piece, Obsessed with tactics, The Navy neglects the importance of operational art doesn't disappoint.

The Navy today is overly focused on the tactical employment of its combat forces, in its doctrine and practice. This might not be a problem in case of a conflict with numerically and technologically inferior forces. However, the Navy would have a much greater problem and possibly suffer a major defeat in a war with a relatively strong opponent that better balances the employment of his forces at the tactical and operational levels of war. The Navy’s superior technology and tactics would not be sufficient to overcome its lack of operational thinking.

The Navy’s over-reliance on technology is also one of the main reasons for its focus on the tactics of employment of platforms, weapons/sensors and combat arms. Moreover, the Navy grossly neglects tactics for employing several naval combat arms or combined arms tactics. Among numerous naval tactical publications, there is not a single one that explains the employment of surface forces, submarines, naval aircraft and combat arms of other services in combination. Another serious problem is that the Navy still lacks a doctrine for the operational level of war at sea. This lack of a broader operational framework greatly complicates writing subordinate tactical doctrinal publications.

Most of the Navy’s attention is given to strike warfare, while so-called “defensive warfare” areas, such as antisubmarine warfare, defense and protection of maritime trade, and mine warfare, are given a short shrift. The fate of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in World War II shows what can happen when the focus is almost exclusively on tactics and offensive employment of one’s combat forces. The Japanese were fixated on the single so-called decisive battle. That preoccupation guided the IJN’s tactical doctrine and ship designs resulting in a powerful surface force that was one-dimensional and brittle. Perhaps there is nothing worse than confusing tactics with strategy, and strategy with the conduct of war, as the IJN did in the interwar years.

The article is an excellent read in full. We find several of the points quite interesting, and while we don't agree on all points we do observe there are a number of examples where tactical thinking is emphasized and where strategy is lacking. In particular we really like how Milan Vego has set up the debate for Strike Warfare.

The Navy’s over-reliance on tactics has become even more pronounced with its adoption of network-centric warfare, now commonly referred to as network-centric operations (NCO). The Navy also became one of the strongest proponents of the so-called effects-based approach to operations (EBAO). Despite claims to the contrary, NCO and EBAO use tactical techniques and procedures to accomplish the objectives across the levels of war. Yet purely tactical actions such as strikes cannot replace, major operations as the main method of accomplishing operational objectives, at least not yet

NCO also provides, through the FORCEnet network architecture, the key component for the execution of the Navy’s vision for the 21st century, Sea Power 21. Except for some elements of Sea Shield and Sea Basing, Sea Power 21 is not focused on the operational level of war. For example, one of the major components of Sea Power 21, Sea Strike, is essentially a tactical concept. Among other things, it envisages that “netted fires and automated decision aids will accelerate the launching of precision attacks on critical targets in order to create appropriate effects.”

The Navy’s narrow and tactical focus is highlighted in almost all its official statements regarding the employment of major tactical forces — the carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, strike or theater ballistic missile surface action groups, and maritime prepositioning groups — as the principal forces subordinate to joint force commander. The numbered and theater fleets, such as the 7th Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, are rarely mentioned. Yet only theater forces have the capabilities to accomplish operational and strategic objectives in war at sea.

When reading this article our discussions trended towards a focus on the node vs a focus on the network, and what each piece has come to represent. A node can be described as a tactical application of technology for "effects" while a network is a strategic application of theater forces for influence. Milan Vego didn't quite carry it that far, but we will.

We think there is a good argument that the node approach to naval warfare describes the Navy's own resource priorities. The tactical mindset would immediately explain why a system like the Cyclone class Patrol Ship would be dismissed by the "effects-based approach" and given up to the Coast Guard, only now to realize how effective these platforms are as part of the strategic theater network.

We really like that Milon Vego links "effects-based approach" to a tactical view of "network-centric operations" because truth is evident in his astute observation. The early controversies that surrounded discussions of network-centric warfare in the Navy were specific to network nodes, not the network itself, specifically most of the criticism of Admiral Cebrowski's Streetfighter focused on the small platforms that lacked capability for "effects" at the unit level, and in this tactical view individual platforms were seen as "expendable". The irony is that an "expendable" label requires a tactical view of an individual platform while the strategic equivalent would be "attrition" due to operations at the theater level of war. The tactical view won that argument, an early sign of trouble.

