Navy May Need a Plan B For USS Enterprise

We have previously discussed what we consider a big issue in the Fy2009 budget facing Congress and the Navy in regards to the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Basically the Navy is looking for permission to reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 10 (which would actually only be 9 due to nuclear refueling) for a total of 33 months from November 2012 until the delivery of the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) in September 2015. We haven't seen any evidence the Senate even addressed the issue with their markup, although we also haven't seen much beyond the summary. The House, led by House Armed Services’ Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor (D-Miss.), has strong opinions on the issue.

Last week, House Armed Services’ Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) affirmed that he does not plan to include language in the FY 2009 defense authorization bill that would allow the Navy to reduce the aircraft carrier fleet below the current legal requirement of 11 carriers. According to Taylor, the Navy has a “responsibility” to fund 11 ships. With the USS Gerald R. Ford joining the fleet in 2015, the Navy has argued that the $2.2 billion it would cost to keep the aging USS Enterprise operational from 2012-2015—thus maintaining the 11 career requirement—is not worth the cost.

While we consistently see Congress tell the bean counters in the US Air Force to deal with it regarding their heavy lift aircraft, basically telling the USAF heavy lift is a national interest worth the costs, it has been awhile since we last saw Congress give these type of instructions to the Navy. Usually the bean counters in the services win these fights, or at least they became comfortable winning these fights when the Republicans were in control.

Whether you agree or disagree with the decision, what we see happening in these debates is Congress participating in the definition of what constitutes a military priority toward the national interest. The critics attempt to claim that Congress is simply making these decisions for political gain and for purposes of pork, but that is a difficult argument intellectually. Is Congressional protection of the C-17s and C-5s really simply been a matter of pork? The USAF argument is that F-22s are more important because of reduced numbers of fighter aircraft. We have sided with Congress on this issue in the past, the value of C-17s and C-5s are unfairly balanced against the F-22 in our opinion, both are critical, but what we see the problem isn't the importance Congress puts on strategic airlift, rather the strategy of the air force to build fighters at the expense of strategic airlift.

The same criticism is being leveled at Congress over the aircraft carriers. Basically, it is claimed that Congress wouldn't allow the Navy to reduce the number of aircraft carriers to 10 for nearly 3 years for reasons of Congressional pork. The problems with this argument are many, beginning with there is no certainty the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) will be ready by September 2015. Additionally, the Navy doesn't have any alternatives for taking aviation to sea with the LHA(R)s being built during that time specific for the Sea Base plan, not as an alternative for naval aviation. Furthermore it was a big deal to reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 12 to 11 with the early retirement of the John F Kennedy, and at that time the Navy assured Congress many times there would be no drop below 11. In order to accuse Congress of making a decision based on pork promises, one would have to make the argument that aircraft carriers are not important to the national interest, which is an argument the Navy wouldn't even make.

We don't know how many aircraft carriers are appropriate for the Navy, and have never seen a study released publicly to examine for an independent conclusion, but we do note there was a major study prior to the development of the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) to evaluate what the next aircraft carrier should be. A number of metrics were measured, like big or small, new design or an evolved design, and many other factors. That study concluded the Navy would get the most bang for the buck with a big carrier of an evolved design from the Nimitz class which is what the Ford class represents. It has also been suggested that because the Ford class doesn't require a nuclear refueling, at that time the Navy could reduce the number of carriers to ten, a build rate of one every 5 years, and sustain aircraft carrier construction and costs indefinitely without loss of capability.

It looks to us like the Navy needs a Plan B for the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) if retirement is not an option. We have stated in the past, long before this debate hit Congress, that instead of looking for permission to retire the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) early, the Navy should ask for funds to convert the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) into a Sea Basing aviation evaluation platform. We think Sea Basing should start bottom-up, meaning build requirements at the low end and work up towards higher requirements like the 2 MEB benchmark. We say this because while we don't hear about it often, the Sea Basing concepts as is clearly still have problems. The biggest problem is aviation for Sea Basing, the current Sea Basing concept steals aviation amphibious ships that can do assault just meet the highest, least likely requirement that doesn't meet the assault requirement. This high requirement is the problem, and as is obvious to everyone but the Navy and Marines, Joint Sea Basing as a complete strategic concept will be at least as difficult to do as naval aviation was, why not start with a Langley approach to Sea Basing, instead of skipping straight to Nimitz capability out of the gate?

The USS Enterprise (CVN 65) offers an excellent platform to examine alternatives for high end Marine aviation requirements for Sea Basing, but additionally a CVN offers other options to examine as well. What is the value of a nuclear reactor for providing water to a Sea Base? What is the value of a large deck alternative, potentially a commercial design, for the Sea Basing concept? There are dozens of questions like this. Instead of spending $2.2 to keep a ship operating like a current aircraft carrier, why not spend much less and use the ship to help define future aviation requirements for strategic sea basing for "Joint" services support.

Because here is the question we believe could make significant impact towards a "Joint Sea Basing" strategic approach. With a dedicated USS Enterprise (CVN 65), what modifications would be necessary and what other assets would be necessary to fully deploy the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division? Seems to me testing that capability would be worth the investment that would cost less than the $2.2 billion required to keep the Enterprise in service for 3 years.