Aside from the obvious tactical view taken in the means the Navy is developing for executing strategy, the tactical ways observed from Milan Vego are interesting to note. Sea Basing is an interesting example, a 2 battalion metric for offensive operations laid down as a requirement by the Marines is a good example of a tactical requirement for Sea Basing replacing a strategic operational concept of Sea Basing. We wonder what the strategic view of Sea Basing would be if the metric of measurement was slightly different, for example a metric that required support for one Army Stryker BCT, two MEUs, and the integration of three Air Force Wings with naval forces for strategic influence of a host nation. Note the difference, the Marine scenario of the 2 MEB requirement is a tactical maneuver and tactical objective requirement, where the second scenario is a strategic requirement for developing, integrating, and supporting a network towards influence of a strategic objective. We believe that depending upon the view, the nodes would be quite different.

We believe influence at the operational level of war can be assessed based on network metrics rather than node metrics, and network strength can be a measurement for strategic influence just like models that assess tactical influence that individual nodes contribute. We believe that with such an approach the value of strategic speed vs tactical speed would become more obvious as a metric, and any measured value of just-in-time logistics would immediately become subordinate to the value of a strategic reserve. It will not be the tactical node's, rather the strategic networks (either connected or disconnected) that will ultimately influence the operational level of war through improving the human decision process. If it was truly the other way around, one node in Washington DC could make all decisions, a theory long proven a fallacy of network-centric operations.

We believe the tactical view of individual network node's at the operational level of war has allowed the metrics that are used to access success in doctrinal planning to be skewed towards the tactical strengths, resulting in several problems when taking a strategic view of the Navy. Only by taking the strategic view of the network will metric realignment take place towards greater understanding of requirements for warfighting under network-centric operations models at the operational level of war from sea in the modern era.

It is easy enough to prove if either Milan Vega or our own observations are correct in these assertions, simply turn off the network connections between theater forces during exercises. If doctrine is right theater forces will perform responsibilities towards theater strategic objectives without the guidance from central nodes. If doctrine is wrong, one will observe a mesh of tactical moves with no strategic ends.

Monsoon Season Arrives In Myanmar

While the international community is busy trying to get the junta to live up to the promises that aid workers can enter country and help with the estimated 2.5 million people in need of assistance following the Cyclone early this month, the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. While aid is getting in through relief flights and a few ships, the response is often described as slow and inadequate. Most aid agencies report problems caused by the government, and the estimated dead and missing is at 133,000+. Government problems continue to dominate the headlines.

Development Program's director for crisis prevention, said Monday that despite the government's statements that most of the short-term relief has been completed, "no one" at the U.N. or on her team "feels that we are anywhere near the end of the humanitarian relief period."

Ms. Cravero, who was in Yangon, Myanmar's main city, for a donor conference Sunday, said only 50% of the affected people have been provided with significant aid and that foreign governments at the meeting stressed they would only offer more support when they see more access and transparency in aid distribution.

There is cautious optimism following the UN brokered diplomatic deal that would allow aid workers, which will supposedly allow workers into country by the end of this week. While the UN is putting the happy face on these developments, we don't expect it to happen quickly. While the government does nothing, conditions on the ground will get much worse this week as the monsoon season we discussed immediately following the Cyclone tragedy arrives in Myanmar.

The monsoon has struck and it is raining all day, every day and will continue like this until October; with high winds and heavy rainfall. They will not see the sun for the next five to six months.

These people have no shelter at all; they have no dry clothes. The young, the weak and the old are particularly vulnerable. People are so demoralised that they have lost interest in taking on any activity, unusual for such industrious people.

Imagine if you had spent the last two weeks soaking wet and up to your knees in water, nothing to eat or drink, with your family dying all around you, your livelihood gone, your home blown away, weakened with dysentery and influenza.

While there have been a number of western media editorials calling for confrontation and intervention, the aid agencies are calling for a different approach. Many aid agencies find the local Burmese institutions to be quite capable, and more important, trusted by the local population unlike external support which has been made unpopular through decades of propaganda. This is a view from a western aid worker perspective inside Myanmar that is outside the usual western press reporting.

Contrary to press reports, a good deal of aid is getting through. The big US cargo planes are still being prevented from landing, but the organisations we are working with all have their own channels. Commercial air freight into the country is working normally and a good deal of aid supply is coming through this way.

Most necessities are available here - there is a ready supply of freight from China, India and Thailand - and yet cyclone survivors are being given bottles of mineral water flown in from the UK when local companies are offering excellent products.

Supplies can be sourced here easily and far more cheaply than flying them in. This is mainland south-east Asia - Burma is surrounded by mass-producing, low-cost, tiger economies. This is not “darkest Africa”.

Village people here are mistrustful of foreign medicines and would prefer Burmese traditional medicines. And they find the high-energy biscuits being doled out by the aid agencies unpalatable and demoralising. Traditional staples such as rice and fish paste are both readily available just outside the disaster zone - indeed, last week, at the Thilawa docks, the government was loading ships with rice for export to Bangladesh. There is no shortage of rice.

There is no need to fly food in, just money, which is lighter, to buy simple essentials.

While the military regime may be incompetent to deal with the crisis, we should not under-estimate the resourcefulness of other Burmese institutions. Local firms, associations, clubs and schools have been collecting funds and goods to send to the needy. Their biggest problem is they can not deliver beyond the distance of a day trip, about 90 miles.

With so many political issues going on, the NGOs have had to learn how things work - you need a Burmese front organisation and the NGO takes the back seat. This is now working - and timely, as a continued local-only response would be impossible to sustain in the long term.

The article goes on to note that the western criticism is hurting the effort. We are not impressed by this argument, we do not see the wisdom in the international community standing quiet while the lives of millions of people hang in the balance, and find the logic of such a stance to be empty given the response by the junta to all conditions, positive or negative.

When two and a half million people face five months of rain with no shelter, and the international community is prohibited from helping these people, it is somewhat telling that the NGOs see the best option being to stand by and allow for small gains. Very understandable though, no government or institution has been willing to take any substantial action towards offering a better alternative.

As the monsoon season rains on the people in Myanmar over the next week, the real danger becomes the expected increase in mosquitoes. With a lack of shelter, an abundance of rotting animal and human corpses, conditions for a perfect storm for disease appears a certainty without rapid action... something that has been absent the entire effort.

While there may be food right now, we note that the rice crop did not get laid down prior to the monsoon seasons arrival, meaning the nation is facing a 40% drop is in the rice crop from the beginning. The UN is right to look at this as a long term problem, because meeting the short term problems of finding shelter for millions of people is only the beginning, the lack of a rice crop in the region this year and the destruction of most regional fishing industries leaves the local communities with long term needs as well.

Memorial Day 2008

The Small Wars Journal has a great roundup.

Have a great holiday, remember the purpose, and stay safe.

Picture of the Day: Fore on the George Washington

There are still no details, but with the fire near Hanger Bay 3 the fire appears to be larger than some assumed originally. We learn through the photography captions on Navy.mil the fire spread through the wiring spaces. These two pictures stand out among those on published to date.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.


Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group

USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
USS Mobile Bay (CG 53)
USS Russell (DDG 59)
USS Shoup (DDG 86)
USS Momsen (DDG 92)
USS Curts (FFG 38)


Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Nassau (LHA 4)
USS Ashland (LSD 48)
USS Nashville (LPD 13)
USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)
USS Ross (DDG 71)
USS Bulkeley (DDG 84)


In Theater

Ocean 6
FGS Emden (F 210)
HMCS Iroquois (DDH 280)
HMCS Calgary (FFH 335)
HNLMS Evertsen (F 805)
ITS Commandante Borsini (P491)
FS Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet (F794)
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51)
HMS Chatham (F87)
HMS Montrose (F236)
HMNZS Te Mana (F111)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)

Fire on USS George Washington Yesterday

The Navy is reporting there was a fire yesterday on the USS George Washington (CVN 73). I shouldn't need to emphasize how serious fire is taken aboard any ship, much less a nuclear aircraft carrier.

At approximately 7:50 a.m. local time on May 22, a fire was detected in the vicinity of the aft air conditioning and refrigeration space and auxiliary boiler room aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73).

The fire spread to several spaces via a cableway and caused extreme heat in some of the ship spaces, but it was contained and extinguished by the crew without any serious injuries to personnel. It took several hours to completely contain and extinguish the fire.

The ship had been conducting a routine replenishment at sea in the Pacific Ocean with USS Crommelin (FFG 37)when smoke was observed and an emergency breakaway was initiated.

There were no serious injuries. Twenty-three Sailors were treated for heat stress and one Sailor was treated for first degree burns. The ship's crew was at general quarters for approximately 12 hours.

Most important point: No one was seriously injured. The rest can be fixed.

Five Thoughts on Friday

An excellent way to start Friday, pictures of North Korea's stealth Navy.

The Navy is headlining the news in Russia. David knows why.

Russia to restore a battleship (Красная Звезда в четверг). Military parades, amphibious assaults on TV, new submarine launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear battleships can give the look and feel of the old Soviet regime, but things aren't just skin deep in Russia. When I can read about the shipbuilding budget of 2007 and 2008 on the internet, read how the active core was originally funded for 2007 but not done (read corruption), and how it is again funded and planned in the 2008 budget it reminds me that despite the hype things have clearly changed in Russia. The transition is interesting...

Analysis of the PLA in action for the earthquake response. More PLA analysis here, and interesting observations here.

New twist to the hijacked ship off Somalia, the pirates claim the ship from Jordan they hijacked which was supposed to have aid from Denmark has weapons aboard. Eagle1 offers more plus analysis. Speaking of smuggling weapons into Africa, remember that Chinese ship loaded with arms that was almost seized in South Africa? Springboard has the rest of the story.

Observing the 3rd Yuan Class Submarine

I would link to the press release, but it doesn't exist. New photography this week highlights the 3rd Yuan Class submarine has been launched. The first photo is a comparison of the first two Yuan class submarines launched, with the remaining photo's of the 3rd Yuan recently launched.

Click images for better resolution.


The 2008 Annual DoD Report (PDF) for Congress was released early this year, and was very short on details regarding the development of China's submarine force. The only noteworthy comment was that it was assessed the Yuan class was in full production.

However if you observe the first three Yuan class submarines closely, you will observe they are different, and there is yet another Yuan class submarine soon to be launched that is even more distinct in design. The Japanese are well known for taking an evolutionary approach to building their submarine forces, incorporating changes at an evolved pace within the framework of construction of one submarine per year. It would appear China is conducting a similar pattern, except the evolution in the case of the Yuan class is steady for each submarine produced.

Ronald O'Rourke describes the Yuan class well in his report from April 16 (PDF).

Yuan-class (Type 041) SS. China is building a new class of SS called the Yuan (or Type 041) class. The first Yuan-class boat, whose appearance reportedly came as a surprise to western observers,245 was launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stage of construction) in 2004. Observers expect the first Yuan-class boat to enter service in 2006 and the second to enter service in 2009. One source stated in 2007 that in addition to the fist two units in the class, “two further units are currently building at Wuhan [Shipbuilding Industry Co.]. By 2010, boats No. 9 & 10 will likely commission. Twenty of [the] class are expected to be built and [the] Jiangnan Shipyard (Shanghai) is expected to be integrated into [the] programme during 2006 with completion of [the] last ‘Song-II’ class.

Some observers believe the Yuan class is a variant of the Song (Type 039) class design and consequently refer to the Yuan class as the Type 039A. One observer stated in 2007:

There are few details at present but the design appears to exhibit some features of the Song class, although it appears to be shorter and broader, and possibly also of the Russian Kilo class. The design of the fin [i.e., the “conning tower”] is similar to that of the former while a distinctive ‘hump’ on top of a teardrop shaped hull is characteristic of the latter. It is possible therefore that the boat is of double-hulled construction. Fitted with a seven-bladed propeller. It is not known whether an AIP system has been incorporated.

Because the Yuan class is similar to both the Song class and the Kilo class, the Yuan goes by two names, neither of which originate from any official Chinese source. The lack of any official source or news reporting using the "Type X" designation highlights just how transparent China is not.

Janes and several other research organizations call the Yuan the Type 041, while several other observers call the Yuan the Type 039A. With the first three Yuan class each obviously distinct based on photography, the question is should we start calling them Type 039A, Type 039B, and Type 039C, and the soon to be launched Type 039D? The increased pace of submarine launches for the Yuan class combined with the physical distinctions highlights a rapidly developing submarine industry, not only in terms of construction but in design as well.

Finally we note that earlier this year someone updated the Yuan class submarine entry on Wikipedia, specifically the propulsion aspect of the article. It is worth a read, although like all things Wikipedia, trust but verify. We have no concrete evidence regarding what kind of propulsion the Yuan class submarine has, but we do observe that with the first Yuan likely to be at sea this year everyone is likely to know for certain.

Because the regulars usually ask, photos from here and here.

6th Fleet Focus: Rafale's Fly Off US Carriers

The USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) is on its way home from a 6 month deployment in the Middle East, but before leaving the Mediterranean Sea, the US Navy is conducting an exercise with France Rafale's.

Images courtesy of Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ricardo J. Reyes. Click pictures for link to Hi-Resolution on the Navy's website.


As we have previously discussed in detail here, the French blog Secret Défense reported last six to eight Rafale's of the flotilla 12 F and two Hawkeyes of the flotilla 4F are expected to embark on the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) in July of this year. There were also rumors from TTUOnline last year that French Rafale's would embark on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) later this year as well, but that has not been confirmed anywhere else.

It is unclear if the French will only be participating in the exercises with the Roosevelt or if they intend to deploy with the Carrier when it makes its scheduled 6 month deployment. With the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (R91) currently in extended maintenance, the French pilots can only train landings and launches from either a US aircraft carrier or the Brazilian aircraft carrier Sao Paulo, which is currently in maintenance itself.

Update: Hat Tip reader FL, who has video here of the French flying on the Truman here. Good stuff. He also has details via this link on the French activity in July on the coast of Norfolk.

Russia Outlines Navy's Return to Sea

The Russian Navy will soon follow the path of their Air Force, and begin regular patrols and deployments.

Russia's Northern Fleet will dispatch ships and submarines on tours of duty to various regions of the world's oceans in 2008, the fleet's commander said on Tuesday.

"There will be tours of duty this year, involving surface ships, submarines and aircraft," Vice-Admiral Nikolai Maksimov said. "We will visit the Atlantic, the Indian and the Pacific oceans, and the Mediterranean."

The cold war is over, and since the end of the cold war the number of deployments by the Russian Navy has been remarkably few. If we were to look for trend lines, we would observe that most Russian deployments with one major exception have involved exercises with NATO or Asian Navies. There have been no indications yet what purpose Russia intends to deploy ships for, except perhaps to show the flag.

The strategic choices for Russia in how it uses forward deployed naval forces will be interesting to observe. Russia can enter the maritime domain as a contributor to safety and security of the global maritime commons, and would be welcomed into the fold by the international community. This approach would include contribution to the international security forces that currently operate in the Mediterranean Sea and off the Horn of Africa. In both cases Russia brings unique capabilities to contribute to international forces, including political clout through existing relationships with nations in those regions.

An alternative approach for Russia would be to be present at these locations, but intentionally remain disconnected from regional international forces seeking a nationalistic policy towards specific regional goals to Russia. This would be a return to the competitor position Russia enjoyed during the cold war, which held sway over many whose interests conflicted with the West.

We believe Russia will ultimately choose the first option, and participate in regional international frameworks to sustain forward presence. We believe this offers the best political options to Russia as a reemerging super power. Should that happen, it will be a positive development for the US Navy, but may not be popular among those who frame policy.

As an outsider, Russia would not sit at the table and would not be in a position to influence the larger international community in the same way they will if they sit at the same table. As a participant, Russia becomes an involved partner, while at the same time an alternative to United States policy in the broader international discussion towards managing challenges to the global system. Such an arrangement would allow Russia to emerge as both a participant with and alternative to the United States as the Russian Navy grows, and this arrangement would be particularly influential with Europe who does not always agree with US policy.

It will be interesting to observe what approach Russia takes with its fleet. The choices made will be an early sign regarding the type of relationship the US and Russia will have during the rebuilding phase of the Russian Fleet soon to begin.